Pakistan has more nuclear warheads than India: report

[Viny]

It actually makes alot of sense ... since India has a large stock pile of fissile material but not making warheads out of them meaning they are not having reliable warhead designs and are waiting for next test..

They don't want to put precious fissile material in faulty warheads that than would be difficult to dismantle

Tell me what would india do with more than 100 nuclear warheads?
Why to waste resources unnecessarily, we have huge civil nuclear plans workings on which needs material. Please read about thorium cycle and need of fissile material. Our nuclear program in regard to same has been very clear and we knew India will be building stock of fissile material in second stage to start 3rd stage.
This might help you https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India's_three-stage_nuclear_power_programme

 

[Chhatrapati]

Tell me what would india do with more than 100 nuclear warheads?
Why to waste resources unnecessarily, we have huge civil nuclear plans workings on which needs material. Please read about thorium cycle and need of fissile material. Our nuclear program in regard to same has been very clear and we knew India will be building stock of fissile material in second stage to start 3rd stage.
This might help you https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India's_three-stage_nuclear_power_programme

You are in the feel-good thread stating facts. Somebody give this guy a negative rating.

 

[Mrc]

Tell me what would india do with more than 100 nuclear warheads?
Why to waste resources unnecessarily, we have huge civil nuclear plans workings on which needs material. Please read about thorium cycle and need of fissile material. Our nuclear program in regard to same has been very clear and we knew India will be building stock of fissile material in second stage to start 3rd stage.
This might help you https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India's_three-stage_nuclear_power_programme

Military and civilian use enrichment is of different percentage...

U guys have a large stock pile of military grade enrichment but few warheads and we are just wondering why??

After all what's the use of military grade enrichment if you are not going to make warheads??? NONE

 

[Viny]

Military and civilian use enrichment is of different percentage...

U guys have a large stock pile of military grade enrichment but few warheads and we are just wondering why??

After all what's the use of military grade enrichment if you are not going to make warheads??? NONE

Weapons-grade uranium has over 90% U-235 (the fissile isotope). Weapons-grade plutonium has over 93% Pu-239 and can be used, like reactor-grade plutonium, in fuel for electricity production.

There are 100s of Civil nuclear facilities that run on weapon grade HEU. Both US and Russia have been doing same too.

 

[Mrc]

Weapons-grade uranium has over 90% U-235 (the fissile isotope). Weapons-grade plutonium has over 93% Pu-239 and can be used, like reactor-grade plutonium, in fuel for electricity production.

There are 100s of Civil nuclear facilities that run on weapon grade HEU. Both US and Russia have been doing same too.

Is India doing it??

 

[PAKISTANFOREVER]

AFP
June 19, 2018
Pakistan has more nuclear warheads than India: report


Listen

STOCKHOLM: Pakistan now has 140-150 nuclear warheads as compared to 130-140 of India, with China hovering around 280, as per the latest report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which was released on Monday.

According the report, the world’s nuclear powers are reducing their arsenals but they are also modernising, putting a fresh and "worrying" focus on strategic deterrence.

"The renewed focus on the strategic importance of nuclear deterrence and capacity is a very worrying trend," the SIPRI said.

"The world needs a clear commitment from the nuclear weapon states to an effective, legally binding process towards nuclear disarmament," SIPRI head Jan Eliasson said.

SIPRI, a well respected authority, said nine countries -- the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea -- had 14,465 nuclear warheads at the beginning of this year, of which 3,750 were actually deployed.

This compared with 14,935 warheads at the start of 2017, SIPRI said, with the reduction largely due to the United States and Russia as they fulfill arms control commitments agreed in their 2010 START treaty.

The two countries between them hold more some 92 percent of total warheads, SIPRI noted, and they both have long-term modernisation programmes in place.

Russia in particular has in recent years re-stated the importance of nuclear weapons to its strategic defence, sparking concerns in NATO that Moscow might be more willing to use them in a crisis.

At the same time, Britain with 215 warheads, France 300, China 280, India 130-140, Pakistan 140-150, Israel 80 and North Korea 10-20, were all either deploying or planning to deploy new nuclear weapons system, it said.

"North Korea also demonstrated unexpected rapid progress in the testing of two new types of long-range ballistic missile delivery systems," it noted.

Explains why a nation that is more than 7x bigger than Pakistan and has abundant access to the world's most advanced weapons systems whilst we are denied this privilege, remains far too weak, powerless and incapable of fighting Pakistan. Even though they have an intensely obsessive hatred towards the Pakistani nation and race. Makes sense.

 

[Viny]

Is India doing it??

Not in totality.
Indian storage of fissile material is not completely weapon grade HEU.
Nor india is aggressively pushing for it. We have ample material available for weapons. We are now more focused on research part. You must have seen we have put up alternate routes to reach faster to 3rd stage of nuclear policy.

 

[LeGenD]

A Pakistani nuclear expert pointed out that these kind of estimates are subject to exaggerations in order to cast Pakistani nuclear program in a negative light.

"So much agreement exists around incorrect estimates of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal because of a paucity of primary source data. Most estimates rely on a few common sources, such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, periodic reports by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbooks, assessments by the Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), and occasional reports by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). These reports in turn rely on each other to corroborate their evaluations, which means that the same data are recycled repeatedly. The appearance of broad consensus comes from circular corroboration, not repeated independent verification. The resulting consensus picture shows Pakistan as a state obsessed with building as many nuclear weapons as it can in as short a time as possible, totally oblivious to the deleterious effects of such an undertaking on its economic health and the regional security environment. This picture, though inaccurate, affirms the suspicion with which Western observers have viewed Pakistan’s nuclear program since its inception. The Pakistani military’s predominant role in the management of the Pakistani nuclear program leads these same observers to perceive the Pakistani nuclear program as overly militaristic and aggressive in nature, while at the same time trusting that India’s program is moving at a leisurely pace, and that its growth is justifiable in light of the twin threat from China and Pakistan. Most observers tend to discount the weaponization potential of India’s enriched uranium stockpiles, which are simply put aside as fuel for India’s nuclear-powered submarines. They even fail to take into account reports emerging since 2012 about the construction of a large enrichment facility in Karnataka that would considerably increase India’s enriched uranium production capability and, in turn, its weapons fabrication capacity. The reality of Pakistan’s nuclear posture is quite different from this consensus perception."

Link: https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-force-structure-in-2025-pub-63912

Pakistan have the capacity to develop 2 nuclear weapons per year, at most.

 

[jetray]

Will, huh??? Why are you guys always in a mood of speculation ? Then make your blatant claim (read lie) once they announce.

no facts only pure bakwas.

 

[YeBeWarned]

we have enough to keep Indian at bay ..

 

[Mrc]

Pakistan have the capacity to develop 2 nuclear weapons per year, at most.

Pakistan has 8 nuclear reactors 4 at khushab 4 at kakuta. ..kindly reasses

 

[El Sidd]

A Pakistani nuclear expert pointed out that these kind of estimates are subject to exaggerations in order to cast Pakistani nuclear program in a negative light.

"So much agreement exists around incorrect estimates of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal because of a paucity of primary source data. Most estimates rely on a few common sources, such as the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, periodic reports by the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM), the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) yearbooks, assessments by the Institute of Science and International Security (ISIS), and occasional reports by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) and the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). These reports in turn rely on each other to corroborate their evaluations, which means that the same data are recycled repeatedly. The appearance of broad consensus comes from circular corroboration, not repeated independent verification. The resulting consensus picture shows Pakistan as a state obsessed with building as many nuclear weapons as it can in as short a time as possible, totally oblivious to the deleterious effects of such an undertaking on its economic health and the regional security environment. This picture, though inaccurate, affirms the suspicion with which Western observers have viewed Pakistan’s nuclear program since its inception. The Pakistani military’s predominant role in the management of the Pakistani nuclear program leads these same observers to perceive the Pakistani nuclear program as overly militaristic and aggressive in nature, while at the same time trusting that India’s program is moving at a leisurely pace, and that its growth is justifiable in light of the twin threat from China and Pakistan. Most observers tend to discount the weaponization potential of India’s enriched uranium stockpiles, which are simply put aside as fuel for India’s nuclear-powered submarines. They even fail to take into account reports emerging since 2012 about the construction of a large enrichment facility in Karnataka that would considerably increase India’s enriched uranium production capability and, in turn, its weapons fabrication capacity. The reality of Pakistan’s nuclear posture is quite different from this consensus perception."

Link: https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-force-structure-in-2025-pub-63912

Pakistan have the capacity to develop 2 nuclear weapons per year, at most.

Its a known fact.

I think this News should be read with indian Terrorist Declaration by the CIA.

With recent complete disregard of the Indian Armys to the Centers request to halt operations in kashmir.

There is a rogue Army rising in the east of Pakistan. Pakistan will use her Limited capability of nuclear deterrence if a rogue Army led by fascist government with links to terror Organisation embarks on any misadevnture.

 

[LeGenD]

Pakistan has 8 nuclear reactors 4 at khushab 4 at kakuta. ..kindly reasses

FYI:

"Even the most professionally calculated quantities of fissile material make estimates based mainly on the capacities of the production facilities in the two countries, and are forced to make assumptions about many functional parameters. For instance, a 50-megawatt plutonium production reactor working at 100 percent capacity can produce 18.25 kilograms of plutonium per year. However, these plants normally run at a much lower capacity, and most calculations use a baseline of between 60 percent and 70 percent capacity. Running at this capacity, a 50-megawatt plant will produce around 11 to 13 kilograms per year, assuming that it can maintain the same efficiency through the entire 365 days. In practice, however, the plants may run as low as 40 percent to 50 percent capacity, producing up to 7 to 9 kilograms per year. Moreover, the reactors cannot run 365 days per year. Reactors shut down for refueling and routinely face technical snags, which are not accounted for in existing calculations. Calculating HEU production is even more complicated because analysts must guess the actual number of centrifuges in a particular plant, the enrichment capacity of each centrifuge (which is dependent on the diameter and height of each machine), the quality of the feed material, and whether the rotor is made of aluminum, maraging steel, or carbon fiber. None of these factors can be accurately estimated without intrusive inspections.24 Finally, it is hard to estimate what proportion of each country’s fissile material has been fabricated into warheads and what proportion is still being processed, or is being kept as reserve for future eventualities, including conversion into more weapon cores.

The amount of fissile material needed for a warhead is also a variable, dependent on the sophistication of weapon designs. The amount of fissile material per warhead that a given study assumes has a direct bearing on the bottom-line result for the estimated arsenal size that that study will find. For instance, the Global Fissile Material Report (GFMR) estimates that Pakistan currently possesses 170 kilograms of plutonium. If the GFMR assumed that Pakistan needed 6 kilograms of plutonium per weapon instead of 4 kilograms, it would make a significant difference in their final estimate; with 4 kilograms per warhead, the estimate would be 42 warheads, but with 6 kilograms per warhead, the estimate would drop to 28. The same clearly holds for HEU warheads; whether a Pakistani HEU-based warhead requires 15, 20, or 25 kilograms of HEU drastically changes the potential size of Pakistan’s arsenal. Compared to the thousands of nuclear tests conducted by great powers during the Cold War, India and Pakistan have only conducted six tests each. Neither has enough data to develop highly sophisticated weapon designs requiring lesser amounts of fissile material. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the estimated size of Indian or Pakistani arsenals comport with reality. Another problem is that these studies, while categorizing India’s entire substantial stockpile of HEU as potential fuel for India’s nuclear-powered submarines, do not address Pakistan’s future HEU needs for naval propulsion. Pakistan is striving to develop the naval leg of its nuclear triad, which would ultimately include naval vessels propelled by nuclear fuel.

Leaving aside all the above-mentioned problems with methods for estimating nuclear arsenal sizes, data available from some of the more credible and widely quoted sources suggest that characterizing Pakistan’s nuclear force as the fastest growing arsenal in the world is totally unjustified.25 Data from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, SIPRI, and the GFMR clearly show that between 2007 and 2015, India and Pakistan’s arsenals grew at exactly the same number of warheads per year (see Tables 1–3). This alone should suffice to debunk the myth of the fastest growing arsenal in the world."

Link: https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-force-structure-in-2025-pub-63912

 

[Mrc]

Not in totality.
Indian storage of fissile material is not completely weapon grade HEU.
Nor india is aggressively pushing for it. We have ample material available for weapons. We are now more focused on research part. You must have seen we have put up alternate routes to reach faster to 3rd stage of nuclear policy.

Look both pak and indian programs are extremely secretive.... so it's just a guessing game...

But certainly questions have been raised on pokhran and indian nuclear posture..

isi even tried to take soil samples from pokhran once according to indian media to check for isotopes

FYI:

"Even the most professionally calculated quantities of fissile material make estimates based mainly on the capacities of the production facilities in the two countries, and are forced to make assumptions about many functional parameters. For instance, a 50-megawatt plutonium production reactor working at 100 percent capacity can produce 18.25 kilograms of plutonium per year. However, these plants normally run at a much lower capacity, and most calculations use a baseline of between 60 percent and 70 percent capacity. Running at this capacity, a 50-megawatt plant will produce around 11 to 13 kilograms per year, assuming that it can maintain the same efficiency through the entire 365 days. In practice, however, the plants may run as low as 40 percent to 50 percent capacity, producing up to 7 to 9 kilograms per year. Moreover, the reactors cannot run 365 days per year. Reactors shut down for refueling and routinely face technical snags, which are not accounted for in existing calculations. Calculating HEU production is even more complicated because analysts must guess the actual number of centrifuges in a particular plant, the enrichment capacity of each centrifuge (which is dependent on the diameter and height of each machine), the quality of the feed material, and whether the rotor is made of aluminum, maraging steel, or carbon fiber. None of these factors can be accurately estimated without intrusive inspections.24 Finally, it is hard to estimate what proportion of each country’s fissile material has been fabricated into warheads and what proportion is still being processed, or is being kept as reserve for future eventualities, including conversion into more weapon cores.

The amount of fissile material needed for a warhead is also a variable, dependent on the sophistication of weapon designs. The amount of fissile material per warhead that a given study assumes has a direct bearing on the bottom-line result for the estimated arsenal size that that study will find. For instance, the Global Fissile Material Report (GFMR) estimates that Pakistan currently possesses 170 kilograms of plutonium. If the GFMR assumed that Pakistan needed 6 kilograms of plutonium per weapon instead of 4 kilograms, it would make a significant difference in their final estimate; with 4 kilograms per warhead, the estimate would be 42 warheads, but with 6 kilograms per warhead, the estimate would drop to 28. The same clearly holds for HEU warheads; whether a Pakistani HEU-based warhead requires 15, 20, or 25 kilograms of HEU drastically changes the potential size of Pakistan’s arsenal. Compared to the thousands of nuclear tests conducted by great powers during the Cold War, India and Pakistan have only conducted six tests each. Neither has enough data to develop highly sophisticated weapon designs requiring lesser amounts of fissile material. It is, therefore, highly unlikely that the estimated size of Indian or Pakistani arsenals comport with reality. Another problem is that these studies, while categorizing India’s entire substantial stockpile of HEU as potential fuel for India’s nuclear-powered submarines, do not address Pakistan’s future HEU needs for naval propulsion. Pakistan is striving to develop the naval leg of its nuclear triad, which would ultimately include naval vessels propelled by nuclear fuel.

Leaving aside all the above-mentioned problems with methods for estimating nuclear arsenal sizes, data available from some of the more credible and widely quoted sources suggest that characterizing Pakistan’s nuclear force as the fastest growing arsenal in the world is totally unjustified.25 Data from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, SIPRI, and the GFMR clearly show that between 2007 and 2015, India and Pakistan’s arsenals grew at exactly the same number of warheads per year (see Tables 1–3). This alone should suffice to debunk the myth of the fastest growing arsenal in the world."

Link: https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/pakistan-s-nuclear-force-structure-in-2025-pub-63912

The guy commenting on expert reports here is called nadeem Salik and is not an expert him self...

Plus all he is saying is that he does not know and arguing neither does any one else... which is true

But even taking his worst estimates of 7 10 kg plutonium and presuming 4 kg per warhead .. each khushab plant is making 2 warheads per year.... since khushab alone has 4 plants I don't know how you calculated pakistan making 2 warheads per year

Looks to me more like 16 to 32 warheads per year... keeping in mind presumed capacities of kahuta and khushab

I m using figures given in your link as reference if u bothered to read them

 

[Trango Towers]

No.
India has more nuclear warheads.

India farts nukes