Four IL-78 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) aircraft entered service between 2009 and 2011. Four AEW&C Erieye systems from Saab of Sweden mounted on Saab 2000 turboprop aircraft and using Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar technology were acquired and integrated with the Command and Control Ground Environment system of the PAF between 2009 and 2011. One was destroyed on the ground in a militant attack on the Kamra base in 2012. Three Dassault Falcon 20 jets in the Electronic Support Measures (ECM/ESM) role are also held in the inventory. Four Chinese Shaanxi ZDK 03 (AEW&C) aircraft based on the Y-8F 600, which is a Chinese derivative of the Russian AN 12 with AESA radars, began entering service in 2011.
Helicopters
The Pakistan Army has a few Eurocopter Fennec and IAR 330 light attack helicopters. The bulk of the attack helicopter fleet consists of Bell AH 1/FS Cobra and 1Z Viper helicopters with the more capable Chinese Z-10 entering service now. Shortage of attack helicopters has forced the military to use fast jets such as the F-16 with Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) for counter insurgency operations. The PAF’s helicopter lift capability is somewhat limited with 40+ Mi-17s and Alouette IIIs. (Only types with significant numbers have been considered).
To increase effectiveness and limit collateral damage during counter insurgency operations, the PAF and Pakistan Army Aviation have increasingly used PGMs. The PAF has, therefore, built up a substantial inventory of air-to-surface PGMs and developed expertise in their use and along with the Army in the use of attack helicopters and fixed-wing fighters in low air threat scenarios in the mountains.
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/pakistan-air-force-today-implications-for-india/
UAVs
A significant Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) capability is being developed with the acquisition of Chinese and locally developed or cloned platforms. The Chinese CASC CH-4 long-range 40-hour endurance platform similar to the US General Atomics MQ-9 Reaper, capable of weapon delivery, is reportedly being inducted. Having been both at the delivering and receiving ends of UAV reconnaissance, surveillance and firepower capabilities, Pakistan certainly has experience in drone operations.
Transport Fleet
The tactical and strategic transport capabilities remain modest based on the earlier C-130 variants and a few CASA 235s. However, the small size of the country somewhat reduces the disadvantages of not having a significant heavy lift capability. (Only types with significant numbers have been considered).
Air Defence System
Since the mid 1980s, the PAF has had an integrated Air Defence Ground Environment System (ADGES) with an India-centric approach. There is an independent AD Command with the tri-service AD system fully integrated. Due to lack of geographical depth, a forward defence posture is the only viable option. The doctrine is based on centralised control of all AD assets, achievement of air superiority over own air space and the battle area, area Air Defence and reliance on aircraft as the main weapon system with SAMs for inner layer protection.
Low level threats over the battlefield are countered by short range man-portable SAMs and radar-guided Anti Aircraft Artillery (AAA). Mobile Observer Units (MOUs), mobile surveillance radars such as the AN TPS 77, longer range Ground Control Interception (GCI) and surveillance radars, a Hughes Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) ADGES integrated with a Siemens Low Level Air Control System (SILLACS) and AEW&S systems are the main components.
There is a possibility of aerostat mounted surveillance radars being deployed. Weapons include AD fighters, Crotale R 440 and SPADA 2000 SAMs, RBS 70, Stinger, Mistral and Anza short-range SAMs, and 57, 35 and 14.5 mm AD guns with Giraffe radars. There is a deficiency in longer range SAMs. Deployed ones are older types including the US RIM 66 Standard Medium Range area defence SAM and the Chinese HQ-2B which is a Russian Dvina variant. Acquisition of the Chinese HQ-18 variant of the Russian S 300 long-range SAM system is a distinct possibility.
Other Missiles
Air-to-Air: The Chinese SD-10 active radar-guided BVR missile entered Chinese service in 2007. It has a reported range of over 70 km and can be carried on the JF-17. The US AIM 120 C-5 AMRAAM BVR missile, which can be carried by the newer F-16C/D variant, has a range in excess of 105 km and has been in service with the PAF since 2010. Both these give the PAF a BVR capability that it lacked earlier. Visual range missiles include the Chinese PL 5 and 9, the US AIM 9 Sidewinder, the AIM 7 Sparrow, the French Matra 550, 530 and the Super 530D.
Air-to-Surface: The locally developed H-4 Stand-off Weapon (SOW) with infra-red guidance and a claimed range of 120 km could be a version of the South African Denel. A shorter range (60 km) H-2 version also exists. These can be carried by the JF-17 and have been in service for over ten years as per claims. Some Chinese origin Anti-Tank missiles are also held. French Exocet, US Maverick, Harpoon HARM and Shrike plus Chinese C 802 and 803 missiles are available to the PAF. The Hatf VIII cruise missile with a range of 350 km has also been in service since 2007 and is nuclear capable.
Surface-to-Surface: List of missiles available in the public domain is given below. Some of them are derived from existing Chinese or North Korean missiles. The solid-fuel missiles have faster response time. Liquid-fueled missiles cannot be stored for long in the fueled state and fueling before launch takes time. Solid-fuel missiles make suitable nuclear warhead carrier platforms due to reduced response time. Given their payload capacities and accuracies (Circular Error Probable or CEP), it becomes evident that most of them are suitable only against larger area targets and that too when armed with nuclear weapons. The ranges all make them India-specific.
Surface to Surface Missiles
Implications for India
In the 1990s, the PAF had a relatively older fleet barring the early model F-16s, no AWACS or flight refueling capability, no BVR air-to-air missiles, limited night attack and Electronic Warfare (EW) capabilities. It was definitely outmatched by the IAF in quantity and quality. Within 15 years, a major transformation has taken place. Similarly, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was a qualitatively inferior force when compared to the IAF in the late 1980s but this also has changed in the last 15 years.
Two factors have contributed to this. The first is the modernisation efforts of the PAF and the PLAAF, that of the former aided by infusion of US and Chinese equipment. This is obviously outside the control of our country except to try and bring diplomatic pressure to limit such transfers, a method that has not been very successful. The second factor is within our control.
The IAF has lost the qualitative edge vis-a-vis the PAF and the PLAAF, and may descend into numerical parity with the PAF for the first time in the near future because of our failure to induct new systems in time and in sufficient quantities. The IAF’s draw down will become critical by 2020 with all MiG 21s, MiG 27s and portions of the Jaguar fleet being phased out. No replacements in sufficient quantities are available as of now. While the Tejas Mk 1 LCA has technologies superior to the JF 17, the fact is that the latter has been in full operational service for some years, whereas the Tejas Mk 1 has not even been deployed and will be obsolescent soon.
The Tejas Mk 2 variant is still on paper. One cannot fight a war using an aircraft which has some aspects of advanced technology incorporated but which is not combat-ready and available in very limited numbers. This mess is of our own making. Let alone a limited conflict on two fronts, we will soon lack the capabilities for a single front conflict if the situation is allowed to deteriorate further. Not just our combat fleet, but our helicopter, medium and light transport, intermediate and advanced trainer fleets, SAMs and a whole lot of other systems are obsolete and also not available in required numbers.
In the area of nuclear weapons, considering the numerical superiority enjoyed by the Indian forces, Pakistan has developed tactical nuclear weapons to counter an Indian mechanised forces thrust into Pakistan which could cut the latter in half if not halted quickly. Pakistan’s declared first use option is meant to serve as a deterrent. What it does is give control of nuclear weapons to field commanders without the degree of safeguards available to the systems under centralised control for strategic use. The increasing radicalisation of elements in the Pakistani military and a climate wherein India has been portrayed as the enemy whose destruction is essential for the safety of Pakistan, plus growing sectarian strife and religious intolerance make for a dangerous mix.
The PAF has nuclear-capable delivery platforms and most Pakistani surface-to-surface missiles are capable of nuclear weapons delivery. Irrespective of intentions, the capabilities exist and that has to be taken into account by our political and military leadership. We do not appear to have developed tactical nuclear weapons and so that option of their use is ruled out for now.
Till such time that the IAF’s combat aircraft strengths improve, effective use of existing assets by induction of more quantities of force multipliers such as Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), air refuellers, AWACS, greater use of Surface-to-Surface Missiles and increased numbers of weaponised and other UAVs are imperative.
To utilise scarce resources better, creation of unified Theatre Commands need to be examined. Warfare no longer consists of independent actions on land, at sea, in the air, in space and in the cyber world but is an integrated activity requiring Integrated Commands.
Military commanders have a duty to insist on actions to be taken on time to improve the capabilities of forces instead of taking paths of least resistance. The political leadership and bureaucracy have to realise that the armed forces are the guarantors of a nation’s very existence and without that existence, their own importance and relevance in the scheme of things will become zero.
http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/pakistan-air-force-today-implications-for-india/
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This article indirectly stresses for the need of rafale so pakistanis should not start thumping chests. IAF is modernizing with heavy weight multirole fighters even though they are not a 1;1 replacement, its a massive enhancement of capability a fact carefully cloaked in the conclusion
