Operation Barbarossa: The Biggest Military Adventure in History

[LeGenD]

@Nilgiri
Whatever strategy we discuss or mistakes are pointed out in that operation, with Red Arm's Logistics intact and abundant supply of man power and material it was obviously a war of logistics from start.

The one who was capable to supply furnace of war endlessly was bound to win.

My two cents.

There is more to this story then Soviet muscle - Hitler did not consider USA in his calculations.

People love to talk about Stalingrad and Kursk but few pay attention to the impact of Lend-Lease Act of USA which addressed logistics-related woes of the Soviet war-machine and ensured supply of weapons in dire times.

http://www.historynet.com/did-russi...ase-helped-the-soviets-defeat-the-germans.htm

https://www.gazeta.ru/science/2016/03/11_a_8115965.shtml

The US itself opened a front against the Wehrmacht in 1943 [in Italy] and began to subject German homeland to bombardment since - these developments forced the Wehrmacht to divert precious resources to its European theater of operations (again) and its war-effort in the East suffered consequently starting with setback in Kursk.

Essentially, the Wehrmacht stood no chance against two superpowers in the battlefield.

 

[Desert Fox]

>Understimation of soviet industrial and mobilization potential and capacity of the russian people to resist the genocidal campaign he wanted to wage.The soviet state lost a third to half its steel and coal production,population in the early days of the war but by redeploying its industries in the nick of time by disassembling and transporting them beyond the urals along with 17 million people evacuated,then in a tremendous effort basically replacing its whole strength twice in 6 months it stopped the germans.

I think this was in general the failure of German intelligence to gather accurate information and in credit of complete Soviet secrecy of their industrial capacity.

>Manpower.Germany didn't have the manpower for a long war of conquest on a global scale.

Well I beg to differ that it was intended to be a war of conquest on a global scale. If it were intended to be so the German economy would have been geared towards such. Neither the Germans were intending for it to be a global war of conquest nor did they have the economic capacity for it to be one.

What started out as a German-Polish border conflict, then war, in collaboration with the Soviet Union in light of the Hitler-Stalin pact on 1939 (signed in Moscow btw) spiralled out of control into a World War.

>Prefering ideology over sense/facts to answer key questions.Thus going easy on britain at dunkirk over 'racial affinity',

This is true and a major mistake, one that Hitler regretted deeply afterwards.

wastage of vast amounts of resources on killing of jews and partisans

Partisans were inflicting major losses of men and material. To put into perspective the partisan threat, Tito had 200,000 partisans in Yugoslavia alone. That is no minor problem.

Regarding the Jews, yes they were classified as a hostile minority, no different to the Japanese in America. Concerning the killings of Jews, besides alleged gas chambers, the mass shootings are indisputable, though they did not occur with Hitler's consent, mostly with Himmlers approval and even then not all of them. There are accounts of local volunteers killing Jews for their cooperation with Soviet authorities before the German arrival, particularly in the Ukraine and Baltics and often to the shock of the Germans themselves.

Refusal to evacuate territory because of fanatical belief in 'superhuman' german soldier to defy laws of warfare against inferior slavs.

Well this was mostly to delay and tie-down the opposition armies as much as possible. Was it a sound strategy? Considering the circumstances I would say it was the only sound strategy.

>Suicidal declaration of war on USA while still at war with russia and britain.Hitler on 8th december 1941(the very day russian counterattak before moscow was about to begin) thought ussr was finished.Totally understimated US industrial potential.When you casually declare war on a nation 1.5 times your population,20% of world's GDP(even after great depression,rising to nearly 40% in 1945) and an industrial capacity greater than ussr,britain,italy and japan combined you must be dumb or delusional

There were two reasons for the declaration of war:

1) The US was never really "neutral".

"We'll fire at German U-boats & merchant vessels in the Atlantic and assist the British by escorting their supply vessels. But hey! We're neutral"

"We will send a few anti-submarine aircraft to monitor German U-boats and then send that vital info over to the Brits so they don't get choked into a peace treaty with Germany. But hey! We're neutral"

2) In hopes of getting the Japanese involved against the Soviet Union.

But to the disappointment of the Germans, the Japanese actually respected their own non-aggression pact with Stalin (which he did not hesitate to violate in 1945).

>Didn't mobilize for total war until 1944.

This was indeed a big mistake. But no one considered a border war with Poland turning into a six year world war.

Also chaotic industrial organization due to internal rivalry between nazi economic czars before speer.German factories were in the smaller workshop style and suited for high quality finish of limited products.Russians and americans in chelyabinsk(tankograd) and detroit built enormous city sized complexes on an assembly line which mass produced vehicles with economics of scale.Russians were also more practical with production philosophy,building engines meant to last for 6 months only - the avg life span of a tank on the eastern front while germans built complete highly manufactured gear until the later years.

The Soviets didn't have to go through these problems because by 1941 their arms industry had already evolved into a war machine, equiped with the best American designed factories (Ford engineers designed Nizhni Novgorod on the same basis as American auto-cities Detroit and Dearborn).

Germany on the other hand was not economically prepared for a major war, which goes against the generally accepted theory that Hitler was out to conquer the world.

>Oil.Only really had ploesti in rumania,some in hungary and synthetic plants which the western allies bombed to shit.Main reason for overambitious caucasus drive in 1942.

I believe oil was a major concern from the outset of the war and the initial strategy of ignoring Moscow and heading straight for the Caucasus was the correct one in the long run, but this strategy was overruled by Hitler's generals.

>Intelligence failure.Enigma codes got cracked and cost them the battle of the atlantic as well as confirming the attack on kursk salient.Failed to estimate the actual strength of the soviet divisions in 1941(in reality it was 3 times the estimate).Totally unaware of existence of T-34/KV tanks or katyusha rocket launchers.Fooled at Normandy as to location of landings.
Design secrets of me-109 were leaked and incorporated during design of spitfire by british intelligence,without this britain may have lost the battle of britain in 1940

Indeed this was a major victory for the allies, perhaps the single greatest one and decisive one at that.

Now of course the Germans were not aware of this so can't really blame them.

Though despite this the Germans were able to achieve the gains they made, mostly because their enemies underestimated them.

>Poor strategic decision to attack russia without taking gibraltar and north africa and securing the mediterranean and middle east .This would have given them oil,a direct invasion route into caucasus and india.Just 5-10 divisions given to rommel could have accomplished this.Britain would have been powerless to resist and the rest of the wehrmacht could guard the eastern border with russia

Given the hostile gestures of the Soviets like refusing to renew a second Hitler-Stalin pact, deploying troops too close to the Romanian border, displaying solidarity for the Yugoslavia coup which overthrew the German-alligned gov.t etc, not to mention Churchill was betting on the Soviets to open a second front, it was only a matter of time.

Also, after summer 1941 the ideal moment to attack the USSR would have been lost.

>Several poor tactical decisions of 'no retreat' style starting with stalingrad and continuing from 1943 onwards

Mostly to tie down enemy divisions and buy time for other more vital fronts to retreat behind a new defensive line.

It was the only strategy left considering the dire circumstances.

The whole debacle was the result of contradictory intelligence reports.

Also, I just want to bring up a similar historical event, the battle of Thermopylae where the famous 300 Spartans fought a futile battle which they ultimately lost due to superior enemy numbers, no one says "well, those idiots, their commander was an idiot, should've retreated elsewhere" (not accusing you of this, but the general attitude towards the stand-fast orders of Germany in WW2 is such). They knew they were going to die but they had to stand fast and fight to the end to buy their own side as much time as possible considering their own circumstances.

>Poor use of breakthrough technology.Wasted the surprise shock effect of tiger tanks by getting one isolated trial version knocked out and captured in late 1942 near leningrad instead of springing a surprise with massed battalions of the vehicle at kursk.

Certainly, surprise would have been better.

The Russians, even if they were surprised at Kursk by the tigers, could easily disable them by knocking out the tracks and the main gun with their low caliber anti-tank guns and anti-tank rifles (which they still did).

Hitlker's objections delayed deployment and mass production of STG-44 assault rifle by a year.

This is true and undisputable.

Wasted me-262 jet fighter by using it as a bomber.

The theory behind using it as a bomber was to make it versatile. Due to allied air superiority the skies over Western Europe were rendered un-flyable (if that's even a word) for the Luftwaffe and a fast fighter/ground attack aircraft was needed on an urgent basis that would be able to out-run allied fighter aircraft.

One word: oil

Maybe Germany should have gone through Turkey instead to get to the caucus oil fields and also middle east oil fields quicker and easier... rather than barbarossa and african campaign simultaneously....and splitting into two theatres to get to the oil (and I guess strategic black sea access and suez canal too)....rather than focusing on just one first.

But then again if that failed, we would be suggesting what the Germans ended up doing (all out campaign to put Russian industrial and political heartlands out of commision ASAP) War is such a thing.

Indeed. We today, looking back, can speculate on various hypotheticals and judge Hitler and his actions because that chapter of history has already been closed. Hindsight is twenty-twenty.

But the proper way to judge someone is to put yourself in their shoes, at that time, and limit your knowledge to what was available to them at that time, and then judge their actions, free of the narrative of vested interests which I know from experience is not an easy task considering that majority of the sources are the products of these interested groups.

 

[Gomig-21]

Germany lost because -

>Understimation of soviet industrial and mobilization potential and capacity of the russian people to resist the genocidal campaign he wanted to wage.The soviet state lost a third to half its steel and coal production,population in the early days of the war but by redeploying its industries in the nick of time by disassembling and transporting them beyond the urals along with 17 million people evacuated,then in a tremendous effort basically replacing its whole strength twice in 6 months it stopped the germans.

>Manpower.Germany didn't have the manpower for a long war of conquest on a global scale.As henry kissinger once said - ''Poor germany,too big for europe,too small for the world''.Soviet advantage was that they had double the nominal manpower base as germany .They also employed millions of women in combat and auxillary roles(gunners,tankers,snipers,logistical staff,nurses,pilots).The military age manpower was also relatively greater for ussr.To add to this Germany didn't have conscription between 1918 and 1935 due to versailles,so the conscription batches of these 17 years were 'lost batches' with no training.USSR had continued compulsory service throughout ,so all of its male population had some experience even if rudimentary.

>Prefering ideology over sense/facts to answer key questions.Thus going easy on britain at dunkirk over 'racial affinity',not using large numbers of disaffected ukrainian and russian troops as allies,instead brutally liquidating them because of 'racial inferiority',wastage of vast amounts of resources on killing of jews and partisans.Refusal to evacuate territory because of fanatical belief in 'superhuman' german soldier to defy laws of warfare against inferior slavs.Total understimation time after time of soviet war potential.

>Suicidal declaration of war on USA while still at war with russia and britain.Hitler on 8th december 1941(the very day russian counterattak before moscow was about to begin) thought ussr was finished.Totally understimated US industrial potential.When you casually declare war on a nation 1.5 times your population,20% of world's GDP(even after great depression,rising to nearly 40% in 1945) and an industrial capacity greater than ussr,britain,italy and japan combined you must be dumb or delusional.

>Didn't mobilize for total war until 1944.Women in germany didn't work until late in the war while millions of women in britain and usssr(children even) toiled.Also chaotic industrial organization due to internal rivalry between nazi economic czars before speer.German factories were in the smaller workshop style and suited for high quality finish of limited products.Russians and americans in chelyabinsk(tankograd) and detroit built enormous city sized complexes on an assembly line which mass produced vehicles with economics of scale.Russians were also more practical with production philosophy,building engines meant to last for 6 months only - the avg life span of a tank on the eastern front while germans built complete highly manufactured gear until the later years.

>Oil.Only really had ploesti in rumania,some in hungary and synthetic plants which the western allies bombed to shit.Main reason for overambitious caucasus drive in 1942.

>Intelligence failure.Enigma codes got cracked and cost them the battle of the atlantic as well as confirming the attack on kursk salient.Failed to estimate the actual strength of the soviet divisions in 1941(in reality it was 3 times the estimate).Totally unaware of existence of T-34/KV tanks or katyusha rocket launchers.Fooled at Normandy as to location of landings.
Design secrets of me-109 were leaked and incorporated during design of spitfire by british intelligence,without this britain may have lost the battle of britain in 1940.

>Poor strategic decision to attack russia without taking gibraltar and north africa and securing the mediterranean and middle east .This would have given them oil,a direct invasion route into caucasus and india.Just 5-10 divisions given to rommel could have accomplished this.Britain would have been powerless to resist and the rest of the wehrmacht could guard the eastern border with russia.

>Several poor tactical decisions of 'no retreat' style starting with stalingrad and continuing from 1943 onwards.

>Poor use of breakthrough technology.Wasted the surprise shock effect of tiger tanks by getting one isolated trial version knocked out and captured in late 1942 near leningrad instead of springing a surprise with massed battalions of the vehicle at kursk.Russians examined the vehicle and prepared heavy tank destroyers as a result and were ready with su-85 and isu-152 at kursk.Hitlker's objections delayed deployment and mass production of STG-44 assault rifle by a year.Wasted me-262 jet fighter by using it as a bomber.

Excellent post. I would add that logistically, the Wehrmacht being hampered by fuel shortages and having to resort to horse & carriage transportation in many cases to conserve fuel eventually took its toll in the brutal temperatures on one end of the winters and bogged down in the mud of the following spring thaws which was a major hampering effect on what essentially was the only real way for the Germans to fight well, ala blitzkrieg.

One other thing that I would add to your excellent list is the lack of winter wear for the Germans compared to the Soviets. While the Germans had arguably the best looking uniforms in the history of military warfare, much of it wasn't adequate enough for that brutal, Russian winter compared to what the Soviets had which ultimately not only made their survival chances much better, but their fighting ability as well.

Reading your list and getting towards the end I kept thinking "oh he's forgetting Hitler's insistence on making the ME-262 a bomber instead of a fighter, but you threw it in at the very last sentence lol!

While I don't think that would've made a huge difference since the ME-262 came rather late in the war, it might've slowed down the potency of the P-51 a bit, especially over Berlin as an escort for the B-17s. Once the P-51 was able to protect the bombers further into Germany and Berlin, that sped up the bombing campaign which essentially destroyed much of the vital production facilities near the city. Slowing the bombing campaign still wouldn't have stopped the Soviets coming in from the east. The result rests entirely on the dire consequences of the failed eastern campaign.

 

[Psychic]

Your thoughts @Nilgiri @Psychic @AUSTERLITZ

(With the benefit of hindsight)
Adding to what you people stated so far;

Lack of long-range bombers

• Lack of long range bombers to hit Soviet war industry in the Urals.
• These bombers could have been employed against the oil facilities of Baku which accounted for more than 80 percent of Soviet oil production. When it was realized that the capture of Caucasian oil fields was not feasible, it was decided to deny their use to the Soviets however, Richthofen's bombers could reach only as far as Grozny. Flying to Baku was impractical since the range involved was at the limit of the endurance of German bombers.
• Unrealistic design criteria set for the long-range bomber(shallow-angle dive bombing capability and only two engines) hampered the production of He-177 which was mired with engine troubles. When it finally came, it was already too late.

Treating the Mediterranean theater as a mere side show .

• While it is true that Admiral Canaris sabotaged the possibility of any deal between Germany and Franco regarding the fate of Gibraltar, however given it's immense strategic significance, Gibraltar should have been occupied nevertheless. Hitler did not take this decision. As a result, the allied supply route to North Africa remained open. Had the Gibraltar strait been blocked by the Germans, the British would have had to sail around the Cape of good hope and through Suez to supply their forces in North Africa. German U-boats would have wreaked havoc along the African coast and the British would have received only thirty percent or so of the supplies they received through Gibraltar.
• Malta was the key to air superiority over the central Mediterranean. This carrier island was not taken on the grounds that airborne assault will lead to too many casualties(like Crete). It inflicted greater number of casualties indirectly, than what would have been suffered in it's capture.
• As a consequence of the above factors, Rommel was always short of supplies and reinforcements.
• Had the British been dealt with by taking Gibralter and Malta, Rommel would have been threatening Caucasus from the South. The objectives of Case blue could have been achieved.

 

[Gomig-21]

Indeed. We today, looking back, can speculate on various hypotheticals and judge Hitler and his actions because that chapter of history has already been closed. Hindsight is twenty-twenty.

Of course, and the complexity of that part of history is what makes these speculations a lot of fun to discuss because they're not as easy to dissect and definitively point out one answer or the other that would be correct.

Defining Hitler as a madman is one of the better ones because as you well know, the general opinion is that all he was missing were vampire teeth to complete his image. Or just maybe we never saw them since he only drank blood in the pitch black darkness of nighttime.

How much significance did Stalingrad have to both, Hitler and Stalin, beyond strategically? Did Hitler really need to take it? Or could he have completed the objective of controlling the Volga without it?

Was Stalin prepared to fight for Moscow as much as he fought for Stalingrad?

But looking back at one of the really remarkable points of Barbarossa, to me anyway, was Hitler's last minute appointment of Paulus to field marshal to dissuade him from surrendering the 6th army, only to see him do exactly that 2 hours later. The psychology that Hitler used at several key moments of the war worked for and against him, like going back to your favorite guy. How justified was Hitler's paranoia about Rommel?

 

[Desert Fox]

Of course, and the complexity of that part of history is what makes these speculations a lot of fun to discuss because they're not as easy to dissect and definitively point out one answer or the other that would be correct.

Defining Hitler as a madman is one of the better ones because as you well know, the general opinion is that all he was missing were vampire teeth to complete his image. Or just maybe we never saw them since he only drank blood in the pitch black darkness of nighttime.

Yes, definitely, there is nothing wrong with coming up with hypotheticals, it is fun and it is good to disect and criticize and think about the possible outcomes had one thing or another been done differently.

However often I have read academic books by major historians who simply dismiss Hitler as a "military mediocrity" or "incompetent military strategist" because of percieved mistakes he made (like the stand-fast orders to hold territory and tie down enemy divisions, or when he diverted Guderians panzers south in the Ukraine away from their previous trajectory towards Moscow, etc.). I'm not sure if this is out of political reasons (ie, nothing good could have come out of Hitler, who was basically the personification of everything evil) or if they came to this conclusion after having metuculously taken into consideration the possible historical circumstances that might have compelled these decisions?

Because to simply dismiss a world historical personality like Hitler as a "idiot" does great injustice to an honest interpretation of history and does not look good coming from people who are academics and historians.

Because this very simplistic view of Hitler does not explain his political acumen during his years of political agitation from 1919 up till his taking power in 1933 and then the consolidation of his power from then up till the end of the war. How did this nobody, veteran of the trenches of WW1, who never went past middle school, spent years as a homeless in Vienna working as a manual laborer and part time water-color artist, outwit his seasoned political adversaries of Germany's most powerful political parties? After all politics is war by other means (and vice versa) as the saying goes.

To say he was an "idiot" leaves a giant black hole in this timeline of history.

Nor does this simplistic interpretation of history explain Hitler's decision to favor revolutionary ideas like Blitzkrieg over the old guard in the Army. Hitler supported opening up Germany military academies to Germans of all walks of life, which before him were exclusively dominated by the Prussian aristocratic officer class. The Nazis favored men like Rommel who were outsiders to the old guard in the army (the main reason why many of them opposed Hitler and undermined him every chance they got).

But this does not go without saying that Hitler did make decisions that ended up playing into the hands of the Allies, like @AUSTERLITZ rightfully pointed out the decision to spare the BEF at Dunkirk (clouded by ideology/goodwill towards the Brits) and others like opposing the production of the Stg-44, and as @Psychic pointed out not taking Gibraltar, though that might have required an already resource-strained Wehrmacht to become ever more burdened by possibly occupying Spain, or perhaps a commando operation might have been sufficient to take Gibraltar (hypotheticals again).

How much significance did Stalingrad have to both, Hitler and Stalin, beyond strategically? Did Hitler really need to take it? Or could he have completed the objective of controlling the Volga without it?

Was Stalin prepared to fight for Moscow as much as he fought for Stalingrad?

I wouldn't rule out that Stalingrad was also a battle of egos between Hitler and Stalin, the name of city might have to do with it. But I think this factor is overstressed, again to prove Hitler's incompetency as a military strategist who became purely obsessed over irrelevant details.

But in reality Stalingrad was a major industrial and transportation hub sitting on the Volga river guarding the mouth of the Caucasus. It's damaged factories were churning out T-34's even as the battle raged around them.

But the battle for the city did turn into a quagmire and not only Hitler is at fault but so are his generals like Franz Halder who against Hitler's orders deployed tanks in the city, tanks that Hitler ordered to reinforce the Italians guarding the German flanks.

How justified was Hitler's paranoia about Rommel?

Do you mean after the failed July assassination attempt?

 

[Gomig-21]

codenamed “Barbarossa” after a 12th-century Holy Roman Emperor who won land for the Germans from the Slavs.

13. The invasion was named Operation Barbarossa after the founder of the 12th century First German Reich.

Kaiser Rotbart , the red beard (Barbarossa) who was actually crowned king of Germany in the 12th century.

Stalingrad tells us that it is not wise to reduce thousands of buildings and structures to rubble in a city - if the plan is to occupy it afterwards - because a huge amount of rubble will block a large number of routes and affect progress on the ground. Defenders may find ample time to take advantage of such obstructions.

It is better to:

1. Surround the city and starve it, before moving in.

OR

2. Move in swiftly and occupy important parts of the city in a span of few hours in the cover of darkness, routing defenders from those locations and forcing the remainder to fight you on your terms afterwards. American THUNDER RUN strategy in short. Encirclement of the city on top of this strategy, guarantees surrender of defenders in short order.

I'm with you on Stalingrad. There's enough history to realize that the city had a greater significance than a purely strategic element. The combination of that and Hitler's sense that withdrawal was a morale killer combined for what eventually happened to the 6th army.

The evidence supports a view that Stalin intended to use the forces concentrated in the west as quickly as possible -- probably about mid-July 1941 -- for a Soviet Barbarossa. Statements of Soviet prisoners also support a view that the Soviets intended an attack on Germany in 1941. The extraordinary deployment of the Soviet forces on the western frontier is best explained as an offensive deployment for an attack without full mobilization by extremely powerful forces massed there for that purpose.

I'm not sure about the level of truth to the idea that Barbarossa was in reality a preemptive operation rather than a designed plan to invade Russia. I don't think there's enough to support that theory, that just because the alleged Soviet deployment of supposed massive troops along the western front was for an imminent Soviet invasion. The same could be said about the deployment being a defensive stance. I think Hitler was always intending on invading Russia for the expansion of German territory AND people. Whether it happened as a result of Soviet troops amassing or not, is probably not even that significant since there is no question that the invasion of Russia was Hitler's dream since as early as 1920 - 1925.

Making that decision in July 1940, he gave Germany a clear chance to win the Second World War in Europe.

Do you believe that had Barbarossa succeeded, the Germans would've been able to stop the allied invasion from the west? Or even an eventual Russian counter-offensive since the Soviet Union territory is about as massive as it gets and the Soviet people had fighting and resisting bred in their character. Thinking that the Soviet Union would collapse, even after such a huge defeat doesn't seem plausible.

Because he did not believe that his generals understood Germany's immense economic and strategic requirements, or the critical economic and strategic importance of the eastern campaign, Hitler rejected their pleas to push on to Moscow in August 1941.

I believe he was right in this case. He should've done the same thing in Stalingrad.

During a visit with some of his Eastern front troops early in the "Barbarossa" campaign, Hitler pauses to speak with a soldier in a back row. Unlike Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, the German leader quite frequently visited his front-line troops.

He was also much younger than the other three lol. At least much younger than Roosevelt (who was practically crippled from polio and later Ike did most of the field visiting anyway) and Churchill. Not sure about Stalin. He wasn't as old as Roosevelt or Churchill.

It was most urgent in his [Hitler's] view to deprive Stalin of his raw materials and arms industry. Besides, a rapid advance southward would encourage Iran to resist the Anglo-Russian invasion which he already knew was in the cards; in any case, he wanted the Crimea in German hands: it was from Crimean airfields that Russian bombers had recently attacked Romania ...

Crimea and the Caucuses would've been ideal as the first areas to capture an control in the south and at the same time, Leningrad in the north (or shortly before since it was closer in distance and the German assault had reached Leningrad quickly) before the Soviets got a chance to really fortify the Caucuses. Then move north (to the east of Stalingrad - behind it) and the same with Moscow (without actually taking either of the two main cities) and simultaneously, a separate push from the west flanking both of those cities to join the northern drive and then creating the ultimate front-line from Astrakhan to Leningrad without all that crazy fighting in the big cities. The fighting would've been relegated to mostly open lands and manageable villages, albeit against a lot of concentrated Soviet troops, it would've been much more favorable to blitzkrieg.

Then the Germans would've been in a position to defend the line instead of fighting an offensive battle in huge, urban cities. The Luftwaffe could've then gone to work bombing all the critical factories and the Soviets'industrial ability to fight, and do that from a much more comfortable position.

consider this possible scenario: Hitler seizes Moscow in September 1941, but his victorious Army Group Center is threatened with encirclement by the vast remaining Soviet forces deployed in the north and especially the south, striking pincer-like at its flanks. To avoid a catastrophic encirclement, Hitler is forced to withdraw and relinquish Moscow -- and a 1941 victory over the Soviet Union eludes him. Decades later, historians assail Hitler's decision to take Moscow directly, arguing that if only he had struck south first, destroying the large Soviet forces there, and seizing the economic wealth of that region, before striking against Moscow, he would have won the campaign and the war.

That's the same concept. They should've used that pincer flanking tactic on the larger scale.

Do you mean after the failed July assassination attempt?

Yes. Hitler did himself a disservice and was his paranoia influenced by the alleged use of narcotics? Do you think he was actually a full fledged drug addict like Herman Goering?

 

[Desert Fox]

I'm not sure about the level of truth to the idea that Barbarossa was in reality a preemptive operation rather than a designed plan to invade Russia. I don't think there's enough to support that theory, that just because the alleged Soviet deployment of supposed massive troops along the western front was for an imminent Soviet invasion. The same could be said about the deployment being a defensive stance. I think Hitler was always intending on invading Russia for the expansion of German territory AND people. Whether it happened as a result of Soviet troops amassing or not, is probably not even that significant since there is no question that the invasion of Russia was Hitler's dream since as early as 1920 - 1925

A number of factors could have influenced Hitler's decision to attack the Soviet Union.

Yes, of course, Hitler made it clear as day in Mein Kampf, published in 1925, that he desired Lebensraum (living space) in the East, namely the Soviet Union. Fourteen years between the date Mein Kampf was published and the date Stalin eagerly signed a pact with Hitler, the book had been translated into all major European languages, including Russian. In fact Stalin owned a Russian translation of Mein Kampf himself.

So this begs the question, why did Stalin eagerly, gleafully sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler, divide Poland and Eastern Europe between themselves, and thus creat a common border with Nazi Germany who's Hitler clearly states in Mein Kampf that he wants Russian land?

I will let you answer that.

The contemporary interpretation of history doesn't answer that question.

Did the Soviet Union plan to attack Germany? Of course we will never know for sure, but there are certain historical events that the contemporary mainstream intepretation of History does not explain which do lend credibility to the above scenario.

The same could be said about the deployment being a defensive stance.

But it wasn't a defensive stance.

A defensive stance was what was witnessed at Kursk where the Red Army had set up layers and webs of defensive strong points, anti-tank ditches, bunkers, decoy positions, mines and traps. The German thrusts were literally absorbed to a halt. Only the southern pincer managed to break through but at great cost and had to be pulled back.

On the eve of Barbarossa the Soviet troops were packed like sardines up to the border which is why they were so easily cut off and surrounded and taken prisoner.

Do you believe that had Barbarossa succeeded, the Germans would've been able to stop the allied invasion from the west? Or even an eventual Russian counter-offensive since the Soviet Union territory is about as massive as it gets and the Soviet people had fighting and resisting bred in their character. Thinking that the Soviet Union would collapse, even after such a huge defeat doesn't seem plausible

If Hitler's initial plan was adhered to where army groups north and south form a giant pincer while Army group center remained on the defensive outside of Moscow covering the flanks of Army groups north and south, where Army group south would capture the Ukraine for it's fertile growing fields and the Caucasus for their oil, thus alleviating Germany and her allies fuel and food problem and enabling the Wehrmacht to maintain it's ability to launch large-scale offensives while the Luftwaffe would continue to have aircraft fuel, and this would also deprive the Soviet Union of 86% of it's fuel supply thus hampering the Red Army's ability to conduct large-scale offensive operations. By mid 1942 the latest Germany would have the favorable position on the Eastern front.

With it's fuel and raw materials problem solved Germany would be secure as the dominant power over Europe. Britain and America would not be able to set foot on mainland Europe without first dislodging the Germans and their allies from the other theaters of the war which also would not be easy considering the axis fuel problem solved.

Sure, with it's strategic depth the Soviet Union would still exist, but nothing that could not be easily dealt with.

I believe he was right in this case. He should've done the same thing in Stalingrad

True. He should've just bombed the city into useless rubble and then just by-passed it and secured the Volga from a different vantage point.

Crimea and the Caucuses would've been ideal as the first areas to capture an control in the south and at the same time, Leningrad in the north (or shortly before since it was closer in distance and the German assault had reached Leningrad quickly) before the Soviets got a chance to really fortify the Caucuses. Then move north (to the east of Stalingrad - behind it) and the same with Moscow (without actually taking either of the two main cities) and simultaneously, a separate push from the west flanking both of those cities to join the northern drive and then creating the ultimate front-line from Astrakhan to Leningrad without all that crazy fighting in the big cities. The fighting would've been relegated to mostly open lands and manageable villages, albeit against a lot of concentrated Soviet troops, it would've been much more favorable to blitzkrieg.

Then the Germans would've been in a position to defend the line instead of fighting an offensive battle in huge, urban cities. The Luftwaffe could've then gone to work bombing all the critical factories and the Soviets'industrial ability to fight, and do

Well that actually was the plan, but his generals neglected this strategy and wasted men and resources on their failed attempt at reaching Moscow. Halder and von Bock in particular.

That's the same concept. They should've used that pincer flanking tactic on the larger

Which was the initial plan, but his generals side-tracked towards Moscow.

Yes. Hitler did himself a disservice and was his paranoia influenced by the alleged use of narcotics? Do you think he was actually a full fledged drug addict like Herman Goering?

Traitorous officers in the army just tried to blow him up, of course he would be paranoid.

I'm sure the stress from the burden of war , the injuries from the bomb explosion and the drugs did take their toll too.

As for Rommel, he was favored by the Nazis. Joseph Goebbels in particular made sure of it that Rommel's image as a popular general was promoted to the public. Of course there are varying sources that claim he was falsely implicated by the plotters of the assassination attempt while others claim he was involved. We will never know.

 

[Saif-ud-Din Qutuz]

Yes, of course, Hitler made it clear as day in Mein Kampf, published in 1925, that he desired Lebensraum (living space) in the East, namely the Soviet Union. Flurten years between the date Mein Kampf was published and the date Stalin eagerly signed a pact with Hitler, the book had been translated into all major European languages, including Russian. In fact Stalin owned a Russian translation of Mein Kampf himself.

So this begs the question, why did Stalin eagerly, gleafully sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler, divide Poland and Eastern Europe between themselves, and thus creat a common border with Nazi Germany who's Hitler clearly states in Mein Kampf that he wants Russian land?

The contemporary interpretation of history doesn't answer that question.

Did the Soviet Union plan to attack Germany? Of course we will never know for sure, but there are certain historical events that the contemporary mainstream intepretation of History does not explain which do lend credibility to the above scenario.

The answer to it lies in WWI. Germans truly believed that Soviets won't be a problem, were busy fighting western side of the boarder when Soviets attacked from the Eastern side. Though Russia was defeated, Germans couldn't do well on the western side, hence had to sign the treaty of Versailles.
Stalin was a cunning man, just see how he got to power. He would have wished to let Germans fight on the western side and share the pie with them. Once, economically broke, he would have attached to not only conquer Germany but all the land they would have under their control. This part of it, I'm only assuming. So naturally, Germans didn't want to be at the mercy and goodwill of Soviets and suffer like they did in WWI. They attacked them and nailed them brutally.

 

[Desert Fox]

The answer to it lies in WWI. Germans truly believed that Soviets won't be a problem, were busy fighting western side of the boarder when Soviets attacked from the Eastern side. Though Russia was defeated, Germans couldn't do well on the western side, hence had to sign the treaty of Versailles.
Stalin was a cunning man, just see how he got to power. He would have wished to let Germans fight on the western side and share the pie with them. Once, economically broke, he would have attached to not only conquer Germany but all the land they would have under their control. This part of it, I'm only assuming.

In WW1 it was Czarist Russia, not the Soviet Union.

 

[Saif-ud-Din Qutuz]

In WW1 it was Czarist Russia, not the Soviet Union.

They had so many names in the history starting from their conflicts with Ottomans. Then you tend to write their present day name every now and then even when quoting past incidents.

In WW1 it was Czarist Russia, not the Soviet Union.

Just before WWII Soviets army was going through a massive overhaul. Stalin only agreed to sign the pact because he knew his army won't stand a chance in front of Germans. So he kind of borrowed time to better prepare his army for an inevitable conflict/war with Germans.

 

[Psychic]

Do you believe that had Barbarossa succeeded, the Germans would've been able to stop the allied invasion from the west? Or even an eventual Russian counter-offensive since the Soviet Union territory is about as massive as it gets and the Soviet people had fighting and resisting bred in their character. Thinking that the Soviet Union would collapse, even after such a huge defeat doesn't seem plausible.

@Desert Fox summed it up beautifully in his reply. I would like to add a few points.

Roosevelt said " Hitler built a fortress around Europe but forgot to put a roof on it". He was referring to the Luftwaffe. The reason why it wasn't there was because many of it's units were fighting in Russia.
Defeat of the Soviet would have released a number of Luftwaffe units which could have been used to put a roof on the fortress. The strengthened Luftwaffe would have inflicted a heavy attrition on the allied bombers, making their bombing campaign unbearable in the long term. We also know that in the later stages of the war, Luftwaffe was mired in fuel shortages---Not enough fuel for training, mounting sorties etc meant that the thousands of planes built were useless. The possession of Caucasian oil fields would have solved the fuel problem.
This strengthened Luftwaffe would have had deterred any thoughts about invasion in the minds of allied generals. Air superiority was considered a prerequisite for the Normandy landings. Air-superiority was the key to the allied successes in Europe.

P.S Soviets may have sued for peace after such a huge defeat.

*Jodl commented on the future of the Western front before commencement of operation Barbarossa ;"In the autumn of 1941, after the consummation of the Russian defeat, our Luftwaffe will appear in the skies of western Europe in greater strength than ever before."

 

[wiseone2]

German invasion of Soviet Union was bound to fail. If Stalin had not executed lot of his generals and officers during the great purge the Soviet army would have the chance of beating back initial assault. The country is too big for the efficient Nazi war machine to conquer

 

[Gomig-21]

In fact Stalin owned a Russian translation of Mein Kampf himself.

There have been several prominent leaders through post WWII history that refer to either having read the book or owning it personally. That says a lot of not necessarily the content, but the impact of the author's mystique. There are also a few who have revealed their admiration of Hitler for his charisma and of course his conviction with which he was able to stamp history in the manner that he did. It takes quite a bit of nerve, as a leader at any level to publicly state his admiration of Hitler.

So this begs the question, why did Stalin eagerly, gleafully sign a non-aggression pact with Hitler, divide Poland and Eastern Europe between themselves, and thus creat a common border with Nazi Germany who's Hitler clearly states in Mein Kampf that he wants Russian land?

I will let you answer that.

Poland had a lot to do with Stalin's decision to sign the non-aggression pact. He realized that Poland could not only be a buffer zone to slow down any German intrusion into Russia, but it also gave him time to build up the Soviet army. Whether the goal was to eventually invade Germany or prepare better to repel an invasion is certainly questionable. I tend to believe it's the latter. But the pact also included an eventual division of Poland between the two. Keep in mind the great purge followed by the red army purge, all within a year prior and after the time frame of signing the non-aggression pact. Both purges actually affected the red Army.

With it's fuel and raw materials problem solved Germany would be secure as the dominant power over Europe. Britain and America would not be able to set foot on mainland Europe without first dislodging the Germans and their allies from the other theaters of the war which also would not be easy considering the axis fuel problem solved.

Why would the allies have needed to dislodge the Germans from other occupied territories? Logistically that would've been almost impossible, if you're referring to the eastern front with Russia or even Crimea or the Caucasus. They could've still came through Normandy & France just like they did and fought Germany through that same corridor. Maybe Norway and the Netherlands which could've been added as part of the D-Day invasion strategy -- on a much larger scale -- to open an additional front on the Germans. I don't think it was necessarily a done deal and that the allies would've conceded the war.

As for Rommel, he was favored by the Nazis. Joseph Goebbels in particular made sure of it that Rommel's image as a popular general was promoted to the public. Of course there are varying sources that claim he was falsely implicated by the plotters of the assassination attempt while others claim he was involved. We will never know.

I don't think he was involved, even if he personally knew von Stauffenberg from Africa or any of the other conspirators. And regardless of his opinion of Hitler -- and allegedly wanting to make an agreement with the allies -- it doesn't seem like the assassination of Hitler would be the way he would go. He was too much of a critical part and had other options, especially if he was eager and willing to organize the defense of Normandy on a much larger scale than what Hitler wanted to commit to. He was too loyal to be involved in that IMO.

@Desert Fox summed it up beautifully in his reply. I would like to add a few points.

Roosevelt said " Hitler built a fortress around Europe but forgot to put a roof on it". He was referring to the Luftwaffe. The reason why it wasn't there was because many of it's units were fighting in Russia.
Defeat of the Soviet would have released a number of Luftwaffe units which could have been used to put a roof on the fortress. The strengthened Luftwaffe would have inflicted a heavy attrition on the allied bombers, making their bombing campaign unbearable in the long term. We also know that in the later stages of the war, Luftwaffe was mired in fuel shortages---Not enough fuel for training, mounting sorties etc meant that the thousands of planes built were useless. The possession of Caucasian oil fields would have solved the fuel problem.
This strengthened Luftwaffe would have had deterred any thoughts about invasion in the minds of allied generals. Air superiority was considered a prerequisite for the Normandy landings. Air-superiority was the key to the allied successes in Europe.

P.S Soviets may have sued for peace after such a huge defeat.

Fuel shortages might've been solved, but now Germany would've been dealing with a much larger landscape to defend and I'm not so sure that the allied bombing campaign would've been completely deterred by the Luftwaffe. Nighttime bombing missions were almost impossible to defend and here's a hypothetical for you: would a wide-stretched Germany have had the ability to stop the B-29 (being diverted from the Pacific theater to the European one) carrying Little Boy II over Berlin and Fat Man over Frankfurt?

 

[Desert Fox]

There have been several prominent leaders through post WWII history that refer to either having read the book or owning it personally. That says a lot of not necessarily the content, but the impact of the author's mystique. There are also a few who have revealed their admiration of Hitler for his charisma and of course his conviction with which he was able to stamp history in the manner that he did. It takes quite a bit of nerve, as a leader at any level to publicly state his admiration of Hitler

Indeed, it is a a very influential book. No one can deny that. And reading it or acknowledging Hitler's charisma as a leader does not make one a Nazi, contrary to commonly held misconceptions, especially when one isn't even White or German to begin with. An Atheist reading the Bible to understand Christianity does not become a Christian.

Poland had a lot to do with Stalin's decision to sign the non-aggression pact. He realized that Poland could not only be a buffer zone to slow down any German intrusion into Russia, but it also gave him time to build up the Soviet army. Whether the goal was to eventually invade Germany or prepare better to repel an invasion is certainly questionable. I tend to believe it's the latter. But the pact also included an eventual division of Poland between the two.

Poland before the division was a buffer zone.

It no longer was a buffer zone when Stalin and Hitler divided it between themselves.

So the question is Stalin knew Hitler wanted Lebensraum in Russia, then why did he go out of his way and tear down the only buffer zone separating him from Hitler?

It's like this: a guy three blocks down from you says he wants to kick you out of your home and take it over for himself. Would you move right next to him? Or would you creat as much distance as possible between you and him?

Because the contemporary interpretation of history tells us that "Hitler is the big bad wolf who wanted to take over the world for Lebensraum, exterminate all the Jews, and enslave all subhuman non-Germans". Okay, point taken.

But then what's Stalin's excuse for calluding with Hitler, the big bad wolf? Especially when Hitler openly proclaimed he wanted Russian land 14 years before Stalin eagerly signed a pact with Hitler? But he didn't stop there, he provided the necessary resources for Germany to continue the war with Britain and France into Western Europe.

Contemporary mainstream history does not explain this. But Victor Suvorov who is an ex-KGB officer explains this very well in his book The Chief Culprit.

Why would the allies have needed to dislodge the Germans from other occupied territories?

Im assuming for the same reasons they dislodged the Germans from North Africa , Sicily and Southern Italy before proceeding to mainland Europe? I'm not certain for sure what the exact reasons were but based on what I have read from various sources it was due to political reasons, ie to allow the Germans and the Soviet to exhaust each other, let the Soviets destroy the best German divisions. Keep in mind that what the allies faced in France in 1944 were under-strength divisions, many of them full of Eastern conscripts from POW camps, rather than Germans, who were fleeing Stalin and as soon as they saw Americans they threw down their rifles.

Logistically that would've been almost impossible, if you're referring to the eastern front with Russia or even Crimea or the Caucasus. They could've still came through Normandy & France just like they did and fought Germany through that same corridor. Maybe Norway and the Netherlands which could've been added as part of the D-Day invasion strategy -- on a much larger scale -- to open an additional front on the Germans. I don't think it was necessarily a done deal and that the allies would've conceded the war

With their hands freed from the Eastern front, fuel and food shortage solved, the Germans and their allies would have made quick work of any allied invasion attempt on mainland Europe.

Think about it:

Luftwaffe with unlimited aviation fuel, Me-262's and other new weapons fully operational and flight worthy.

Italian navy fully fueled and now capable of challenging the Royal Navy and even USN if necessary in the Mediterranean.

Rommels Africa Corp can now receive all of its supplies and push the British out of North Africa and the Middle East, link up with Army group A coming down from the Caucasus into Iraq (which actually was the plan before the setbacks) and push into Iran, Afghanistan and then into British India.

With the Luftwaffe and the U-boats still posing a major challenge, and with Germany rebuilding it's divisions up to strength it is safe to assume that the allies would have scrapped any plans to invade Europe for the foreseeable future.

Also, at this point many neutral countries like Spain, Vichy France and Turkey would have joined the Axis seeing the potential spoils of war (who doesn't want to be on the winning side?)

I don't think he was involved, even if he personally knew von Stauffenberg from Africa or any of the other conspirators. And regardless of his opinion of Hitler -- and allegedly wanting to make an agreement with the allies -- it doesn't seem like the assassination of Hitler would be the way he would go. He was too much of a critical part and had other options, especially if he was eager and willing to organize the defense of Normandy on a much larger scale than what Hitler wanted to commit to. He was too loyal to be involved in that IMO.

During interrogations of the conspirators Rommel was falsely implicated. But other sources claim he was involved. We will never know.

Either way his loss was a tragedy.

Fuel shortages might've been solved, but now Germany would've been dealing with a much larger landscape to defend and

They would have also had more allies now that their position was favorable.

I'm not so sure that the allied bombing campaign would've been completely deterred by the Luftwaffe. Nighttime bombing missions were almost impossible to defend and

Sure, night-time raids would still continue. But the Germans already developed an excellent method of coping with them by relocating their factories and production centers away from cities and into rural areas. V1 and V2 production was shifted to mountains and underground facilities.

Also, keep in mind that despite the increase in allied air-raids German weapons production increased in 1943-44 to it's highest point during the duration of the war.

here's a hypothetical for you: would a wide-stretched Germany have had the ability to stop the B-29 (being diverted from the Pacific theater to the European one) carrying Little Boy II over Berlin and Fat Man over Frankfurt?

If the war dragged on past 1945, then maybe not.

But then again, considering the above scenario where Hitler's initial plan on the Eastern front had been adhered to, the Luftwaffe would have been conducting it's own raids on British airfields and ports rendering them useless.

If anything, the Germans themselves would be sending submarine launched V1's and V2's on the US Eastern seaboard (actual plan Himmler proposed late in the war).