To perform those tasks well would probably be expected by a Cruiser/AAW Destroyer instead of on a 4000-tonnes general-purpose Frigate with median-range AAW abilities...
Sure, live-fire exercise (LFX) + training rounds can be deployed, but they usually are aimed at the other way around, at drones/small boats/target ships/decommissioned ships from the newly-acquired frigate; you just don't fire directly at a brand-new just-commissioned ship, no matter how "special" your magic ammos/missiles are supposed to be. That's just ludicrous!
Anyway, the ship's crew has yet to fully master her capabilities; being inducted into service does not mean the ship has reached the Initial operating capability (IOC), let alone full operating capability (FOC). There are months/years ahead before you even attempt to put a ship into such intense combat (simulated) situation.
I remember what happened to HMS Sheffield. As I was a great fan of the ship and the adverts for the navy was it can do this and it can do that: fight ships, aircrafts and submarines at the same time. My heart sank when Sheffield was sunk by a few third world planes and Exocet missiles. We need to learn the lessons
To perform those tasks well would probably be expected by a Cruiser/AAW Destroyer instead of on a 4000-tonnes general-purpose Frigate with median-range AAW abilities...
Sure, live-fire exercise (LFX) + training rounds can be deployed, but they usually are aimed at the other way around, at drones/small boats/target ships/decommissioned ships from the newly-acquired frigate; you just don't fire directly at a brand-new just-commissioned ship, no matter how "special" your magic ammos/missiles are supposed to be. That's just ludicrous!
Anyway, the ship's crew has yet to fully master her capabilities; being inducted into service does not mean the ship has reached the Initial operating capability (IOC), let alone full operating capability (FOC). There are months/years ahead before you even attempt to put a ship into such intense combat (simulated) situation.
I was thinking more of learning from HMS Sheffield tragedy :-
en.wikipedia.org
Sinking[edit]
Argentinean attack[edit]
Argentine Navy
Dassault-Breguet Super Étendard.
Sheffield was first detected by an
Argentine Naval Aviation Lockheed SP-2H Neptune (2-P-112) patrol aircraft at 07:50 on 4 May 1982. The Neptune kept the British ships under surveillance, verifying
Sheffield'
s position again at 08:14 and 08:43. Two
Argentine Navy Super Étendards, both armed with
AM39 Exocets, took off from
Río Grande naval air base at 09:45 and met with an
Argentine Air Force KC-130H Hercules tanker to refuel at 10:00. The two aircraft were 3-A-202, piloted by mission commander
Capitán de Fragata (Commander)
Augusto Bedacarratz, and 3-A-203, piloted by
Teniente (Lieutenant) Armando Mayora.
[13]
In the two weeks leading up to the attack, Argentinian pilots had been practising tactics against their own ships, including Type 42 destroyers of the same class as
Sheffield, and therefore knew the radar horizon, detection distances, and reaction times of the ship radar, as well as the optimal procedure to programme the Exocet missile for a successful attack profile.
[14] The technique they used is known colloquially as "Pecking the Lobes", in reference to the aircraft probing the
side lobes of the emitting radar using the
Radar warning receiver. The aircraft can avoid detection by avoiding the
Main lobe of the emitting radar.
At 10:35, the Neptune climbed to 1,170 metres (3,840 ft) and detected one large and two medium-sized contacts. A few minutes later, the Neptune updated the Super Étendards with the positions. Flying at very low altitude, at approximately 10:50 both Super Étendards climbed to 160 metres (520 ft) to verify these contacts, but failed to locate them and returned to low altitude. They later climbed again and after a few seconds of scanning, the targets appeared on their radar screens.
[15][16]
Both pilots loaded the coordinates into their weapons systems, returned to low level, and after last minute checks, each launched an AM39 Exocet missile at 11:04 while 20 to 30 miles (32 to 48 km) away from their targets. The Super Étendards did not need to refuel again from the KC-130, which had been waiting, and landed at Río Grande at 12:04.
Supporting the mission were an Argentine Air Force
Learjet 35 as a decoy and two
IAI Daggers as the KC-130 escorts.
[15][16]
On Sheffield[edit]
At approximately 10:00 on 4 May,
Sheffield was at defence watches (second degree readiness), the southernmost of three Type 42 destroyers (the others being
HMS Glasgow and
Coventry) operating as a forward anti-aircraft picket 18 to 30 miles (29 to 48 km) to the west of the main task force which were south-east of the Falklands. The weather was fair and the sea calm with a 2-metre swell.
HMS Invincible which was with the main task force was responsible for Anti-Air Warfare Coordination (AAWC).
Sheffield had relieved her
sister ship Coventry as the latter was having technical trouble with her
Type 965 radar.
[17]
Prior to the attack,
Sheffield's radar operators had been experiencing difficulty distinguishing
Mirage and Super Étendard aircraft, and the destroyer may have lacked effective
IFF or
radar jamming.
[18] Despite intelligence briefings that identified an Exocet attack by Super Étendards as possible,
Sheffield had assessed the Exocet threat as overrated for the previous two days, and disregarded another as a false alarm.
As the Type 965 could not detect low-flying aircraft, the two incoming enemy aircraft were not detected flying at 98 feet (30 m).
[19] The two planes were detected at a distance of only 40 nautical miles (74 km) by the UAA1, a
radar warning receiver. This was then confirmed by the 965M long range aircraft warning radar of
Glasgow when the aircraft popped up to 120 feet (37 m) above sea-level for a radar check at 45 nautical miles (83 km).
[20] The
Glasgow immediately went to action stations, and communicated the warning codeword 'Handbrake' by
UHF and
HF to all task force ships. The radar contacts were also seen by
Invincible, which directed
Sea Harriers on combat patrol to investigate, but they detected nothing. The AAWC on
Invincible declared the radar contacts as false and left the Air Warning at yellow, instead of raising it to red.
[3]
In response to
Glasgow's warning, an order to stand to was issued to the crews of the 4.5 inch gun, Sea Dart and 20 mm guns. The aircraft were detected on the forward Type 909 radar but not on the aft set.
[3] Sheffield's UAA1 sensor was then blocked by an unauthorised transmission by the ship's satellite communications systems (SCOT). No information was received via data link from
Glasgow. Seven seconds later, the first Exocet missile was fired, in response to which
Glasgow fired its chaff. Onboard
Sheffield, it was not until smoke from the missile was sighted by lookouts that the crew realised they were under attack. The bridge officers did not call the captain to the bridge, made no call to
action stations, made no evasive measures, and made no effort to prepare the 4.5-inch gun, the Sea Dart missiles, or order chaff to be fired.
[11][10] The antiair warfare officer was called to the operations room by the principal warfare officer, arriving just before the first missile hit.
Two Exocets had been launched, the second missile being sighted by
Yarmouth and missing
Sheffield, splashing into the sea 0.5 miles (0.43 nmi) off her
port beam.
[21] The Exocet that struck
Sheffield hit her on the starboard side at deck level 2, travelling through the junior ratings' scullery and breaching the Forward Auxiliary Machinery Room/Forward Engine Room bulkhead 2.4 metres (7.9 ft) above the waterline, creating a hole in the hull roughly 1.2 metres (3.9 ft) by 3 metres (9.8 ft). Contemporary accounts suggested that the missile failed to explode, despite disabling the ship's electrical distribution systems and breaching the pressurised sea water fire main. The damage to the fire system severely hampered any firefighting response and eventually doomed the ship to be consumed by the fire.
[22]
At the time of the hit, the captain was off duty in his cabin after having previously visited the operations room, while
Sheffield's anti-air warfare officer (AAWO) was in the wardroom chatting to the stewards and his assistant was in the heads.
[3] Sheffield and
Coventry were chatting over UHF and communications ceased until an unidentified message was heard flatly stating, "Sheffield is hit."
[17]
Response[edit]
Burning
Sheffield
The flagship,
HMS Hermes, dispatched the escorts
Arrow and
Yarmouth to investigate, and a helicopter was launched. Confusion reigned until
Sheffield's Lynx helicopter unexpectedly landed aboard
Hermes carrying the air operations officer and operations officer,
[17] confirming the strike.
With the main fire fighting systems out of action due to the loss of the fire main the crew were reduced to fighting the fire using portable electrically powered pumps and buckets. The control of firefighting lacked cohesion and was uncoordinated with no emergency HQ being established, while crew members were unclear as to where Command was located.
Arrow and
Yarmouth assisted in fighting the fire from the outside (to little effect) by stationing themselves to port and starboard respectively.
[3]
The crew of
Sheffield fought for almost four hours to save the ship before Captain Salt made the decision to abandon ship due to the risk of fires igniting the Sea Dart magazine, the loss of the combat capability of the destroyer, and the exposed position to air attack of
Arrow and
Yarmouth. Most of the
Sheffield'
s crew climbed over onto
Arrow, a few transferred by Gemini RHIB to
Yarmouth, while some were taken by helicopter to
Hermes.
[3] As
Sheffield'
s crew departed in
Arrow, Sub-lieutenant Carrington-Wood led the crew in singing "
Always Look on the Bright Side of Life" from
Monty Python's Life of Brian.
[23][24]
Over the next six days from 4 May 1982, as the ship drifted, five inspections were made to see if any equipment was worth salvaging. Orders were issued to shore up the hole in
Sheffield's starboard side and tow the ship to
South Georgia.
[11] Before these orders were issued, the burnt-out hulk had already been taken under tow by
Yarmouth. The high seas that the ship was towed through caused slow flooding through the hole in the ship's side, causing a list to starboard and which eventually caused
Sheffield to roll over and sink on the edge of the Total Exclusion Zone in 1,000 fathoms (6,000 ft; 1,800 m) of water at
53°04′S 56°56′W on 10 May 1982, the first Royal Navy vessel sunk in action since
World War II.
[25]
