Amaa'n
STAFF
- Joined
- Aug 19, 2012
- Messages
- 10,660
- Reaction score
- 149
- Country
- Location
please do so, we would like to see what wrong the infidel Airforce has done......
Pakistan Air Force | News & Discussions.
- Thread starter fatman17
- Start date
please do so, we would like to see what wrong the infidel Airforce has done......
nangyale
SENIOR MEMBER
- Joined
- May 31, 2010
- Messages
- 2,251
- Reaction score
- 2
- Country
- Location
Please don't put words in my mouth I never said anything about infidel AirForce. But I do consider it as a case of overkill.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Pakistani and Chinese air forces participate in joint 'Shaheen-II' exercises
Author:Farhan Bokhari, Islamabad
Last posted:2013-09-05
Pakistani Mirage 5EF are to participate in the Shaheen-II joint air exercise with the PLAAF. The exercise is being held in China from 3 to 22 September 2013. (PAF)
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) began what it described as its first ever joint exercises in Chinese airspace with the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) on 3 September.
Known as the 'Shaheen-II' exercises, they will run until 22 September and follow the Sino-Pakistani Shaheen-I exercises that took place in Pakistan in March 2011.
The PAF said it had sent Mirage and Chinese-built F-7PG aircraft to China for Shaheen-II, while declining to give the exact number of aircraft involved.
"The prime objective of the exercise is to excel in air combat capability with a focus on air power employment in any future conflict," the PAF said. "The Pakistan Air Force conducts such exercises on regular intervals, both inland and abroad.
"Air exercise Shaheen-II will provide an opportunity to combat crew of both air forces to acquaint themselves with applied tactics of airpower in realistic scenarios."
Pakistani F-7PG are to participate in the Shaheen-II joint exercise with China. (PAF)
Western defence officials in Islamabad stated that the PLAAF air base chosen for the exercises in China's restive western Xinjiang region is important for Beijing's security interests. During the past decade, Xinjiang has occasionally seen unrest by Muslim separatists; some reports have suggested China has quietly complained to Pakistan over the possibility of some of these groups receiving arms and training from Muslim separatists in Pakistan.
"I am sure these exercises are important for Pakistan and China, to have their assets flown together. This gives new experience to the air force commanders in both countries," said one Western defence official in Islamabad.
"The choice of Xinjiang seems to be very important. The Chinese are keen to further build up their ties with Pakistan's armed forces."
ANALYSIS
The joint exercises between the PAF and PLAAF come at a time when the PAF remains heavily dependent on China for the supply of some of its hardware. The PAF plans to eventually induct between 200 and 250 JF-17 Thunder fighters, jointly developed by Pakistan and China. Some analysts believe Pakistan has begun quietly lobbying to gain eventual access to the stealth fighters China is developing.
JDW
Author:Farhan Bokhari, Islamabad
Last posted:2013-09-05
Pakistani Mirage 5EF are to participate in the Shaheen-II joint air exercise with the PLAAF. The exercise is being held in China from 3 to 22 September 2013. (PAF)
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) began what it described as its first ever joint exercises in Chinese airspace with the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) on 3 September.
Known as the 'Shaheen-II' exercises, they will run until 22 September and follow the Sino-Pakistani Shaheen-I exercises that took place in Pakistan in March 2011.
The PAF said it had sent Mirage and Chinese-built F-7PG aircraft to China for Shaheen-II, while declining to give the exact number of aircraft involved.
"The prime objective of the exercise is to excel in air combat capability with a focus on air power employment in any future conflict," the PAF said. "The Pakistan Air Force conducts such exercises on regular intervals, both inland and abroad.
"Air exercise Shaheen-II will provide an opportunity to combat crew of both air forces to acquaint themselves with applied tactics of airpower in realistic scenarios."
Pakistani F-7PG are to participate in the Shaheen-II joint exercise with China. (PAF)
Western defence officials in Islamabad stated that the PLAAF air base chosen for the exercises in China's restive western Xinjiang region is important for Beijing's security interests. During the past decade, Xinjiang has occasionally seen unrest by Muslim separatists; some reports have suggested China has quietly complained to Pakistan over the possibility of some of these groups receiving arms and training from Muslim separatists in Pakistan.
"I am sure these exercises are important for Pakistan and China, to have their assets flown together. This gives new experience to the air force commanders in both countries," said one Western defence official in Islamabad.
"The choice of Xinjiang seems to be very important. The Chinese are keen to further build up their ties with Pakistan's armed forces."
ANALYSIS
The joint exercises between the PAF and PLAAF come at a time when the PAF remains heavily dependent on China for the supply of some of its hardware. The PAF plans to eventually induct between 200 and 250 JF-17 Thunder fighters, jointly developed by Pakistan and China. Some analysts believe Pakistan has begun quietly lobbying to gain eventual access to the stealth fighters China is developing.
JDW
airomerix
PDF THINK TANK: ANALYST
- Joined
- Dec 31, 2012
- Messages
- 1,624
- Reaction score
- 35
- Country
- Location
Our F-7s have seen F-22s, J-11s, J-10s and Block 60s till now. A handy experience for future viper/thunder pilots. I wouldn't be surprised if some of the veteran F-16 pilots would be piloting the PG's.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
DEFENCE NOTES
Devastation of Pathankot
Columnist Gp Capt SULTAN M HALI writes about the PAF’s air strike on PATHANKOT in 1965.
PAF’s air strike on 6th September, 1965 on the Indian Air Force base of Pathankot has been rated by historians and defence analysts of both Indian and Pakistan as one of the most successful air raids of contemporary history. Not only did the PAF pilots achieve complete surprise but they also executed the attack with text-book precision. Its details make fascinating reading.
PAF’s airfield strike plan for the dusk of day one of the war in 1965 comprised the following:-
STATION OF ORIGIN SORTIES & AIRCRAFT TARGET
Sargodha.......................................8 F-86 Sabres................................ Adampur
Sargodha.......................................8 F-86 Sabres................................ Halwara
Peshawar.......................................8 F-86 Sabres................................Pathankot
Mauripur........................................8 F-86 Sabres................................ Jamnagar
Source: Story of PAF
The Time Over Target (TOT) for the strike was set at 1705 hours. This was to be followed by night bombing raids by B-57 bombers.
No 19 Squadron which was based at Peshawar, had been given the Indian airfield at Pathankot as its first target. This target had been allotted in mid-1965 when the Rann of Katch crisis was at its peak. Pathankot was the only large Indian Air Force (IAF) airfield within fighter reach of Peshawar, and even this distance of 200 miles or so was marginal for the Sabre, with two 200-gallon drop tanks in addition to full internal fuel, if sufficient reserve was to be kept in hand for a fighting exit. This would limit the weapons to only the 1800 rounds of the six. 50 Browning guns of the Sabres.
Squadron Leader Sajad Haider, affectionately known as ‘Nosey Haider’, the Squadron Commander of No 19 Squadron had prepared his squadron pilots well and planned the strikes very thoroughly using a High-lo-High profile. This involved getting airborne from Peshawar and climbing high in the opposite direction then dipping to tree-top level below radar cover, turning simultaneously towards the target. The Squadron had in fact carried out identical and simulated strikes to practice for attacks on its primary and alternate targets.
Dawn of 6th September, 1965 saw a formation of 6 F-86s of No 19 Squadron fully loaded with 5 inch rockets (a last minute premonition the night before, by Air Marshal Nur Khan the C-in-C, which paid rich dividends) flying on “Hot Patrol’. The moment the Air Defence Commander learnt of Indian Army’s advance towards Lahore, the 19 Squadron formation was diverted to stop the advancing Indian armour columns at Wagah. In twenty minutes of action, the Grand Trunk Road was littered with scores of burning tanks, armoured and soft vehicles. The 5 inch rockets had a devastating effect on the enemy armour. The formation led by Squadron Leader Sajad Haider with Flight Lieutenants M Akbar, Dilawar Hussain, Ghani Akbar and Flying Officers Khalid Latif, and Arshad Chaudhry brought the Indian attack to a dead halt.
After landing at Sargodha for re-fuelling, the formation rushed back to Peshawar to prepare for the strike on Pathankot.
Having rested a while the pilots were assembled for a final briefing at 1600 hrs. The formation comprised:-
After a thorough briefing and going over the already well rehearsed strike plan, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider surprised his pilots by asking for a fire bucket filled with fresh water. He pulled out a bottle of No 4711 Eau-de-Cologne from his coverall pocket and emptied it in the bucket. He took small white towellettes, dipped them in the water and after wringing them out, handed over one each to his pilots. “This could be a one-way mission and if we meet our Maker, we should be smelling nice”, Sajad Haider wryly remarked.1 Every pilot complied, his resolve emboldened and his faith reinvigorated.
Everything proceeded according to the plan and the formation got airborne at 1630 hours, climbed in battle formation up to about 11,000 metres and then dived down to tree top level and set course for the I P (initial point) for the target.
The planning staff was not certain whether Pathankot would still be occupied by IAF aircraft after the outbreak of hostilities. But the formation of eight Sabres, escorted by two more sidewinders equipped
F-86s acting as top cover at 6,000 metres were fortunate.
A glimpse of the other side of the story is also presented from website Bharat Rakhshak:
“Meanwhile, at the IAF Air Base at Pathankot, the Station Commander, Group Captain Roshan Suri had just returned from a meeting of Station Commanders from Western Air Command. Suri briefed his Squadron Commanders of the impending Army move to cross the international border....
As evening approached, Pathankot Airbase received an urgent phone call from Squadron Leader Dandapani at Amritsar Air Defence Centre. He spoke to Wing Commander Kuriyan and informed him that several Sabres had been observed taking off and then go ‘Off the Scope’ as they all went below the radar horizon. This had all the tell-tale signs of an incoming raid. Kuriyan informed Suri about the suspicions of a raid and asked for permission to scramble the CAP (Combat Air Patrol). (This is where the Pathankot Base Commander made a vital mistake for which IAF paid dearly) Suri refused to order the CAP to go off and ordered Kuriyan to go off the shift.”2
The PAF aircraft reached Pathankot precisely on time at 1705 hours and discovered a large number of IAF aircraft parked around in protected dispersal pens. With no enemy fighters in the vicinity and fairly thin ground fire, ‘Nosey’ set the ball rolling with four carefully-positioned dives from about 500 metres, systematically selecting individual aircraft in protected pens on the airfield for his fixed-gun attacks. He was gratified to recognize the distinctive delta-winged MiG-21s- India’s latest fighter - among the aircraft on the ground, and singled them out for special attention.
The rest of the pilots followed suit. Each pilot had been briefed to make only two passes but the lucrative targets and limited opposition enabled them to make multiple passes. Wing Commander Tawab, flying top cover, counted at least 14 fires burning on the airfield.
“Wing Commander Kuriyan was just then driving into his garage at his house, when he heard the ack ack guns booming. He looked towards the airfield to see four F-86 Sabres bore down the airfield at low level firing their machine guns, while two ‘F-104 Starfighters’ kept high altitude cover. As the four Sabres pulled out, another four bore in. The Sabres strafed buildings, installations and aircraft on the ground....
......The Sabres attacked the row of MiGs and Mysteres along the blast pens in the airfield. The CAP was not scrambled. Two of the MiGs, which were being refuelled after returning from an earlier flight, went up in flames.
.......Some Mysteres on the ground bore the brunt of the raid and were damaged as were the two MiG-21s. Only the fact that the Sabre’s 0.50 inch machine guns could fire ball ammunition instead of exploding cannon shells prevented further damage. The Sabres slipped off unscathed as even the airfield defences were caught napping. For the PAF this raid was a cakewalk. All in all one C-119, four Mysteres, two Gnats and two MiG-21s were destroyed in this highly successful raid by the Pakistan Air Force.” 3
After de-briefing and interrogation, this text book operation against Pathankot was credited with seven MiG-21s, five Mysteres and one Fairchild C-119 destroyed on the ground, plus damage to the Air Traffic Control building - IAF admits to the loss of only two MiG-21s but it goes to the credit of PAF that after the fateful strike on Pathankot, Indian MiG-21s were not seen in the air for the remaining duration of the 1965 War.
Epilogue:
Where are they now?
Six of the pilots on the devastating raid on Pathankot including both pilots flying Top Cover, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider, Flight Lieutenants M Akbar, Dilawar Hussain, Ghani Akbar and Arshad Sami and Wing Commander M G Tawab were decorated with the Sitara-e-Jurat.
Squadron Leader Sajad Haider later commanded the Flying wing at Sargodha during the 1971 War. He served as Air Attache at Washington D.C. and retired as Air Commodore in 1983.
Flight Lieutenant M Akbar rose to the rank of Air Commodore, commanded the Pakistan Armed Forces Mission at Riyadh and retired in September, 1991.
Flight Lieutenant Dilawar saw action during the 1971 War and shot down an IAF Hunter over Dhaka on 04 December, 1971. He went on to become an Air Marshal and retired from the post of Director General Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra.
Flying Officer Abbas Khattak also saw action in the 1971 War. He rose to the rank of Air Chief Marshal and commanded Pakistan Air Force from 1994-97. He is now leading a retired life.
Flying Officer Arshad Chaudhry rose to the rank of Air Marshal and retired from the post of Vice Chief of the Air Staff in 1997.
Flight Lieutenant Mazhar Abbas retired in the rank of Air Commodore.
Flying Officer Khalid Latif retired in the rank of Group Captain.
Flight Lieutenant Ghani Akbar left the airforce as a Squadron Leader and started flying for PIA. He is now retired.
Flight Lieutenant Arshad Sami Khan left the Air Force in the rank of Squadron Leader and joined Foreign Service. Currently he is an Ambassador.
Wing Commander M G Tawab left Pakistan Air Force in the rank of Group Captain. He later became an Air Vice Marshal and commanded the fledgling Bangladesh Air Force. After his retirement, he settled in Germany, where he breathed his last in 1998 after a brief illness. His demise was mourned by friends and admirers all over.
Bibliography
1. Narrated from Air Cdre Sajad Haider’s TV programme telecast on Defence of Pakistan Day 1997.
2. Down loaded from the Internet “Air Attack — Outbreak of the War (September-1965)” website Bharat Rakhshak.
3. Ibid.
4. Fricker, John, Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965, published by Ian Allan Ltd, Surrey, 1979.
5. The Story of the Pakistan Air Force, published by the Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, 1988.
DJ
Devastation of Pathankot
Columnist Gp Capt SULTAN M HALI writes about the PAF’s air strike on PATHANKOT in 1965.
PAF’s air strike on 6th September, 1965 on the Indian Air Force base of Pathankot has been rated by historians and defence analysts of both Indian and Pakistan as one of the most successful air raids of contemporary history. Not only did the PAF pilots achieve complete surprise but they also executed the attack with text-book precision. Its details make fascinating reading.
PAF’s airfield strike plan for the dusk of day one of the war in 1965 comprised the following:-
STATION OF ORIGIN SORTIES & AIRCRAFT TARGET
Sargodha.......................................8 F-86 Sabres................................ Adampur
Sargodha.......................................8 F-86 Sabres................................ Halwara
Peshawar.......................................8 F-86 Sabres................................Pathankot
Mauripur........................................8 F-86 Sabres................................ Jamnagar
Source: Story of PAF
The Time Over Target (TOT) for the strike was set at 1705 hours. This was to be followed by night bombing raids by B-57 bombers.
No 19 Squadron which was based at Peshawar, had been given the Indian airfield at Pathankot as its first target. This target had been allotted in mid-1965 when the Rann of Katch crisis was at its peak. Pathankot was the only large Indian Air Force (IAF) airfield within fighter reach of Peshawar, and even this distance of 200 miles or so was marginal for the Sabre, with two 200-gallon drop tanks in addition to full internal fuel, if sufficient reserve was to be kept in hand for a fighting exit. This would limit the weapons to only the 1800 rounds of the six. 50 Browning guns of the Sabres.
Squadron Leader Sajad Haider, affectionately known as ‘Nosey Haider’, the Squadron Commander of No 19 Squadron had prepared his squadron pilots well and planned the strikes very thoroughly using a High-lo-High profile. This involved getting airborne from Peshawar and climbing high in the opposite direction then dipping to tree-top level below radar cover, turning simultaneously towards the target. The Squadron had in fact carried out identical and simulated strikes to practice for attacks on its primary and alternate targets.
Dawn of 6th September, 1965 saw a formation of 6 F-86s of No 19 Squadron fully loaded with 5 inch rockets (a last minute premonition the night before, by Air Marshal Nur Khan the C-in-C, which paid rich dividends) flying on “Hot Patrol’. The moment the Air Defence Commander learnt of Indian Army’s advance towards Lahore, the 19 Squadron formation was diverted to stop the advancing Indian armour columns at Wagah. In twenty minutes of action, the Grand Trunk Road was littered with scores of burning tanks, armoured and soft vehicles. The 5 inch rockets had a devastating effect on the enemy armour. The formation led by Squadron Leader Sajad Haider with Flight Lieutenants M Akbar, Dilawar Hussain, Ghani Akbar and Flying Officers Khalid Latif, and Arshad Chaudhry brought the Indian attack to a dead halt.
After landing at Sargodha for re-fuelling, the formation rushed back to Peshawar to prepare for the strike on Pathankot.
Having rested a while the pilots were assembled for a final briefing at 1600 hrs. The formation comprised:-
After a thorough briefing and going over the already well rehearsed strike plan, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider surprised his pilots by asking for a fire bucket filled with fresh water. He pulled out a bottle of No 4711 Eau-de-Cologne from his coverall pocket and emptied it in the bucket. He took small white towellettes, dipped them in the water and after wringing them out, handed over one each to his pilots. “This could be a one-way mission and if we meet our Maker, we should be smelling nice”, Sajad Haider wryly remarked.1 Every pilot complied, his resolve emboldened and his faith reinvigorated.
Everything proceeded according to the plan and the formation got airborne at 1630 hours, climbed in battle formation up to about 11,000 metres and then dived down to tree top level and set course for the I P (initial point) for the target.
The planning staff was not certain whether Pathankot would still be occupied by IAF aircraft after the outbreak of hostilities. But the formation of eight Sabres, escorted by two more sidewinders equipped
F-86s acting as top cover at 6,000 metres were fortunate.
A glimpse of the other side of the story is also presented from website Bharat Rakhshak:
“Meanwhile, at the IAF Air Base at Pathankot, the Station Commander, Group Captain Roshan Suri had just returned from a meeting of Station Commanders from Western Air Command. Suri briefed his Squadron Commanders of the impending Army move to cross the international border....
As evening approached, Pathankot Airbase received an urgent phone call from Squadron Leader Dandapani at Amritsar Air Defence Centre. He spoke to Wing Commander Kuriyan and informed him that several Sabres had been observed taking off and then go ‘Off the Scope’ as they all went below the radar horizon. This had all the tell-tale signs of an incoming raid. Kuriyan informed Suri about the suspicions of a raid and asked for permission to scramble the CAP (Combat Air Patrol). (This is where the Pathankot Base Commander made a vital mistake for which IAF paid dearly) Suri refused to order the CAP to go off and ordered Kuriyan to go off the shift.”2
The PAF aircraft reached Pathankot precisely on time at 1705 hours and discovered a large number of IAF aircraft parked around in protected dispersal pens. With no enemy fighters in the vicinity and fairly thin ground fire, ‘Nosey’ set the ball rolling with four carefully-positioned dives from about 500 metres, systematically selecting individual aircraft in protected pens on the airfield for his fixed-gun attacks. He was gratified to recognize the distinctive delta-winged MiG-21s- India’s latest fighter - among the aircraft on the ground, and singled them out for special attention.
The rest of the pilots followed suit. Each pilot had been briefed to make only two passes but the lucrative targets and limited opposition enabled them to make multiple passes. Wing Commander Tawab, flying top cover, counted at least 14 fires burning on the airfield.
“Wing Commander Kuriyan was just then driving into his garage at his house, when he heard the ack ack guns booming. He looked towards the airfield to see four F-86 Sabres bore down the airfield at low level firing their machine guns, while two ‘F-104 Starfighters’ kept high altitude cover. As the four Sabres pulled out, another four bore in. The Sabres strafed buildings, installations and aircraft on the ground....
......The Sabres attacked the row of MiGs and Mysteres along the blast pens in the airfield. The CAP was not scrambled. Two of the MiGs, which were being refuelled after returning from an earlier flight, went up in flames.
.......Some Mysteres on the ground bore the brunt of the raid and were damaged as were the two MiG-21s. Only the fact that the Sabre’s 0.50 inch machine guns could fire ball ammunition instead of exploding cannon shells prevented further damage. The Sabres slipped off unscathed as even the airfield defences were caught napping. For the PAF this raid was a cakewalk. All in all one C-119, four Mysteres, two Gnats and two MiG-21s were destroyed in this highly successful raid by the Pakistan Air Force.” 3
After de-briefing and interrogation, this text book operation against Pathankot was credited with seven MiG-21s, five Mysteres and one Fairchild C-119 destroyed on the ground, plus damage to the Air Traffic Control building - IAF admits to the loss of only two MiG-21s but it goes to the credit of PAF that after the fateful strike on Pathankot, Indian MiG-21s were not seen in the air for the remaining duration of the 1965 War.
Epilogue:
Where are they now?
Six of the pilots on the devastating raid on Pathankot including both pilots flying Top Cover, Squadron Leader Sajad Haider, Flight Lieutenants M Akbar, Dilawar Hussain, Ghani Akbar and Arshad Sami and Wing Commander M G Tawab were decorated with the Sitara-e-Jurat.
Squadron Leader Sajad Haider later commanded the Flying wing at Sargodha during the 1971 War. He served as Air Attache at Washington D.C. and retired as Air Commodore in 1983.
Flight Lieutenant M Akbar rose to the rank of Air Commodore, commanded the Pakistan Armed Forces Mission at Riyadh and retired in September, 1991.
Flight Lieutenant Dilawar saw action during the 1971 War and shot down an IAF Hunter over Dhaka on 04 December, 1971. He went on to become an Air Marshal and retired from the post of Director General Pakistan Aeronautical Complex, Kamra.
Flying Officer Abbas Khattak also saw action in the 1971 War. He rose to the rank of Air Chief Marshal and commanded Pakistan Air Force from 1994-97. He is now leading a retired life.
Flying Officer Arshad Chaudhry rose to the rank of Air Marshal and retired from the post of Vice Chief of the Air Staff in 1997.
Flight Lieutenant Mazhar Abbas retired in the rank of Air Commodore.
Flying Officer Khalid Latif retired in the rank of Group Captain.
Flight Lieutenant Ghani Akbar left the airforce as a Squadron Leader and started flying for PIA. He is now retired.
Flight Lieutenant Arshad Sami Khan left the Air Force in the rank of Squadron Leader and joined Foreign Service. Currently he is an Ambassador.
Wing Commander M G Tawab left Pakistan Air Force in the rank of Group Captain. He later became an Air Vice Marshal and commanded the fledgling Bangladesh Air Force. After his retirement, he settled in Germany, where he breathed his last in 1998 after a brief illness. His demise was mourned by friends and admirers all over.
Bibliography
1. Narrated from Air Cdre Sajad Haider’s TV programme telecast on Defence of Pakistan Day 1997.
2. Down loaded from the Internet “Air Attack — Outbreak of the War (September-1965)” website Bharat Rakhshak.
3. Ibid.
4. Fricker, John, Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965, published by Ian Allan Ltd, Surrey, 1979.
5. The Story of the Pakistan Air Force, published by the Shaheen Foundation, Islamabad, 1988.
DJ
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
In Memoriam: M.M. Alam (1935-2013)
Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam
Air Commodore (Retd.) Muhammad Mahmood Alam, popularly known as "M.M. Alam", Pakistan's first fighter ace, who shot down nine Indian Air Force (IAF) jets in the 1965 India-Pakistan War, including five in a single sortie, passed away in Karachi on 18 March 2013, aged 78.
Born into a Bengali family on 6 July 1935 in Calcutta, British India, Alam completed his secondary education from Government High School in Dhaka in 1951 and joined the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) College (later Academy), Risalpur in 1952, enrolling in the 16th General Duties Pilot (GDP) Batch from which he graduated a year later. He was commissioned into the PAF on 2 October 1953.
At the outbreak of the 1965 India-Pakistan War, Alam was serving as Squadron Leader with the PAF's elite No. 11 Squadron, flying F-86F Sabres out of Sargodha Air Base.
During the War, Alam downed a total of nine Indian fighters in air-to-air combat with two additional unconfirmed probables. Alam's tally of confirmed kills comprised nine IAF Hawker Hunters. On 7 September 1965, Alam downed five IAF Hunters in less than a minute, the first four within 30 seconds, thereby establishing a world record.
John Fricker, the noted British aviation writer, wrote of M.M. Alam in his article "Thirty Seconds over Sargodha" (Air Enthusiast, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1971):
"...Mohammad Mahmood Alam is a scrap of a man who appears almost lost in the none-too-roomy cockpit of a Sabre. Yet during the 1965 conflict with India, this Pakistani squadron commander, established a combat record which has few equals in the history of jet warfare...Many pilots have scored several air victories in one sortie, and have exceeded or equaled Alam’s...shooting down up to five enemy aircraft of superior performance within a few minutes. But few are likely to be able to match his record of destroying at least three opponents – Hawker Hunters of the IAF [Indian Air Force] – within the space of somewhere around 30 seconds."
Alam's confirmed kills are as follows:
Date: 6 September 1965
Aircraft Used: F-86F Sabre
Downed Aircraft: 2× IAF Hawker Hunters
Downed Pilots: Squadron Leader Ajit Kumar Rawlley, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; 1 Unknown IAF pilot
Location: Over Taran Taran, India
Other Information: Dogfight involving 3 PAF F-86s versus 4 IAF Hunters
Date: 7 September 1965
Aircraft Used: F-86F Sabre
Downed Aircraft: 5× IAF Hawker Hunters
Downed Pilots: Squadron Leader Onkar Nath Kacker, No. 27 Sqn, POW; Squadron Leader A.B. Devayya, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; Squadron Leader Suresh B. Bhagwat, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; Flight Lieutenant B. Guha, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; Flying Officer Jagdev Singh Brar, No. 7 Sqn, KIA
Location: 1 Kill east of Sargodha near the Chenab River and 4 Kills 30 miles away over Sangla Hill - midway between Lahore and Sargodha, Pakistan
Other Information: Dogfight involving 2 PAF F-86s versus 6 IAF Hunters. All 5 aircraft shot down in a single sortie, 4 within 30 seconds. 1 AIM-9 Sidewinder Kill, 4 Gun Kills
Date: 16 September 1965
Aircraft Used: F-86F Sabre
Downed Aircraft: 2× IAF Hawker Hunters
Downed Pilots: Flying Officer Farokh Dara Bunsha, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; 1 Unknown IAF pilot
Location: Near Halwara and Adampur, India
Other Information: In a single sortie. Dogfight involving 2 IAF Hunters versus 2 PAF F-86 Sabres. 1 Gun Kill, 1 AIM-9 Sidewinder Kill
Alam next to his F-86 Sabre in September 1965 (notice the 11 Indian flags
painted on the Sabre representing 9 confirmed kills and 2 probable kills)
Below is Alam's account of his kills on 7 September 1965 as quoted by Fricker:
"As we were vectored back towards Sargodha, Akhtar called, "Contact - four Hunters", and I saw the IAF aircraft diving to attack our airfield. So I jettisoned my drops [external fuel tanks] to dive through our own ack-ack [anti-aircraft cannon] after them. But in the meantime I saw two more Hunters about 1,000 ft. to my rear, so I forgot the four in front and pulled up to go after the pair behind. The Hunters broke off their attempted attack on Sargodha, and the rear pair turned into me. I was flying much faster than they were at this stage - I must have been doing about 500 knots - so I pulled up to avoid overshooting them and then reversed to close in as they flew back towards India.
"I took the last man and dived behind him, getting very low in the process. The Hunter can out-run the Sabre, it's only about 50 knots faster, but has a much better acceleration, so it can pull away very rapidly. Since I was diving, I was going still faster, and as he was out of gun range, I fired the first of my two GAR-8 Sidewinder (air- to-air missiles) at him. In this case, we were too low and I saw the missile hit the ground short of its target.
"This area east of Sargodha, however, has lots of high tension wires, some of them as high as 100-150 ft., and when I saw the two Hunters pull up to avoid one of these cables, I fired my second Sidewinder. The missile streaked ahead of me, but I didn't see it strike. The next thing I remember was that I was overshooting one of the Hunters and when I looked behind, the cockpit canopy was missing and there was no pilot in the aircraft. He had obviously pulled up and ejected and then I saw him coming down by parachute. This pilot [Sqn. Ldr. Onkar Nath Kakar, commander of an IAF Hunter squadron] was later taken prisoner.
"I had lost sight of the other five Hunters, but I pressed on thinking maybe they would slow down. There were, of course, still only two Sabre’s pitted against the remaining five IAF aircraft. I had lots of fuel so I was prepared to fly 50-60 miles to catch up with them. We had just crossed the Chenab river when my wingman called out, "Contact - Hunters 1'o’clock," and I picked them up at the same time - five Hunters in absolutely immaculate battle formation. They were flying at about 100-200 ft., at around 480 knots and when I was in gun-fire range they saw me. They all broke in one direction, climbing and turning steeply to the left, which put them in loose line astern. This, of course, was their big mistake. If you are bounced, which means a close range approach by an enemy fighter to within less than about 3,000ft, the drill is to call a break. This is a panic maneuver to the limits of the aircraft's performance, which splits the formation and both gets you out of the way of an attack and frees you to position yourself behind your opponent.
"But in the absence of one of the IAF sections initiating a break in the other direction to sandwich our attack, they all simply stayed in front of us.
"It all happened very fast. We were all turning very tightly - in excess of 5g or just about on the limits of the Sabre's very accurate A-4 radar ranging gun sight. And I think before we had completed more than about 270 degrees of the turn, at around 12 degrees per second, all four Hunters had been shot down.
"In each case, I got the pipper of my sight around the canopy of the Hunter for virtually a full deflection shot. Almost all our shooting throughout the war was at very high angles off – seldom less than about 30 degrees. Unlike some of the Korean combat films I had seen, nobody in our war was shot down flying straight and level.
"I developed a technique of firing very short bursts – around half a second or less. The first burst was almost a sighter, but with a fairly large bullet pattern from six machine guns, it almost invariably punctured the fuel tanks that they streamed kerosene.
"During the battle on 7 September, as we went round in the turn, I could just see, in the light of the rising sun, the plumes of fuel gushing from the tanks after my hits. Another half-second burst was then sufficient to set fire to the fuel, and, as the Hunter became a ball of flame, I would shift my aim forward to the next aircraft. The Sabre carries about 1,800 rounds of ammunition for its six 0.5 in. guns, which can therefore fire for about 15 seconds. In air combat, this is a lifetime. Every fourth or fifth round is an armor piercing bullet, and the rest are HEI - high-explosive incendiary. I am certain after this combat that I brought back more than half of my ammunition, although we didn’t have time to waste counting rounds.
"My fifth victim of this sortie started spewing smoke and then rolled on to his back at about 1,000 ft. I thought he was going to do a barrel roll, which at low altitude is a very dangerous maneuver for the opponent if the man in front knows what he's doing. I went almost on my back and then I realized I might not be able to stay with him so I took off bank and pushed the nose down. The next time I fired was at very close range - about 600 ft. or so – and his aircraft virtually blew up in front of me. None of the pilots ejected, and all of them were killed."
Alam's F-86 Sabre as depicted by official PAF artist,
Group Captain (Retd.) Syed Masood Akhtar Hussaini
In recognition of his feats during the 1965 War, Alam was awarded Pakistan's second-highest gallantry medal, the Sitara-e-Jurrat (Star of Courage) (with Bar), by the President of Pakistan, which is the highest gallantry medal that can be bestowed upon a living military person by Pakistan (the highest gallantry medal being the Nishan-e-Haider (Sign of the Lion), which is only awarded posthumously).
In 1967, Alam was one of the select group of six PAF pilots sent to Mont-de-Marsan, France for nine-months long conversion training on the PAF's newly-acquired batch of 24 advanced Dassault Mirage III fighters. Alam was subsequently given command of the PAF's first Mirage squadron, No. 5 Squadron, based at Sargodha.
Being a man of impeccable integrity, Alam was critical of the manner in which Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim was running the PAF in the early 1980s, amidst allegations of corruption and abuse of power, which was causing anger and resentment in PAF ranks. Being outspoken, Alam thought it fit to let the Air Chief know of his feelings, which, needless to say, was not taken well by the Air Chief. Alam then lodged a complaint with President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, informing the President that he had made a mistake by appointing Shamim as the Air Chief. Zia replied by pointing out that Shamim was loyal. To this, Alam retorted, "Loyalty to whom? The country or you?" This was too much for Gen. Zia and the Air Chief to swallow and Alam was prematurely forced into retirement in 1982, when he was holding the rank of Air Commodore. According to Air Marshal Ayaz Ahmed Khan, who was then serving as Vice Chief of the Air Staff, there was a lot of resentment in the PAF at Alam's forced retirement. As a mark of protest, Alam refused to receive pension from the PAF. Anwar Shamim's successor, Air Chief Marshal Jamal Ahmed Khan, tried his best to persuade Alam to accept his pension, but in vain. Alam finally accepted his pension (with arrears) under Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi in the late 1990s.
Despite the treatment meted out to him, Alam never lost faith in Pakistan or the PAF. Alam's bitterness was directed at individuals, never at institutions or the State. In an interview in 2010, Alam said, "Unfortunately we have not understood the real meaning of freedom. I have learned a lot from life. At times I do feel down, depressed and upset, but at the end of the day I know that I am a soldier and a fighter."
M.M. Alam was buried with full military honours in the graveyard at PAF Base Masroor, Karachi.
Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to Facebook
Rai Muhammad Saleh Azam
Air Commodore (Retd.) Muhammad Mahmood Alam, popularly known as "M.M. Alam", Pakistan's first fighter ace, who shot down nine Indian Air Force (IAF) jets in the 1965 India-Pakistan War, including five in a single sortie, passed away in Karachi on 18 March 2013, aged 78.
Born into a Bengali family on 6 July 1935 in Calcutta, British India, Alam completed his secondary education from Government High School in Dhaka in 1951 and joined the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) College (later Academy), Risalpur in 1952, enrolling in the 16th General Duties Pilot (GDP) Batch from which he graduated a year later. He was commissioned into the PAF on 2 October 1953.
At the outbreak of the 1965 India-Pakistan War, Alam was serving as Squadron Leader with the PAF's elite No. 11 Squadron, flying F-86F Sabres out of Sargodha Air Base.
During the War, Alam downed a total of nine Indian fighters in air-to-air combat with two additional unconfirmed probables. Alam's tally of confirmed kills comprised nine IAF Hawker Hunters. On 7 September 1965, Alam downed five IAF Hunters in less than a minute, the first four within 30 seconds, thereby establishing a world record.
John Fricker, the noted British aviation writer, wrote of M.M. Alam in his article "Thirty Seconds over Sargodha" (Air Enthusiast, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1971):
"...Mohammad Mahmood Alam is a scrap of a man who appears almost lost in the none-too-roomy cockpit of a Sabre. Yet during the 1965 conflict with India, this Pakistani squadron commander, established a combat record which has few equals in the history of jet warfare...Many pilots have scored several air victories in one sortie, and have exceeded or equaled Alam’s...shooting down up to five enemy aircraft of superior performance within a few minutes. But few are likely to be able to match his record of destroying at least three opponents – Hawker Hunters of the IAF [Indian Air Force] – within the space of somewhere around 30 seconds."
Alam's confirmed kills are as follows:
Date: 6 September 1965
Aircraft Used: F-86F Sabre
Downed Aircraft: 2× IAF Hawker Hunters
Downed Pilots: Squadron Leader Ajit Kumar Rawlley, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; 1 Unknown IAF pilot
Location: Over Taran Taran, India
Other Information: Dogfight involving 3 PAF F-86s versus 4 IAF Hunters
Date: 7 September 1965
Aircraft Used: F-86F Sabre
Downed Aircraft: 5× IAF Hawker Hunters
Downed Pilots: Squadron Leader Onkar Nath Kacker, No. 27 Sqn, POW; Squadron Leader A.B. Devayya, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; Squadron Leader Suresh B. Bhagwat, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; Flight Lieutenant B. Guha, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; Flying Officer Jagdev Singh Brar, No. 7 Sqn, KIA
Location: 1 Kill east of Sargodha near the Chenab River and 4 Kills 30 miles away over Sangla Hill - midway between Lahore and Sargodha, Pakistan
Other Information: Dogfight involving 2 PAF F-86s versus 6 IAF Hunters. All 5 aircraft shot down in a single sortie, 4 within 30 seconds. 1 AIM-9 Sidewinder Kill, 4 Gun Kills
Date: 16 September 1965
Aircraft Used: F-86F Sabre
Downed Aircraft: 2× IAF Hawker Hunters
Downed Pilots: Flying Officer Farokh Dara Bunsha, No. 7 Sqn, KIA; 1 Unknown IAF pilot
Location: Near Halwara and Adampur, India
Other Information: In a single sortie. Dogfight involving 2 IAF Hunters versus 2 PAF F-86 Sabres. 1 Gun Kill, 1 AIM-9 Sidewinder Kill
Alam next to his F-86 Sabre in September 1965 (notice the 11 Indian flags
painted on the Sabre representing 9 confirmed kills and 2 probable kills)
Below is Alam's account of his kills on 7 September 1965 as quoted by Fricker:
"As we were vectored back towards Sargodha, Akhtar called, "Contact - four Hunters", and I saw the IAF aircraft diving to attack our airfield. So I jettisoned my drops [external fuel tanks] to dive through our own ack-ack [anti-aircraft cannon] after them. But in the meantime I saw two more Hunters about 1,000 ft. to my rear, so I forgot the four in front and pulled up to go after the pair behind. The Hunters broke off their attempted attack on Sargodha, and the rear pair turned into me. I was flying much faster than they were at this stage - I must have been doing about 500 knots - so I pulled up to avoid overshooting them and then reversed to close in as they flew back towards India.
"I took the last man and dived behind him, getting very low in the process. The Hunter can out-run the Sabre, it's only about 50 knots faster, but has a much better acceleration, so it can pull away very rapidly. Since I was diving, I was going still faster, and as he was out of gun range, I fired the first of my two GAR-8 Sidewinder (air- to-air missiles) at him. In this case, we were too low and I saw the missile hit the ground short of its target.
"This area east of Sargodha, however, has lots of high tension wires, some of them as high as 100-150 ft., and when I saw the two Hunters pull up to avoid one of these cables, I fired my second Sidewinder. The missile streaked ahead of me, but I didn't see it strike. The next thing I remember was that I was overshooting one of the Hunters and when I looked behind, the cockpit canopy was missing and there was no pilot in the aircraft. He had obviously pulled up and ejected and then I saw him coming down by parachute. This pilot [Sqn. Ldr. Onkar Nath Kakar, commander of an IAF Hunter squadron] was later taken prisoner.
"I had lost sight of the other five Hunters, but I pressed on thinking maybe they would slow down. There were, of course, still only two Sabre’s pitted against the remaining five IAF aircraft. I had lots of fuel so I was prepared to fly 50-60 miles to catch up with them. We had just crossed the Chenab river when my wingman called out, "Contact - Hunters 1'o’clock," and I picked them up at the same time - five Hunters in absolutely immaculate battle formation. They were flying at about 100-200 ft., at around 480 knots and when I was in gun-fire range they saw me. They all broke in one direction, climbing and turning steeply to the left, which put them in loose line astern. This, of course, was their big mistake. If you are bounced, which means a close range approach by an enemy fighter to within less than about 3,000ft, the drill is to call a break. This is a panic maneuver to the limits of the aircraft's performance, which splits the formation and both gets you out of the way of an attack and frees you to position yourself behind your opponent.
"But in the absence of one of the IAF sections initiating a break in the other direction to sandwich our attack, they all simply stayed in front of us.
"It all happened very fast. We were all turning very tightly - in excess of 5g or just about on the limits of the Sabre's very accurate A-4 radar ranging gun sight. And I think before we had completed more than about 270 degrees of the turn, at around 12 degrees per second, all four Hunters had been shot down.
"In each case, I got the pipper of my sight around the canopy of the Hunter for virtually a full deflection shot. Almost all our shooting throughout the war was at very high angles off – seldom less than about 30 degrees. Unlike some of the Korean combat films I had seen, nobody in our war was shot down flying straight and level.
"I developed a technique of firing very short bursts – around half a second or less. The first burst was almost a sighter, but with a fairly large bullet pattern from six machine guns, it almost invariably punctured the fuel tanks that they streamed kerosene.
"During the battle on 7 September, as we went round in the turn, I could just see, in the light of the rising sun, the plumes of fuel gushing from the tanks after my hits. Another half-second burst was then sufficient to set fire to the fuel, and, as the Hunter became a ball of flame, I would shift my aim forward to the next aircraft. The Sabre carries about 1,800 rounds of ammunition for its six 0.5 in. guns, which can therefore fire for about 15 seconds. In air combat, this is a lifetime. Every fourth or fifth round is an armor piercing bullet, and the rest are HEI - high-explosive incendiary. I am certain after this combat that I brought back more than half of my ammunition, although we didn’t have time to waste counting rounds.
"My fifth victim of this sortie started spewing smoke and then rolled on to his back at about 1,000 ft. I thought he was going to do a barrel roll, which at low altitude is a very dangerous maneuver for the opponent if the man in front knows what he's doing. I went almost on my back and then I realized I might not be able to stay with him so I took off bank and pushed the nose down. The next time I fired was at very close range - about 600 ft. or so – and his aircraft virtually blew up in front of me. None of the pilots ejected, and all of them were killed."
Alam's F-86 Sabre as depicted by official PAF artist,
Group Captain (Retd.) Syed Masood Akhtar Hussaini
In recognition of his feats during the 1965 War, Alam was awarded Pakistan's second-highest gallantry medal, the Sitara-e-Jurrat (Star of Courage) (with Bar), by the President of Pakistan, which is the highest gallantry medal that can be bestowed upon a living military person by Pakistan (the highest gallantry medal being the Nishan-e-Haider (Sign of the Lion), which is only awarded posthumously).
In 1967, Alam was one of the select group of six PAF pilots sent to Mont-de-Marsan, France for nine-months long conversion training on the PAF's newly-acquired batch of 24 advanced Dassault Mirage III fighters. Alam was subsequently given command of the PAF's first Mirage squadron, No. 5 Squadron, based at Sargodha.
Being a man of impeccable integrity, Alam was critical of the manner in which Air Chief Marshal Anwar Shamim was running the PAF in the early 1980s, amidst allegations of corruption and abuse of power, which was causing anger and resentment in PAF ranks. Being outspoken, Alam thought it fit to let the Air Chief know of his feelings, which, needless to say, was not taken well by the Air Chief. Alam then lodged a complaint with President Gen. Zia-ul-Haq, informing the President that he had made a mistake by appointing Shamim as the Air Chief. Zia replied by pointing out that Shamim was loyal. To this, Alam retorted, "Loyalty to whom? The country or you?" This was too much for Gen. Zia and the Air Chief to swallow and Alam was prematurely forced into retirement in 1982, when he was holding the rank of Air Commodore. According to Air Marshal Ayaz Ahmed Khan, who was then serving as Vice Chief of the Air Staff, there was a lot of resentment in the PAF at Alam's forced retirement. As a mark of protest, Alam refused to receive pension from the PAF. Anwar Shamim's successor, Air Chief Marshal Jamal Ahmed Khan, tried his best to persuade Alam to accept his pension, but in vain. Alam finally accepted his pension (with arrears) under Air Chief Marshal Pervaiz Mehdi Qureshi in the late 1990s.
Despite the treatment meted out to him, Alam never lost faith in Pakistan or the PAF. Alam's bitterness was directed at individuals, never at institutions or the State. In an interview in 2010, Alam said, "Unfortunately we have not understood the real meaning of freedom. I have learned a lot from life. At times I do feel down, depressed and upset, but at the end of the day I know that I am a soldier and a fighter."
M.M. Alam was buried with full military honours in the graveyard at PAF Base Masroor, Karachi.
Email ThisBlogThis!Share to TwitterShare to Facebook
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
F-104 Starfighters of the PAF
•
•
Details
Created on Tuesday, 02 December 2008 16:18
Last Updated: Sunday, 04 January 2009 00:25
Published on Tuesday, 02 December 2008
F-104A 56-874 is an old PAF warhorse that had seen action in both the Indo-Pak Wars of 65 and 71. It has one confirmed Air to Air Combat kill and another Air to Ground kill. Its currently on display at Sargodha AFB .
The F-104 Starfighter was undoubtedly one of the most charismatic fighters of the 50s and 60s. It was the first Mach-2 capable fighter in the Indian Subcontinent, when it was inducted into the PAF as part of the Military Asistance Program of the CENTO. It prompted the Indian Air Force to search for a similar aircraft that would balance it.
Between 1961 and 1965, the PAF procured 14 of these aircraft. Ten single seaters and two Twin seaters were inducted till 1964. After one of the single seaters was lost in an accident (Serial no unknown), two replacement aircraft was seconded from Taiwan in Mar 65. The following table gives the individual aircraft numbers and the fates as known.
Tail # Date Rec SOC Remarks
56-802 05-Aug-61
56-803 05-Aug-61
56-804 05-Aug-61 06-Dec-71 S/L Amjad Hussain was SD by AA fire over Amritsar
56-805 05-Aug-61
56-807 05-Aug-61
56-868 05-Aug-61 17-Sep-65 F/O GA Abbasi crashed while landing in low visibility. Mystere claim (65)
56-874 05-Aug-61 Preserved at PAF Peshawar. Canberra Kill (65) HF-24 Ground Kill (71)
56-875 05-Aug-61 Pole Mounted at PAF Risalpur
56-877 05-Aug-61 07-Sep-65 F/L Amjad Hussain was SD by S/L AB Devayya (Mystere). 'Gnat FL Claim'
56-879 05-Aug-61 Preserved at PAF Masroor
56-773 08-Jun-64 12-Dec-71 W/C MH Middlecoat was SD by F/L BB Soni (MiG-21) over Kutch
56-798 01-Mar-65 Preserved at Karachi Museum Internal Hangar - Ex Taiwan
57-1309 05-Aug-61 Two Seater Trainer - Preserved at Karachi Museum
57-1312 05-Aug-61 Two Seater Trainer - Preserved at PAF Faisal
The F-104 Starfighters remained in service with Pakistan Air Force for twelve years and flew 11,690 hours. During the 1965 Pakistan-India War, the F-104s flew a total of 246 hours and 45 minutes while during the 1971 War, the F-104s flew a total of 103 hours and forty-five minutes.
Of the fourteen aircraft, two were officially lost in the 65 War and another two were lost to Indian AA fire and MiGs respectively in the 1971 conflict. Today atleast six of the original fourteen are known to be preserved at various locations in Pakistan. Only one of the aircraft has a rich combat history as far as we know. 56-874 preserved at Peshawar has a Canberra night kill in the 65 war and a confirmed HF-24 strafed on the ground at Uttarlai in the 71 Operations.
One Starfighter 56-875 is displayed on a pole at the PAF Academy in Risalpur , while 56-879 is at PAF Masroor.
F-104A 56-875 is displayed in a striking manner at the PAF Academy at Risalpur.
F-104A 56-879 in a magnificient display at PAF Masroor.
Two other PAF F-104s are preserved in the Karachi PAF Museum. These include one of the two seaters 57-1309. The PAF Museum also houses a third F-104 serialled 62-682 . This third Starfighter was a gift from Turkey and is displayed on a pedestal in a nose high attitude sporting the Turkish Air Force markings. The other Starfighter is the ex Taiwanese machine 56-798 which is displayed inside the hangar in the museum. This was reported to have been displayed at Sargodha earlier before being moved to its current home. The last of the two seaters 57-1312 is preserved at the gate of PAF Faisal near Karachi.
There were reports of a sixth PAF survivor but no information is known on its serial number. A picture of this aircraft appears in the PAF History book for 1988-98 and it is reported to be preserved at Chaklala. If this was indeed another original PAF F-104 Starfighter, it would leave two other F-104s unaccounted for, as we know one was lost Pre-1965. But it turned out that this was the same aircraft that is now displayed in Risalpur. So that left just three F-104s of whose fate we do not have information about.
F-104B 57-1312 is one of the two twin seaters used by the PAF , seen here on display at PAF Faisal.
F-104B 57-1309 is second of the two twin seaters used by the PAF , seen here on display at PAF Risalpur, before it was moved to the PAF Museum in Karachi in 1999.
John Fricker in an article 'Post-Mortem of an Air War' that appeared in Air Enthusiast in January 1972 reported that the PAF had only eight F-104s at the beginning of the war implying that atleast four were lost in accidents before the 1971 war. Fricker also mentions that the PAF was able to account for five survivors at the end of it. But we now have six survivors. Its probable that one of the six survivors was actually struck off charge before the 71 Ops commenced.
•
•
Details
Created on Tuesday, 02 December 2008 16:18
Last Updated: Sunday, 04 January 2009 00:25
Published on Tuesday, 02 December 2008
F-104A 56-874 is an old PAF warhorse that had seen action in both the Indo-Pak Wars of 65 and 71. It has one confirmed Air to Air Combat kill and another Air to Ground kill. Its currently on display at Sargodha AFB .
The F-104 Starfighter was undoubtedly one of the most charismatic fighters of the 50s and 60s. It was the first Mach-2 capable fighter in the Indian Subcontinent, when it was inducted into the PAF as part of the Military Asistance Program of the CENTO. It prompted the Indian Air Force to search for a similar aircraft that would balance it.
Between 1961 and 1965, the PAF procured 14 of these aircraft. Ten single seaters and two Twin seaters were inducted till 1964. After one of the single seaters was lost in an accident (Serial no unknown), two replacement aircraft was seconded from Taiwan in Mar 65. The following table gives the individual aircraft numbers and the fates as known.
Tail # Date Rec SOC Remarks
56-802 05-Aug-61
56-803 05-Aug-61
56-804 05-Aug-61 06-Dec-71 S/L Amjad Hussain was SD by AA fire over Amritsar
56-805 05-Aug-61
56-807 05-Aug-61
56-868 05-Aug-61 17-Sep-65 F/O GA Abbasi crashed while landing in low visibility. Mystere claim (65)
56-874 05-Aug-61 Preserved at PAF Peshawar. Canberra Kill (65) HF-24 Ground Kill (71)
56-875 05-Aug-61 Pole Mounted at PAF Risalpur
56-877 05-Aug-61 07-Sep-65 F/L Amjad Hussain was SD by S/L AB Devayya (Mystere). 'Gnat FL Claim'
56-879 05-Aug-61 Preserved at PAF Masroor
56-773 08-Jun-64 12-Dec-71 W/C MH Middlecoat was SD by F/L BB Soni (MiG-21) over Kutch
56-798 01-Mar-65 Preserved at Karachi Museum Internal Hangar - Ex Taiwan
57-1309 05-Aug-61 Two Seater Trainer - Preserved at Karachi Museum
57-1312 05-Aug-61 Two Seater Trainer - Preserved at PAF Faisal
The F-104 Starfighters remained in service with Pakistan Air Force for twelve years and flew 11,690 hours. During the 1965 Pakistan-India War, the F-104s flew a total of 246 hours and 45 minutes while during the 1971 War, the F-104s flew a total of 103 hours and forty-five minutes.
Of the fourteen aircraft, two were officially lost in the 65 War and another two were lost to Indian AA fire and MiGs respectively in the 1971 conflict. Today atleast six of the original fourteen are known to be preserved at various locations in Pakistan. Only one of the aircraft has a rich combat history as far as we know. 56-874 preserved at Peshawar has a Canberra night kill in the 65 war and a confirmed HF-24 strafed on the ground at Uttarlai in the 71 Operations.
One Starfighter 56-875 is displayed on a pole at the PAF Academy in Risalpur , while 56-879 is at PAF Masroor.
F-104A 56-875 is displayed in a striking manner at the PAF Academy at Risalpur.
F-104A 56-879 in a magnificient display at PAF Masroor.
Two other PAF F-104s are preserved in the Karachi PAF Museum. These include one of the two seaters 57-1309. The PAF Museum also houses a third F-104 serialled 62-682 . This third Starfighter was a gift from Turkey and is displayed on a pedestal in a nose high attitude sporting the Turkish Air Force markings. The other Starfighter is the ex Taiwanese machine 56-798 which is displayed inside the hangar in the museum. This was reported to have been displayed at Sargodha earlier before being moved to its current home. The last of the two seaters 57-1312 is preserved at the gate of PAF Faisal near Karachi.
There were reports of a sixth PAF survivor but no information is known on its serial number. A picture of this aircraft appears in the PAF History book for 1988-98 and it is reported to be preserved at Chaklala. If this was indeed another original PAF F-104 Starfighter, it would leave two other F-104s unaccounted for, as we know one was lost Pre-1965. But it turned out that this was the same aircraft that is now displayed in Risalpur. So that left just three F-104s of whose fate we do not have information about.
F-104B 57-1312 is one of the two twin seaters used by the PAF , seen here on display at PAF Faisal.
F-104B 57-1309 is second of the two twin seaters used by the PAF , seen here on display at PAF Risalpur, before it was moved to the PAF Museum in Karachi in 1999.
John Fricker in an article 'Post-Mortem of an Air War' that appeared in Air Enthusiast in January 1972 reported that the PAF had only eight F-104s at the beginning of the war implying that atleast four were lost in accidents before the 1971 war. Fricker also mentions that the PAF was able to account for five survivors at the end of it. But we now have six survivors. Its probable that one of the six survivors was actually struck off charge before the 71 Ops commenced.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Sunday, September 12, 2010
PAF s’ Air War Plan June 1965
Basic Philosophy of Air Defence of Pakistan:-
Since its incorporation, The Pakistan Air Force was a small size tactical Air Force and was geared for its paramount mission in terms of defensive and offensive operations be used to deny the numerically superior enemy Air Forces the free utilization of Pakistan s’ air space and as well to safeguard the country s’ strategic military and economic assets and infrastructure, including the Air Force s’ own aircraft , air bases, ADGE s’ radars from destruction at the hands of superior enemy Air Force.
The offensive mission in the first phase at the outset of hostilities was to attack the superior enemy Air Force s’ air bases, destroying as many enemy aircraft and air base infrastructure, including air base installations, radars and other facilities of POL & ammunition dumps etc. Such offensive operation would not only reduce the pressure on Pakistan s’ Air Defences; but it would also greatly facilitate the achievement of the over all control of the air space, with out which the Air Force s’ Army and Navy support operations could effectively be jeopardized by the superior enemy Air Force.
The Air War Plan was resulted from the fundamental school of thought crystallized along with final analysis contemplated by Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan Commander-in-Chief, PAF and his staff on the employment of the Air Force in the air defense battle for Pakistan in June 1962., Which was later updated and finalized on June 1965 after operation desert hawk during Rann of Kutch military duel between Indian and Pakistan Armies in the desert.
Strategic Background:-
Since 15th August, 1947., The paramount mission of the Royal Pakistan Air Force had been established by its High Command to achieve a high degree of air superiority at the outset of the war with enemy air force through Counter Air Operation.
Every Air Chief of the PAF has maintained its paramount mission with spirit and letter. Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley s’ first message delivered to the Air Force, while taking over the command of Royal Pakistan Air Force on 19th February 1949., reflected a thorough professional approach, defining its milestone. ”The sole preoccupation of every individual in this Air Force, No matter in what sphere of activity he finds himself, is to keep our aircraft flying, ready to fight, equipped and trained for war, down to the last detail.”
While, Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley releasing strategic cardinal policy for air defence of Pakistan stated, “that the Air Force take on enemy Air Force, then try to isolate the battlefield and after that give direct support to the ground forces”.
The Royal Pakistan Air Force s’ Air Headquarters directive No 11 issued in April 1949, which declared:-
“In air strategy initiative is a prerequisite to air superiority: in air tactics, it’s the key to victory.”
The air superiority proved to be a prerequisite to any successful surface military campaign in sea or at land. No operational mission, not even the routine movement of troops or logistics, was possible with out first achieving favourable air superiority by the Air Force.
The concept dates back Spain s’ Civil War of 1936. The German Luftwaffe s’ Condor legion sank a number of Republican ships, and they developed effective tactical procedure for integrating air operations with the artillery fire and movement of General Franco s’ ground forces.
The concept of air superiority was described by Prime Minister of the Britain, Sir Winston Churchill during the Second World War. “The only security upon which sound military principles will rely is that you should be master of your own air.”
The concept of air superiority and its object, scope and operational methodology in terms of tactical and strategic air operations has adequately demonstrated its track record during World War-II, Korean War and Arab Israel Wars.
Apart from above wars, during the first Indo-Pak military conflict on account of Kashmir valley. The Indian Army units led by Col. Sam Manekshaw (Later Chief of Army Staff & Field Marshal) pre empted to start landing in the Kashmir valley through massive air lift and air support sorties rendered by the Indian Air Force at 9.30 am on 27th October 1947. The Indian Air Force s’ Dakota DC-3s along 100 Dakotas from Air Lines successfully undertook the uphill task under the command of Air Commodore Baba Mehar Singh.
The PAF was severely handicapped, with only 16 Tempests on its inventory against the IAF s’ 68. Furthermore, The Government of Pakistan had prohibited its battle employment in order to avoid a full scale air war with India. Whereas, IAF s’ Tempests fighter aircraft enjoyed complete freedom of action to carry out hit and run air raids against mujahideen lashkars operating around Srinagar and valley. The Indian Army could successfully hold the battle ground to ward off mujahideen s’ guerilla warfare offensive operations by capturing Srinagar through the active and dynamic air support operations/sorties carried out by the Indian Air Force. During Poonch & Ladakh/Leh operations, The tactical utilization of the Air Force on mountain range and its valleys turned tide in favour of invading Army.
Whereas the Pak Army High Command and Army Generals of the early 50s perhaps found it difficult to understand what this new concept of air superiority was all about. Even C-in-C, Pak Army, General Douglas Gracey tried to advocate the “Air Support Vs Air Superiority” school of thought among sister services in his arbitrary and arrogant style, Without acknowledging the historical significance of Air Superioriy through Counter Air Operation with recent proven track records in Battle of Britain,Japanese Navy s' pre emptive air strikes on Pearl Harbour/Hawai US Naval Complex,Battle of Midway and World War-II.
Gracey would be remembered in our National History, who defaulted to comply the legitimate & constitutional orders issued by Governor General Pakistan Muhammah Ali Jinnah to launch attack in Kasmir to counter Indian military operations there on 26th October ,1947., leaving behind an abject disgrace to be followed by others.
General Gracey distributed a paper under title “ First Lesson from Korea” to various formations of the Pakistan Army and a copy endorsed to the C-in-C, RPAF, outlining the proposed Air Support role of the Air Force dated 29th August, 1950.
“The small Pakistan Air Force should be trained primarily for tactical support of the Pakistan Army and the Navy, and be equipped to carry out this task with suitable aircraft. Army & Air Force and Navy & Air Force cooperation must be perfected, especially as regard air reconnaissance, the production of air photos and the direct support of the Army in conjunction with artillery in the destruction of enemy tanks. The indirect tactical support of the Army by air attacks on enemy ammunition, POL and supply convoys should be studied.”
Where as mentioned earlier, Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley the Commander in Chief of the Royal Pakistan Air Force had been firm conviction on a graduated approach by the Air Force during the battle week, Because no military operation in modern warfare can succeed with out prior attainment of a favourable air situation.
Later on the Concept of the Joint Operations & Planning between the Army and the Air Force as well as the Army and the Navy could not get any practical shape at GHQ s' level, because Military ruler General Ayub Khan and his loyal C-in-C of the Army General Musa Khan had not acknowledged the paramount significance of the Air Force and the Navy for the defence of the country and thereby had been considering the Air Force as an extension of the artillery and the army due to their poor military vision and very limited elementary knowledge of strategy and tactics. Although the country was divided geographically among two parts West and East connecting through sea lanes via Indian Ocean & aerial route overflying archrival India,the Pakistan Navy was also getting lowest priority as per defence policy of the government of Pakistan, which was basically army dominated due to General Ayub Khan s' military rule in the country.
That s' why, these incompetent & mediocre Army Generals commanding the best professional army of Pakistan could not visualized the strategic role of the PAF under the air war strategy, its operational & tactical capabilities as well as limitations Vs numerically superior enemy the IAF anticipating future military conflicts between India and Pakistan on Kashmir s' core issue.
Meanwhile, PAF s' chief Air Marshal Asghar Khan tried to convince his counterpart General Musa Khan and President General Ayub Khan about the concept & operational methodology of the Joint Operations & Planning, but could not achieve any breakthrough and the Pakistan Army High Command remained engaged in its war planning in isolation from the Air Force and the Navy. Whereas, effective inter services co-operation between the air force, the navy and the army can grow only out of mutual trust and complete understanding of each other operational capabilities and limitations, which totally was lacked on part of the army !
“Air Superiority” The Strategic Milestone of PAF:-
Later on in subsequent years during sixties the controversy about air superiority vs air support continued, while the PAF was setting its course on the path of supersonic jet technology transformation in line with USAF s’ globally acknowledged professional standards. Air Marshal Asghar Khan being a very visionary strategist and Commander in Chief , Pakistan Air Force strongly advocated the case of Air Force before army dominated school of thought and hierarchy clearly stating that:
“PAF must first achieve a high degree of air superiority over the land battle areas, and it must be equipped to do this effectively.”
That s’ why Air Superiority through Counter Air Operation has been the Strategic Milestone of PAF Air War Strategy since August 1947.
Geo-Political & Strategic Factors:-
Since the time of independence, Air Force High Command kept assuming that the PAF would be fighting the numerically superior, highly trained enemy Air Force. Therefore, Air Force hierarchy wanted to raised and maintained a highly trained, motivated and professional Air Force that could destroy any enemy numerically superior Air Force that might deployed against Pakistan and which could render adequate air support to Army ground forces.
The Indian Government after humiliating military defeat of Indian Army by the Chinese Army during mountainous battles at Ladakh & NEFA in 1962 , launched a gigantic program to expand the size of the Indian Air Force. The IAF s’ strength was planned to increased from 28,000 personnel in 1962 to 100,000 personnel by 1964 and A large number of new fighter bombers squadrons and wings were planned to raised in the Air Force. An emerging sign of formidable air power threat in the future conflict with India.
The Indian Army s’ Rann of Kutch venture against Pakistan Army also turned out to be another fiasco. Soon after Kutch debacle in the desert, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bhadur Shastri announced his war agenda “India will choose a front of her own choice.” While another military encounter with China was considered a very remote chance, Pakistan would be the ultimate target of Indian Strategic designs at large, a clear writing was on the wall!
As another war was imminent on account of Kashmir s’ issue with India, Western and Eastern Punjab would be the centre of gravity during the Indo-Pak conflict. Any political venture will open the flood gates of the war. The main battle for Pakistan would be fought in the lands of Punjab and Kashmir. More over the next war would be a matter of survival for Pakistan and the Air Force was supposed to put most decisive contribution for the next Indo-Pak war on Kashmir.
The IAF s' numerical superiority in terms of air war machines & infrastructure as a consequence,these two major factors were cardinal in designing the PAF s' Air War Plan June, 1965:-
A. That the IAF s'operational assests must be attacked at its bases to reduce its numerically superiority, thereby creating an equitable balance of air power.
B. That the IAF can not be allowed the luxury of a surprise air attack,because that could render the PAF ineffective and the skies would be under enemy s' air control, leaving the army and the navy at its mercy.
Consequently, the PAF high command needed to contemplate tactically offensive deployment. Pre-Emption was therefore, to be an imperative for the PAF, rather a mere contigency plan.
Strategic Mission:-
The ultimate milestone of the PAF was to neutralize selected very vital elements of the Indian Air Force by undertaking massive pre-emptive air strikes in strength against them in order to reduce the margin of superiority of the IAF, Thereby preventing it from gaining air superiority in air battle against PAF and as well effectively providing air support missions for Pakistan Army in the land battles.
The Counter Air Operation :-
When numerical superiority was heavily tilted in favour of the Indian Air Force. A bold and meticulous operational plan envisaged initiative on the outbreak of Indo-Pak war by launching sustained and wide spread pre-emptive air strikes/ sorties after sorties by the PAF over the enemy air bases, radars and military targets, would ultimately bottle up major portion of the enemy Air Force in defensive posture and in doing so also to ensure PAF s’ operational employment for any subsequent land-air operations.
The strategic mission of the PAF was to achieve a high degree of air superiority through counter air operation at the outset of the war. It was a firm determination on the part that found the Air Force getting ever ready and able to decisively achieve air superiority in the first two days of the 1965 war.
The Anti Surface Force Operation:-
Primarily, No air support plans for the Pakistan Army had at all intended to be set aside during the preliminary rounds of the air battle with IAF. Over the just past twelve months the Air Headquarters had however, came to appreciate a possible requirement by the Army for direct air support from the very outset of hostilities. An up date feature of the plan was that a fighter bomber wing of F-86s was earmarked for the air support missions.
Rann of Kutch:-
On 5thApril,1965 The Indian Army set out to capture the disputed Rann of Kutch territory by launching three infantry brigades. The Pakistan Army took precaution of moving into an area between Chaad Bet and Biar Bet, to prevent the Indian forces from attempting the complete military occupation of Rann. The limited scale Rann of Kutch military duel between Indian and Pakistan Armies provided an opportunity to the Air Force to test and up date its air war planning and operational preparations accordingly.
Although the Air Force was not called upon to actively join the Kutch operations, but it was fully mobilized to face the eventual threat from enemy. In the light of the armed flare up in the area, The PAF s’ High Command swiftly made operational preparations to react immediately, assuming that the enemy Air Force could have committed to battle operations.
The Air Force red alert directly concerned two major air bases-Mauripur was to cover the Rann of Kutch in the south and Sargodha was to keep an eye on the IAF line up at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara in the north.
The Indian Air Force had deployed following Squadrons operating from southern sector at :-
A. Jamnagar air base
One Fighter Recce Squadron
One Fighter Bomber Squadron
One Canberra Bomber Squadron
One Gnat Fighter Detachment
B. Poona air base
One Maritime Recce Squadron
Two Vampire Fighter Squadrons
One Canberra Bomber Squadron
However, The Pakistan Air Force deployment in the southern sector enjoyed qualitative edge considered to be a fair match for the numerically superior enemy air force.
Operation Desert Hawk:-
Under the operational command order issued by the Air Force Headquarters code name “Desert Hawk” Mauripur air base, located near Karachi, had assumed its full war status and was ready for any eventuality that might emerge. Since April 8th 1965 all operational aircraft at both the air bases were ordered to operate from wartime dispersals in combat readiness and their operations rooms like the air defence operations centre at air headquarters were to be manned round the clock. The following operational steps reflected its state of readiness:-
Operational Profile:-
1. Four F-86s and four F-104s armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) were shifted from Sargodha air base and deployed at Mauripur air base for air defence missions.
2. Six F-86s & two B-57s operating from Mauripur air base were kept at one hour readiness for close support or strike missions if required.
3. Ack Ack batteries were placed to their war time locations for the defence of the air bases.
4. All F-86 s’ pilots, including undergoing training and staff courses, were recalled for active duties.
5. Group Captain Bukhari was attached to GHQ, Rawalpindi and Squadron Leader S.A.Changezi was attached to HQ 8th Division, Hyderabad to act as liaison officers.
6. Radars/Mobile observer units were deployed to war time locations.
7. Ground Combateer units were deployed at Mauripur air base and Early Warning & GCI Radar station at Badin for close range defence of installations.
8. The PAF was brought to at higher degree of readiness to timely counter the hostile designs of enemy air force.
Hot line communications:-
Meanwhile during the Rann of Kutch skirmishes, Air Marshal M Asghar Khan, Commander-in Chief Pakistan Air Force contacted his counter part in the Indian Air Force telling Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh that it would be prudent to have an agreement of keeping both the Air Forces away from local conflict of Rann because, if the IAF attacked the Pakistan Army in the Rann of Kutch areas, the PAF would feel free to retaliate any where and in any manner it saw fit, and this could lead to an immediate escalation of the local conflict beyond predictable dimensions.
Although IAF s’ Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh could hardly be expected to give a positive response to such a proposal, he clearly heeded the implied threat; the Indian Air Force did indeed stay away from the Rann of Kutch battle areas and this proved to be of great advantage to the Pakistan Army s’ military duel with Indian Army.
Wing Commander Zulfiqar Ali Khan (Later Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal) was Air Adviser to the High Commission for Pakistan in New Delhi, India, reported in a letter to C-in-C PAF dated 19th April 1965, that the IAF s’ High Command was disturbed over the PAF s’ requirement of keeping the air above the disputed area clear of all aerial activities. He wrote ,”They (the IAF senior officers) were visibly disturbed at the receipt of your message. Air Marshal M. M. Engineer wanted to know if IAF s’ Transport or Helicopter aircraft could go on supply missions to Indian Army posts in the area. I replied that we would consider any Indian aircraft entering disputed territory as violation of our air space.”
The Air Adviser further stated, ”I was asked if we were going to use fighter aircraft to stop air supply missions to Indian Army posts.”
At the same time, Air Headquarters sensing hostile air threat from enemy s’ Air Force in the southern sector; acted imaginatively, issued Command Orders that were flashed for hot scramble of PAF interceptor fighters in the event of an IAF aircraft crossing into Pakistan territory.
“The Indian fighter bomber aircraft were to be shot down with in 10 nautical miles into Pakistan territory; However military transport aircraft were to be forced down at the nearest PAF air bases around Karachi.”
First IAF s’ fighter aircraft forced down by F-86s:-
An IAF fighter crossed the international border near Rann of Kutch and set its course towards PAF s’ Early Warning & Ground Controlled Interception Radar network at Badin on 24th June, 1965.
An unexpected track appeared over the radar scopes in and around Badin. A command order was flashed to Mauripur air base to “scramble” F-86s. An ever vigilant F-86s pair scrambled from air base to intercept the enemy fighter. The Ground Controlled Interception Radar vectored F-86s pair towards Badin areas. Finally, the PAF s’ F-86s had successfully forced down IAF Ouragan fighter aircraft from 51 Auxiliary Squadron operating from IAF Jamnagar, which was on an aerial reconnaissance mission over Badin.
Indian pilot Flt.Lt. Rana Lal Chand got released on the occasion of 14th August Independence day by the Government of Pakistan.
The Rann of Kutch emergency period was very efficiently handled through operation Desert Hawk by Air Marshal M Asghar Khan, Commander-in Chief Pakistan Air Force and his air staff including Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) Air Commodore Rahim Khan and Director Operations Group Captain Zafar Chaudhry. Although the operational exercise proved to be the curtain raiser to the September war with India.
Whereas the PAF stood guard during the emergency period of operation “Desert Hawk”, Air Headquarters finalized and issued “ Air War Plan” on June 29, 1965 to all units,squadrons,wings,bases & commands.
Air War Plan of June , 1965:-
The Air Strategy of the Air War Plan of June , 1965. was worked for Counter Air Operations on top most priority and then undertaking Anti Surface Force Operations in the gradual phase of the air battle of Pakistan, Sargodha and Peshawar were to be the two major operational nucleolus for air war operations against India posing direct threat to major air bases of the IAF.
Sargodha air base operating , in conjunction with high powered Early Warning & Ground Controlled Interception radars system at Sakesar was the major centre of the PAF s’ entire air defence network in the northern and western sectors. However, Size of the force and lack of material resources prohibited any large scale dispersal of the PAF and denied to it much of the flexibility needed for its air operations.
Peshawar air base a bomber wing nucleolus was planned to deploy and to operate B-57s bomber wing for major night bombing operations along with Risalpur air base, using Samungali air base as stand by junction for rearming and refueling the bomber formations.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & Air Strike Missions Profile :-
The Air Force s’ original counter air /air strike plan therefore covered the entire string of IAF s’ air bases from Srinagar in the north up to Jamnagar in the south, along with Western borders with India.
The depth of the air strikes, dependent mainly on the radius of action at tree top level to avoid enemy radar‘s detection, extended up to Ambala air base in the case of aircraft operating from West Pakistan, and to Kalaikunda air base near Calcutta for aircraft operating from Dacca in East Pakistan.
IAF Battle Deployment before 1965 War:-
Whereas, numerically superior Indian Air Force faced no such limitations and operational constraints. The formidable fighter bomber force deployed at Pathankot, Adampur, Ambala,Agra and Halwara, the availability of large immediate reserves and the flexible choice of air operations from any number of integrated jet air bases, provided them a superiority and dynamic advantage in any course of action they wished to follow.
Mysteres:
No. 1 Sqn
No. 3 Sqn
No. 8 Sqn
No. 31 Sqn
No. 32 Sqn
Hunters:
No. 7 Sqn
No. 27 Sqn
No. 20 Sqn
No. 14 Sqn (East)
No. 17 Sqn (East)
No. 37 Sqn (East)
Gnats:
No. 2 Sqn
No. 9 Sqn
No. 23 Sqn
Canberra:
No. 5 Sqn
No. 16 Sqn (East)
No. 35 Sqn
No. 106 SPR Sqn
Jet Bomber Conversion Unit Other Types:
No. 28 Sqn - MiG-21
No. 45/220 Sqn - Vampire
No. 24 Sqn - Vampire (East)
No. 4 Sqn - Ouragan (East)
• IAF Western Air Command ( Air Vice Marshal R. Rajaram)
o Pathankot (Gp. Capt. Roshan Suri)
 No.28 MiG-21 (Small Dett: 2) (Wg. Cdr. MSD Wollen) >>> Moved to Adampur
 No.45/No.220 Vampire (Sqn. Ldr. SK Dahar) >>> Moved to Hindon
 No.3 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. Paul Ruby)
 No.31 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. WM Goodman)
 No.23 Gnat (Dett: 8 under S/L J W Greene)
o Halwara (Gp. Capt. GKK John)
 No.7 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. ATRH Zachariah)
 No.27 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. Jog)
 No.20 Hunter (Dett: 4-6 under S/L B K Bishnoi att to No.7 Later)
 No.2 Gnat (Dett: 4 under S/L R Dhawan - Later W/C Bharat Singh)
o Adampur (Gp. Capt. WVA Lloyd)
 No.1 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. OP Taneja)
 No.8 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. Milikins)
 No.28 MiG-21 (Dett: 4)
o Ambala (Gp. Capt. DE Bouchier)
 No.2 Gnat (Main Dett: 8) (Wg. Cdr. Bharat Singh)
 No.23 Gnat (Main Dett.) (Wg. Cdr. S. Raghavendran)
o Agra
 No.5 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. PP Singh)
 No.35 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. Bakshish Singh)
 No.2 Gnat (Dett: 4)
o Hindon
 No.20 Hunter (Main Dett.) (Wg. Cdr. Amrit Lal Bajaj)
• IAF Eastern Air Command ( Air Vice Marshal Shivdev Singh)
o Kalaikonda (Gp. Capt. MB Naik)
 No.14 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. DA La Fontaine)
 No.16 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. PM Wilson) >>> Moved to WAC Agra
 No.24 Vampire (Sqn. Ldr. M. Banerji)
o Baghdogra (Wg. Cdr. MB Singh)
o Hashimara
 No.4 Ouragan (Sqn. Ldr. MM Singh)
o Chabua
 No.17 Hunter
o Gauhati
 No.37 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. McNeil) >>> Moved to WAC
Notes:
1. No.45/220 Vampire squadron was an amalgamated unit with 16 Vampires under the command of a Sqn. Ldr.
2. No.28 MiG-21 squadron had only nine aircraft as establishment.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & PAF Operational Deployment:-
Since the F-86 was the chief weapon system and mainstay of Pakistan Air Force. The F-86 fighter bomber aircraft was to play the major operational role in accordance with air war plan entailed extensive utilization on very massive level.
PAF fighter bomber squadrons of F-86s were required to operate from Peshawar, Sargodha, Lahore and Mauripur air bases against enemy air bases of Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara,Ambala in the northern sector,Jhodpur, Bhuj and Jamnagar in southern sector and Radar installations at Amritsar, Ferozpur, Patiala and Ambala in the northern sector and Porbander in the southern sector.
With in theses strike missions each F-86s formation of eight aircraft was allocated an alternative target.
PAF Battle Deployment before 1965 War:-
F-86s Sabre
Fighter Bomber & Interceptors)
No. 5 Sqn
No. 11 Sqn
No. 14 Sqn
No. 15 Sqn
No. 16 Sqn
No. 17 Sqn
No. 18 Sqn
No. 19 Sqn
B-57s MartinMedium Night Bomber)
No. 7 Sqn
No. 8 Sqn
No. 24 Sqn (Elint/ECM/ESM/Phographic & Reconnaissance)
F-104s Star fighter(Mach 2 Interceptor)
No. 9 Sqn
T-33: Advanced Training Jet
No. 20 (Photograpic & Reconnaissance)
No. 2 Sqn
SA-16: Grumman Albatross Amphibious Maritime Reconnaissance
No. 4 Sqn
Tactical Transport & Communication
No. 6 Sqn ( Hercules C-130s)
No.12 Sqn
West Pakistan:-
o Sargodha (Gp. Capt. M.Z.Masud)
 No.5 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Sarfraz A. Rafiqui
 No.9 Sqn F-104 ( Sqn. Ldr. M. L. Middlecoat)
 No.11 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. M.M.Alam)
 No.15 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. M Arshad)
 No.20 Sqn R T-33 (Sqn. Ldr. M.M.Ahmed)
o Mauripur (Gp. Capt. Khaqan Abbasi)
 No.7 Sqn B-57s (Sqn. Ldr. Najeeb A. Khan) Later moved to Peshawar in September 1965.
 No.8 Sqn B-57s (Sqn. Ldr. Rais A. Rafi) Later moved to Peshawar in September 1965.
 No.16 Sqn F-86 (Sqn.Ldr. A.A.Randhawa)
 No.17 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. A. Daudpota) Later shifted to Sargodha in September.
 No.18 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Alauddin Butch) Later shifted to Sargodha in September.
 No.2 Sqn T-33 (Sqn. Ldr. Khurshid A. Mirza) Later a Dett of 4 moved to Sargodha
 No.4 Sqn SA-16 (Sqn. Ldr. Afsar K. Jadoon)
o Peshawar (Wing. Cdr. Amanullah)
 No.19 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. S. Sajjad Haider)
 No.24 Sqn RB-57Fs (Sqn. Ldr. M. Iqbal)
o Chaklala (Gp. Capt. E.G.Hall)
 No.6 Sqn C-130s (Wing. Cdr. A Masood Khan)
 No.12 Sqn Comp/Transport (Sqn. Ldr.M. M.Suhail)
o Risalpur ( Gp. Capt. C.R.Nawaz)
 Trainers Sqn T-6Gs Harvard (Sqn. Ldr. M.Yunis)
East Pakistan:-
o Dacca (Gp. Capt. Ghulam Haider)
 No.14 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Shabbir H. Syed)
Notes:
1. No.4 S-16 maritime reccee squadron had only four aircraft.
2. No.24 RB-57F Elint squadron had only four aircraft.
3. No.20 RT-33 squadron had only six aircraft
4. Every air base had its one T-33.
5. Four Bristal Freighter Transport aircraft kept in stores were readied to join C-130s.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & Operational Methodology:-
The air strike F-86s force was required to fly at tree top level, as to remain beneath the IAF s’ Radar Stations.
Each F-86s formation of 8 aircraft was required to attack IAF s’ air base, exclusively using six machine guns fire destroying enemy aircraft on priority.
Each F-86s formation of 8 aircraft was required to undertake 2-3 strafing runs on enemy targets for each mission/sortie.
The time over target (TOT) for each mission on the first day of opening hostilities, was defined to be 15 minutes before sunset.
The critical issue of the timing of the initial air strike missions by the fighter bomber force of F-86s before sun set was determined through lengthy debates held at High Command Level in the light of material factors and numerical superiority in favour of the Indian Air Force.
These were the major factors why the PAF High Command chose the timing of air strike missions 15 minutes before sunset:-
Timing of the first air strike missions:-
1. The Pakistan Air Force, a small air force countering a numerically superior the Indian Air Force , would not have the capability to deliver a decisive crippling blow in a single assault and could well provoked large scale enemy air force massive retaliation by resorting to one. Therefore, the timing selection in the early morning was not considered for initial air strike missions.
2. Since Second World War, air strike missions are carried out at dawn, as anticipated the numerically superior IAF would be ever vigilant to face the adversary. Several flights of Hunters, Gnats and Mysteres deployed at air bases on air defence alert duty would be waiting at the end of the runways on five minute alert at dawn since morning. It was carefully calculated to be most unlikely that they would have stayed at this state of readiness indefinitely.
3. The IAF state of alert would have past its peak, when no air raids had materialized with in two to three hours since dawn the IAF would more than likely have lessened the high alert and switched off some of the radars.
4. Therefore, air strike missions carried out against IAF major air bases 15 minutes before sunset by the PAF would achieve an element of complete surprise, pulverizing the enemy in a state of shock and nerve shattering blow by delivering devastating blitzkrieg.
5. The major portion of the Indian Air Force would suppose to be caught on the ground.
6. By carrying out a dusk air strike missions 15 minutes before sunset, on the other hand, The PAF would be safe from an immediate counter attacks from enemy air force; It could sustain enemy pressure during the night relatively safely and would reasonably well prepared by the next morning to face reprisals as also ready to deliver further air strike missions against enemy air force.
The air strike missions operating except from Peshawar air base, were to be repeated the next day, making 15 minutes before sun rise as their time over target. From Mauripur air base, four T-33s were also configured to supplement the F-86s formations for air strike missions.
Lahore air base located nearest to the Indian border was to be activated for occasional operational utilization since first week of the war at short notice. Two formations of eight F-86s each from Mauripur and Peshawar air bases were to move in there at six hours notice, thereby assembling a single largest formation of 16 aircraft for initial air strike mission against Ambala airbase to be led by Sqn Ldr Sajad Haider OC 19 Sqn along with Sqn Ldr Waqar Azim OC 17 Sqn, as a staging air base. The Lahore runway lenght was 6000 feet, therefore both the F-86s formations were to be ensured fully operational on the runway day and night taking off and landing practice as per specific order issued by C-in-C Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan in a mission briefing held at Air Headquarters on June 28, 1965.
The F-86s Squadron operating from Dacca air base, East Pakistan was required to strike enemy major air base at Kalaikunda, located near Calcutta by dawn only on the very next day of the Indo-Pak war.
The major portion of the fighter bomber F-86s Squadrons force was to be deployed at Sargodha air base as a main nucleolus of air strike and other operational missions, leaving one F-86s Squadron each at Peshawar, Mauripur and Dacca air bases.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & Night Bombing Missions Profile:-
The paramount mission of the B-57s Bomber Wing night bombing operations was to deny the numerically superior Indian Air Force, Thereby to sustain the pressure of the fighter bomber F-86s force s’ air strike missions at dusk, the PAF s’ Bomber Wing of B-57s operating from Mauripur and Peshawar was to bomb enemy aircraft on the ground, runways, hangars, fuel and ammunition dumps at major IAF s’ air bases at Jamnagar, Adampur, Halwara and Pathankot through out the first night of the air operations, starting at 2030 and ending an hour before sun rise the next day.
The Bomber B-57s s’ formation recovering at Sargodha air base after their first air strike mission at Adampur and Halwara were to turnaround and leave for Agra and Palm air bases.
The Bomber formations recovering at Peshawar air base were to make a second bombing run to Adampur and Halwara; or hit the enemy aircraft parked at Ambala and Chandigarh air bases as alternatives.
Old work horse propeller training aircraft in action:-
The Harvard T-6Gs Training Squadron from Risalpur air base was required to harass the Indian Army on the first night in the areas; Amritsar-Jullunder axis and Ferozpur-Ludhiana axis operating from Chaklala & Lahore as staging air bases, assigned mission of night offensive road recce.
The operational utilization of the Harvard aircraft was fully studied and its operational missions in the coming September war could be attributed to the Operation Desert Hawk.
Defensive Counter Air Operation & Air Defence Command Profile:-
As per Air War Plan of June , 1965., the Air Defence Battle of West and East Pakistan during the hostilities with India was to be commanded by Air Officer Commanding(AOC) Air Defence, as per requirement of the emerging air war scenario, from the Interceptor fighters force detailed at its disposal. The force comprised the following squadrons, as Sargodha air base would be the major centre of gravity during war.
1. One F-104s Squadron armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) deployed at Sargodha airbase.
2. One F-86s Squadron armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) deployed at Sargodha airbase.
A formation of four F-86s Interceptor fighters armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) was also earmarked for Peshawar airbase along with another formation of four F-86s Interceptor fighters armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) would be sent to Mauripur airbase simultaneously from Sargodha air base. Apart from this, a portion of the F-86s Squadrons operating from Peshawar, Mauripur and Dacca were also assigned to air defence missions.
A Meticulous Air War Plan !
From critical prospective and analysis, An intricate air war plan that had all the elements of dynamic approach, daring initiative and surprise which are essential for success in a strategic situation tilted heavily in favour of the superior enemy Air Force. The meticulous air war plan was contemplated by Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan Commander-in-Chief, PAF and his Air Staff on the employment of the Pakistan Air Force in the air defense battle for Pakistan. It was kept up-to-date and modified as strategic circumstances demanded.
Offensive Counter Air Operation s’ inherent advantages:-
A. Offensive Operation allows the attacker to seize the initiative, capitalize the optimum level capabilities of the Air Force and concentrate strength Vs weakness.
B. It carries the air war to the enemy centre of nucleolus, reduces the number of offensive sorties that numerically superior enemy Air Force can mount and forces enemy Air Force to detailed a substantial portion of its total air force s’ Squadrons to dedicated defensive operations.
C. It can better exploit the three dimensions space of the skies, the vagaries of light and weather and the masking effect of terrain.
D. It denies the enemy air force a sanctuary.
The Strategic Parametres/Levels of the Air War Plan June, 1965 were thoroughly been worked out in advance as well keeping the operational levels of the air bases, wings & squadrons through periodic exercises at par with strategic milestone of the air battle for Pakistan:-
1. Offensive Counter Air Operation
2. Defensive Counter Air Operation
3. Anti Surface Force Operation
Although some tactical level changes and up dates were made by Air Marshal M Nur Khan, C-in-C, the PAF in the light of imminent air battle scenario with enemy air force , thereby activating Air Force on phase-I, II & III during August 1965
The ultimate success of a war plan depends not so much on the plan itself, as upon the human response which the actual situation evokes Courage, Dedication, Sacrifice, Inspiring Leadership and Accurate timely Judgment form part of no man made plan, but it is these very attributes which, in moments of critical danger and anxiety, manifest or absent themselves to tilt the balance of divine fate between success and failure, victory and defeat in the annals of air warfare.
The war plan would have been put on supreme test during the Indo-Pak war with in three months by the highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional Air Force against the numerically superior enemy Air Force.
The Pakistan Air Force rose to the decisive air battle for Pakistan under this air war plan during the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and returned with flying colours, registering its name in golden words in the annals of air warfare.
Pakistani Nation s’ debt to its Air Force “Those wonderful young men’: Never have so many owed so much to so few.”
Bibliography:-
1.“The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988.By: Shaheen Foundation ,Islamabad.”
2.“The History of the Pakistan Air Force 1947-1982.By: Shabbir Hussain & Sqn Ldr. M.Tariq Qureshi.”
3.” Battle for Pakistan” The Air War of 1965. by: John Fricker
4. “The First Round” By Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan,C-in-C,The Pakistan Air Force
5. The Story of the Indian Air Force”Bharat Rakshak”
6.” A History of the Pakistan Army” by: Col.Brian Cloughley
7. “Memoirs” by: Lt. General Gul Hassan,C-in-C,The Pakistan Army
8.” Fiza’ya
syche of The Pakistan Air Force” by.Singh & R.Rakhye
Copyright © Arshad Hussain.
PAF s’ Air War Plan June 1965
Basic Philosophy of Air Defence of Pakistan:-
Since its incorporation, The Pakistan Air Force was a small size tactical Air Force and was geared for its paramount mission in terms of defensive and offensive operations be used to deny the numerically superior enemy Air Forces the free utilization of Pakistan s’ air space and as well to safeguard the country s’ strategic military and economic assets and infrastructure, including the Air Force s’ own aircraft , air bases, ADGE s’ radars from destruction at the hands of superior enemy Air Force.
The offensive mission in the first phase at the outset of hostilities was to attack the superior enemy Air Force s’ air bases, destroying as many enemy aircraft and air base infrastructure, including air base installations, radars and other facilities of POL & ammunition dumps etc. Such offensive operation would not only reduce the pressure on Pakistan s’ Air Defences; but it would also greatly facilitate the achievement of the over all control of the air space, with out which the Air Force s’ Army and Navy support operations could effectively be jeopardized by the superior enemy Air Force.
The Air War Plan was resulted from the fundamental school of thought crystallized along with final analysis contemplated by Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan Commander-in-Chief, PAF and his staff on the employment of the Air Force in the air defense battle for Pakistan in June 1962., Which was later updated and finalized on June 1965 after operation desert hawk during Rann of Kutch military duel between Indian and Pakistan Armies in the desert.
Strategic Background:-
Since 15th August, 1947., The paramount mission of the Royal Pakistan Air Force had been established by its High Command to achieve a high degree of air superiority at the outset of the war with enemy air force through Counter Air Operation.
Every Air Chief of the PAF has maintained its paramount mission with spirit and letter. Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley s’ first message delivered to the Air Force, while taking over the command of Royal Pakistan Air Force on 19th February 1949., reflected a thorough professional approach, defining its milestone. ”The sole preoccupation of every individual in this Air Force, No matter in what sphere of activity he finds himself, is to keep our aircraft flying, ready to fight, equipped and trained for war, down to the last detail.”
While, Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley releasing strategic cardinal policy for air defence of Pakistan stated, “that the Air Force take on enemy Air Force, then try to isolate the battlefield and after that give direct support to the ground forces”.
The Royal Pakistan Air Force s’ Air Headquarters directive No 11 issued in April 1949, which declared:-
“In air strategy initiative is a prerequisite to air superiority: in air tactics, it’s the key to victory.”
The air superiority proved to be a prerequisite to any successful surface military campaign in sea or at land. No operational mission, not even the routine movement of troops or logistics, was possible with out first achieving favourable air superiority by the Air Force.
The concept dates back Spain s’ Civil War of 1936. The German Luftwaffe s’ Condor legion sank a number of Republican ships, and they developed effective tactical procedure for integrating air operations with the artillery fire and movement of General Franco s’ ground forces.
The concept of air superiority was described by Prime Minister of the Britain, Sir Winston Churchill during the Second World War. “The only security upon which sound military principles will rely is that you should be master of your own air.”
The concept of air superiority and its object, scope and operational methodology in terms of tactical and strategic air operations has adequately demonstrated its track record during World War-II, Korean War and Arab Israel Wars.
Apart from above wars, during the first Indo-Pak military conflict on account of Kashmir valley. The Indian Army units led by Col. Sam Manekshaw (Later Chief of Army Staff & Field Marshal) pre empted to start landing in the Kashmir valley through massive air lift and air support sorties rendered by the Indian Air Force at 9.30 am on 27th October 1947. The Indian Air Force s’ Dakota DC-3s along 100 Dakotas from Air Lines successfully undertook the uphill task under the command of Air Commodore Baba Mehar Singh.
The PAF was severely handicapped, with only 16 Tempests on its inventory against the IAF s’ 68. Furthermore, The Government of Pakistan had prohibited its battle employment in order to avoid a full scale air war with India. Whereas, IAF s’ Tempests fighter aircraft enjoyed complete freedom of action to carry out hit and run air raids against mujahideen lashkars operating around Srinagar and valley. The Indian Army could successfully hold the battle ground to ward off mujahideen s’ guerilla warfare offensive operations by capturing Srinagar through the active and dynamic air support operations/sorties carried out by the Indian Air Force. During Poonch & Ladakh/Leh operations, The tactical utilization of the Air Force on mountain range and its valleys turned tide in favour of invading Army.
Whereas the Pak Army High Command and Army Generals of the early 50s perhaps found it difficult to understand what this new concept of air superiority was all about. Even C-in-C, Pak Army, General Douglas Gracey tried to advocate the “Air Support Vs Air Superiority” school of thought among sister services in his arbitrary and arrogant style, Without acknowledging the historical significance of Air Superioriy through Counter Air Operation with recent proven track records in Battle of Britain,Japanese Navy s' pre emptive air strikes on Pearl Harbour/Hawai US Naval Complex,Battle of Midway and World War-II.
Gracey would be remembered in our National History, who defaulted to comply the legitimate & constitutional orders issued by Governor General Pakistan Muhammah Ali Jinnah to launch attack in Kasmir to counter Indian military operations there on 26th October ,1947., leaving behind an abject disgrace to be followed by others.
General Gracey distributed a paper under title “ First Lesson from Korea” to various formations of the Pakistan Army and a copy endorsed to the C-in-C, RPAF, outlining the proposed Air Support role of the Air Force dated 29th August, 1950.
“The small Pakistan Air Force should be trained primarily for tactical support of the Pakistan Army and the Navy, and be equipped to carry out this task with suitable aircraft. Army & Air Force and Navy & Air Force cooperation must be perfected, especially as regard air reconnaissance, the production of air photos and the direct support of the Army in conjunction with artillery in the destruction of enemy tanks. The indirect tactical support of the Army by air attacks on enemy ammunition, POL and supply convoys should be studied.”
Where as mentioned earlier, Air Vice Marshal Sir R L R Atcherley the Commander in Chief of the Royal Pakistan Air Force had been firm conviction on a graduated approach by the Air Force during the battle week, Because no military operation in modern warfare can succeed with out prior attainment of a favourable air situation.
Later on the Concept of the Joint Operations & Planning between the Army and the Air Force as well as the Army and the Navy could not get any practical shape at GHQ s' level, because Military ruler General Ayub Khan and his loyal C-in-C of the Army General Musa Khan had not acknowledged the paramount significance of the Air Force and the Navy for the defence of the country and thereby had been considering the Air Force as an extension of the artillery and the army due to their poor military vision and very limited elementary knowledge of strategy and tactics. Although the country was divided geographically among two parts West and East connecting through sea lanes via Indian Ocean & aerial route overflying archrival India,the Pakistan Navy was also getting lowest priority as per defence policy of the government of Pakistan, which was basically army dominated due to General Ayub Khan s' military rule in the country.
That s' why, these incompetent & mediocre Army Generals commanding the best professional army of Pakistan could not visualized the strategic role of the PAF under the air war strategy, its operational & tactical capabilities as well as limitations Vs numerically superior enemy the IAF anticipating future military conflicts between India and Pakistan on Kashmir s' core issue.
Meanwhile, PAF s' chief Air Marshal Asghar Khan tried to convince his counterpart General Musa Khan and President General Ayub Khan about the concept & operational methodology of the Joint Operations & Planning, but could not achieve any breakthrough and the Pakistan Army High Command remained engaged in its war planning in isolation from the Air Force and the Navy. Whereas, effective inter services co-operation between the air force, the navy and the army can grow only out of mutual trust and complete understanding of each other operational capabilities and limitations, which totally was lacked on part of the army !
“Air Superiority” The Strategic Milestone of PAF:-
Later on in subsequent years during sixties the controversy about air superiority vs air support continued, while the PAF was setting its course on the path of supersonic jet technology transformation in line with USAF s’ globally acknowledged professional standards. Air Marshal Asghar Khan being a very visionary strategist and Commander in Chief , Pakistan Air Force strongly advocated the case of Air Force before army dominated school of thought and hierarchy clearly stating that:
“PAF must first achieve a high degree of air superiority over the land battle areas, and it must be equipped to do this effectively.”
That s’ why Air Superiority through Counter Air Operation has been the Strategic Milestone of PAF Air War Strategy since August 1947.
Geo-Political & Strategic Factors:-
Since the time of independence, Air Force High Command kept assuming that the PAF would be fighting the numerically superior, highly trained enemy Air Force. Therefore, Air Force hierarchy wanted to raised and maintained a highly trained, motivated and professional Air Force that could destroy any enemy numerically superior Air Force that might deployed against Pakistan and which could render adequate air support to Army ground forces.
The Indian Government after humiliating military defeat of Indian Army by the Chinese Army during mountainous battles at Ladakh & NEFA in 1962 , launched a gigantic program to expand the size of the Indian Air Force. The IAF s’ strength was planned to increased from 28,000 personnel in 1962 to 100,000 personnel by 1964 and A large number of new fighter bombers squadrons and wings were planned to raised in the Air Force. An emerging sign of formidable air power threat in the future conflict with India.
The Indian Army s’ Rann of Kutch venture against Pakistan Army also turned out to be another fiasco. Soon after Kutch debacle in the desert, Indian Prime Minister Lal Bhadur Shastri announced his war agenda “India will choose a front of her own choice.” While another military encounter with China was considered a very remote chance, Pakistan would be the ultimate target of Indian Strategic designs at large, a clear writing was on the wall!
As another war was imminent on account of Kashmir s’ issue with India, Western and Eastern Punjab would be the centre of gravity during the Indo-Pak conflict. Any political venture will open the flood gates of the war. The main battle for Pakistan would be fought in the lands of Punjab and Kashmir. More over the next war would be a matter of survival for Pakistan and the Air Force was supposed to put most decisive contribution for the next Indo-Pak war on Kashmir.
The IAF s' numerical superiority in terms of air war machines & infrastructure as a consequence,these two major factors were cardinal in designing the PAF s' Air War Plan June, 1965:-
A. That the IAF s'operational assests must be attacked at its bases to reduce its numerically superiority, thereby creating an equitable balance of air power.
B. That the IAF can not be allowed the luxury of a surprise air attack,because that could render the PAF ineffective and the skies would be under enemy s' air control, leaving the army and the navy at its mercy.
Consequently, the PAF high command needed to contemplate tactically offensive deployment. Pre-Emption was therefore, to be an imperative for the PAF, rather a mere contigency plan.
Strategic Mission:-
The ultimate milestone of the PAF was to neutralize selected very vital elements of the Indian Air Force by undertaking massive pre-emptive air strikes in strength against them in order to reduce the margin of superiority of the IAF, Thereby preventing it from gaining air superiority in air battle against PAF and as well effectively providing air support missions for Pakistan Army in the land battles.
The Counter Air Operation :-
When numerical superiority was heavily tilted in favour of the Indian Air Force. A bold and meticulous operational plan envisaged initiative on the outbreak of Indo-Pak war by launching sustained and wide spread pre-emptive air strikes/ sorties after sorties by the PAF over the enemy air bases, radars and military targets, would ultimately bottle up major portion of the enemy Air Force in defensive posture and in doing so also to ensure PAF s’ operational employment for any subsequent land-air operations.
The strategic mission of the PAF was to achieve a high degree of air superiority through counter air operation at the outset of the war. It was a firm determination on the part that found the Air Force getting ever ready and able to decisively achieve air superiority in the first two days of the 1965 war.
The Anti Surface Force Operation:-
Primarily, No air support plans for the Pakistan Army had at all intended to be set aside during the preliminary rounds of the air battle with IAF. Over the just past twelve months the Air Headquarters had however, came to appreciate a possible requirement by the Army for direct air support from the very outset of hostilities. An up date feature of the plan was that a fighter bomber wing of F-86s was earmarked for the air support missions.
Rann of Kutch:-
On 5thApril,1965 The Indian Army set out to capture the disputed Rann of Kutch territory by launching three infantry brigades. The Pakistan Army took precaution of moving into an area between Chaad Bet and Biar Bet, to prevent the Indian forces from attempting the complete military occupation of Rann. The limited scale Rann of Kutch military duel between Indian and Pakistan Armies provided an opportunity to the Air Force to test and up date its air war planning and operational preparations accordingly.
Although the Air Force was not called upon to actively join the Kutch operations, but it was fully mobilized to face the eventual threat from enemy. In the light of the armed flare up in the area, The PAF s’ High Command swiftly made operational preparations to react immediately, assuming that the enemy Air Force could have committed to battle operations.
The Air Force red alert directly concerned two major air bases-Mauripur was to cover the Rann of Kutch in the south and Sargodha was to keep an eye on the IAF line up at Pathankot, Adampur and Halwara in the north.
The Indian Air Force had deployed following Squadrons operating from southern sector at :-
A. Jamnagar air base
One Fighter Recce Squadron
One Fighter Bomber Squadron
One Canberra Bomber Squadron
One Gnat Fighter Detachment
B. Poona air base
One Maritime Recce Squadron
Two Vampire Fighter Squadrons
One Canberra Bomber Squadron
However, The Pakistan Air Force deployment in the southern sector enjoyed qualitative edge considered to be a fair match for the numerically superior enemy air force.
Operation Desert Hawk:-
Under the operational command order issued by the Air Force Headquarters code name “Desert Hawk” Mauripur air base, located near Karachi, had assumed its full war status and was ready for any eventuality that might emerge. Since April 8th 1965 all operational aircraft at both the air bases were ordered to operate from wartime dispersals in combat readiness and their operations rooms like the air defence operations centre at air headquarters were to be manned round the clock. The following operational steps reflected its state of readiness:-
Operational Profile:-
1. Four F-86s and four F-104s armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) were shifted from Sargodha air base and deployed at Mauripur air base for air defence missions.
2. Six F-86s & two B-57s operating from Mauripur air base were kept at one hour readiness for close support or strike missions if required.
3. Ack Ack batteries were placed to their war time locations for the defence of the air bases.
4. All F-86 s’ pilots, including undergoing training and staff courses, were recalled for active duties.
5. Group Captain Bukhari was attached to GHQ, Rawalpindi and Squadron Leader S.A.Changezi was attached to HQ 8th Division, Hyderabad to act as liaison officers.
6. Radars/Mobile observer units were deployed to war time locations.
7. Ground Combateer units were deployed at Mauripur air base and Early Warning & GCI Radar station at Badin for close range defence of installations.
8. The PAF was brought to at higher degree of readiness to timely counter the hostile designs of enemy air force.
Hot line communications:-
Meanwhile during the Rann of Kutch skirmishes, Air Marshal M Asghar Khan, Commander-in Chief Pakistan Air Force contacted his counter part in the Indian Air Force telling Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh that it would be prudent to have an agreement of keeping both the Air Forces away from local conflict of Rann because, if the IAF attacked the Pakistan Army in the Rann of Kutch areas, the PAF would feel free to retaliate any where and in any manner it saw fit, and this could lead to an immediate escalation of the local conflict beyond predictable dimensions.
Although IAF s’ Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh could hardly be expected to give a positive response to such a proposal, he clearly heeded the implied threat; the Indian Air Force did indeed stay away from the Rann of Kutch battle areas and this proved to be of great advantage to the Pakistan Army s’ military duel with Indian Army.
Wing Commander Zulfiqar Ali Khan (Later Chief of the Air Staff Air Chief Marshal) was Air Adviser to the High Commission for Pakistan in New Delhi, India, reported in a letter to C-in-C PAF dated 19th April 1965, that the IAF s’ High Command was disturbed over the PAF s’ requirement of keeping the air above the disputed area clear of all aerial activities. He wrote ,”They (the IAF senior officers) were visibly disturbed at the receipt of your message. Air Marshal M. M. Engineer wanted to know if IAF s’ Transport or Helicopter aircraft could go on supply missions to Indian Army posts in the area. I replied that we would consider any Indian aircraft entering disputed territory as violation of our air space.”
The Air Adviser further stated, ”I was asked if we were going to use fighter aircraft to stop air supply missions to Indian Army posts.”
At the same time, Air Headquarters sensing hostile air threat from enemy s’ Air Force in the southern sector; acted imaginatively, issued Command Orders that were flashed for hot scramble of PAF interceptor fighters in the event of an IAF aircraft crossing into Pakistan territory.
“The Indian fighter bomber aircraft were to be shot down with in 10 nautical miles into Pakistan territory; However military transport aircraft were to be forced down at the nearest PAF air bases around Karachi.”
First IAF s’ fighter aircraft forced down by F-86s:-
An IAF fighter crossed the international border near Rann of Kutch and set its course towards PAF s’ Early Warning & Ground Controlled Interception Radar network at Badin on 24th June, 1965.
An unexpected track appeared over the radar scopes in and around Badin. A command order was flashed to Mauripur air base to “scramble” F-86s. An ever vigilant F-86s pair scrambled from air base to intercept the enemy fighter. The Ground Controlled Interception Radar vectored F-86s pair towards Badin areas. Finally, the PAF s’ F-86s had successfully forced down IAF Ouragan fighter aircraft from 51 Auxiliary Squadron operating from IAF Jamnagar, which was on an aerial reconnaissance mission over Badin.
Indian pilot Flt.Lt. Rana Lal Chand got released on the occasion of 14th August Independence day by the Government of Pakistan.
The Rann of Kutch emergency period was very efficiently handled through operation Desert Hawk by Air Marshal M Asghar Khan, Commander-in Chief Pakistan Air Force and his air staff including Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) Air Commodore Rahim Khan and Director Operations Group Captain Zafar Chaudhry. Although the operational exercise proved to be the curtain raiser to the September war with India.
Whereas the PAF stood guard during the emergency period of operation “Desert Hawk”, Air Headquarters finalized and issued “ Air War Plan” on June 29, 1965 to all units,squadrons,wings,bases & commands.
Air War Plan of June , 1965:-
The Air Strategy of the Air War Plan of June , 1965. was worked for Counter Air Operations on top most priority and then undertaking Anti Surface Force Operations in the gradual phase of the air battle of Pakistan, Sargodha and Peshawar were to be the two major operational nucleolus for air war operations against India posing direct threat to major air bases of the IAF.
Sargodha air base operating , in conjunction with high powered Early Warning & Ground Controlled Interception radars system at Sakesar was the major centre of the PAF s’ entire air defence network in the northern and western sectors. However, Size of the force and lack of material resources prohibited any large scale dispersal of the PAF and denied to it much of the flexibility needed for its air operations.
Peshawar air base a bomber wing nucleolus was planned to deploy and to operate B-57s bomber wing for major night bombing operations along with Risalpur air base, using Samungali air base as stand by junction for rearming and refueling the bomber formations.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & Air Strike Missions Profile :-
The Air Force s’ original counter air /air strike plan therefore covered the entire string of IAF s’ air bases from Srinagar in the north up to Jamnagar in the south, along with Western borders with India.
The depth of the air strikes, dependent mainly on the radius of action at tree top level to avoid enemy radar‘s detection, extended up to Ambala air base in the case of aircraft operating from West Pakistan, and to Kalaikunda air base near Calcutta for aircraft operating from Dacca in East Pakistan.
IAF Battle Deployment before 1965 War:-
Whereas, numerically superior Indian Air Force faced no such limitations and operational constraints. The formidable fighter bomber force deployed at Pathankot, Adampur, Ambala,Agra and Halwara, the availability of large immediate reserves and the flexible choice of air operations from any number of integrated jet air bases, provided them a superiority and dynamic advantage in any course of action they wished to follow.
Mysteres:
No. 1 Sqn
No. 3 Sqn
No. 8 Sqn
No. 31 Sqn
No. 32 Sqn
Hunters:
No. 7 Sqn
No. 27 Sqn
No. 20 Sqn
No. 14 Sqn (East)
No. 17 Sqn (East)
No. 37 Sqn (East)
Gnats:
No. 2 Sqn
No. 9 Sqn
No. 23 Sqn
Canberra:
No. 5 Sqn
No. 16 Sqn (East)
No. 35 Sqn
No. 106 SPR Sqn
Jet Bomber Conversion Unit Other Types:
No. 28 Sqn - MiG-21
No. 45/220 Sqn - Vampire
No. 24 Sqn - Vampire (East)
No. 4 Sqn - Ouragan (East)
• IAF Western Air Command ( Air Vice Marshal R. Rajaram)
o Pathankot (Gp. Capt. Roshan Suri)
 No.28 MiG-21 (Small Dett: 2) (Wg. Cdr. MSD Wollen) >>> Moved to Adampur
 No.45/No.220 Vampire (Sqn. Ldr. SK Dahar) >>> Moved to Hindon
 No.3 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. Paul Ruby)
 No.31 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. WM Goodman)
 No.23 Gnat (Dett: 8 under S/L J W Greene)
o Halwara (Gp. Capt. GKK John)
 No.7 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. ATRH Zachariah)
 No.27 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. Jog)
 No.20 Hunter (Dett: 4-6 under S/L B K Bishnoi att to No.7 Later)
 No.2 Gnat (Dett: 4 under S/L R Dhawan - Later W/C Bharat Singh)
o Adampur (Gp. Capt. WVA Lloyd)
 No.1 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. OP Taneja)
 No.8 Mystere (Wg. Cdr. Milikins)
 No.28 MiG-21 (Dett: 4)
o Ambala (Gp. Capt. DE Bouchier)
 No.2 Gnat (Main Dett: 8) (Wg. Cdr. Bharat Singh)
 No.23 Gnat (Main Dett.) (Wg. Cdr. S. Raghavendran)
o Agra
 No.5 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. PP Singh)
 No.35 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. Bakshish Singh)
 No.2 Gnat (Dett: 4)
o Hindon
 No.20 Hunter (Main Dett.) (Wg. Cdr. Amrit Lal Bajaj)
• IAF Eastern Air Command ( Air Vice Marshal Shivdev Singh)
o Kalaikonda (Gp. Capt. MB Naik)
 No.14 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. DA La Fontaine)
 No.16 Canberra (Wg. Cdr. PM Wilson) >>> Moved to WAC Agra
 No.24 Vampire (Sqn. Ldr. M. Banerji)
o Baghdogra (Wg. Cdr. MB Singh)
o Hashimara
 No.4 Ouragan (Sqn. Ldr. MM Singh)
o Chabua
 No.17 Hunter
o Gauhati
 No.37 Hunter (Wg. Cdr. McNeil) >>> Moved to WAC
Notes:
1. No.45/220 Vampire squadron was an amalgamated unit with 16 Vampires under the command of a Sqn. Ldr.
2. No.28 MiG-21 squadron had only nine aircraft as establishment.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & PAF Operational Deployment:-
Since the F-86 was the chief weapon system and mainstay of Pakistan Air Force. The F-86 fighter bomber aircraft was to play the major operational role in accordance with air war plan entailed extensive utilization on very massive level.
PAF fighter bomber squadrons of F-86s were required to operate from Peshawar, Sargodha, Lahore and Mauripur air bases against enemy air bases of Srinagar, Jammu, Pathankot, Adampur, Halwara,Ambala in the northern sector,Jhodpur, Bhuj and Jamnagar in southern sector and Radar installations at Amritsar, Ferozpur, Patiala and Ambala in the northern sector and Porbander in the southern sector.
With in theses strike missions each F-86s formation of eight aircraft was allocated an alternative target.
PAF Battle Deployment before 1965 War:-
F-86s Sabre
Fighter Bomber & Interceptors)No. 5 Sqn
No. 11 Sqn
No. 14 Sqn
No. 15 Sqn
No. 16 Sqn
No. 17 Sqn
No. 18 Sqn
No. 19 Sqn
B-57s Martin
Medium Night Bomber)No. 7 Sqn
No. 8 Sqn
No. 24 Sqn (Elint/ECM/ESM/Phographic & Reconnaissance)
F-104s Star fighter(Mach 2 Interceptor)
No. 9 Sqn
T-33: Advanced Training Jet
No. 20 (Photograpic & Reconnaissance)
No. 2 Sqn
SA-16: Grumman Albatross Amphibious Maritime Reconnaissance
No. 4 Sqn
Tactical Transport & Communication
No. 6 Sqn ( Hercules C-130s)
No.12 Sqn
West Pakistan:-
o Sargodha (Gp. Capt. M.Z.Masud)
 No.5 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Sarfraz A. Rafiqui
 No.9 Sqn F-104 ( Sqn. Ldr. M. L. Middlecoat)
 No.11 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. M.M.Alam)
 No.15 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. M Arshad)
 No.20 Sqn R T-33 (Sqn. Ldr. M.M.Ahmed)
o Mauripur (Gp. Capt. Khaqan Abbasi)
 No.7 Sqn B-57s (Sqn. Ldr. Najeeb A. Khan) Later moved to Peshawar in September 1965.
 No.8 Sqn B-57s (Sqn. Ldr. Rais A. Rafi) Later moved to Peshawar in September 1965.
 No.16 Sqn F-86 (Sqn.Ldr. A.A.Randhawa)
 No.17 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. A. Daudpota) Later shifted to Sargodha in September.
 No.18 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Alauddin Butch) Later shifted to Sargodha in September.
 No.2 Sqn T-33 (Sqn. Ldr. Khurshid A. Mirza) Later a Dett of 4 moved to Sargodha
 No.4 Sqn SA-16 (Sqn. Ldr. Afsar K. Jadoon)
o Peshawar (Wing. Cdr. Amanullah)
 No.19 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. S. Sajjad Haider)
 No.24 Sqn RB-57Fs (Sqn. Ldr. M. Iqbal)
o Chaklala (Gp. Capt. E.G.Hall)
 No.6 Sqn C-130s (Wing. Cdr. A Masood Khan)
 No.12 Sqn Comp/Transport (Sqn. Ldr.M. M.Suhail)
o Risalpur ( Gp. Capt. C.R.Nawaz)
 Trainers Sqn T-6Gs Harvard (Sqn. Ldr. M.Yunis)
East Pakistan:-
o Dacca (Gp. Capt. Ghulam Haider)
 No.14 Sqn F-86 (Sqn. Ldr. Shabbir H. Syed)
Notes:
1. No.4 S-16 maritime reccee squadron had only four aircraft.
2. No.24 RB-57F Elint squadron had only four aircraft.
3. No.20 RT-33 squadron had only six aircraft
4. Every air base had its one T-33.
5. Four Bristal Freighter Transport aircraft kept in stores were readied to join C-130s.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & Operational Methodology:-
The air strike F-86s force was required to fly at tree top level, as to remain beneath the IAF s’ Radar Stations.
Each F-86s formation of 8 aircraft was required to attack IAF s’ air base, exclusively using six machine guns fire destroying enemy aircraft on priority.
Each F-86s formation of 8 aircraft was required to undertake 2-3 strafing runs on enemy targets for each mission/sortie.
The time over target (TOT) for each mission on the first day of opening hostilities, was defined to be 15 minutes before sunset.
The critical issue of the timing of the initial air strike missions by the fighter bomber force of F-86s before sun set was determined through lengthy debates held at High Command Level in the light of material factors and numerical superiority in favour of the Indian Air Force.
These were the major factors why the PAF High Command chose the timing of air strike missions 15 minutes before sunset:-
Timing of the first air strike missions:-
1. The Pakistan Air Force, a small air force countering a numerically superior the Indian Air Force , would not have the capability to deliver a decisive crippling blow in a single assault and could well provoked large scale enemy air force massive retaliation by resorting to one. Therefore, the timing selection in the early morning was not considered for initial air strike missions.
2. Since Second World War, air strike missions are carried out at dawn, as anticipated the numerically superior IAF would be ever vigilant to face the adversary. Several flights of Hunters, Gnats and Mysteres deployed at air bases on air defence alert duty would be waiting at the end of the runways on five minute alert at dawn since morning. It was carefully calculated to be most unlikely that they would have stayed at this state of readiness indefinitely.
3. The IAF state of alert would have past its peak, when no air raids had materialized with in two to three hours since dawn the IAF would more than likely have lessened the high alert and switched off some of the radars.
4. Therefore, air strike missions carried out against IAF major air bases 15 minutes before sunset by the PAF would achieve an element of complete surprise, pulverizing the enemy in a state of shock and nerve shattering blow by delivering devastating blitzkrieg.
5. The major portion of the Indian Air Force would suppose to be caught on the ground.
6. By carrying out a dusk air strike missions 15 minutes before sunset, on the other hand, The PAF would be safe from an immediate counter attacks from enemy air force; It could sustain enemy pressure during the night relatively safely and would reasonably well prepared by the next morning to face reprisals as also ready to deliver further air strike missions against enemy air force.
The air strike missions operating except from Peshawar air base, were to be repeated the next day, making 15 minutes before sun rise as their time over target. From Mauripur air base, four T-33s were also configured to supplement the F-86s formations for air strike missions.
Lahore air base located nearest to the Indian border was to be activated for occasional operational utilization since first week of the war at short notice. Two formations of eight F-86s each from Mauripur and Peshawar air bases were to move in there at six hours notice, thereby assembling a single largest formation of 16 aircraft for initial air strike mission against Ambala airbase to be led by Sqn Ldr Sajad Haider OC 19 Sqn along with Sqn Ldr Waqar Azim OC 17 Sqn, as a staging air base. The Lahore runway lenght was 6000 feet, therefore both the F-86s formations were to be ensured fully operational on the runway day and night taking off and landing practice as per specific order issued by C-in-C Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan in a mission briefing held at Air Headquarters on June 28, 1965.
The F-86s Squadron operating from Dacca air base, East Pakistan was required to strike enemy major air base at Kalaikunda, located near Calcutta by dawn only on the very next day of the Indo-Pak war.
The major portion of the fighter bomber F-86s Squadrons force was to be deployed at Sargodha air base as a main nucleolus of air strike and other operational missions, leaving one F-86s Squadron each at Peshawar, Mauripur and Dacca air bases.
Offensive Counter Air Operation & Night Bombing Missions Profile:-
The paramount mission of the B-57s Bomber Wing night bombing operations was to deny the numerically superior Indian Air Force, Thereby to sustain the pressure of the fighter bomber F-86s force s’ air strike missions at dusk, the PAF s’ Bomber Wing of B-57s operating from Mauripur and Peshawar was to bomb enemy aircraft on the ground, runways, hangars, fuel and ammunition dumps at major IAF s’ air bases at Jamnagar, Adampur, Halwara and Pathankot through out the first night of the air operations, starting at 2030 and ending an hour before sun rise the next day.
The Bomber B-57s s’ formation recovering at Sargodha air base after their first air strike mission at Adampur and Halwara were to turnaround and leave for Agra and Palm air bases.
The Bomber formations recovering at Peshawar air base were to make a second bombing run to Adampur and Halwara; or hit the enemy aircraft parked at Ambala and Chandigarh air bases as alternatives.
Old work horse propeller training aircraft in action:-
The Harvard T-6Gs Training Squadron from Risalpur air base was required to harass the Indian Army on the first night in the areas; Amritsar-Jullunder axis and Ferozpur-Ludhiana axis operating from Chaklala & Lahore as staging air bases, assigned mission of night offensive road recce.
The operational utilization of the Harvard aircraft was fully studied and its operational missions in the coming September war could be attributed to the Operation Desert Hawk.
Defensive Counter Air Operation & Air Defence Command Profile:-
As per Air War Plan of June , 1965., the Air Defence Battle of West and East Pakistan during the hostilities with India was to be commanded by Air Officer Commanding(AOC) Air Defence, as per requirement of the emerging air war scenario, from the Interceptor fighters force detailed at its disposal. The force comprised the following squadrons, as Sargodha air base would be the major centre of gravity during war.
1. One F-104s Squadron armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) deployed at Sargodha airbase.
2. One F-86s Squadron armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) deployed at Sargodha airbase.
A formation of four F-86s Interceptor fighters armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) was also earmarked for Peshawar airbase along with another formation of four F-86s Interceptor fighters armed with sidewinder missiles (GAR-8) would be sent to Mauripur airbase simultaneously from Sargodha air base. Apart from this, a portion of the F-86s Squadrons operating from Peshawar, Mauripur and Dacca were also assigned to air defence missions.
A Meticulous Air War Plan !
From critical prospective and analysis, An intricate air war plan that had all the elements of dynamic approach, daring initiative and surprise which are essential for success in a strategic situation tilted heavily in favour of the superior enemy Air Force. The meticulous air war plan was contemplated by Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan Commander-in-Chief, PAF and his Air Staff on the employment of the Pakistan Air Force in the air defense battle for Pakistan. It was kept up-to-date and modified as strategic circumstances demanded.
Offensive Counter Air Operation s’ inherent advantages:-
A. Offensive Operation allows the attacker to seize the initiative, capitalize the optimum level capabilities of the Air Force and concentrate strength Vs weakness.
B. It carries the air war to the enemy centre of nucleolus, reduces the number of offensive sorties that numerically superior enemy Air Force can mount and forces enemy Air Force to detailed a substantial portion of its total air force s’ Squadrons to dedicated defensive operations.
C. It can better exploit the three dimensions space of the skies, the vagaries of light and weather and the masking effect of terrain.
D. It denies the enemy air force a sanctuary.
The Strategic Parametres/Levels of the Air War Plan June, 1965 were thoroughly been worked out in advance as well keeping the operational levels of the air bases, wings & squadrons through periodic exercises at par with strategic milestone of the air battle for Pakistan:-
1. Offensive Counter Air Operation
2. Defensive Counter Air Operation
3. Anti Surface Force Operation
Although some tactical level changes and up dates were made by Air Marshal M Nur Khan, C-in-C, the PAF in the light of imminent air battle scenario with enemy air force , thereby activating Air Force on phase-I, II & III during August 1965
The ultimate success of a war plan depends not so much on the plan itself, as upon the human response which the actual situation evokes Courage, Dedication, Sacrifice, Inspiring Leadership and Accurate timely Judgment form part of no man made plan, but it is these very attributes which, in moments of critical danger and anxiety, manifest or absent themselves to tilt the balance of divine fate between success and failure, victory and defeat in the annals of air warfare.
The war plan would have been put on supreme test during the Indo-Pak war with in three months by the highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional Air Force against the numerically superior enemy Air Force.
The Pakistan Air Force rose to the decisive air battle for Pakistan under this air war plan during the Indo-Pak War of 1965 and returned with flying colours, registering its name in golden words in the annals of air warfare.
Pakistani Nation s’ debt to its Air Force “Those wonderful young men’: Never have so many owed so much to so few.”
Bibliography:-
1.“The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988.By: Shaheen Foundation ,Islamabad.”
2.“The History of the Pakistan Air Force 1947-1982.By: Shabbir Hussain & Sqn Ldr. M.Tariq Qureshi.”
3.” Battle for Pakistan” The Air War of 1965. by: John Fricker
4. “The First Round” By Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan,C-in-C,The Pakistan Air Force
5. The Story of the Indian Air Force”Bharat Rakshak”
6.” A History of the Pakistan Army” by: Col.Brian Cloughley
7. “Memoirs” by: Lt. General Gul Hassan,C-in-C,The Pakistan Army
8.” Fiza’ya
syche of The Pakistan Air Force” by.Singh & R.RakhyeCopyright © Arshad Hussain.
fatman17
PDF THINK TANK: CONSULTANT
- Joined
- Apr 24, 2007
- Messages
- 32,563
- Reaction score
- 98
- Country
- Location
Sunday, September 12, 2010
PAF s Bomber Wing of B-57s
A tribute to those B-57s pilots & navigators, Who executed night bombing missions flying at tree top level on pitch dark nights, carried the war deep into the enemy's heartland, few lionhearted could not return to motherland and embraced shahadat in the line of duty leaving behind a supreme tradition alive Mission First.
Preamble:-
Its an untold story of Pakistan Air Force s No 31 Bomber Wing of B-57s comprising No 7th & 8th Squadrons during 1965 & 1971 Indo-Pak Wars. Although long before the outbreak of hostilities in 1971, No 31 Bomber Wing was non existent and the valiant No 8th Squadron had also been number plated because of US Government embargo on military hardware and supplies, but its pilots & navigators took active part by joining No 7th Squadron in the war of 1971, operating from Masroor and Mianwali air bases.
In August 1982, finally all the remaining B-57s of No 7th Squadron were transferred to No 2 Squadron, adding yet role of night interdiction and special missions to unit s assignment until retirement this reliable workhorse B-57 from meritorious service from PAF. Another chapter has been added to highlight the commendable performance and missions of low profile, stealth unit of PAF s No 24th Elint Squadron operating RB-57Fs & RB-57Bs during and after war of 1965.
The B-57 Bomber nicknamed Baba has been serving the Pakistan Air Force for more than 25 years as a weapons delivery platform, conventional weapons bomber, high altitude aerial reconnaissance, electronic counter & support measures and tow target aircraft as well as being the mainstay for the Air Force. This story is dedicated to the bold and devoted aircrew, maintenance and support personnel of the bomber wing who knew the dream workhorse B-57 and were part of its sorties and missions during peace and wars of 1965 and 1971. It is a beginning with the hope that those who were a part of the Bomber Wing will contribute to the growth of this effort by providing original photos and record of the missions. Since another chapter about the Indo-Pak war of 1971 is under process.
USAF & Operational Background of Martin B-57Bs:-
The Pakistan Air Force was one of the major users of the B-57s except USAF,NASA and National Republic of China Air Force.
(Taiwan) The US Air Force considered the B-57B inadequate for the night intruder role and Martin puting all aircraft through an extensive avionics upgrade. Regardless, by the end of 1957 the USAF tactical squadrons were being re-equipped with supersonic F-100 Super Sabres. The complete retirement was delayed, however, by the start of the Vietnam War.The deployment of B-57Bs from 8th and 13th Bomb Squadrons to Bien Hoa began with three aircraft lost in collisions on arrival. An additional five aircraft were destroyed with another 15 damaged by a Viet Cong mortar attack in November 1964. The first combat mission by the US Air Force s B-57Bs was not flown until 19 February 1965, with the first excursion into North Vietnam taking place on 2 March as part of Operation Rolling Thunder.
The aircraft typically carried 9 x 500 lb (227 kg) bombs in the bomb bay and 4 x 750 lb (340 kg) bombs under the wings. In April 1965, B-57Bs began flying night intruder missions supported by C-123 Provider or C-130 Hercules flare ships and EF-10B Skyknight electronic warfare aircraft. On missions extending into North Vietnam, B-57Bs carried their own flares. On 16 May 1965, an armed B-57B exploded on the runway at Bien Hoa setting off a chain reaction that destroyed ten other aircraft, eleven A-1 Skyraiders, and one F-8 Crusader. Due to combat attrition, in October 1966 B-57Bs were transferred to Phan Rang where they supported operations in the Iron Triangle along with Australian Canberra B.20s. The aircraft also continued to fly night interdiction missions against the Ho Chi Minh trail. Of the USAF s 94 B-57Bs deployed to Southeast Asia, 51 were lost in combat and only 9 were still flying by 1969. As the result, the all B-57Bs were withdrawn from USAF sservice.
Two RB-57As were used by the National Republic of China Air Force for reconnaissance missions over People's Republic of China. One of these was shot down by a Chinese Air Force MiG-19 on 18th February1958. Two other RB-57As were used by the Federal Aviation Administration to plan high-altitude airways for the upcoming jet passenger aircraft.
US Military Aid Package:-
During a visit to Pakistan, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised to provide the government of Pakistan with modern jet bombers under US Military Aid Package.
The No 31st Bomber Wing to formed 7th & 8th Bomber Squadrons:-
PAF s B-57 Bombers force began its maiden flight joining Air Force inventory since 27th November,1959. Whereas, twenty four B-57Bs and two B-57Cs inactivated from US Air Force 345th Tactical Bomber Group at Langley AFB in Virginia were ferried to Mauripur air base in Karachi, Pakistan to form the 7th & 8th Bomber Squadrons of the 31st Bomber Wing of the Pakistan Air Force on 11th May 1960.
Our Air Force made very extensive operational use of the B-57B bomber in two wars with India. In the Indo-Pak War of 1965,B-57s force logged 195 operational sorties, dropping over 600 tons of bombs against IAF air bases,radar stations and military targets. Three B-57s of the Bomber Wing were lost in action but out of these, only one due to enemy action. First B-57 spiloted by Squadron Leader Alam Siddiqui & navigator Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi dived into the sea over IAF air base Jamnagar misjudging the height through the thin layers of clouds or getting spatially disoriented, on the early night of 7th September. The 2nd B-57 was shot down over IAF air base Adampur piloted by Flt.Lt.Altaf Sheikh & navigator Flt. Lt. Bashir Chaudhy through enemy ack ack batteries on 14th September .The 3rd B-57 piloted by Flt.Lt Mehmood Butt & navigator Flt. L.t Khalid crashed on the Risalpur air base runway because of bad weather on 17th September.
Whereas one RB-57B electronics intelligence aircraft piloted by Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24th Elint Squadron was shot down by Pakistan Army s ack ack battery during a bombing practice mission on a PAF s radar unit near Rahwali,Gujranwala. In the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, There was a higher attrition rate with at least five B-57s being put out of service by the end of the war.
Martin B-57B in PAF
The US Glenn. L. Martin B-57B a first generation of jet bomber was a tandem 2 seat, twin engines, night intruder or tactical, all weather long-range bomber, its crew consisted of a pilot and a navigator, carrying a payload of 56 rockets, 4 x 20mm cannons and 8000 lbs. of bombs, 2 turbo jets engines, fired by cartridge starters powered the aircraft. It was very large in size, having a length and wingspan of 65 feet, which meant virtually no maneuverability. Its speed was 570 mph, ceiling height 45,000 feet and ferry range 2656 miles with max load. The PAF B-57s pilots prefer to fly hardly above 200-500 feet in order to avoid enemy radar detection during wars of 1965 and 1971.
However, once over the IAF targets they would pull up to about 7000-8000 feet to make an accurate dive position on targets, from where they would release bombs over the targets with pin point accuracy and precision.
RB-1A all-weather bombing system for PAF sB-57s:-
At first, these bombers were not equipped with an all-weather bombing system as had been originally planned. From 1963, all of the PAF s B-57Bs were retrofitted with the RB-1A all-weather bombing system which gave them a somewhat longer nose shape than that of standard USAF B-57Bs. Some of the B-57s were also fitted with under wing points for the carriage of four extra fuel tanks, which gave them sufficient range to reach distant military targets well inside India.
The No 24th Electronic Intelligence Squadron:-
In addition, two General Dynamics/Martin-RB-57Fs ultra-high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were also supplied to Pakistan Air Force in the early 1960s. The RB-57Fs was known as droopy because of enormous 122 ft wingspan and capable to fly at the cruising height of 80,000 ft beyond the range of enemy interceptors and SAMs of that period. This was state of art highly specialized aircraft for ECM/ESM missions. The No 24th Elint squadron operated the RB-57Fs along with two RB-57Bs for electronic counter & support measures missions and photographic surveillance missions against IAF during and after the war of 1965.These aircraft extensively over flew most of the IAF air bases up to Ambala at the height of 67000ft or more to carry out monitoring/ reconnaissance missions. The following missions were assigned to the No 24 Elint squadron deployed at Peshawar air base:-
Operational Missions Profile:-
1. Low level homing on to enemy radars.
2. Monitoring of enemy radars for which daily surveillance was kept up to locate their grid reference as well as any change.
3. Monitoring & Jamming of enemy radio channels particularly for GCI transmissions.
Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal SJ was the first OC, who later embraced shahadat being Officer Commanding of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his navigator Saifullah Lodhi SJ during a bombing practice mission on a PAF sradar unit near Rahwali in the 1965 War.
Since the start of the 1965 war. The PAF s F-86s Sabre wing operating from Sargodha air base tried to neutralize the IAF Amritsar radar, but could not deliver accurate attacks due to difficulty experienced in triangulating the exact location of the radar system. Squadron Leader Iqbal floated a novel idea of locating the enemy radar by utilizing the electronic devices fitted RB-57 aircraft. He led in his electronic intelligence RB-57 as a pathfinder, a formation of four B-57s to Amritsar radar on a daylight bombing mission and did not seem to be satisfied with the practical results.
He, therefore, decided to make some practice attacks on a PAF s radar station deployed at Rahwali, near Gujranwala. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24 Elint Squadron and his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi were busy in making low dive bombing practice on radar station. The Army ack ack unit deployed around radar station opened fire on diving B-57 and shot it down, killing both the pilot and navigator. A first rate thorough professional, dedicated and lion hearted pioneer OC of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his outstanding professional navigator Saifullah Lodhi embraced shahadat during mid stream of the war. Both were awarded well deserved Sitara-e-Jurat posthumously. A very tragic loss of invaluable lives of pilot and navigator along with a specilized RB-57 aircraft and an incident that could have been avoided through timely liasion with Air Force and Army ack ack regiment.
If wing operation officer Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed SJ of F-86 Sabre wing would shed his blood for his noble air strike mission to destroy IAF radar station at Amritsar, Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal SJ OC of No 24 Elint Squadron and his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi SJ were also there to shed their blood in the line of the duty.
Nest of the Eagles:-
Since its maiden flight, the No 31 Bomber Wing of B-57s along with its No 7 & 8 Squadrons was deployed at Mauripur air base, Karachi and was assigned the strategic role of airfield night bombing strikes and deep interdiction night missions against numerically superior Indian Air Force bases and military installations during war with India.
Mission & Scope of the B-57s Bomber Wing:-
The paramount mission of the B-57s Bomber Wing night bombing operations was to deny the numerically superior Indian Air Force, the operational utilization of its massive potential air power destroying air bases, runways, hangars, fuel and ammunition dumps and radar installations from where IAF was supposed to streamline air war efforts by launching fighter and bomber aircraft during eventual war with Pakistan. Since IAF maintained a very vast network of major airbases integrated with Russian state of art P-35 three dimension radar systems with Early Warning & GCI facilities along with the adjoining borders with enemy and was quite capable to extend its war efforts through flexible mode by virtue its geographical depth and large airfields infrastructure. A bold and offensive meticulous operational doctrine under The PAF Air War Plan of June 1962 for bomber wing was worked out by the Air Headquarters to counter the numerically superior IAF to fight the air war of Pakistan, keeping in the mind to take bold initiative on the outbreak of Indo-Pak war by launching sustained and wide spread night bombing sorties after sorties over the enemy air bases and military targets, would ultimately bottle up major portion of the Indian Air Force in defensive deployment. It was a strategic offensive plan of PAF s Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan, when numerical superiority was heavily tilted in favour of the enemy. The No 31 Bomber Wing being strategic wing of PAF, raised and trained for ultimate war with India during sixties under the dynamic and visionary leadership of its then Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan. As an Air Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan, whose sterling credentials and brand name has been marked on the PAF since August 15, 1947. A youngest inspiring air force commander with strategic vision and a distinguished jet fighter pilot for newly born Air Force.
Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan a chief architect of Pakistan Air Force:-
Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan has been chief architect of our modern fighter jet Air Force from teeth, to tail. Since July 1957 during his tenure, The air force inducted Korean battle tested fighter bomber F-86s, Martin B-57s bombers, supersonic F-104s star fighter, Hercules C-130s, advanced training jets T-33s and basic training jets T-37s, for search and rescue operations Sikorsky H-19D helicopters and SA-16 Albatross as well modern & state of art high powered early warning and surveillance radar systems of FPS-6 (height finder) & FPS-20 (surveillance).
PAF on the path of Jet technology transformation:-
The Air Force had also begun inducting sidewinder air-to-air missiles (GAR-8 series) to its jet interceptor-fighters force. The entire infrastructure of the Air Force was planned to transforming from propeller aircraft force to jet aircraft force, an advanced technology transformation ahead of its time in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent.
Apart from induction of the US origin hi-tech military hardware in the Air Force, The Air Chief and his Air Staff undertook the uphill task to transforming PAF s propeller aircraft force into a technologically advanced fighter jet air force in accordance with professional and operational training standards of the US Air Force on war footings. The US Air Force also provided its F-86 Sabre jets Vs MIGs air combat tactics/strategy profiles during Korean War of 1950-53 through bilateral training programs held in USA, West Germany and Pakistan. The key factor of this gigantic transformation program for the PAF was professional excellence through logging of highest jet flying hours by the fighter-bomber pilots, while maintaining highest degree of flight safety.
Operational Standards for the Air Force:-
Air Marshal Asghar Khan himself played the role model of the fighter pilot by flying/checking out each and every aircraft including B-57 under his command setting finest operational standards for the air force. Thereby raising Squadrons after Squadron, as well imparting rigorous and perpetual professional gigantic training program for this newly advanced fighter jet air force in line with USAF s standards. The ultimate milestone worked out by Air Headquarters, getting its air force ever ready for eventual war on Kashmir with numerically superior Indian Air Force. The professional excellence in fighter flying of the PAF was duly acknowledged by the USAF, when state of art mach- 2 air superiority fighter F-104 were provided to PAF, although our air force was the only non NATO Air Force declared qualified to operate these advanced hi-tech fighter aircraft.
The PAF had become razor sharp air war machine, ever ready to face any eventuality during war and peace, long before Air Marshal Asghar Khan got retired from Air Force in July 1965 handing over his command to another accomplished air warrior and bomber pilot of No 7th dive bomber Squadron Burma front bombing missions famed Air Marshal M Nur Khan.
As Commander in Chief Air Marshal Nur Khan would command this highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional air force during Indo-Pak war of 1965.
The ambitious night bombing training program of No 31 Bomber wing was remained under specific and direct supervision of Air Marshal Asghar Khan and his air staff. The selection criteria entailed hand picked and hard task commanding officers of the Air Force for this premiere wing.
Gallery of Wing OCs:-
An Orion of star pilots detailed by the Air Headquarters for wing ever ready to go for action, beyond the call of the duty during war and peace, providing a dynamic leadership nucleus for professional and purpose built bomber wing training. The leaders No 31 Bomber Wing included Air Commodore Khaqan Abbasi, Air Commodore Nazir Latif, Air Vice Marshal A.H.Qureshi, Group Captain M.A. Dogar, Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar A. Khan, Air Vice Marshal Mehmood Akhtar Bokhari and Air Commodore Rais A. Rafi.
Gallery of Pilots & Navigators:-
The Bomber Wing s No 7 & 8 Squadrons were commanded by including Squadron Leaders of 7th Squadron Ayaz A. Khan (being the first OC), A.M.Lodhie, A. Shamim, Najeeb A. Khan, M.Akhtar, S.A.Rahman, Wing Commanders S.A.Ansari and M.Yunis and Squadron Leaders of 8th Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal (being the first OC), who later embraced shahadat being Officer Commanding of No 24 Elint Squadron in the 1965 War, S.A.Ansari, Rais A. Rafi, M.Zaman, M.K.Bashar as well as with a large number of Akhtars, Altafs, Alams, Aslams, Bashirs, Bashars, Basits, Bukharis, *****, Ghauris, Harneys, Iftikhars, Irfans. Khalids, Khans, Khusros, Kamals Mehmoods, Osmans, Peters, Qureshis, Shabbirs, Shams, Shoaibs, and Sikandar, etc. These brave and dedicated bomber pilots were commanding the wing and its squadrons through cockpit, following the first flying tradition of the PAF The Commander is up front!
Bomber Wing Training Profiles:-
The professional excellence and rigorous flying training profiles during day and night by The No 31 Bomber Wing and its crew culminated in the shape of undertaking of maximum number of night bombing sorties/missions after mission against heavily defended air bases of IAF and other military installations during the wars of 1965 and 1971.
The extensive night low level flying and weapons delivery training involved low level strikes from 1000ft above the ground level and dive bombing attacks from 8000 ft, releasing weapons at 4000ft and recovery at 2000ft. The night training program entailed through out night achieving 50% of the monthly flying hours done at night. The extensive day and night training profiles transformed B-57s a formidable force for its operational missions. Thereby maintaining its best turn around time by two B-57 bomber squadrons.
Highest Degree of Turn Around:
To achieve the highest degree of turn around by a heavy bomber B-57 in a couple of hours and to keep the bomber wing of 22 aircraft that was flying more than 2-3 sorties per aircraft per night in the air field strike missions, required tremendous technical skills and best coordinated war efforts by the bomber personnel as well the technical & logistics ground personnel of the wing deployed around the country on distant air bases of PAF. i.e. at Peshawar, Mauripur, Samungli, Risalpur and Sargodha etc.
Operational Methodology:-
As major night operations program by the B-57s was conducted through Peshawar air base since 6th September, every bomber formation leaving for bombing mission against IAF air bases was suppose to return to alternate air base to ensure safety to rearm and refuel, and then to strike again before returning to base or to another safe air base. The standard operational procedure enabled B-57s force to be prepared to attack their targets night after night creating dynamic approach through flexible mode. By arriving over their targets in a stream at intervals of about 15-20 minutes, the B-57s certainly succeeded in hitting hard the IAF air bases again and again. As Peshawar and Risalpur air bases were also considered too vulnerable to IAF attacks during the nights. Therefore, Samungali and Mauripur air bases were also utilized for turn around.
A successful and accurate night bombing mission is a reflection of overall bomber wing service efficiency-direct or in-direct flying up to targets through ever-vigilant enemy ack ack guns and missiles and fine blend of integration with friendly GCI radar system, navigation, communication, maintenance & technical personnel and bomber pilots & navigators etc.
Serviceability of Bomber Wing:-
At 1800 hours evening of the 6th September 1965,when first formation of six B-57s fully armed with 4x1000lb bombs, 56x2.75 rockets and full load of 4x20 mm cannons took off from air force base Mauripur setting its course for IAF base Jamnagar to undertake the first bombing mission against enemy. The serviceability of our bomber wing was around 99% and technical & logistics ground personnel of the wing maintained it through out the war. An engineering magic by those unsung heroes of the bomber wing under the command of Squadron Leader Aurangzeb Malik. Although it might have taken a couple of hours to patch up the holes in one or two of aircraft, at no stage was any of the B-57 aircraft was unserviceable. Excluding the aircraft losses and damages due to enemy or friendly ack ack fire or crashes. Never did the wing had the situation of bomber pilots waiting for the B-57s for next due operational sortie against enemy targets. A commendable chapter recorded by the wing and its technical & logistics personnel in the annals of air warfare.
Battle for Lahore and The F-86s Force strikes back:-
When the Indian Army launched multiple ground attacks on Lahore in the early hours of 6th September 1965.The war was declared and Government of Pakistan ordered PAF s High Command to carry out air war operations accordingly. The PAF s F-86s Force operating from Peshawar and Sargodha air bases responded swiftly by strafing and rocketing against advancing columns of Indian army s armor, artillery and infantry units from Batapur- Wagah-Atari axis. Since morning till evening containing enemy surprise offensive operations against Lahore, while Pakistan Army deployed in strength on BRB canal banks.
The No 31 Bomber Wing & Night Bombing Missions Profile:-
Now The No 31 Bomber Wing along with its No 7 & 8 Squadrons rose to the occasion in accordance with its pre defined bombing operational doctrine worked out under the PAF Air War Plan of June 1965 with imaginative vision and intricate planning. The Wing operated as an independent and self-supporting arm of the air force undertaking night bombing missions after mission against IAF base Jamnagar to Jodhpur, Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Sirsa, Srinagar and Ambala, from the shores of the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Himalayas.
The night bombing campaign started by the wing on the dusk of 6th September by a formation of six B-57s dropping 24,000 lbs. of bombs and rockets on the IAF airbase Jamnagar and followed by IAF air base Adampur lasted till the last close support bombing mission undertaken by The Bomber Wing against Indian Army at Wagah-Atari axis on 22nd September 1965. B-57Bs force of 22 aircraft undertook a total 195 missions of day and night dropping more than 600 tons of bombs against IAF targets as compared to an estimated 92 night bombing sorties against PAF targets by more than 60 IAF Canberras.
The First Bombing Mission against Indian Air Force:-
Although a major portion of the Bomber Wing was already shifted to Peshawar as per operational doctrine. The remaining six aircraft were waiting at Mauripur air base, then an order received to launch attacks against Jamnagar at 1800 hours on 6th September 1965. The Wing Commander A.H.Qureshi led his bomber force of six B-57s along with Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi, Squadron Leader Alam Siddiqui , Squadron Leader Ansari, Flt Lt Rashid & Flt Lt Amin Khalil from air force base Mauripur in southern sector by launching bombing mission against IAF base Jamnagar. They carried out the first bombing attack of the war against IAF by opening bombing account of the PAF, extensively damaging runways and hangars. Rockets were also fired to hit hangars and buildings. The formation returned successfully with out encountering enemy ack ack firing and any loss. The lone B-57 would repeat air strike mission one after another until morning against IAF Jamnagar. A milkman shuttle service.
Catch Me if you can
The Wing Operations Officer Squadron Leader M.Akhtar Bukhari apart from engagement with operational and administrative matters at the air base also undertook the highly dangerous night flying mission over Indian air space to test and monitor the night interception capability of the Indian Air Force.
After the start of the war with India, the PAF high command decided to check the night interception capability of the enemy air force during mid stream of the air battle by detailing lone B-57 flying over the Indian air space during the mid night. Valiant Sqn Ldr M.Akhtar Bukhari along with Flt Lt Basit volunteered to fly the mission impossible on the night of 8th September at high twelve hours.
The B-57 No 885 piloted by him took off from Mauripur air base around mid night @ high 12 hours and after attaining cruising height of 35,000 ft headed its course @ 400 knots /hour towards enemy borders for IAF s Jodhpur air base, then reaching the target orbited the enemy air base for few minutes and finally turning its direction to wards north over enemy territory over flying one enemy air base including Amritsar and Pathankot after another.The aircraft took 2 hours & 40 minutes from take off till landing.
The enemy air force through its high powered P-35 three dimension radar system with Early Warning & GCI facilities monitored the B-57 taking off from air force base Mauripur in the middle of the night over flying Indian air space for unknown mission from Jodhpur up to Pathankot and then heading for Peshawar. No enemy interceptor scrambled to check the B-57 in the mid stream of the night flying mission.
An open challenge was thrown to the trigger-happy interceptor-fighter pilots of the enemy for easy target, but enemy would not dare to intercept the highflying Eagle in the mid stream. Daredevil Sqn Ldr M.Akhtar Bukhari along with navigator Flt Lt Basit flew his assigned route/mission cool headedly over Indian air space and landed safely at air force base Peshawar, reporting back all clear. A night mission impossible.
First Shaheeds of Bomber Wing:-
The Lionhearted Squadron Leader Shabir Alam Siddiqui & Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi would undertake bombing missions after mission with in first night against IAF base Jamnagar, to inflict maximum damages to the enemy ultimately embraced Shahadat during their 3rd sortie on the night of 6-7th September, by following the finest tradition of fighting falcons of PAF, serving air force and the motherland beyond the call of the duty. The first shaheeds of bomber wing in the line of the duty after F-86 Sabre wing first Shaheeds Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafique HJ along with Flt Lt. Yunas Hussain SJ in Halwara aerial combat!
Peshawar air base A Bomber Wing Nucleolus:-
The Wing Commander Nazir Latif was also leading his bomber force of sixteen B-57s along with Squadron Leader M.Akhtar and Squadron Leader Najeeb A. Khan from air force base Peshawar in northern sector. Which remained a bomber wing operational nucleolus through out the war. Thereby launching bombing missions after mission against IAF bases Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Sirsa, Srinagar and finally hard hitting night bombing mission Ambala would be undertaken by them.
Najeeb hits hard IAF air base Adampur
Squadron Leader Najeeb Khan led a formation of four B-57s taking off from air force base Peshawar in northern sector by launching first bombing mission against IAF Adampur. The enemy welcomed B-57 bomber force with illuminating runways s lights. Leader Najeeb and his formation responded delivering bombs over the targets with pinpoint accuracy shocking the enemy with surprise, leaving behind a trail of smoke and fire engulfed Adampur air base.
As soon the Squadron Leader Najeeb s B-57s were returning to land at Peshawar, another B-57s formation led by Squadron Leader M.Akhtar was setting its course for IAF Pathankot. The formation flew at tree top level to evade enemy radar detection and pulled up 8000ft through the massive ack ack barrage. The airfield beacons were blinking to highlight its location.
The leader dropped bombs over runways and hangars and formation followed the action, extensively damaging runways and hangars. An enemy radio message was intercepted by the Pakistan Army signal intelligence IAF air base Pathankot is burning, Please advance relief.
Soon after arrival from IAF Adampur, another night bombing mission was assigned to Squadron Leader Najeeb Khan and his formation of four B-57s to hit hard Beas river bridge to disrupt an important military supply link for Indian Army and the formation pressed for the mission then and there. Although, bridge proved to be a futile night bombing target. No damage was reported.
A large scale night bombing mission program launched by the B-57 bomber wing originating from Peshawar and Mauripur airbases since 6th September, was getting its momentum through its head start from Jamnagar and Adampur air bases, moving up to Pathankot, Halwara and Jodhpur, carrying the war deep into the enemy's major airfields.
The frequency of the night bombing sorties was in progress with the passage of the time. Sooner, its scope and operational methodology will widen according to the rapidly changing scenario of the air war in favour of Pakistan Air Force.
Chawinda Tank Battle & B-57s Night Mission Samba:-
The Indian Army launched another Major ground offensive from Samba in Sialkot sector after Lahore front through Charwa-Gadgor-Chawinda Axis on 8th September 1965. Major attack was spearhead by leading Indian Army s pride 1st Armoured division along with two Motorized Infantry and one Mountain divisions backing up by massive Corps Artillery s shelling with ultimate mission to reach G.T. Road at Gujranwala cutting main railway lines and roads encircling Lahore front from northern access by passing Pakistan s 6th Armoured division, 24th Infantry brigade along with 4th Corps Artillery units deployed around Chawinda-Daska axis. Another diversionary ground attack was launched against Sialkot by 26th Indian Infantry division to engage 15th Infantry division defending Sialkot-Jammu main axis. Indian army units had also brought road & bridge construction equipments and specialized vehicles & boats to negotiate water obstacles, rivers and canals in the area. The enemy war plan, if that could have been operationally implemented in accordance to its strategic milestone, would have defeat the Pakistan Army in the ground battle.
The 25th Cavalry a premiere regiment of Patton (M-47) tanks under the command of Col. Nisar A.Khan SJ took the lead to bear the major brunt of enemy First Armoured Division along with 24th infantry brigade under the command of Brig. Abdul Ali Malik HJ and 4th corps artillery under the command of Brig. Amjad Ali Chaudhri HJ engaged advancing columns of vanguard armor units of the enemy with in 7-8 miles from border.
A major tank and artillery duel began and lasted day and night. A large number of enemy Centurion and Sherman tanks were destroyed and eight Centurion tanks captured in running condition by the 25th Cavalry during the first round of Chawinda battle. From one of the Indian tanks, A copy of operational plan for 16th Cavalry recovered. Heavy, medium and field guns & howitzers regiments of 4th Corps artillery deployed around Chawinda, Pasrur and Sialkot were delivering accurate shelling on advancing enemy tanks and infantry units thus containing them for further move. Our artillery engaged enemy targets from the battle field of Chawinda up to border and beyond visual range hitting hard enemy units deployed around Sialkot Samba axis with dropping the shells of 200 lbs, 90 lbs, 80 lbs & 25 lbs in a very substantial and effective style.
The Indian Army 1st Corps Headquarters located at Samba 7 miles distance from Indo-Pak border, was controlling entire military operations for Chawinda battle. A large number of tanks, artillery and infantry units were assembled there to be launched for battle from Samba, a battle nucleolus point.
In the wake of the mounting pressure from Indian Army s large scale offensive operations against Sialkot and Chawinda sectors, Pakistan Army sought immediate air support missions from PAF high command against enemy concentrations around Samba. The bomber wing was tasked to carry out night bombing missions against Indian Army units deployed there on the night of 10th September 1965.
A B-57 s formation led by Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar took off to undertake the night close support bombing mission around Samba to harass the enemy army throughout the night. Although, it was bright moon lit night, B-57s dropped flares from 5000ft altitude, maintaining R/T liaison with army ground liaison officer to identify the target areas.
The flares hit the mark reported by the GLO. Now, Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar responded with lightning speed by dropping bombs over the target and repeated the action up to 20 minutes, before B-57 exited the area. Another B-57 aircraft reached the scene and undertook the bombing mission over enemy concentrations. The B-57 bombing missions after mission continued the whole night of 10th/11th September, disturbing and harassing the Indian army units and thus preventing them from joining the battle of Chawinda.
In the morning valiant 17th,18th & 19th Squadrons of F-86s from Sargodha ans Peshawar would come to settle their balance with depleted units of enemy by strafing and rocketing through out the day. Advancing Indian Centurion & Sherman tanks were proved to be hot favorite shooting ground of the hovering F-86s at tree top level from dawn to dusk. The F-86s formations after formation remained there to take its due share of enemy ground targets under its dynamic Squadron Leader Butch Ahmed SJ who later embraced Shahadat during another ground attack mission against an ammunition carrying train at Gurdaspur railway station and Squadron Leader Azim Doudpota SJ from No 32 fighter wing operating from Sargodha air base.
Therefore, PAF s bomber wing B-57s along with its brother fighter bomber wings of F-86s played decisive role to contain the enemy army advance through Chawinda battle by effectively knocking out a large number of Tanks, Artillery guns and Infantry vehicles particularly 14th mountain division which was prepared to join the battle royal of Chawinda along with 1st Armoured division. The PAF s aircraft knocked out its fighting potential destroying vehicles, guns and fighting arms leaving in a very depleted condition not fit for any battle.
Target Alpha
IAF s high powered P-35 three dimension radar systems with Early warning & GCI facilities at Amritsar was a prime target for PAF, because of its strategic location on border near Lahore. Its call sign Fish oil The radar was posing direct threat to PAF air operations directing IAF air operations over West Pakistan.
Since the outbreak of Indo-Pak war, F-86s fight bomber wing from Sargodha air base operating along with No 24 Elint Squadron s RB-57s as pathfinder escorted by No 9 Squadron F-104s as top cover launched sustained air strikes to neutralize this target.
Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi embraced Shahadat during a practice mission for this vital target, his RB-57B was hit by friendly ack ack fire.
During a successful air strike undertaken by the F-86s on radar station, its wing operation officer Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed embraced shahadat and radar was extensively damaged for effective air operations on 11th September. However after some interval, Fish oil again back on the air to streamline Indian Air Force operations over West Pakistan. Meanwhile, the mission to destroy this radar was detailed to bomber wing. The C-in-C Air Marshal Nur Khan himself briefed pilots and navigators for the bombing mission against IAF radar station at Amritsar code named Target Alpha. The B-57s bombers struck successfully to the radar station. A formation of four B-57s led by Wing Commander Nazir Latif , dropped 28,000 lbs. of bombs on Amritsar Radar station with pin point accuracy and precision completely damaged the target on 12th September, leaving Indian Air Force with out any Early warning & GCI radar coverage for air operations.
First B-57 shot down by the IAF over Adampur air base:-
The daredevil Flt Lt Altaf Sheikh & Flt Lt Bashir Chaudhy would undertake bombing missions after mission since the first night of 6th September against heavily defended IAF bases, making two or three bombing runs to achieve accurate target hits but against the laid down procedure of single attack and quick egress. During his 13th bombing mission against Adampur, B-57 s bomb release system malfunctioned and bombs did not release, after many aborted attempts, Altaf decided to jettison the bombs en route to its air base. But he then again tried his luck to bomb IAF base Adampur, while in the dive, enemy ack ack shells hit the B-57. However Flt Lt Altaf & Flt Lt Bashir Chaudhy bailed out safely from downing aircraft and became POWs. The war history is made of those patriot air boys who rose to serve the air force and the motherland beyond the call of the duty, with out caring their personal safety and life. This was the first B-57 casualty claimed by the IAF on 14th September 1965.
Mission Ambala
IAF air base Ambala, which was among major operational bases of Canberra bomber force heavily defended with heavy and medium ack ack batteries and SAM-II missiles located an aerial distance of about 400 miles from Peshawar air base. It remained on top priority of the bombing target list by the B-57 bomber wing. A night bombing mission undertaken by Wing Commander Nazir Latif on 8th September aborted, The formation could not locate the target returned safely to the air base with out dropping bombs. Another night bombing mission against IAF air base Ambala renewed by highly experienced crews B-57s led by Squadron Leader Najeeb A. Khan with navigator Flt.Lt. William D. Harney and Wing Commander Nazir Latif with navigator Squadron Leader Auranzeb.
The B-57s formation delivered delay fuse bombs extensively damaging runways, hangars and airfield infrastructure on the night of 18th September. When B-57s were exiting from mission, Ambala airfield was ablaz through chain reaction of firework and blistering barrage of ack ack batteries.
B-57 Bombing with Allah-o-Akbar
Finally another highly dangerous night bombing mission against IAF Ambala was planned by the bomber wing and undertaken by B-57s highly experienced crews team led by Squadron Leader Najeeb OC No 7th Squadron & navigator Flg Officer Kamal, Squadron Leader Rafi OC No 8th Squadron & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar and Squadron Leader Feroz & navigator Squadron Leader Aurangzeb on the night of 21st September 1965.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) Air Commodore Rahim Khan was himself there to brief the mission Ambala to B-57s crew in detailed because of its prime significance. The low level dive-bombing angles, a safety insurance from radar controlled SAMs-II, but offered an acute risk to the bomber aircraft and pilots from blistering anti aircraft guns and heavy machine gun batteries deployed in and around Ambala air base.
But pilots and navigators of B-57s pressed for the mission flying with 360 nautical miles speed at 500ft above ground level in the moon light keeping total radio silence up to the target. While complete surprise was achieved by the leading B-57 piloted by Squadron Leader Najeeb & navigator Flg Officer Kamal, encountered no enemy ack ack shells from Ambala. In the bright moon light, IAF air base lay clearly visible before the B-57s crew, who could see the cars with their headlights on streaming along the road past the air base. A bomber pilot s dream emerged true, the target was in sight offering perfect view and accurate delivery of bombs.
The B-57s formation struck the Ambala with lightning action delivering bombs with delay fuses through low level skip technique in the face of massive ack ack barrage and returned with flying colors. Squadron Leader Najeeb & Flg Officer Kamal, were first to hit the target blowing fuel dumps which illuminated the burning target from miles to mile, Squadron Leader Rais Rafi & Flt Lt. Akhtar ventured to hit hard the runways by accurate low level bombing. Squadron Leader Rafi while delivering bombs on runways kept the piper right on the targets raised Allah-o-Akbar and also pressed machine guns to hit some buildings on the runway and subsequently Squadron Leader Feroz & Squadron Leader Aurangzeb delivered another bomb load on the targets with devastating impact,leaving behind enemy Air Force in shock and surprise. A veritable inferno of fire and smoke engulfed the airfield. Enemy ack ack guns were firing at full fury also hit its own buildings during the air strike.
While on their way back, flying at full throttle en route to air base Squadron Leader Rais A. Rafi & Flt Lt. Akhtar were very apprehensive about their comrades Squadron Leader Feroz & Squadron Leader Aurangzeb. Both prayed humbly May God protect Feroz & Auranzeb Meanwhile Squadron Leader Feroz voiced through R/T DCO (duty carried out). A jubiliant mood prevailed among B-57 s formation flying over Bhatinda. An enemy transport vehicles convoy became the target of trigger happy Squadron Leader Rais A. Rafi using cannons of the bomber. The exploding vehicles created another sensation and remaining rounds of the cannons were expended on Bhatinda railway station.
An intricate planning and skillful execution in flying and navigation as well as daredevil approach with surprise and professionalism were the keys to successful night bombing missions of the bomber wing through out the war.
An American magazine published a story that the Indian Air Force had lost 25 aircraft as a result of the PAF night bombing sorties against Ambala. However a clear message was given to the Indian leadership and IAF s high command that PAF bomber wing was quite capable of delivering bombing missions at will any where against IAF and military targets around the country.
B-57s for close support mission Wagah Atari
Before the cease fire announcement with India on 22nd September 1965. Indian Army was concentrating its Armour, Artillery and Infantry units for a possible assault on the salient to consolidate its positions on the eastern bank of the BRB Canal. A task was assigned to Bomber Wing to prevent Indian Army reinforcements from reaching their targets. A formation of four B-57s, which dropped 28,000 lbs. of bombs on Indian Army artillery pieces and tanks deployment near Wagah-Atari axis. The bombs from the B-57s dropped 'in train' engulfed the enemy tanks, artillery guns and support vehicles camouflaged under the trees and in the bushes. Very few enemy officers and soldiers survived to escape Atari. This was the last bombing mission carried out by the bomber wing before the cease fire with India on 23rd September 1965.
Operational losses during the war of 1965:-
Three B-57s of the No 31st Bomber Wing were lost in action but out of these, only one due to enemy action. One RB-57B electronics intelligence aircraft of No 24th Elint was lost due to friendly ack ack fire.
Shaheeds Gallery:-
No 31st Bomber Wing:-
1. Squadron Leader Shabbir Alam Siddiqui (Pilot)
2. Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi (Navigator)
3. Flt. Lt. Mehmood Butt (Pilot)
4. Flt.Lt.A.S.Z.Khalid (Navigator)
No 24th Elint Squadron:-
1. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal (Pilot)
2. Flt.Lt. Saifullah Lodhi (Navigator)
Gallantry Awards:-
The Government of Pakistan gallantry awards to the Bomber Wing & 24th Squadron for outstanding perforce in line of the duty.
No 31ST Bomber Wing:-
1. Squadron Leader Najeeb A.Khan OC No 7th Squadron (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
2. Squadron Leader Rais A.Rafi OC No 8th Squadron (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
3. Wing Commander Nazir Latif (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
4. Flt.Lt.Sikander M.Khan (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
5. Flt.Lt.Altaf Sheikh (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
7. Flt.Lt. Shams Ahmed (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
8. Squadron Leader Shuaib A.Khan (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ
9. Flt.Lt. William D.Harney (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
10. Flt.Lt.S.M.Akhtar (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
11. Flt.Lt. Iftikhar A. Ghori (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
12. Wing Commander Ayaz A, Khan (Pilot) Sitara-e-Basalat (SB)
13. Squadron Leader Aurangzeb Malik (Engg) Sitara-e-Basalat (SB)
No 24th Elint Squadron:-
1. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
2. Flt.Lt. Saifullah Lodhi (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
3. Squadron Leader Mir Abdul Rashid OC (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
Strategic Victory:-
The strategic material out come of these night bombing missions carried out by the bomber wing made nerve shattering shock impact on IAF High Command moral, which was forced to retreat from major air force bases of Pathankot, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jamnagar, Sirsa, Srinagar and Adampur to rear air bases i.e Agra, Ambala and Hindon. The IAF High Command compelled to shift its priority offensive air operations to defensive air operations nevertheless its larger size and very big air defense infrastructure. The IAF could not launch massive night bomber operations by its larger Canberra bombers force against few PAF bases during the war and also failed to provide effective interdiction/air support missions to Indian Army at battlefields as acknowledged by the Indian Army Generals serving in Western Army Command during Indo-Pak war of 1965. The perpetual night bombing campaign exerted devastating effect on the morale of the IAF personnel. The material effect of fatigue caused to them was most pronounced on their air and ground crew while they were forced to keep shuttling in and out of air raid shelters and trenches.
Enemy s Acknowledgement:-
As Indian Army Lt. General Harbaksh Singh has mentioned in his book War despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965. There was no air support available from IAF during field battles with enemy on western front and IAF was forced to exit from its main and forward air bases for reasons best known to IAF s High Command. Our officers and jawans were witnessing PAF s fighter bombers commanding the skies from dawn to dusk for shelling and bombing around thirty minutes or more over the battle fields under the Indian Army Western Command areas.
The Indian Navy s Vice Admiral Mihir Roy has also acknowledged in his book War in the Indian Ocean Perpetual bombing raids reported against IAF base Jamnagar by the PAF sB-57s bombers since the evening of 6th September 1965.
An Overview of Balance Sheet:-
The numerically superior IAF Canberra Bomber Force was completely knocked out in all instruments of its war machine without registering any major breakthrough for the war of 1965.
The PAF bomber s Pilot/Navigator Vs IAF bomber s Pilot/Navigator.
Martin B-57 Bomber Force of 22 aircraft Vs English Electric Canberra B-58 Bomber Force of more than 60 aircraft.
No of Bombing Mission/Sorties -195 Vs No of Bombing Mission/Sorties 92.
PAF Bomber Command Vs IAF Bomber Command.
The PAF Bomber Wing of B-57s emerged victorious with flying colours during day and night bombing missions assigned by the Air Force and the Country by keeping the numerically superior enemy Air Force at bay. The Wing performed bigger assignments, not only holding its own, made concerted night and day air strikes deep into the enemy territory as well performing close support missions for Pakistan Army engaged in the field battles.
Qualitative Edge & Factors:-
The qualitative edge and factors enabled B-57 bomber wing to produced remarkable performance during the war:
1. The meticulous war planning contemplated over several years, operational readiness and periodic operational exercises at Squadron, Wing, Base and Air Force levels masterminded by the C-in-C PAF Air Marshal Asghar Khan.
2. The selection of best pilots to command combat Squadrons & Wing, uncompromising standard and merit criteria.
3. Years of perpetual and rigorous night & day operational training-in flying, navigation and bombing precision, proved to be a very vital link in the chain of success. During the war, as it turned out the bombing results were even better than in peacetime practice exercises. This was perhaps because the pilots & navigators were so proficient and concentrated all their flying efforts on achieving the maximum pinpoint accuracy and precision.
4. Martin B-57 one of the most versatile and reliable bomber of the time and being the only type of that category in the Air Force s inventory, the bomber pilots and navigators were able to fly it extensively day and nights and learned to exploit its capabilities up to the limits.
5. The Engineers & engineering staff were able to achieve high aircraft serviceability and reliability, to sustain healthy rates of highest flying hours in the Squadrons and Wing level.
6. The Maintenance chiefs and maintenance staff s commendable performance during the war operations was a prime factor as described in detailed earlier.
7. The B-57 s pilots and navigators young, dedicated, bold and hard taskmasters, a fine blend of national spirit with unparallel professionalism, their heroic performance during the battle week was above the board. Enemy s massive ack ack batteries, fighter interceptors and SAMs-II could not deter them to carry out their bombing missions after mission. They wrought such havoc in the numerically superior IAF s ranks that they had no stomach left for air battle.
8. As Air Marshal Nur Khan being the bomber pilot was fully aware about operational potential of the bomber wing. Therefore, the B-57 s bomber wing being the strategic arm of the PAF was remained under specific and direct supervision of Commander in Chief PAF and Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) during Indo-Pak war of 1965.A number of bombing missions were briefed to aircrews by the Air Marshal Nur Khan and Air Commodore Rahim Khan. Air Chief and his air staff presence during operational brief proved to be, a true source of inspiration and motivation during the week of the war for pilots and navigators leaving for the highly dangerous bombing missions.
In a modern jet age war, Bomber Wing s strategic breakthrough during the Indo-Pak War 1965, Which PAF capitalized and enjoyed was the result of bold and skillful tactical actions of its highly trained, motivated and disciplined air and ground crew possessing highest degree of professionalism and patriotism. The crew executed every dangerous mission believing in the uprightness of the National Cause and felt no Sacrifice too great for it.
Bibliography
1.PAF BOMBER OPERATIONS 1965 & 1971 WARS by Rais A. Rafi, Air Commodore SJ, a B-57 bomber pilot & decorated star of Indo-Pak Wars
2.The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988.
3. Battle for Pakistan The Air War of 1965. by John Fricker
4.B-57 THE INTREPID BOMBER OF PAF.Defence Journal, Karachi by Hali Sultan M. Group Captain
5.Martin B-57 Canberra--The Complete Record, Robert C. Mikesh, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1995.
6.Canberra: The Operational Record, Robert Jackson, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.
7.The English Electric Canberra Mk.1 and IV, K. Munson, Aircraft In Profile, Doubleday, 1969
8.United States Military Aircraft Since 1909, Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.
9.Library of Congress Country Study--Pakistan
10.War despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 by: Lt. General Harbaksh Singh Indian Army
11. War in the Indian Ocean by: Vice Admiral Mihir Roy Indian Navy
Arshad Hussain.
PAF s Bomber Wing of B-57s
A tribute to those B-57s pilots & navigators, Who executed night bombing missions flying at tree top level on pitch dark nights, carried the war deep into the enemy's heartland, few lionhearted could not return to motherland and embraced shahadat in the line of duty leaving behind a supreme tradition alive Mission First.
Preamble:-
Its an untold story of Pakistan Air Force s No 31 Bomber Wing of B-57s comprising No 7th & 8th Squadrons during 1965 & 1971 Indo-Pak Wars. Although long before the outbreak of hostilities in 1971, No 31 Bomber Wing was non existent and the valiant No 8th Squadron had also been number plated because of US Government embargo on military hardware and supplies, but its pilots & navigators took active part by joining No 7th Squadron in the war of 1971, operating from Masroor and Mianwali air bases.
In August 1982, finally all the remaining B-57s of No 7th Squadron were transferred to No 2 Squadron, adding yet role of night interdiction and special missions to unit s assignment until retirement this reliable workhorse B-57 from meritorious service from PAF. Another chapter has been added to highlight the commendable performance and missions of low profile, stealth unit of PAF s No 24th Elint Squadron operating RB-57Fs & RB-57Bs during and after war of 1965.
The B-57 Bomber nicknamed Baba has been serving the Pakistan Air Force for more than 25 years as a weapons delivery platform, conventional weapons bomber, high altitude aerial reconnaissance, electronic counter & support measures and tow target aircraft as well as being the mainstay for the Air Force. This story is dedicated to the bold and devoted aircrew, maintenance and support personnel of the bomber wing who knew the dream workhorse B-57 and were part of its sorties and missions during peace and wars of 1965 and 1971. It is a beginning with the hope that those who were a part of the Bomber Wing will contribute to the growth of this effort by providing original photos and record of the missions. Since another chapter about the Indo-Pak war of 1971 is under process.
USAF & Operational Background of Martin B-57Bs:-
The Pakistan Air Force was one of the major users of the B-57s except USAF,NASA and National Republic of China Air Force.
(Taiwan) The US Air Force considered the B-57B inadequate for the night intruder role and Martin puting all aircraft through an extensive avionics upgrade. Regardless, by the end of 1957 the USAF tactical squadrons were being re-equipped with supersonic F-100 Super Sabres. The complete retirement was delayed, however, by the start of the Vietnam War.The deployment of B-57Bs from 8th and 13th Bomb Squadrons to Bien Hoa began with three aircraft lost in collisions on arrival. An additional five aircraft were destroyed with another 15 damaged by a Viet Cong mortar attack in November 1964. The first combat mission by the US Air Force s B-57Bs was not flown until 19 February 1965, with the first excursion into North Vietnam taking place on 2 March as part of Operation Rolling Thunder.
The aircraft typically carried 9 x 500 lb (227 kg) bombs in the bomb bay and 4 x 750 lb (340 kg) bombs under the wings. In April 1965, B-57Bs began flying night intruder missions supported by C-123 Provider or C-130 Hercules flare ships and EF-10B Skyknight electronic warfare aircraft. On missions extending into North Vietnam, B-57Bs carried their own flares. On 16 May 1965, an armed B-57B exploded on the runway at Bien Hoa setting off a chain reaction that destroyed ten other aircraft, eleven A-1 Skyraiders, and one F-8 Crusader. Due to combat attrition, in October 1966 B-57Bs were transferred to Phan Rang where they supported operations in the Iron Triangle along with Australian Canberra B.20s. The aircraft also continued to fly night interdiction missions against the Ho Chi Minh trail. Of the USAF s 94 B-57Bs deployed to Southeast Asia, 51 were lost in combat and only 9 were still flying by 1969. As the result, the all B-57Bs were withdrawn from USAF sservice.
Two RB-57As were used by the National Republic of China Air Force for reconnaissance missions over People's Republic of China. One of these was shot down by a Chinese Air Force MiG-19 on 18th February1958. Two other RB-57As were used by the Federal Aviation Administration to plan high-altitude airways for the upcoming jet passenger aircraft.
US Military Aid Package:-
During a visit to Pakistan, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower promised to provide the government of Pakistan with modern jet bombers under US Military Aid Package.
The No 31st Bomber Wing to formed 7th & 8th Bomber Squadrons:-
PAF s B-57 Bombers force began its maiden flight joining Air Force inventory since 27th November,1959. Whereas, twenty four B-57Bs and two B-57Cs inactivated from US Air Force 345th Tactical Bomber Group at Langley AFB in Virginia were ferried to Mauripur air base in Karachi, Pakistan to form the 7th & 8th Bomber Squadrons of the 31st Bomber Wing of the Pakistan Air Force on 11th May 1960.
Our Air Force made very extensive operational use of the B-57B bomber in two wars with India. In the Indo-Pak War of 1965,B-57s force logged 195 operational sorties, dropping over 600 tons of bombs against IAF air bases,radar stations and military targets. Three B-57s of the Bomber Wing were lost in action but out of these, only one due to enemy action. First B-57 spiloted by Squadron Leader Alam Siddiqui & navigator Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi dived into the sea over IAF air base Jamnagar misjudging the height through the thin layers of clouds or getting spatially disoriented, on the early night of 7th September. The 2nd B-57 was shot down over IAF air base Adampur piloted by Flt.Lt.Altaf Sheikh & navigator Flt. Lt. Bashir Chaudhy through enemy ack ack batteries on 14th September .The 3rd B-57 piloted by Flt.Lt Mehmood Butt & navigator Flt. L.t Khalid crashed on the Risalpur air base runway because of bad weather on 17th September.
Whereas one RB-57B electronics intelligence aircraft piloted by Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24th Elint Squadron was shot down by Pakistan Army s ack ack battery during a bombing practice mission on a PAF s radar unit near Rahwali,Gujranwala. In the Indo-Pakistan War of 1971, There was a higher attrition rate with at least five B-57s being put out of service by the end of the war.
Martin B-57B in PAF
The US Glenn. L. Martin B-57B a first generation of jet bomber was a tandem 2 seat, twin engines, night intruder or tactical, all weather long-range bomber, its crew consisted of a pilot and a navigator, carrying a payload of 56 rockets, 4 x 20mm cannons and 8000 lbs. of bombs, 2 turbo jets engines, fired by cartridge starters powered the aircraft. It was very large in size, having a length and wingspan of 65 feet, which meant virtually no maneuverability. Its speed was 570 mph, ceiling height 45,000 feet and ferry range 2656 miles with max load. The PAF B-57s pilots prefer to fly hardly above 200-500 feet in order to avoid enemy radar detection during wars of 1965 and 1971.
However, once over the IAF targets they would pull up to about 7000-8000 feet to make an accurate dive position on targets, from where they would release bombs over the targets with pin point accuracy and precision.
RB-1A all-weather bombing system for PAF sB-57s:-
At first, these bombers were not equipped with an all-weather bombing system as had been originally planned. From 1963, all of the PAF s B-57Bs were retrofitted with the RB-1A all-weather bombing system which gave them a somewhat longer nose shape than that of standard USAF B-57Bs. Some of the B-57s were also fitted with under wing points for the carriage of four extra fuel tanks, which gave them sufficient range to reach distant military targets well inside India.
The No 24th Electronic Intelligence Squadron:-
In addition, two General Dynamics/Martin-RB-57Fs ultra-high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft were also supplied to Pakistan Air Force in the early 1960s. The RB-57Fs was known as droopy because of enormous 122 ft wingspan and capable to fly at the cruising height of 80,000 ft beyond the range of enemy interceptors and SAMs of that period. This was state of art highly specialized aircraft for ECM/ESM missions. The No 24th Elint squadron operated the RB-57Fs along with two RB-57Bs for electronic counter & support measures missions and photographic surveillance missions against IAF during and after the war of 1965.These aircraft extensively over flew most of the IAF air bases up to Ambala at the height of 67000ft or more to carry out monitoring/ reconnaissance missions. The following missions were assigned to the No 24 Elint squadron deployed at Peshawar air base:-
Operational Missions Profile:-
1. Low level homing on to enemy radars.
2. Monitoring of enemy radars for which daily surveillance was kept up to locate their grid reference as well as any change.
3. Monitoring & Jamming of enemy radio channels particularly for GCI transmissions.
Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal SJ was the first OC, who later embraced shahadat being Officer Commanding of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his navigator Saifullah Lodhi SJ during a bombing practice mission on a PAF sradar unit near Rahwali in the 1965 War.
Since the start of the 1965 war. The PAF s F-86s Sabre wing operating from Sargodha air base tried to neutralize the IAF Amritsar radar, but could not deliver accurate attacks due to difficulty experienced in triangulating the exact location of the radar system. Squadron Leader Iqbal floated a novel idea of locating the enemy radar by utilizing the electronic devices fitted RB-57 aircraft. He led in his electronic intelligence RB-57 as a pathfinder, a formation of four B-57s to Amritsar radar on a daylight bombing mission and did not seem to be satisfied with the practical results.
He, therefore, decided to make some practice attacks on a PAF s radar station deployed at Rahwali, near Gujranwala. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24 Elint Squadron and his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi were busy in making low dive bombing practice on radar station. The Army ack ack unit deployed around radar station opened fire on diving B-57 and shot it down, killing both the pilot and navigator. A first rate thorough professional, dedicated and lion hearted pioneer OC of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his outstanding professional navigator Saifullah Lodhi embraced shahadat during mid stream of the war. Both were awarded well deserved Sitara-e-Jurat posthumously. A very tragic loss of invaluable lives of pilot and navigator along with a specilized RB-57 aircraft and an incident that could have been avoided through timely liasion with Air Force and Army ack ack regiment.
If wing operation officer Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed SJ of F-86 Sabre wing would shed his blood for his noble air strike mission to destroy IAF radar station at Amritsar, Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal SJ OC of No 24 Elint Squadron and his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi SJ were also there to shed their blood in the line of the duty.
Nest of the Eagles:-
Since its maiden flight, the No 31 Bomber Wing of B-57s along with its No 7 & 8 Squadrons was deployed at Mauripur air base, Karachi and was assigned the strategic role of airfield night bombing strikes and deep interdiction night missions against numerically superior Indian Air Force bases and military installations during war with India.
Mission & Scope of the B-57s Bomber Wing:-
The paramount mission of the B-57s Bomber Wing night bombing operations was to deny the numerically superior Indian Air Force, the operational utilization of its massive potential air power destroying air bases, runways, hangars, fuel and ammunition dumps and radar installations from where IAF was supposed to streamline air war efforts by launching fighter and bomber aircraft during eventual war with Pakistan. Since IAF maintained a very vast network of major airbases integrated with Russian state of art P-35 three dimension radar systems with Early Warning & GCI facilities along with the adjoining borders with enemy and was quite capable to extend its war efforts through flexible mode by virtue its geographical depth and large airfields infrastructure. A bold and offensive meticulous operational doctrine under The PAF Air War Plan of June 1962 for bomber wing was worked out by the Air Headquarters to counter the numerically superior IAF to fight the air war of Pakistan, keeping in the mind to take bold initiative on the outbreak of Indo-Pak war by launching sustained and wide spread night bombing sorties after sorties over the enemy air bases and military targets, would ultimately bottle up major portion of the Indian Air Force in defensive deployment. It was a strategic offensive plan of PAF s Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan, when numerical superiority was heavily tilted in favour of the enemy. The No 31 Bomber Wing being strategic wing of PAF, raised and trained for ultimate war with India during sixties under the dynamic and visionary leadership of its then Commander-in-Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan. As an Air Chief Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan, whose sterling credentials and brand name has been marked on the PAF since August 15, 1947. A youngest inspiring air force commander with strategic vision and a distinguished jet fighter pilot for newly born Air Force.
Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan a chief architect of Pakistan Air Force:-
Air Marshal Muhammad Asghar Khan has been chief architect of our modern fighter jet Air Force from teeth, to tail. Since July 1957 during his tenure, The air force inducted Korean battle tested fighter bomber F-86s, Martin B-57s bombers, supersonic F-104s star fighter, Hercules C-130s, advanced training jets T-33s and basic training jets T-37s, for search and rescue operations Sikorsky H-19D helicopters and SA-16 Albatross as well modern & state of art high powered early warning and surveillance radar systems of FPS-6 (height finder) & FPS-20 (surveillance).
PAF on the path of Jet technology transformation:-
The Air Force had also begun inducting sidewinder air-to-air missiles (GAR-8 series) to its jet interceptor-fighters force. The entire infrastructure of the Air Force was planned to transforming from propeller aircraft force to jet aircraft force, an advanced technology transformation ahead of its time in the Indo-Pak Sub-Continent.
Apart from induction of the US origin hi-tech military hardware in the Air Force, The Air Chief and his Air Staff undertook the uphill task to transforming PAF s propeller aircraft force into a technologically advanced fighter jet air force in accordance with professional and operational training standards of the US Air Force on war footings. The US Air Force also provided its F-86 Sabre jets Vs MIGs air combat tactics/strategy profiles during Korean War of 1950-53 through bilateral training programs held in USA, West Germany and Pakistan. The key factor of this gigantic transformation program for the PAF was professional excellence through logging of highest jet flying hours by the fighter-bomber pilots, while maintaining highest degree of flight safety.
Operational Standards for the Air Force:-
Air Marshal Asghar Khan himself played the role model of the fighter pilot by flying/checking out each and every aircraft including B-57 under his command setting finest operational standards for the air force. Thereby raising Squadrons after Squadron, as well imparting rigorous and perpetual professional gigantic training program for this newly advanced fighter jet air force in line with USAF s standards. The ultimate milestone worked out by Air Headquarters, getting its air force ever ready for eventual war on Kashmir with numerically superior Indian Air Force. The professional excellence in fighter flying of the PAF was duly acknowledged by the USAF, when state of art mach- 2 air superiority fighter F-104 were provided to PAF, although our air force was the only non NATO Air Force declared qualified to operate these advanced hi-tech fighter aircraft.
The PAF had become razor sharp air war machine, ever ready to face any eventuality during war and peace, long before Air Marshal Asghar Khan got retired from Air Force in July 1965 handing over his command to another accomplished air warrior and bomber pilot of No 7th dive bomber Squadron Burma front bombing missions famed Air Marshal M Nur Khan.
As Commander in Chief Air Marshal Nur Khan would command this highly trained, highly disciplined, and motivated professional air force during Indo-Pak war of 1965.
The ambitious night bombing training program of No 31 Bomber wing was remained under specific and direct supervision of Air Marshal Asghar Khan and his air staff. The selection criteria entailed hand picked and hard task commanding officers of the Air Force for this premiere wing.
Gallery of Wing OCs:-
An Orion of star pilots detailed by the Air Headquarters for wing ever ready to go for action, beyond the call of the duty during war and peace, providing a dynamic leadership nucleus for professional and purpose built bomber wing training. The leaders No 31 Bomber Wing included Air Commodore Khaqan Abbasi, Air Commodore Nazir Latif, Air Vice Marshal A.H.Qureshi, Group Captain M.A. Dogar, Air Chief Marshal Zulfiqar A. Khan, Air Vice Marshal Mehmood Akhtar Bokhari and Air Commodore Rais A. Rafi.
Gallery of Pilots & Navigators:-
The Bomber Wing s No 7 & 8 Squadrons were commanded by including Squadron Leaders of 7th Squadron Ayaz A. Khan (being the first OC), A.M.Lodhie, A. Shamim, Najeeb A. Khan, M.Akhtar, S.A.Rahman, Wing Commanders S.A.Ansari and M.Yunis and Squadron Leaders of 8th Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal (being the first OC), who later embraced shahadat being Officer Commanding of No 24 Elint Squadron in the 1965 War, S.A.Ansari, Rais A. Rafi, M.Zaman, M.K.Bashar as well as with a large number of Akhtars, Altafs, Alams, Aslams, Bashirs, Bashars, Basits, Bukharis, *****, Ghauris, Harneys, Iftikhars, Irfans. Khalids, Khans, Khusros, Kamals Mehmoods, Osmans, Peters, Qureshis, Shabbirs, Shams, Shoaibs, and Sikandar, etc. These brave and dedicated bomber pilots were commanding the wing and its squadrons through cockpit, following the first flying tradition of the PAF The Commander is up front!
Bomber Wing Training Profiles:-
The professional excellence and rigorous flying training profiles during day and night by The No 31 Bomber Wing and its crew culminated in the shape of undertaking of maximum number of night bombing sorties/missions after mission against heavily defended air bases of IAF and other military installations during the wars of 1965 and 1971.
The extensive night low level flying and weapons delivery training involved low level strikes from 1000ft above the ground level and dive bombing attacks from 8000 ft, releasing weapons at 4000ft and recovery at 2000ft. The night training program entailed through out night achieving 50% of the monthly flying hours done at night. The extensive day and night training profiles transformed B-57s a formidable force for its operational missions. Thereby maintaining its best turn around time by two B-57 bomber squadrons.
Highest Degree of Turn Around:
To achieve the highest degree of turn around by a heavy bomber B-57 in a couple of hours and to keep the bomber wing of 22 aircraft that was flying more than 2-3 sorties per aircraft per night in the air field strike missions, required tremendous technical skills and best coordinated war efforts by the bomber personnel as well the technical & logistics ground personnel of the wing deployed around the country on distant air bases of PAF. i.e. at Peshawar, Mauripur, Samungli, Risalpur and Sargodha etc.
Operational Methodology:-
As major night operations program by the B-57s was conducted through Peshawar air base since 6th September, every bomber formation leaving for bombing mission against IAF air bases was suppose to return to alternate air base to ensure safety to rearm and refuel, and then to strike again before returning to base or to another safe air base. The standard operational procedure enabled B-57s force to be prepared to attack their targets night after night creating dynamic approach through flexible mode. By arriving over their targets in a stream at intervals of about 15-20 minutes, the B-57s certainly succeeded in hitting hard the IAF air bases again and again. As Peshawar and Risalpur air bases were also considered too vulnerable to IAF attacks during the nights. Therefore, Samungali and Mauripur air bases were also utilized for turn around.
A successful and accurate night bombing mission is a reflection of overall bomber wing service efficiency-direct or in-direct flying up to targets through ever-vigilant enemy ack ack guns and missiles and fine blend of integration with friendly GCI radar system, navigation, communication, maintenance & technical personnel and bomber pilots & navigators etc.
Serviceability of Bomber Wing:-
At 1800 hours evening of the 6th September 1965,when first formation of six B-57s fully armed with 4x1000lb bombs, 56x2.75 rockets and full load of 4x20 mm cannons took off from air force base Mauripur setting its course for IAF base Jamnagar to undertake the first bombing mission against enemy. The serviceability of our bomber wing was around 99% and technical & logistics ground personnel of the wing maintained it through out the war. An engineering magic by those unsung heroes of the bomber wing under the command of Squadron Leader Aurangzeb Malik. Although it might have taken a couple of hours to patch up the holes in one or two of aircraft, at no stage was any of the B-57 aircraft was unserviceable. Excluding the aircraft losses and damages due to enemy or friendly ack ack fire or crashes. Never did the wing had the situation of bomber pilots waiting for the B-57s for next due operational sortie against enemy targets. A commendable chapter recorded by the wing and its technical & logistics personnel in the annals of air warfare.
Battle for Lahore and The F-86s Force strikes back:-
When the Indian Army launched multiple ground attacks on Lahore in the early hours of 6th September 1965.The war was declared and Government of Pakistan ordered PAF s High Command to carry out air war operations accordingly. The PAF s F-86s Force operating from Peshawar and Sargodha air bases responded swiftly by strafing and rocketing against advancing columns of Indian army s armor, artillery and infantry units from Batapur- Wagah-Atari axis. Since morning till evening containing enemy surprise offensive operations against Lahore, while Pakistan Army deployed in strength on BRB canal banks.
The No 31 Bomber Wing & Night Bombing Missions Profile:-
Now The No 31 Bomber Wing along with its No 7 & 8 Squadrons rose to the occasion in accordance with its pre defined bombing operational doctrine worked out under the PAF Air War Plan of June 1965 with imaginative vision and intricate planning. The Wing operated as an independent and self-supporting arm of the air force undertaking night bombing missions after mission against IAF base Jamnagar to Jodhpur, Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Sirsa, Srinagar and Ambala, from the shores of the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Himalayas.
The night bombing campaign started by the wing on the dusk of 6th September by a formation of six B-57s dropping 24,000 lbs. of bombs and rockets on the IAF airbase Jamnagar and followed by IAF air base Adampur lasted till the last close support bombing mission undertaken by The Bomber Wing against Indian Army at Wagah-Atari axis on 22nd September 1965. B-57Bs force of 22 aircraft undertook a total 195 missions of day and night dropping more than 600 tons of bombs against IAF targets as compared to an estimated 92 night bombing sorties against PAF targets by more than 60 IAF Canberras.
The First Bombing Mission against Indian Air Force:-
Although a major portion of the Bomber Wing was already shifted to Peshawar as per operational doctrine. The remaining six aircraft were waiting at Mauripur air base, then an order received to launch attacks against Jamnagar at 1800 hours on 6th September 1965. The Wing Commander A.H.Qureshi led his bomber force of six B-57s along with Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi, Squadron Leader Alam Siddiqui , Squadron Leader Ansari, Flt Lt Rashid & Flt Lt Amin Khalil from air force base Mauripur in southern sector by launching bombing mission against IAF base Jamnagar. They carried out the first bombing attack of the war against IAF by opening bombing account of the PAF, extensively damaging runways and hangars. Rockets were also fired to hit hangars and buildings. The formation returned successfully with out encountering enemy ack ack firing and any loss. The lone B-57 would repeat air strike mission one after another until morning against IAF Jamnagar. A milkman shuttle service.
Catch Me if you can
The Wing Operations Officer Squadron Leader M.Akhtar Bukhari apart from engagement with operational and administrative matters at the air base also undertook the highly dangerous night flying mission over Indian air space to test and monitor the night interception capability of the Indian Air Force.
After the start of the war with India, the PAF high command decided to check the night interception capability of the enemy air force during mid stream of the air battle by detailing lone B-57 flying over the Indian air space during the mid night. Valiant Sqn Ldr M.Akhtar Bukhari along with Flt Lt Basit volunteered to fly the mission impossible on the night of 8th September at high twelve hours.
The B-57 No 885 piloted by him took off from Mauripur air base around mid night @ high 12 hours and after attaining cruising height of 35,000 ft headed its course @ 400 knots /hour towards enemy borders for IAF s Jodhpur air base, then reaching the target orbited the enemy air base for few minutes and finally turning its direction to wards north over enemy territory over flying one enemy air base including Amritsar and Pathankot after another.The aircraft took 2 hours & 40 minutes from take off till landing.
The enemy air force through its high powered P-35 three dimension radar system with Early Warning & GCI facilities monitored the B-57 taking off from air force base Mauripur in the middle of the night over flying Indian air space for unknown mission from Jodhpur up to Pathankot and then heading for Peshawar. No enemy interceptor scrambled to check the B-57 in the mid stream of the night flying mission.
An open challenge was thrown to the trigger-happy interceptor-fighter pilots of the enemy for easy target, but enemy would not dare to intercept the highflying Eagle in the mid stream. Daredevil Sqn Ldr M.Akhtar Bukhari along with navigator Flt Lt Basit flew his assigned route/mission cool headedly over Indian air space and landed safely at air force base Peshawar, reporting back all clear. A night mission impossible.
First Shaheeds of Bomber Wing:-
The Lionhearted Squadron Leader Shabir Alam Siddiqui & Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi would undertake bombing missions after mission with in first night against IAF base Jamnagar, to inflict maximum damages to the enemy ultimately embraced Shahadat during their 3rd sortie on the night of 6-7th September, by following the finest tradition of fighting falcons of PAF, serving air force and the motherland beyond the call of the duty. The first shaheeds of bomber wing in the line of the duty after F-86 Sabre wing first Shaheeds Squadron Leader Sarfraz Rafique HJ along with Flt Lt. Yunas Hussain SJ in Halwara aerial combat!
Peshawar air base A Bomber Wing Nucleolus:-
The Wing Commander Nazir Latif was also leading his bomber force of sixteen B-57s along with Squadron Leader M.Akhtar and Squadron Leader Najeeb A. Khan from air force base Peshawar in northern sector. Which remained a bomber wing operational nucleolus through out the war. Thereby launching bombing missions after mission against IAF bases Adampur, Halwara, Pathankot, Sirsa, Srinagar and finally hard hitting night bombing mission Ambala would be undertaken by them.
Najeeb hits hard IAF air base Adampur
Squadron Leader Najeeb Khan led a formation of four B-57s taking off from air force base Peshawar in northern sector by launching first bombing mission against IAF Adampur. The enemy welcomed B-57 bomber force with illuminating runways s lights. Leader Najeeb and his formation responded delivering bombs over the targets with pinpoint accuracy shocking the enemy with surprise, leaving behind a trail of smoke and fire engulfed Adampur air base.
As soon the Squadron Leader Najeeb s B-57s were returning to land at Peshawar, another B-57s formation led by Squadron Leader M.Akhtar was setting its course for IAF Pathankot. The formation flew at tree top level to evade enemy radar detection and pulled up 8000ft through the massive ack ack barrage. The airfield beacons were blinking to highlight its location.
The leader dropped bombs over runways and hangars and formation followed the action, extensively damaging runways and hangars. An enemy radio message was intercepted by the Pakistan Army signal intelligence IAF air base Pathankot is burning, Please advance relief.
Soon after arrival from IAF Adampur, another night bombing mission was assigned to Squadron Leader Najeeb Khan and his formation of four B-57s to hit hard Beas river bridge to disrupt an important military supply link for Indian Army and the formation pressed for the mission then and there. Although, bridge proved to be a futile night bombing target. No damage was reported.
A large scale night bombing mission program launched by the B-57 bomber wing originating from Peshawar and Mauripur airbases since 6th September, was getting its momentum through its head start from Jamnagar and Adampur air bases, moving up to Pathankot, Halwara and Jodhpur, carrying the war deep into the enemy's major airfields.
The frequency of the night bombing sorties was in progress with the passage of the time. Sooner, its scope and operational methodology will widen according to the rapidly changing scenario of the air war in favour of Pakistan Air Force.
Chawinda Tank Battle & B-57s Night Mission Samba:-
The Indian Army launched another Major ground offensive from Samba in Sialkot sector after Lahore front through Charwa-Gadgor-Chawinda Axis on 8th September 1965. Major attack was spearhead by leading Indian Army s pride 1st Armoured division along with two Motorized Infantry and one Mountain divisions backing up by massive Corps Artillery s shelling with ultimate mission to reach G.T. Road at Gujranwala cutting main railway lines and roads encircling Lahore front from northern access by passing Pakistan s 6th Armoured division, 24th Infantry brigade along with 4th Corps Artillery units deployed around Chawinda-Daska axis. Another diversionary ground attack was launched against Sialkot by 26th Indian Infantry division to engage 15th Infantry division defending Sialkot-Jammu main axis. Indian army units had also brought road & bridge construction equipments and specialized vehicles & boats to negotiate water obstacles, rivers and canals in the area. The enemy war plan, if that could have been operationally implemented in accordance to its strategic milestone, would have defeat the Pakistan Army in the ground battle.
The 25th Cavalry a premiere regiment of Patton (M-47) tanks under the command of Col. Nisar A.Khan SJ took the lead to bear the major brunt of enemy First Armoured Division along with 24th infantry brigade under the command of Brig. Abdul Ali Malik HJ and 4th corps artillery under the command of Brig. Amjad Ali Chaudhri HJ engaged advancing columns of vanguard armor units of the enemy with in 7-8 miles from border.
A major tank and artillery duel began and lasted day and night. A large number of enemy Centurion and Sherman tanks were destroyed and eight Centurion tanks captured in running condition by the 25th Cavalry during the first round of Chawinda battle. From one of the Indian tanks, A copy of operational plan for 16th Cavalry recovered. Heavy, medium and field guns & howitzers regiments of 4th Corps artillery deployed around Chawinda, Pasrur and Sialkot were delivering accurate shelling on advancing enemy tanks and infantry units thus containing them for further move. Our artillery engaged enemy targets from the battle field of Chawinda up to border and beyond visual range hitting hard enemy units deployed around Sialkot Samba axis with dropping the shells of 200 lbs, 90 lbs, 80 lbs & 25 lbs in a very substantial and effective style.
The Indian Army 1st Corps Headquarters located at Samba 7 miles distance from Indo-Pak border, was controlling entire military operations for Chawinda battle. A large number of tanks, artillery and infantry units were assembled there to be launched for battle from Samba, a battle nucleolus point.
In the wake of the mounting pressure from Indian Army s large scale offensive operations against Sialkot and Chawinda sectors, Pakistan Army sought immediate air support missions from PAF high command against enemy concentrations around Samba. The bomber wing was tasked to carry out night bombing missions against Indian Army units deployed there on the night of 10th September 1965.
A B-57 s formation led by Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar took off to undertake the night close support bombing mission around Samba to harass the enemy army throughout the night. Although, it was bright moon lit night, B-57s dropped flares from 5000ft altitude, maintaining R/T liaison with army ground liaison officer to identify the target areas.
The flares hit the mark reported by the GLO. Now, Squadron Leader Rasi A. Rafi & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar responded with lightning speed by dropping bombs over the target and repeated the action up to 20 minutes, before B-57 exited the area. Another B-57 aircraft reached the scene and undertook the bombing mission over enemy concentrations. The B-57 bombing missions after mission continued the whole night of 10th/11th September, disturbing and harassing the Indian army units and thus preventing them from joining the battle of Chawinda.
In the morning valiant 17th,18th & 19th Squadrons of F-86s from Sargodha ans Peshawar would come to settle their balance with depleted units of enemy by strafing and rocketing through out the day. Advancing Indian Centurion & Sherman tanks were proved to be hot favorite shooting ground of the hovering F-86s at tree top level from dawn to dusk. The F-86s formations after formation remained there to take its due share of enemy ground targets under its dynamic Squadron Leader Butch Ahmed SJ who later embraced Shahadat during another ground attack mission against an ammunition carrying train at Gurdaspur railway station and Squadron Leader Azim Doudpota SJ from No 32 fighter wing operating from Sargodha air base.
Therefore, PAF s bomber wing B-57s along with its brother fighter bomber wings of F-86s played decisive role to contain the enemy army advance through Chawinda battle by effectively knocking out a large number of Tanks, Artillery guns and Infantry vehicles particularly 14th mountain division which was prepared to join the battle royal of Chawinda along with 1st Armoured division. The PAF s aircraft knocked out its fighting potential destroying vehicles, guns and fighting arms leaving in a very depleted condition not fit for any battle.
Target Alpha
IAF s high powered P-35 three dimension radar systems with Early warning & GCI facilities at Amritsar was a prime target for PAF, because of its strategic location on border near Lahore. Its call sign Fish oil The radar was posing direct threat to PAF air operations directing IAF air operations over West Pakistan.
Since the outbreak of Indo-Pak war, F-86s fight bomber wing from Sargodha air base operating along with No 24 Elint Squadron s RB-57s as pathfinder escorted by No 9 Squadron F-104s as top cover launched sustained air strikes to neutralize this target.
Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC of No 24 Elint Squadron along with his navigator Flt.Lt.Saifullah Lodhi embraced Shahadat during a practice mission for this vital target, his RB-57B was hit by friendly ack ack fire.
During a successful air strike undertaken by the F-86s on radar station, its wing operation officer Squadron Leader Munir Ahmed embraced shahadat and radar was extensively damaged for effective air operations on 11th September. However after some interval, Fish oil again back on the air to streamline Indian Air Force operations over West Pakistan. Meanwhile, the mission to destroy this radar was detailed to bomber wing. The C-in-C Air Marshal Nur Khan himself briefed pilots and navigators for the bombing mission against IAF radar station at Amritsar code named Target Alpha. The B-57s bombers struck successfully to the radar station. A formation of four B-57s led by Wing Commander Nazir Latif , dropped 28,000 lbs. of bombs on Amritsar Radar station with pin point accuracy and precision completely damaged the target on 12th September, leaving Indian Air Force with out any Early warning & GCI radar coverage for air operations.
First B-57 shot down by the IAF over Adampur air base:-
The daredevil Flt Lt Altaf Sheikh & Flt Lt Bashir Chaudhy would undertake bombing missions after mission since the first night of 6th September against heavily defended IAF bases, making two or three bombing runs to achieve accurate target hits but against the laid down procedure of single attack and quick egress. During his 13th bombing mission against Adampur, B-57 s bomb release system malfunctioned and bombs did not release, after many aborted attempts, Altaf decided to jettison the bombs en route to its air base. But he then again tried his luck to bomb IAF base Adampur, while in the dive, enemy ack ack shells hit the B-57. However Flt Lt Altaf & Flt Lt Bashir Chaudhy bailed out safely from downing aircraft and became POWs. The war history is made of those patriot air boys who rose to serve the air force and the motherland beyond the call of the duty, with out caring their personal safety and life. This was the first B-57 casualty claimed by the IAF on 14th September 1965.
Mission Ambala
IAF air base Ambala, which was among major operational bases of Canberra bomber force heavily defended with heavy and medium ack ack batteries and SAM-II missiles located an aerial distance of about 400 miles from Peshawar air base. It remained on top priority of the bombing target list by the B-57 bomber wing. A night bombing mission undertaken by Wing Commander Nazir Latif on 8th September aborted, The formation could not locate the target returned safely to the air base with out dropping bombs. Another night bombing mission against IAF air base Ambala renewed by highly experienced crews B-57s led by Squadron Leader Najeeb A. Khan with navigator Flt.Lt. William D. Harney and Wing Commander Nazir Latif with navigator Squadron Leader Auranzeb.
The B-57s formation delivered delay fuse bombs extensively damaging runways, hangars and airfield infrastructure on the night of 18th September. When B-57s were exiting from mission, Ambala airfield was ablaz through chain reaction of firework and blistering barrage of ack ack batteries.
B-57 Bombing with Allah-o-Akbar
Finally another highly dangerous night bombing mission against IAF Ambala was planned by the bomber wing and undertaken by B-57s highly experienced crews team led by Squadron Leader Najeeb OC No 7th Squadron & navigator Flg Officer Kamal, Squadron Leader Rafi OC No 8th Squadron & navigator Flt Lt. Akhtar and Squadron Leader Feroz & navigator Squadron Leader Aurangzeb on the night of 21st September 1965.
Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) Air Commodore Rahim Khan was himself there to brief the mission Ambala to B-57s crew in detailed because of its prime significance. The low level dive-bombing angles, a safety insurance from radar controlled SAMs-II, but offered an acute risk to the bomber aircraft and pilots from blistering anti aircraft guns and heavy machine gun batteries deployed in and around Ambala air base.
But pilots and navigators of B-57s pressed for the mission flying with 360 nautical miles speed at 500ft above ground level in the moon light keeping total radio silence up to the target. While complete surprise was achieved by the leading B-57 piloted by Squadron Leader Najeeb & navigator Flg Officer Kamal, encountered no enemy ack ack shells from Ambala. In the bright moon light, IAF air base lay clearly visible before the B-57s crew, who could see the cars with their headlights on streaming along the road past the air base. A bomber pilot s dream emerged true, the target was in sight offering perfect view and accurate delivery of bombs.
The B-57s formation struck the Ambala with lightning action delivering bombs with delay fuses through low level skip technique in the face of massive ack ack barrage and returned with flying colors. Squadron Leader Najeeb & Flg Officer Kamal, were first to hit the target blowing fuel dumps which illuminated the burning target from miles to mile, Squadron Leader Rais Rafi & Flt Lt. Akhtar ventured to hit hard the runways by accurate low level bombing. Squadron Leader Rafi while delivering bombs on runways kept the piper right on the targets raised Allah-o-Akbar and also pressed machine guns to hit some buildings on the runway and subsequently Squadron Leader Feroz & Squadron Leader Aurangzeb delivered another bomb load on the targets with devastating impact,leaving behind enemy Air Force in shock and surprise. A veritable inferno of fire and smoke engulfed the airfield. Enemy ack ack guns were firing at full fury also hit its own buildings during the air strike.
While on their way back, flying at full throttle en route to air base Squadron Leader Rais A. Rafi & Flt Lt. Akhtar were very apprehensive about their comrades Squadron Leader Feroz & Squadron Leader Aurangzeb. Both prayed humbly May God protect Feroz & Auranzeb Meanwhile Squadron Leader Feroz voiced through R/T DCO (duty carried out). A jubiliant mood prevailed among B-57 s formation flying over Bhatinda. An enemy transport vehicles convoy became the target of trigger happy Squadron Leader Rais A. Rafi using cannons of the bomber. The exploding vehicles created another sensation and remaining rounds of the cannons were expended on Bhatinda railway station.
An intricate planning and skillful execution in flying and navigation as well as daredevil approach with surprise and professionalism were the keys to successful night bombing missions of the bomber wing through out the war.
An American magazine published a story that the Indian Air Force had lost 25 aircraft as a result of the PAF night bombing sorties against Ambala. However a clear message was given to the Indian leadership and IAF s high command that PAF bomber wing was quite capable of delivering bombing missions at will any where against IAF and military targets around the country.
B-57s for close support mission Wagah Atari
Before the cease fire announcement with India on 22nd September 1965. Indian Army was concentrating its Armour, Artillery and Infantry units for a possible assault on the salient to consolidate its positions on the eastern bank of the BRB Canal. A task was assigned to Bomber Wing to prevent Indian Army reinforcements from reaching their targets. A formation of four B-57s, which dropped 28,000 lbs. of bombs on Indian Army artillery pieces and tanks deployment near Wagah-Atari axis. The bombs from the B-57s dropped 'in train' engulfed the enemy tanks, artillery guns and support vehicles camouflaged under the trees and in the bushes. Very few enemy officers and soldiers survived to escape Atari. This was the last bombing mission carried out by the bomber wing before the cease fire with India on 23rd September 1965.
Operational losses during the war of 1965:-
Three B-57s of the No 31st Bomber Wing were lost in action but out of these, only one due to enemy action. One RB-57B electronics intelligence aircraft of No 24th Elint was lost due to friendly ack ack fire.
Shaheeds Gallery:-
No 31st Bomber Wing:-
1. Squadron Leader Shabbir Alam Siddiqui (Pilot)
2. Squadron Leader Aslam Qureshi (Navigator)
3. Flt. Lt. Mehmood Butt (Pilot)
4. Flt.Lt.A.S.Z.Khalid (Navigator)
No 24th Elint Squadron:-
1. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal (Pilot)
2. Flt.Lt. Saifullah Lodhi (Navigator)
Gallantry Awards:-
The Government of Pakistan gallantry awards to the Bomber Wing & 24th Squadron for outstanding perforce in line of the duty.
No 31ST Bomber Wing:-
1. Squadron Leader Najeeb A.Khan OC No 7th Squadron (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
2. Squadron Leader Rais A.Rafi OC No 8th Squadron (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
3. Wing Commander Nazir Latif (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
4. Flt.Lt.Sikander M.Khan (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
5. Flt.Lt.Altaf Sheikh (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
7. Flt.Lt. Shams Ahmed (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
8. Squadron Leader Shuaib A.Khan (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ
9. Flt.Lt. William D.Harney (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
10. Flt.Lt.S.M.Akhtar (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
11. Flt.Lt. Iftikhar A. Ghori (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
12. Wing Commander Ayaz A, Khan (Pilot) Sitara-e-Basalat (SB)
13. Squadron Leader Aurangzeb Malik (Engg) Sitara-e-Basalat (SB)
No 24th Elint Squadron:-
1. Squadron Leader Muhammad Iqbal OC (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
2. Flt.Lt. Saifullah Lodhi (Navigator) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
3. Squadron Leader Mir Abdul Rashid OC (Pilot) Sitara-e-Jurat (SJ)
Strategic Victory:-
The strategic material out come of these night bombing missions carried out by the bomber wing made nerve shattering shock impact on IAF High Command moral, which was forced to retreat from major air force bases of Pathankot, Halwara, Jodhpur, Jamnagar, Sirsa, Srinagar and Adampur to rear air bases i.e Agra, Ambala and Hindon. The IAF High Command compelled to shift its priority offensive air operations to defensive air operations nevertheless its larger size and very big air defense infrastructure. The IAF could not launch massive night bomber operations by its larger Canberra bombers force against few PAF bases during the war and also failed to provide effective interdiction/air support missions to Indian Army at battlefields as acknowledged by the Indian Army Generals serving in Western Army Command during Indo-Pak war of 1965. The perpetual night bombing campaign exerted devastating effect on the morale of the IAF personnel. The material effect of fatigue caused to them was most pronounced on their air and ground crew while they were forced to keep shuttling in and out of air raid shelters and trenches.
Enemy s Acknowledgement:-
As Indian Army Lt. General Harbaksh Singh has mentioned in his book War despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965. There was no air support available from IAF during field battles with enemy on western front and IAF was forced to exit from its main and forward air bases for reasons best known to IAF s High Command. Our officers and jawans were witnessing PAF s fighter bombers commanding the skies from dawn to dusk for shelling and bombing around thirty minutes or more over the battle fields under the Indian Army Western Command areas.
The Indian Navy s Vice Admiral Mihir Roy has also acknowledged in his book War in the Indian Ocean Perpetual bombing raids reported against IAF base Jamnagar by the PAF sB-57s bombers since the evening of 6th September 1965.
An Overview of Balance Sheet:-
The numerically superior IAF Canberra Bomber Force was completely knocked out in all instruments of its war machine without registering any major breakthrough for the war of 1965.
The PAF bomber s Pilot/Navigator Vs IAF bomber s Pilot/Navigator.
Martin B-57 Bomber Force of 22 aircraft Vs English Electric Canberra B-58 Bomber Force of more than 60 aircraft.
No of Bombing Mission/Sorties -195 Vs No of Bombing Mission/Sorties 92.
PAF Bomber Command Vs IAF Bomber Command.
The PAF Bomber Wing of B-57s emerged victorious with flying colours during day and night bombing missions assigned by the Air Force and the Country by keeping the numerically superior enemy Air Force at bay. The Wing performed bigger assignments, not only holding its own, made concerted night and day air strikes deep into the enemy territory as well performing close support missions for Pakistan Army engaged in the field battles.
Qualitative Edge & Factors:-
The qualitative edge and factors enabled B-57 bomber wing to produced remarkable performance during the war:
1. The meticulous war planning contemplated over several years, operational readiness and periodic operational exercises at Squadron, Wing, Base and Air Force levels masterminded by the C-in-C PAF Air Marshal Asghar Khan.
2. The selection of best pilots to command combat Squadrons & Wing, uncompromising standard and merit criteria.
3. Years of perpetual and rigorous night & day operational training-in flying, navigation and bombing precision, proved to be a very vital link in the chain of success. During the war, as it turned out the bombing results were even better than in peacetime practice exercises. This was perhaps because the pilots & navigators were so proficient and concentrated all their flying efforts on achieving the maximum pinpoint accuracy and precision.
4. Martin B-57 one of the most versatile and reliable bomber of the time and being the only type of that category in the Air Force s inventory, the bomber pilots and navigators were able to fly it extensively day and nights and learned to exploit its capabilities up to the limits.
5. The Engineers & engineering staff were able to achieve high aircraft serviceability and reliability, to sustain healthy rates of highest flying hours in the Squadrons and Wing level.
6. The Maintenance chiefs and maintenance staff s commendable performance during the war operations was a prime factor as described in detailed earlier.
7. The B-57 s pilots and navigators young, dedicated, bold and hard taskmasters, a fine blend of national spirit with unparallel professionalism, their heroic performance during the battle week was above the board. Enemy s massive ack ack batteries, fighter interceptors and SAMs-II could not deter them to carry out their bombing missions after mission. They wrought such havoc in the numerically superior IAF s ranks that they had no stomach left for air battle.
8. As Air Marshal Nur Khan being the bomber pilot was fully aware about operational potential of the bomber wing. Therefore, the B-57 s bomber wing being the strategic arm of the PAF was remained under specific and direct supervision of Commander in Chief PAF and Assistant Chief of Air Staff (Operations) during Indo-Pak war of 1965.A number of bombing missions were briefed to aircrews by the Air Marshal Nur Khan and Air Commodore Rahim Khan. Air Chief and his air staff presence during operational brief proved to be, a true source of inspiration and motivation during the week of the war for pilots and navigators leaving for the highly dangerous bombing missions.
In a modern jet age war, Bomber Wing s strategic breakthrough during the Indo-Pak War 1965, Which PAF capitalized and enjoyed was the result of bold and skillful tactical actions of its highly trained, motivated and disciplined air and ground crew possessing highest degree of professionalism and patriotism. The crew executed every dangerous mission believing in the uprightness of the National Cause and felt no Sacrifice too great for it.
Bibliography
1.PAF BOMBER OPERATIONS 1965 & 1971 WARS by Rais A. Rafi, Air Commodore SJ, a B-57 bomber pilot & decorated star of Indo-Pak Wars
2.The Story of the Pakistan Air Force 1988.
3. Battle for Pakistan The Air War of 1965. by John Fricker
4.B-57 THE INTREPID BOMBER OF PAF.Defence Journal, Karachi by Hali Sultan M. Group Captain
5.Martin B-57 Canberra--The Complete Record, Robert C. Mikesh, Schiffer Military/Aviation History, 1995.
6.Canberra: The Operational Record, Robert Jackson, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.
7.The English Electric Canberra Mk.1 and IV, K. Munson, Aircraft In Profile, Doubleday, 1969
8.United States Military Aircraft Since 1909, Gordon Swanborough and Peter M. Bowers, Smithsonian Institution Press, 1989.
9.Library of Congress Country Study--Pakistan
10.War despatches Indo-Pak Conflict 1965 by: Lt. General Harbaksh Singh Indian Army
11. War in the Indian Ocean by: Vice Admiral Mihir Roy Indian Navy
Arshad Hussain.
Zarvan
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 28, 2011
- Messages
- 54,470
- Reaction score
- 87
- Country
- Location
An Air force page on facebook is saying that J-10 B would enter Pakistan next years @Aeronaut @Oscar @nuclearpak @Icarus @RazPaK @Imran Khan
Last edited by a moderator:
That Guy
PDF THINK TANK: ANALYST
- Joined
- Mar 29, 2013
- Messages
- 14,553
- Reaction score
- 52
- Country
- Location
An Air force page on facebook is saying that J-10 B would enter Pakistan next years @Aeronaut @Oscar @nuclearpak @Icarus @RazPaK @Imran Khan
HOLY....That HAS to be photoshopped, it just looks too pretty!
Also, if true, then GOOD NEWS!
Last edited by a moderator:
Zarvan
ELITE MEMBER
- Joined
- Apr 28, 2011
- Messages
- 54,470
- Reaction score
- 87
- Country
- Location
Yes that is photoshop but the main thing is news some other resources suggested the same they are saying wyne went for thisHOLY....That HAS to be photoshopped, it just looks too pretty!
Also, if true, then GOOD NEWS!
purpose to China and also to get some weapons for Navy and also the news came that despite bad economy still Pakistan would go ahead with Air Force future plans @Aeronaut @fatman17
Last edited by a moderator:
That Guy
PDF THINK TANK: ANALYST
- Joined
- Mar 29, 2013
- Messages
- 14,553
- Reaction score
- 52
- Country
- Location
Right, still, it confirms my first thought that the 2014-15 deadline will be met. There were a lot of skeptics, but this pretty much confirms what I've said in the past.
Last edited by a moderator:
Chak Bamu
RETIRED MOD
- Joined
- Jan 3, 2013
- Messages
- 5,361
- Reaction score
- 69
- Country
- Location
Sit tight and wait for confirmation. This is just low level chatter at this point.
My feeling is that Pakistan ought to go for a stealth solution by 2022. Until that time, we ought to make do with JF-17 upgrades. J-10B is a good aircraft, but stealth is a must. Going for J-10B would leave fewer funds for a stealth fighter/bomber, it would also ensure that in 2020s Pakistan would have four combat aircraft types - F-16, JF-17, Stealth fighter/bomber, and J-10B (five if you add J-7PG if it goes on til then).
If J-10B brings a capability that is well beyond JF-17, I would want it for PAF. But we have very limited resources and we need a hard hitting (twin-engine?) fighter/bomber with decent range, payload, and stealth. If getting J-10B gets in the way, then I would rather not have PAF go for it.
My feeling is that Pakistan ought to go for a stealth solution by 2022. Until that time, we ought to make do with JF-17 upgrades. J-10B is a good aircraft, but stealth is a must. Going for J-10B would leave fewer funds for a stealth fighter/bomber, it would also ensure that in 2020s Pakistan would have four combat aircraft types - F-16, JF-17, Stealth fighter/bomber, and J-10B (five if you add J-7PG if it goes on til then).
If J-10B brings a capability that is well beyond JF-17, I would want it for PAF. But we have very limited resources and we need a hard hitting (twin-engine?) fighter/bomber with decent range, payload, and stealth. If getting J-10B gets in the way, then I would rather not have PAF go for it.
