Most people believe that during 1965; the Rann of Kutch Indian military debacle followed by Pakistan's aimless incursions into Kashmir; originally opposed in 1964 by the Army CinC (as told to me by a reliable source who does not wish his name to be disclosed), led to a full scale war in the plains of Punjab. It included the largest tank battle which had taken place till then, this side of the WW II. The outcome of the 1965 war, consisting mainly of costly military manoeuvring by both sides, was however a stalemate. Finally, both sides heaved a sigh of relief when the UN sponsored cease-fire came through. It was a victory for neither country. On the contrary, the pride of the Indian Military leadership was badly dented by its failure to effectively utilise the massive forces available to it. Simultaneously, the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was sadly tarnished when it failed to exploit a break through across the river Ravi.
Two naval myths, too, got generated at that time. That the whole of the Indian Navy was bottled up in harbour because of the presence of a single Pakistani submarine at sea. And, the Indian Naval expansion during the seventies and eighties was a reaction to the Pakistan Navy's bombardment of Dwarka. The real facts, however, were that almost seventy five percent of the Indian Navy was caught under maintenance in harbour after an intensive three months anti-submarine work up with a British submarine in the Bay of Bengal. And, for the second, that the post 1965, IN build up was part of the Indian Defence Plan, drawn out earlier, to prevent the recurrence of any military threat to India from seaward similar to one which had allowed Hindoosthan to be enslaved by the Europeans in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Pakistan And Its Three Wars - 1
Actually you are quite right about the facts that you have described there.
Now let me flesh out details for you some-what. In the IN of that time, the Fleet (there was only ONE Fleet with only one FOCIF- Flag Officer CinC Indian Fleet) routinely was out of Bombay at that time of the year for exercises. Most ships in the fleet then were a knackered bunch esp. the Hunt class Destroyers (the original Godavaris) and the R-Class (the original Rajput Class). Most of the problems were with the propulsion esp the Boilers and in one case the turbines. This coupled with the fact that spares were generally not "off the shelf" but were indented from the Admiralty i.e. RN on "as required basis". And everything (right down to paint-pails) had to be AP (Admiralty Pattern). Plus the Admiralty itself was grappling with limited inventory (one of the effects of post-war) austerity. The IN had some new Ships in the Fleet, the K-Class and T-Class Frigates, but the new Brahmaputra Class (Leopard Class) Frigates were the first Diesel Engined "Largish Ships" in the IN, which had perennial cooling water problems in Tropical conditions ( till they were rectified by local modifications). But the old war-horse Cruiser INS Mysore was still a force to reckon with. The rest of the Fleet post-summer exercises need maintenance.
About INS Vikrant; she was slated for a long refit (which was planned), and had been dry-docked in the Cruiser Graving Dock in ND Bombay. The Graving Dock had been modified to accommodate her and the Cranage on Quayside was upgraded. IIRC the ASD then was R/Adm. P.K.Mukherji who later helmed MDL for some time. Vikrant's Steam Cat had been dissasembled completely and the Boilers opened up for re-tubing apart from major work to be undertaken on the condensors and pumps. Her Air-Wing was shifted to Dabolim and later part of it to Jamnagar. So Vikrant was out of the game before hostilities commenced. That was the situation when the conflict opened up. While in D/Dock I remember walking on her Flight Deck and Hangar Deck (as a guest of one of the then Flight Commanders) who was retained on board as part of the skeleton crew to oversee the refit. And having a "soft drink" (tomato juice, since I was'nt yet adult) in the Officers Wardroom, while my father had his usual whisky! Of course that was not my last visit to her Wardroom, nor my last drink there.
The last time that I crossed her Gangway and saluted the Quarter-deck was about eight years ago as she lay afloat moored as a Museum Ship. But that digresses.
Now about the IN's role in the 65 conflict: the IN was not mandated any agressive role. Rather after V/Adm. Soman (then CNS) promulgated an 'Order of the Day' on commencement of hostilities, he was asked to rescind it and then was issued an Instruction resticting the IN from operating North of a certain latitude in the vicinity of Porbandar. Rather the IN was specifically tasked with patrolling around the A & N archipelago, since Indonesia had been showing signs of moving in to that area. And that conflict would have afforded an excellent opportunity to do so. The upshot of all this was that though V/Adm. Soman was then Chairman of COSC of the three Services, he did not chair any of the proceedings and recused in favor of Gen. J.N. Chaudhuri. And I doubt whether he had any role in the decisions emanating from there. Not for nothing was the IN "pi$$ed off" with the state of affairs.
Now about the raid on Dwarka itself, an Uncle of mine was then a GM with ACC which owned and operated the Cement factory there apart from one at Porbandar. While he held responsibilities for both, he lived at Dwarka. I remember hearing the stories from my Aunt (a great
raconteaur) about the raid which brought some excitement into their lives in a sleepy little town with some fire-works, accoustic effects and little damage.
BTW, an aside; Most of the shells (if not all) and certainly all of the 6-inch shells fired by PNS Babur's main armament had originated from Indian Ordnance Factories. At the time of apportioning the ammo post-partition, great care had been taken to check on the 'material state' of the ammo prior transfer. Later evidence at time the raid suggests that most of them had turned up "dud"!!! Which turned up as a bonanza of brass scrap for the farmers of Dwarka.
Similar for the RIN sloop HMIS Narbudda which for some time served as the Flag-Ship of PN.
Post Script/addendum:
Dwarka had some nuisance value and little else.
Post Dwarka, PN even made the claim of having sunk INS Brahmaputra (the Leopard class frigate). The then FOCIF, R/Adm. B.A. Samson lined up all the three Leopards in Bombay anchorage and invited the foreign press and defence attaches to take a tour of a "sunken ship".
Maybe something similar may be done at Kamra/Minhas now.
The growth of the IN post 1965 was due to the fact that 1965 was a conflict where both adversaries eventually became susceptible to the embargo imposed on both of them and that hit home to the planners in the MoD. Then Adm. A.K. Chatterjee took over as CNS after V/Adm. Soman. Earlier as Director of Plans in 1948-49, he had forethought this issue while drawing up the expansion plans for the nascent IN. Unfortunately India's then leaders scarcely had any maritime vision, of course even if they had; resources were scarce. So the expansion plan remained in some dusty files. When Adm. Adhar Chatterjee came in as CNS (after a stint as Commdt. NDC) he was able to make a good case again for the IN to get some attention. Of course, there arose the question of source of equipment? Britain under (American pressure) had proved to be a niggardly fickle-minded source. Fortunately that period coincided with renewed Soviet interest in the region to counter-balance the American influence. So they made India some offers that India could not refuse (not Don Corleone style!
) A vast range of equipment at very attractive terms. Hence the ships that came in then were known as Project AK (Adhar Kumar) ships. That then led to the zenith of Soviet strategic and political influence in the region.
While for the IN there was really no looking back after that.
