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An old article , makes relevant reading.
Pakistan and America: Till deaths us do part | The Economist
PAKISTANS deeply troubled relationship with America has survived so many intense provocations this year, it will probably also get over the latest bloody incident. Yet there is no guarantee. At 2am on November 26th helicoptersand perhaps other aircraftfrom NATO attacked a Pakistani border position in a remote corner of the Afghan frontier. The bloodiest single strike by NATO (read Americans) on the Pakistani army, it killed 24 soldiers and injured another 13.
A host of leaders from NATO and the United States were quick to admit to the attack, apologise for it and call it a dreadful accident. That was just as well. But for Pakistanis, especially, it will be hard to accept it was a mere blunder. In the past, firing in Pakistan by American forces inside Afghanistan, against Taliban or other forces fleeing there for sanctuary, has killed one or two soldiers on the border. This time, say the Pakistanis, two different buildings, 300 metres apart on two outcrops, were destroyed. The soldiers in each one, many of whom were said to have been sleeping, were 2.5km inside Pakistani territory, and the Americans reportedly had grid-references for these long-established army posts.
The two sides dispute whether there was much activity by Taliban fighters in the area which could have confused (or possibly helped to provoke) the forces which struck inside Pakistan. NATO described enemy activity on the ground, talked of a Taliban training camp in the area, and said the assault took place with permission from up the chain of command. That suggests the nature of the accident was merely (though still unforgivably) technical: to have mistaken the known Pakistani posts for Taliban positions. A darker possibility is that the NATO officers who made the decision to attack, perhaps deeply frustrated by many years of active Pakistani support for Taliban and other fighters who kill Western forces in Afghanistan, were negligent or deliberate in striking the Pakistani armed forces along with their Taliban targets.
What matters now is how the bloody episode is handled, especially by Pakistans armed forces and politicians. The immediate outrage expressed by every Pakistani leader is natural enough. Anti-Americanismmore precisely a hatred of their own countrys long involvement in what is seen as Americas war against Islamist extremist groupsis intense and widespread. Many in Pakistan have long been fiercely resentful of Americas role in their territory, angry at drone attacks against terrorist leaders that kill civilians too, and, for example, at the case of a CIA man who shot dead two would-be robbers in Lahore, in January. Even the discovery and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, in May, drew public anger (fanned by the media, which does much of the bidding of the armed forces) over Americas humiliating disregard for Pakistan's sovereignty.
If the latest killings stir up yet more intense public opposition to Americaa big rally on November 27th in Karachi suggested it mightthat could suit Pakistans various leaders. For a start it makes it easier for them to demand more American aid and assistance to justify prolonging a deeply unpopular working relationship. Just as useful, for Pakistans army, is that public anger against the Americans gives it an excuse to put off, yet again, a long-sought military intervention in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network (a violent force that has a sanctuary there, but is active in Afghanistan). Being seen to do the bidding of the Americans, Pakistani leaders can easily say, would be to court an unacceptable level of internal instability.
Pakistans leaders know the Americans are still deeply dependant on them. In the past few months NATOand especially the Americanshave done an impressive job of reducing their reliance on land transport corridors through Pakistan to supply Western soldiers in Afghanistan. Over the past 120 days, for example, of the materiel received by the Americans in Afghanistan, around 30% was flown in and 40% was driven over Afghanistans northern borders from Central Asia, leaving just 30% to come via Pakistan's roads. That is a sharp reduction on previous years. Thus the immediate and predictable closing of the Pakistan route, in response to the deaths on the border, should prove less disruptive than it once would have been.
But America relies on Pakistan in other ways. A military base, Shamsi, used by America inside Pakistan, apparently to launch drones, has been ordered closed within 15 days. That may be smoke and mirrors (it was quite possibly no longer used by the Americans anyway, after a previous clash), but is a sign of the sort of co-operation the Americans have quietly enjoyed on Pakistan's account as they hunted al-Qaeda and other extremist leaders whom Pakistan does not regard as allies. Intelligence co-operation (however flawed) from Pakistan, against individuals plotting attacks on the West will also continue to be crucial in the coming years. Keeping close tabs on Pakistans large (perhaps 100-warhead strong) and fast-growing nuclear arsenal is also a long-term priority for the Americans.
Yet America and Pakistan could decide it is better to wind down their relationship to something minimal. A strong cohort within the Pentagonespecially after attacks on Americas embassy in Kabul, in September, by fighters seen as allied with Pakistanhas been demanding direct American military intervention in North Waziristan, possibly including American soldiers on the ground, even if Pakistans government opposes the idea. Pakistan is blamed for NATO and Afghan army forces failure to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan, and for the Talibans refusal to consider peace talks. American lawmakers have also grown increasingly hostile over civilian and military aid to Pakistan, especially once it appeared that bin Laden had been harboured in Pakistan.
Within Pakistan, a breaking point could be near. One factor may be the rise of Imran Khan, a populist figure who makes a big deal of his opposition to America's role in the ongoing fighting. As important may be the rise of younger, more religious army officers who are instinctively more anti-American than previous generals. After a year of crises and confrontations, the relationship, though troubled, survives. But the moment when one side or the other decides it is better to cut aid, reduce military co-operation and weaken diplomatic ties is growing nearer.
---------- Post added at 10:24 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:22 AM ----------
Another one with the same title, events have moved on since this was published, yet contains relevant points.
Pakistan and America: Till deaths us do part | The Economist
THE NATO helicopters that on November 26th flattened Volcano and Boulder, two Pakistani military outposts on the Afghan border, also blasted the alliance’s own strategic interests. The Americans (and others) promptly talked of an accident, offering condolences and an inquiry into how 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed, and 13 more injured, during a confused night of fighting. They also spoke of provocation by Taliban fighters, who enjoy sanctuary on Pakistani soil and tentative backing from its army. A suggestion was even aired that there had been firing from the bases themselves.
Pakistan responded with fury, denying any provocations and accusing the attackers of outright aggression: a deliberate assault on its sovereignty. NATO had grid references for the posts, hundreds of metres inside Pakistani territory, yet had bombed sleeping soldiers and others who raced to help. The attack continued for an hour or more, allegedly ignoring frantic appeals to halt. Pakistan’s media dutifully pumped out the army line, stirring public outrage.
In this section
Relations look dire. As a result of the incident, Pakistan’s government said on November 29th that it would boycott the Afghan talks that are about to open in Bonn. Its army told America it must, within days, stop using Shamsi airbase in Baluchistan for launching its drones. Two land corridors that provide NATO in Afghanistan with half its supplies were shut. American demands for military intervention against insurgents in North Waziristan will again be batted away.
Yet the fact that the broad relationship has survived other severe tests this year suggests it may get over this one too. Pakistanis were whipped into a fury when a CIA contractor shot dead two men in Lahore in January, provoking weeks of confrontation. That quarrel had just about been patched up by May, when American special forces discovered and killed Osama bin Laden nesting in what was probably a Pakistani army-spy safe house in a military town, Abbottabad. Then, in September, it was the Americans’ turn for dismay, after an Afghan insurgent group, the Haqqani network, seen as having close ties to the Pakistani army, launched a prolonged attack on their embassy in Kabul.
The spate of incidents may continue. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is rising to intense levels, which could spur younger, religiously minded officers, especially those who have not been trained by America, to demand a snapping of ties.
Yet policymakers both in Pakistan and America are likely to conclude that they still get enough from each other to make it too risky to break up just yet. America needs Pakistan to get the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network to talks, to do more on counter-terrorism, to allow drones to keep flying in its tribal areas and to keep its big nuclear arsenal safely locked up. In turn, Pakistan’s army, which to its neighbours looks isolated and paranoid, has no serious alternative to bidding for more lavish American aid. The result could be dismally cynical: each side using and attacking the other—and growing ever more bitter.
Pakistan and America: Till deaths us do part | The Economist
PAKISTANS deeply troubled relationship with America has survived so many intense provocations this year, it will probably also get over the latest bloody incident. Yet there is no guarantee. At 2am on November 26th helicoptersand perhaps other aircraftfrom NATO attacked a Pakistani border position in a remote corner of the Afghan frontier. The bloodiest single strike by NATO (read Americans) on the Pakistani army, it killed 24 soldiers and injured another 13.
A host of leaders from NATO and the United States were quick to admit to the attack, apologise for it and call it a dreadful accident. That was just as well. But for Pakistanis, especially, it will be hard to accept it was a mere blunder. In the past, firing in Pakistan by American forces inside Afghanistan, against Taliban or other forces fleeing there for sanctuary, has killed one or two soldiers on the border. This time, say the Pakistanis, two different buildings, 300 metres apart on two outcrops, were destroyed. The soldiers in each one, many of whom were said to have been sleeping, were 2.5km inside Pakistani territory, and the Americans reportedly had grid-references for these long-established army posts.
The two sides dispute whether there was much activity by Taliban fighters in the area which could have confused (or possibly helped to provoke) the forces which struck inside Pakistan. NATO described enemy activity on the ground, talked of a Taliban training camp in the area, and said the assault took place with permission from up the chain of command. That suggests the nature of the accident was merely (though still unforgivably) technical: to have mistaken the known Pakistani posts for Taliban positions. A darker possibility is that the NATO officers who made the decision to attack, perhaps deeply frustrated by many years of active Pakistani support for Taliban and other fighters who kill Western forces in Afghanistan, were negligent or deliberate in striking the Pakistani armed forces along with their Taliban targets.
What matters now is how the bloody episode is handled, especially by Pakistans armed forces and politicians. The immediate outrage expressed by every Pakistani leader is natural enough. Anti-Americanismmore precisely a hatred of their own countrys long involvement in what is seen as Americas war against Islamist extremist groupsis intense and widespread. Many in Pakistan have long been fiercely resentful of Americas role in their territory, angry at drone attacks against terrorist leaders that kill civilians too, and, for example, at the case of a CIA man who shot dead two would-be robbers in Lahore, in January. Even the discovery and killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, in May, drew public anger (fanned by the media, which does much of the bidding of the armed forces) over Americas humiliating disregard for Pakistan's sovereignty.
If the latest killings stir up yet more intense public opposition to Americaa big rally on November 27th in Karachi suggested it mightthat could suit Pakistans various leaders. For a start it makes it easier for them to demand more American aid and assistance to justify prolonging a deeply unpopular working relationship. Just as useful, for Pakistans army, is that public anger against the Americans gives it an excuse to put off, yet again, a long-sought military intervention in North Waziristan against the Haqqani network (a violent force that has a sanctuary there, but is active in Afghanistan). Being seen to do the bidding of the Americans, Pakistani leaders can easily say, would be to court an unacceptable level of internal instability.
Pakistans leaders know the Americans are still deeply dependant on them. In the past few months NATOand especially the Americanshave done an impressive job of reducing their reliance on land transport corridors through Pakistan to supply Western soldiers in Afghanistan. Over the past 120 days, for example, of the materiel received by the Americans in Afghanistan, around 30% was flown in and 40% was driven over Afghanistans northern borders from Central Asia, leaving just 30% to come via Pakistan's roads. That is a sharp reduction on previous years. Thus the immediate and predictable closing of the Pakistan route, in response to the deaths on the border, should prove less disruptive than it once would have been.
But America relies on Pakistan in other ways. A military base, Shamsi, used by America inside Pakistan, apparently to launch drones, has been ordered closed within 15 days. That may be smoke and mirrors (it was quite possibly no longer used by the Americans anyway, after a previous clash), but is a sign of the sort of co-operation the Americans have quietly enjoyed on Pakistan's account as they hunted al-Qaeda and other extremist leaders whom Pakistan does not regard as allies. Intelligence co-operation (however flawed) from Pakistan, against individuals plotting attacks on the West will also continue to be crucial in the coming years. Keeping close tabs on Pakistans large (perhaps 100-warhead strong) and fast-growing nuclear arsenal is also a long-term priority for the Americans.
Yet America and Pakistan could decide it is better to wind down their relationship to something minimal. A strong cohort within the Pentagonespecially after attacks on Americas embassy in Kabul, in September, by fighters seen as allied with Pakistanhas been demanding direct American military intervention in North Waziristan, possibly including American soldiers on the ground, even if Pakistans government opposes the idea. Pakistan is blamed for NATO and Afghan army forces failure to defeat the Taliban and other insurgents in Afghanistan, and for the Talibans refusal to consider peace talks. American lawmakers have also grown increasingly hostile over civilian and military aid to Pakistan, especially once it appeared that bin Laden had been harboured in Pakistan.
Within Pakistan, a breaking point could be near. One factor may be the rise of Imran Khan, a populist figure who makes a big deal of his opposition to America's role in the ongoing fighting. As important may be the rise of younger, more religious army officers who are instinctively more anti-American than previous generals. After a year of crises and confrontations, the relationship, though troubled, survives. But the moment when one side or the other decides it is better to cut aid, reduce military co-operation and weaken diplomatic ties is growing nearer.
---------- Post added at 10:24 AM ---------- Previous post was at 10:22 AM ----------
Another one with the same title, events have moved on since this was published, yet contains relevant points.
Pakistan and America: Till deaths us do part | The Economist
THE NATO helicopters that on November 26th flattened Volcano and Boulder, two Pakistani military outposts on the Afghan border, also blasted the alliance’s own strategic interests. The Americans (and others) promptly talked of an accident, offering condolences and an inquiry into how 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed, and 13 more injured, during a confused night of fighting. They also spoke of provocation by Taliban fighters, who enjoy sanctuary on Pakistani soil and tentative backing from its army. A suggestion was even aired that there had been firing from the bases themselves.
Pakistan responded with fury, denying any provocations and accusing the attackers of outright aggression: a deliberate assault on its sovereignty. NATO had grid references for the posts, hundreds of metres inside Pakistani territory, yet had bombed sleeping soldiers and others who raced to help. The attack continued for an hour or more, allegedly ignoring frantic appeals to halt. Pakistan’s media dutifully pumped out the army line, stirring public outrage.
In this section
Relations look dire. As a result of the incident, Pakistan’s government said on November 29th that it would boycott the Afghan talks that are about to open in Bonn. Its army told America it must, within days, stop using Shamsi airbase in Baluchistan for launching its drones. Two land corridors that provide NATO in Afghanistan with half its supplies were shut. American demands for military intervention against insurgents in North Waziristan will again be batted away.
Yet the fact that the broad relationship has survived other severe tests this year suggests it may get over this one too. Pakistanis were whipped into a fury when a CIA contractor shot dead two men in Lahore in January, provoking weeks of confrontation. That quarrel had just about been patched up by May, when American special forces discovered and killed Osama bin Laden nesting in what was probably a Pakistani army-spy safe house in a military town, Abbottabad. Then, in September, it was the Americans’ turn for dismay, after an Afghan insurgent group, the Haqqani network, seen as having close ties to the Pakistani army, launched a prolonged attack on their embassy in Kabul.
The spate of incidents may continue. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is rising to intense levels, which could spur younger, religiously minded officers, especially those who have not been trained by America, to demand a snapping of ties.
Yet policymakers both in Pakistan and America are likely to conclude that they still get enough from each other to make it too risky to break up just yet. America needs Pakistan to get the Afghan Taliban and Haqqani network to talks, to do more on counter-terrorism, to allow drones to keep flying in its tribal areas and to keep its big nuclear arsenal safely locked up. In turn, Pakistan’s army, which to its neighbours looks isolated and paranoid, has no serious alternative to bidding for more lavish American aid. The result could be dismally cynical: each side using and attacking the other—and growing ever more bitter.
