Operation Barbarossa: The Biggest Military Adventure in History

[Psychic]

but now Germany would've been dealing with a much larger landscape to defend

If you defend everywhere then you cannot defend anywhere. Prevention of daylight raids was a question of the relationship of strength between raiders and defending fighters. A greater number of defenders would inflict severe losses on the raiders and would even disperse the raiders. That superior defender ratio could be achieved even in the real world events; General of fighters Adolf Galland suggested to Hitler that concentration of defending fighter forces could be achieved at the cost of leaving some areas without fighter cover, Hitler rejected the idea(wrongly, not giving an inch didn't work well in the air). With the presence of fuel and success in the East, the overall economic and military situation would also have improved to a great extent, providing the Germans with more options at their disposal.

Germans already dealt with a landscape upto Rostov and even Maykop at some point in 1942. All the while fighting a huge war with the dangerous Soviet Union(take into account the daily losses in men and material which had to be continuously replaced). In case of a success in the East, the threat from a crushed Soviet Union is very little and hence some areas could be weakened to reinforce other areas. (you no more are allocating a large number of forces for ambitious advances in the East; There's even a possibility of a peace deal in the East)

I'm not so sure that the allied bombing campaign would've been completely deterred by the Luftwaffe. Nighttime bombing missions were almost impossible to defend

Daytime bombing would have completely stopped, considering the much greater number of fighters in the defending force compared to the bombers+escorts. The attrition on the bombers would have been unbearable for the allies.
Night-time; difficult but not impossible, German night-fighters achieved remarkable successes till midsummer of 1943, if stopping these raids was impossible then they couldn't have done that. By this time you had radar in night-fighters. Improvement of overall military situation would have allowed the Luftwaffe to carry out retaliatory raids, using bombers and missiles. New tactics and weapons were introduced by both sides. Stopping bomber raids was a question of establishing air-superiority over the Reich which could have been achieved by concentrating a greater number of fighters. Success in the East would have released a number of units for the defence of the Reich. Availability of fuel would have allowed for better training of new recruits in day and night-fighter squadrons.
While it's true that the raiders employed innovative tactics of radar interference which allowed them to devastate Hamburg unmolested, however, the other side can also adapt accordingly, or retaliate accordingly(considering our hypothesis of success in the East).

It was a matter of getting the priorities right. The RAF had switched over from offense (bomber) to defence(fighter) during the Battle of Britain, and then switched over to offense again once air superiority was established over the island.
Consider these facts as they occurred in the face of huge setbacks and fuel shortages; during the first eight months of 1943 7600 fighter planes were produced. But despite the threat of enemy in the air, fighter production still had no priority over bomber production. Of these 7600 fighters, only a very small portion was allocated to the defense of the Reich. Air superiority was lost and instead of re-establishing air superiority with more fighters, it was weakened by taking planes away from the fighter arm and using them for support purposes. In the year 1944 alone 13,000 ME-109s and 4500 FW-190s were diverted to reconnaissance and battle squadrons.
Now consider a success in the East i.e low level threat from the Soviets would have released these support role fighters for the defence of the Reich.

The Germans even considering fuel shortages and other setbacks, suffered a lot more because of wrong priorities. After the Hamburg catastrophe, when Hitler was told that fighter should be getting priority he responded with the words that terror can only be dealt with by counter-terror. He ordered retaliatory bombing which proved to be pin pricks when compared to the allied raids and was unbearable in the long term and had to be abandoned.

 

[Gomig-21]

It's like this: a guy three blocks down from you says he wants to kick you out of your home and take it over for himself. Would you move right next to him? Or would you creat as much distance as possible between you and him?

Hahaha, nice analogy. Might not be exactly the same lol! But to answer your question and make it a closer analogy, I'd move in and put up a CCTV security system! Now I can keep an eye on him. That would be closer.

Keep in mind that what the allies faced in France in 1944 were under-strength divisions, many of them full of Eastern conscripts from POW camps, rather than Germans, who were fleeing Stalin and as soon as they saw Americans they threw down their rifle

That's right, because the Germans suffered a lot of losses on the eastern front at not even close to what the Soviets suffered........which plays into the equation as to whether they would've had the manpower to not only hold on to that massive territory from the Russians who were able to resupply that manpower at an unimaginable rate, but to also defend an allied invasion. IMO, the only time (at the latest) for them to have defeated the Soviets on the eastern front and still had enough manpower to occupy the vast territory and defend France, Belgium and Germany from an invasion and ultimate defeat was at the end of 1941 or halfway through 1942. After that they suffered way too many losses. And think of how the Soviets were able to replenish their abhorrent number of losses and they still beat the Germans back.

From the start of the Barbarossa in June 22, 1941 to January 31, 1943 when Paulus surrendered, that's 19 months where the Germans lost (conservatively, based on an average from 2 major sources I've read through all the years) dead and captured was roughly 600,000 to 4 million Soviets. That's actually through the end of 1942 since Paulus surrendered only a month into 1943. Look at that incredible ratio of almost 5-1 in favor of the Germans yet things got much worst after that. By 1945 the Soviets had lost close to 15 million soldiers killed and captured almost 5 million Germans which is a 3-1 ratio in favor of the Germans, yet still with all those Soviets losses compared to the Germans, they still got beat back. These are strictly military numbers and not civilians which adds another dimension to the whole equation because the Soviets had a much larger pool to draw from, hence were much more capable of absorbing the losses than the Germans.

This is one (but a major one) reason why I don't believe the Germans would've been able to hold on to a victory. The Soviets alone were capable of regrouping on a much larger scale, even with astronomical manpower losses compared to the Germans.

Granted I'll give you the logistics and fuel advantage the Germans would've had, but their aircraft losses during those same 2 periods (June 1941 - January 1943) were substantial and even worst by 1945. They were decimated by then.

I don't remember the exact aircraft and tank losses. I'd have to look them up and compare, but I remember they were even more lopsided in favor of the Germans and they still couldn't do it. I'll look up tank/armor in general and aircraft losses for those 2 time frames and get back. If anyone has them offhand, please post them.

I also realize that a quick German victory by very early 1943 or a little earlier might've crippled the Soviet production capabilities, but there are also reasons to believe the Soviets were able to move factories on a dime. Their industrial capabilities were unmatched as far as armor as we all know and they could've been building T-34s out of barns if they needed. We can definitely factor that in after we look at the hardware losses.

With their hands freed from the Eastern front, fuel and food shortage solved, the Germans and their allies would have made quick work of any allied invasion attempt on mainland Europe.

Think about it:

Luftwaffe with unlimited aviation fuel, Me-262's and other new weapons fully operational and flight worthy.

Italian navy fully fueled and now capable of challenging the Royal Navy and even USN if necessary in the Mediterranean.

Rommels Africa Corp can now receive all of its supplies and push the British out of North Africa and the Middle East, link up with Army group A coming down from the Caucasus into Iraq (which actually was the plan before the setbacks) and push into Iran, Afghanistan and then into British India.

With the Luftwaffe and the U-boats still posing a major challenge, and with Germany rebuilding it's divisions up to strength it is safe to assume that the allies would have scrapped any plans to invade Europe for the foreseeable future.
@Pychic

Also, at this point many neutral countries like Spain, Vichy France and Turkey would have joined the Axis seeing the potential spoils of war (who doesn't want to be on the winning side?)

Once the US entered the war and in a year's time, unfortunately the Germans lost 800 U-Boats and roughly 30,000 sailors my bro. That was a 75% attrition rate to their entire fleet. The German U-Boat loss, as I'm sure you know, was the largest loss percentage of all the German forces.

Once we get the aircraft and tank numbers, we can really put them all together with manpower loss and I bet the numbers won't be pretty. @Psychic

If the war dragged on past 1945, then maybe not.

By then, most definitely not! I think the only way it might have some merit is if we're taking the end of Barbarossa as an maximum timeline for when the Germans would've hypothetically had to have beaten the Soviets to determine whether they had enough gas left in the tank to hold on to Europe.

 

[Desert Fox]

I'd move in and put up a CCTV security system!

But then why did Stalin not do that in Mongolia in August of 1939? It was a similar situation to Germany's conflict with Poland.

Stalin didn't dissolve Mongolia in a secret pact with the Japanese like he did to Poland with Hitler. Rather he militarily defended Mongolia against Japanese aggression.

That's right, because the Germans suffered a lot of losses on the eastern front at not even close to what the Soviets suffered

Only because the war in the East prolonged up to that point. The Germans were not prepared for a long drawn out war in Russia. Thus Hitler's strategy to take the Caucasus in one quick drive in 1941-42, deprive the Soviets of their oil (86-90%), cripple their industries and armies and put them permanently on the defensive.

The German U-Boat loss, as I'm sure you know, was the largest loss percentage of all the German forces.

Yes, however the U-boats were used to strangle Britain's maritime trade in the Atlantic. Their loss although considerably large would not really have dealt a defeating blow to the Germans were they victorious in the East. Defeating the Soviets was the key. US would need to do more than simply sink German U-boats to deal any significant blow to German hegemony on the European continent.

I think the only way it might have some merit is if we're taking the end of Barbarossa as an maximum timeline for when the Germans would've hypothetically had to have beaten the Soviets to determine whether they had enough gas left in the tank to hold on to Europe

If we go by the initial strategy then certainly the Germans would have had more than enough "gas in the tank" to repell any allied attempt in Europe.

But then again I doubt the allies would be stupid enough to carry out such an attempt knowing that the Axis powers in Europe have consolidated their position (which is why Operation Overlord was conducted in 1944 when the Germans were at their weakest).

Also, as I pointed out earlier, there were neutral countries on the sidelines willing to join the axis in the wake of a major German victory over the Soviets, particularly Turkey, Spain and Vichy France. The entry of these countries would have significantly boosted the Axis in every respect (man power, strategic choke points like Gibraltar, Hormuz, Dardanelles, etc)

 

[Nilgiri]

I for one am really enjoying this conversation on this thread. Keep it going guys!

 

[Desert Fox]

1941 or halfway through 1942

IMO, the only time (at the latest) for them to have defeated the Soviets on the eastern front and still had enough manpower to occupy the vast territory and defend France, Belgium and Germany from an invasion and ultimate defeat was at the end of 1941 or halfway through 1942

Indeed. This is true. The problem the Germans faced was the lack of fuel and the ability to deliver that fuel to their motorized and armored divisions in order to maintain the ability to launch largescale offensive operations that came to characterize the Blitzkrieg strategy.

Germany only had a limited supply of fuel, thus again why Hitler prioritized taking the Ukraine (for food, rubber, etc) and the Caucasus for the necessary oil for his tanks and aircraft.

After that they suffered way too many losses. And think of how the Soviets were able to replenish their abhorrent number of losses and they still beat the Germans back.

From the start of the Barbarossa in June 22, 1941 to January 31, 1943 when Paulus surrendered, that's 19 months where the Germans lost (conservatively, based on an average from 2 major sources I've read through all the years) dead and captured was roughly 600,000 to 4 million Soviets.

That's actually through the end of 1942 since Paulus surrendered only a month into 1943. Look at that incredible ratio of almost 5-1 in favor of the Germans yet things got much worst after that.

By 1945 the Soviets had lost close to 15 million soldiers killed and captured almost 5 million Germans which is a 3-1 ratio in favor of the Germans, yet still with all those Soviets losses compared to the Germans, they still got beat back.

This is one (but a major one) reason why I don't believe the Germans would've been able to hold on to a victory. The Soviets alone were capable of regrouping on a much larger scale, even with astronomical manpower losses compared to the Germans.

Soviet casualties were certainly high. Mostly due to desperate tactics like sending waves of soldiers into enemy fire, using soldiers (& civilians) to clear mines.

If hypothetically the Germans had taken the Caucasus in the initial strike the Stalingrad debacle would have never happened because the red army was still recovering in 1941-42. Without their oil Soviets would have been limited in their offensive capabilities.

Only because the war in the East dragged on that German casualties began to pile up and considering that the Germans were also involved in various other theaters of the war they were stretched thin.

I also realize that a quick German victory by very early 1943 or a little earlier might've crippled the Soviet production capabilities, but there are also reasons to believe the Soviets were able to move factories on a dime. Their industrial capabilities were unmatched as far as armor as we all know and they could've been building T-34s out of barns if they needed. We can definitely factor that in after we look at the hardware losses.

Of course and they did in fact relocate most of their factories out of reach of the Germans. But they could have built as many tanks as they liked, doing so and then using those tanks would have only sped up the depletion of their fuel reserves. Therefore they'd be very limited in how they used their tanks.

 

[Gomig-21]

In the year 1944 alone 13,000 ME-109s and 4500 FW-190s were diverted to reconnaissance and battle squadrons.
Now consider a success in the East i.e low level threat from the Soviets would have released these support role fighters for the defence of the Reich.

I think there needs to be a large consideration for not only what the cost of that success in the east would've been for the Germans, but when that success and the actual goal of Operation Barbarossa would've been achieved.

The timeline for when a German victory over the Soviets is critical since not only are the available numbers of aircraft, armor and personnel critical to whether they would've been able to hold on to all that territory as well as repel an inevitable allied invasion, but the situation on the ground and particularly the delineation of the German front line and exactly what areas they held would greatly affect their ability to hold on and defend other fronts.

The Germans needed to achieve the actual goal of Barbarossa which was the 'planned advance to' line on this map.

So the northern point of the line was intended to be at Archangel, the southeast port of the White Sea. That's 740 km to the west beyond Leningrad. So not only would the siege of Leningrad need to have been completed, but a push through with Army group north to take the entire port of Archangel.

Then at the south, they needed to get even past Astrakhan (which was also a huge seaport on the Caspian Sea) and then draw that straight line up to Archangel. Then there's all the objectives inside that territory.

- Archangel
- Leningrad
- Smolensk
- Minsk
- Kiev
- Karkhov
- Rostov
- Crimean peninsula
- Caucuses
- Black Sea
- Eastern Caspian Sea
- Stalingrad
- Moscow.

Assuming they could've taken this entire swath of territory -- considering what happened in Stalingrad and the Leningrad siege never materialized to an actual victory -- including Moscow which they were stopped short by roughly 60 km, then be able to use the captured oil and transport it to all these areas within that territory (not to mention back to Germany) and protect it, what timeline are you thinking all of this needed to happen by? You mentioned 1944 in your quote but that was a reference to the number of 109s and 190s but I'm not sure when you think they needed to have Barbarossa's objectives completed by. Then we could assess what conditions were all forces and events at that time.

Indeed. This is true. The problem the Germans faced was the lack of fuel and the ability to deliver that fuel to their motorized and armored divisions in order to maintain the ability to launch largescale offensive operations that came to characterize the Blitzkrieg strategy.

Germany only had a limited supply of fuel, thus again why Hitler prioritized taking the Ukraine (for food, rubber, etc) and the Caucasus for the necessary oil for his tanks and aircraft.

Even after the capture of the entire Caucuses and being able to defend all that seized oil, would they have been able to deal with the logistics of transporting that oil especially back to Germany and to all the forces that would've been needed to defend France from an allied invasion, not to mention all their forces scattered across that huge swath of territory that every single inch of it needed to be defended?

In 1944 it took almost exactly 12 months for the allies to defeat Germany from D-Day to Victory Day. So they would've needed huge diversion of forces from the east to western Europe and have enough fuel for all those defenses. Tall order.

If hypothetically the Germans had taken the Caucasus in the initial strike the Stalingrad debacle would have never happened because the red army was still recovering in 1941-42. Without their oil Soviets would have been limited in their offensive capabilities.

The still had to eventually deal with Stalingrad after the Caucuses. What about Moscow? Without actually taking full control of both those cities, they wouldn't have been able to subdue the Soviet forces completely. They still needed to take them both because the threat of a counter offensive by the Soviets in the Caucuses would've still been there and without the capture of Moscow, Stalin would've still been able to gather his people and army. And Stalingrad would've been pumping out equipment and even attempting a breakout. The Germans would've still needed to defend the front line on top of that.

I think before even debating whether the Germans would've won the entire war and been able to completely subdue the Soviets as well as defend Germany and France from an allied invasion, we need a realistic timeline for when the actual and final goal of Barbarossa would've been achieved and even if it was a realistic goal. Any suggestions?

 

[Desert Fox]

Even after the capture of the entire Caucuses and being able to defend all that seized oil, would they have been able to deal with the logistics of transporting that oil especially back to Germany and to all the forces that would've been needed to defend France from an allied invasion, not to mention all their forces scattered across that huge swath of territory that every single inch of it needed to be defended?

In 1944 it took almost exactly 12 months for the allies to defeat Germany from D-Day to Victory Day. So they would've needed huge diversion of forces from the east to western Europe and have enough fuel for all those defenses. Tall order.

Certainly the logistical nightmare that the Germans faced in Russia would have persisted. Even the Soviets, despite being accustomed to the slush & mud-ridden dirt roads of Russia had difficulties launching large-scale offensives in the spring and autumn when the rainy season kicked in (in the winter however, the Soviets were bosses). With the Caucasus captured however, now the Germans could afford to utilize most of their motorized transports instead of relying on large numbers of horses and other animals. This would have alleviated the transportation paralyses to an extent.

Another major concern for the Germans would be the Partisans. There were large numbers of them operating in the rear of Axis armies all over occupied Soviet territories. Victor Suvorov goes into great details to describe the complex underground networks the Soviets had developed prior to the German invasion. These tunnels and literal underground bases could sustain partisans for months. These would have been a far greater problem for the Axis than the Russian weather because the weather still gave respite, Partisans didn't.

Regarding the Caucasus, with the Crimea and the port of Sevastopol in their hands, the Germans could simply ship the vital fuel into Romania via Black sea which was far more convenient, instead of the longer land route which was prone to partisan attacks and terrible weather conditions.

The still had to eventually deal with Stalingrad after the Caucuses. What about Moscow? Without actually taking full control of both those cities, they wouldn't have been able to subdue the Soviet forces completely. They still needed to take them both because the threat of a counter offensive by the Soviets in the Caucuses would've still been there and without the capture of Moscow, Stalin would've still been able to gather his people and army. And Stalingrad would've been pumping out equipment and even attempting a breakout. The Germans would've still needed to defend the front line on top of that.

Yes, i think they would have still stuck to the same strategy of securing Stalingrad simulteanously with invading the Caucasus. Stalingrad sits at the entrance to the Caucasus, and its a choke point on the volga river, and it was a major industrial center of the Soviet Union in the south. It would make no sense for the Germans to ignore it. But by the time the Soviets would be ready for any counter-offensive the Axis would have consolidated their position.

Also keep in mind that the Soviets would have been faced with a critical problem: they were deprived of their breadbasket (Ukraine) and 86% of their fuel source (Caucasus). Building a huge army and then preparing it for counter-offensives is a huge resource drain in itself. Already they lost huge fuel stores in the German attack. They would be reliant upon American oil but this would have slowed down any Soviet re-buildup.

Moscow should have been a secondary objective. It was too far, in the middle which would require securing the northern and southern flanks first, and the Germans were running out of fuel for their ground forces and their air force. So its all about prioritizing the targets based on the need of the hour.

I think before even debating whether the Germans would've won the entire war and been able to completely subdue the Soviets as well as defend Germany and France from an allied invasion, we need a realistic timeline for when the actual and final goal of Barbarossa would've been achieved and even if it was a realistic goal. Any suggestions?

Barbarossa was a desperate gamble. It was hastily planned and executed. It was planned based on very crappy intelligence. The Germans were ill-prepared for a drawn out war, miscalculated Soviet military strength, capabilities, industrial capacity, manpower, etc. Of course, then there were Hitler's racial theories that clouded his underestimation of the resilience of the Slavic population, which could have been his greatest asset in the East had he exploited their anti-Communist sentiments instead of alienating them (though surprisingly despite this over a million Soviets of all backgrounds still fought in the ranks of the Axis. Largest defection in military history to date).

Now, such a desperate attack must have desperate reasons. We've already discussed them in previous posts so i won't go into depth here.

The initial German victory's were possible due to Soviet troop dispositions that were not defensive. 4 million Red Army soldiers were taken prisoner in the first few months of the operation. That's unprecedented in history.

Hitler himself was astonished as to the military strength of the Soviets,
as can be observed from this private conversation between Hitler and
Mannerheim, military leader of Finland (very interesting conversation):

Unfortunately the recording ends there regarding Molotov's demands
on Romania. But there was the beginning portion
which is included in this one below (full recording, better subtitles):

 

[Gomig-21]

Unfortunately the recording ends there regarding Molotov's demands

It's always fascinating to hear him talking about these things. There's another series that's also incredible to hear with him and his generals I forget where it is I'll try to look it up, but they show that he was somewhat pragmatic, but most of it was hindsight. To that point, he mentions 'if someone had told him that the Soviets would've had 35,000 tanks, then he would've said they were crazy' is indicative of that slight delusion he suffered from. While the ratio was staggering in the Soviets' favor, they didn't have nearly 35K tanks. That number at the start of the war was around 23,000 tanks of all types, the T-34 and T-35 and other heavy tanks of all types etc., while the Germans had a combined count of just barely over 6000 panzers and deployed 4000 of them to the eastern front in 1941. That's a 6-1 ratio in favor of the Russians lol, and it left the Germans naked in the west. Basically the reason why I mentioned to @Psychic that we should take into account the number of armor the Germans would've needed to win let alone hold off the allies. His point on the Luftwaffe was excellent, but there are also issues with that in my humble opinion because the Germans didn't have a system of rotation for their pilots while the allies did. That had a huge effect on manning the Luftwaffe and the effects were much greater as far as the attrition rate of their quality pilots since they basically stayed at the front and fought until they either survived or died.

Strangely enough, though, German tank production actually kept up with their attrition rate in the east, and even surpassed it considerably. Their tank numbers increased in 1942 and even in 1943. But they were still vastly outnumbered.

The probability of a German victory in the east was mostly predicated on timing. It needed to be done by the autumn of 42 and no later. That means they had barely over a year to reach that planned line and take all the big cities I mentioned within that territory because sieges were not effective enough. They took too long and wore out the Germans themselves while empowering the Soviets.

Even if they somehow succeeded in doing that by the fall of 42, they still had huge challenges to consolidate their defenses and recoup their losses, not to mention dealing with resistance movements and the Partisans that you mentioned. I totally forgot about that.

Obviously he was right in that recording, no only the panzers weren't equipped for the harsh winters of the east and they were more suited for the landscapes like France, but the German troops weren't used to those conditions and their uniforms were severely lacking to the Soviets'.

Not only did they have to deal with the autumn rains and mud, the same thing happened in the thaws of spring sandwiched by the brutal Russian winter. The same reason why the Luftwaffe struggled mightily because the grass fields turned into muck. It wasn't so much just fuel issues or air engagements, but they had logistical nightmares to deal with at the airports.

Moscow should have been a secondary objective. It was too far, in the middle which would require securing the northern and southern flanks first, and the Germans were running out of fuel for their ground forces and their air force. So its all about prioritizing the targets based on the need of the hour.

Indeed, but we do agree that Moscow was a must. This was the hub of the Soviet Union where Stalin ran the war and could plan and recruit almost endless manpower from the east and Siberia, which is pretty much what he did. Not to mention the industrial giant that city was. If I'm not mistaken, it made Stalingrad look like a baby child. They had to take it and I even think it had to be somewhat of a priority.

The other problem regarding the impracticality of Barbarossa was the distance of course. The average distance from the center of production in Germany to the closest oil of the Caucuses was 2500 km! lol. People don't realize how NUTS that distance is! It took the Germans about 8 days to take France's lush greenery in gorgeous weather with relatively 0 resistance and that was a mere 130 km. The Soviet terrain was 20-fold compared to that then add the elements.

Regarding the Caucasus, with the Crimea and the port of Sevastopol in their hands, the Germans could simply ship the vital fuel into Romania via Black sea which was far more convenient, instead of the longer land route which was prone to partisan attacks and terrible weather conditions.

They needed to take Myokop and Grozny at the least to stabilize their oil situation. They couldn't get to Baku quick enough but they needed to stop it's flow and supply line to the Soviets to starve them of their own oil supply, so to speak. Obviously they needed to cut off the Volga to do that and that's where Stalingrad came in. The problem was the time they had to do all that and they were running out of it. They had both those challenges, to get enough oil fast enough and then cut the Russians off from their own source. Never mind the German logistical nightmare of transporting the oil back to Germany.

The other thing is the majority of the Caucuses' oil was crude. At the same time, the German oil needs and consumption was in all forms and not just refined fuel. They needed grease, lubricants, tar etc. They needed to bring that crude back to their own refineries in Germany and start working it and that was a monumental challenge.

Even if they used Sevastopol and Black Sea as you suggested, that would still only get them to Romania just the same. It would only bypass some Soviet territory but they still needed to bring a vast amount of it back to major German cities like Hamburg, Frankfurt and Berlin of course. I think this is a big part of the war that is often overlooked when discussing the emphasis on the German need for oil. It went way beyond just capturing the oil fields of the Caucuses and it was a monumental problem.

They had the challenge of the scope of the campaign, the logistic nightmare, the strategic element, the timing, the Russian weather and the Soviet people's resolve. IMO, there was no way they would've won the war let alone hold off an allied invasion even if they had. Sorry about my stubbornness.

 

[Nefer]

Moscow should have been a secondary objective. It was too far, in the middle which would require securing the northern and southern flanks first, and the Germans were running out of fuel for their ground forces and their air force. So its all about prioritizing the targets based on the need of the hour.

If I recall correctly Moscow was not primary, if I am mistaken please correct me, but from what I heard is that Hitler wanted the Caspian Oil reserves and thus Stalinrad as primary objective, but he became ill and was unable to oversee the operation during that time in which the general staff changed the plans a bit and went for Moscow ? for a quick end of the war with the russians ?

 

[Desert Fox]

While the ratio was staggering in the Soviets' favor, they didn't have nearly 35K tanks.

I wouldn't be surprised if he was including Soviet Armored cars considering those were basically tanks on wheels.

BA-10

This thing had a 45mm gun,
Excellent road & off-road capabilities.
Catterpillar tracks could be attached to rear Wheels for increased off-road capabilities.
Bulk of Germany's tank force on
the Eastern front had inferior guns
, bar the Panzer III and a few Panzer IV's.​

That number at the start of the war was around 23,000 tanks of all types, the T-34 and T-35 and other heavy tanks of all types etc.

Indeed. And contrary to common misconceptions those tanks were equal to or superior of any German tanks in 1941.

In 1941 Germans had nothing comparable to the BT's, KV's and T-34's.

The problem was the time they had to do all that and they were running out of it.

Right. Which is why in our hypothetical, Hitler's original plan of going for Caucasus would have been stuck to, it would have afforded them more time to maintain their intitiative in Russia.

but they still needed to bring a vast amount of it back to major German cities like Hamburg, Frankfurt and Berlin of course

Of course, through Romania and then into Germany, considering that Germans were already getting oil from Romania as it was, the Caucasus oil would supplement that. And the Black Sea route was the most convenient route compared to the land route.

The Germans did in fact utilize the Black Sea for this purpose for a short time during their capture of some of the oils fields of the Caucasus.

They had the challenge of the scope of the campaign, the logistic nightmare, the strategic element, the timing, the Russian weather

True, but considering that they managed to not only survive, but hold on to most of their territorial gains, and then maintain the offensive after the brutal winter of 1941-42 indicates that it wouldn't be far fetched to believe that they could hold on to their gains and eventually adapt to the situation had they gone for the oil from the outset of Barbarossa.

The other problem regarding the impracticality of Barbarossa was the distance of course.

Well, despite this distance (and the other challenges), to their credit and their resolve they did manage to maintain their presence in Soviet territories for 3 1/2 years, unlike Napoleon who couldn't last one winter (and he captured Moscow too which didn't win him the war).

but we do agree that Moscow was a must. This was the hub of the Soviet Union where Stalin ran the war and could plan and recruit almost endless manpower from the east and Siberia

Yes. Moscow was important. But it should not have been the priority. The Caucasus should have remained the primary objective as Hitler intended.

Because going straight for Moscow didn't bode well for them.

At a later date, sure. They could bomb it to smithereens, choke it like Leningrad. Whatever worked for them. But Caucasus was more important.

They had both those challenges, to get enough oil fast enough and then cut the Russians off from their own source

Even if they achieved one of these without the other would have been better than not achieving anything.

But they had a greater chance of achieving both goals in 1941.

in 1941. That's a 6-1 ratio in favor of the Russians lol, and it left the Germans naked in the west. Basically the reason why I mentioned to @Psychic that we should take into account the number of armor the Germans would've needed to win let alone hold off the allies.

Yes, but the allies weren't going to launch an Invasion of Europe in 1941. Considering that America wasn't even an official party to the war yet.

Also, the Germans only came to realize how many Tanks Stalin had after the invasion. They prepared for the invasion based on the intelligence they had.

There's another series that's also incredible to hear with him and his generals I forget where it is I'll try to look it up

Interesting. If you manage to find them do post them here.

Sorry about my stubbornness.

Not at all. It's a very interesting discussion. I'm certainly enjoying it.

If I recall correctly Moscow was not primary, if I am mistaken please correct me, but from what I heard is that Hitler wanted the Caspian Oil reserves and thus Stalinrad as primary objective, but he became ill and was unable to oversee the operation during that time in which the general staff changed the plans a bit and went for Moscow ? for a quick end of the war with the russians ?

Yes, this is correct. Hitler prioritized the Ukraine and the Caucasus. However he fell ill and his Generals diverted the momentum towards Moscow which ended up a failure.

 

[Nilgiri]

Sorry about my stubbornness.

This is what makes the conversation this long and interesting. Keep going.

BTW this might be of interest to you:

 

[Psychic]

@Gomig-21 Marcks plan was way too ambitious no doubt about that.
However, with the loss of Caucasus's oil, the ability of the Soviets to launch large-scale counterattacks would have diminished ---regardless of the number of tanks and men they possessed. German heavy bombers (which came too late) would have been hitting the Urals, Moscow and Baku(if it couldn't be taken).
The Soviets could have sued for peace at that stage or at least the front would have stabilised; allowing the Germans to transfer many of their planes and tanks to the West which would have denied the Allies the control of the air.

Add the Me-262 to that, and availability of oil for better training programs. The presence of German heavy bombers and V-2s would have served as a deterrent at the same time.


As far as the faulty intelligence of Germans is concerned yes this was an issue which was discussed in earlier posts in this thread; This problem was compounded by the fact that the STAVKA was fed with accurate and timely intelligence about German dispositions by none other than traitors in Germany and possibly in the OKW itself. We hear a lot about the British code-breaking but not so much about 'Werther' who fed the Russians directly from the OKW. Also, the Cheif of Abwehr Admiral Canaris was a traitor who was executed in 1944, who knows how many more were committing treason.
Soviets had nothing to fear from the East; thanks to Dr Sorge, their spy in Japan who assured Stalin that no attack would come from that direction. Perhaps the Germans thought about the number of divisions Stalin would have to keep in the East ; but he didn't have to keep anything in the East.

 

[Desert Fox]

IMO, there was no way they would've won the war let alone hold off an allied invasion even if they had.

An interesting lecture that reminded me of what you said here.

The thing is we will never really know. But considering the odds that were stacked against the Wehrmacht in 1939 and then in 1940 and despite that they were able to make the gains they did, I wouldn't be quick to throw in the towel for the Germans considering how much more favorable their position was in 1941 compared to any previous year since the start of the war in Europe in terms of military preparedness..

 

[Gomig-21]

@Desert Fox , thank you man. I will watch that when I get some time.

 

[Psychic]

@Gomig-21 @Desert Fox @Nilgiri