fatman17
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Pakistans nuclear facilities said to be secure from attack
* Stimson Centre report notes attack on installations not attractive prospect for terrorists
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: The controls and security measures around various nuclear installations and radiation facilities in Pakistan are enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack, and any such attempt would be detected in the early stages, according to a paper released this week by US-based independent thinktank the Stimson Centre.
The finding is part of a brief study by Mohammad Saleem Zafar, who was a visiting fellow from the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) to Stimson last year. He claims that a sabotage act on a nuclear installation is not very attractive to a terrorist group in general and specifically within the context of Pakistan. He lists Pakistans response to nuclear terrorism and improvements needed to manage such emergencies.
He argues that advances in the knowledge of science and technology and their accessibility to terrorists have made the threat of nuclear terrorism no longer fiction, but reality with their intention to inflict catastrophic damage on man, environment, and property. However, in the presence of multiple safety and physical barriers, the probability of nuclear terrorism on research reactors is very low. Even after a successful sabotage act on a nuclear research reactor, the extent of damage both to the public and the environment will depend upon the mode of attack, the quantity of radioactivity released, the movement of radioactive material through the atmosphere and its uptake by the human body, weather conditions, time of attack, the efficiency of countermeasures put in place to protect the public from radiation and other factors.
Zafar writes that, were such an attack to take place, it is suspected that there will be widespread environmental contamination. Difficulties are likely to arise in informing members of the public in the surrounding rural areas where individuals may be unaware of the incident and who, scattered about the countryside, may be difficult to locate and advise in time. However, the people living in an urban area would be informed to restrain themselves at home in order to get themselves away from the harmful effects of radiation. All exposed individuals would need to be monitored for health outcomes over their lifetimes, especially those that suffer internal contamination. Massive decontamination efforts would be needed for recovery and if decontamination remains unsatisfactory, institutional controls would become essential.
The controls around various nuclear installations and radiation facilities in Pakistan are enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack and any malicious diversion would be detected in early stages.
* Stimson Centre report notes attack on installations not attractive prospect for terrorists
By Khalid Hasan
WASHINGTON: The controls and security measures around various nuclear installations and radiation facilities in Pakistan are enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack, and any such attempt would be detected in the early stages, according to a paper released this week by US-based independent thinktank the Stimson Centre.
The finding is part of a brief study by Mohammad Saleem Zafar, who was a visiting fellow from the Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA) to Stimson last year. He claims that a sabotage act on a nuclear installation is not very attractive to a terrorist group in general and specifically within the context of Pakistan. He lists Pakistans response to nuclear terrorism and improvements needed to manage such emergencies.
He argues that advances in the knowledge of science and technology and their accessibility to terrorists have made the threat of nuclear terrorism no longer fiction, but reality with their intention to inflict catastrophic damage on man, environment, and property. However, in the presence of multiple safety and physical barriers, the probability of nuclear terrorism on research reactors is very low. Even after a successful sabotage act on a nuclear research reactor, the extent of damage both to the public and the environment will depend upon the mode of attack, the quantity of radioactivity released, the movement of radioactive material through the atmosphere and its uptake by the human body, weather conditions, time of attack, the efficiency of countermeasures put in place to protect the public from radiation and other factors.
Zafar writes that, were such an attack to take place, it is suspected that there will be widespread environmental contamination. Difficulties are likely to arise in informing members of the public in the surrounding rural areas where individuals may be unaware of the incident and who, scattered about the countryside, may be difficult to locate and advise in time. However, the people living in an urban area would be informed to restrain themselves at home in order to get themselves away from the harmful effects of radiation. All exposed individuals would need to be monitored for health outcomes over their lifetimes, especially those that suffer internal contamination. Massive decontamination efforts would be needed for recovery and if decontamination remains unsatisfactory, institutional controls would become essential.
The controls around various nuclear installations and radiation facilities in Pakistan are enough to deter and delay a terrorist attack and any malicious diversion would be detected in early stages.
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