Next Chief Of Army Staff - 2013 ?

[airomerix]

Agreed with your first line
Don't forget General Tariq has always been on command ever since he promoted to the Rank of Major General which was all in war zone . He is continuously commanding a corps since his promotion to present rank. He and general Haroon have set examples to lead their troops from the front in war zones and am sure others would also have set same example if had the oppertunity, therefore there is hardly any difference amongst these very fine officers. Anyone who rises to this rank has all the potentials to command army. I wish concept of seniority should prevail here.

If its the seniority to be followed, then Gen. Haroon Aslam is to be the Chairman Joint Staff. Followed by Rashad Mahmood for CoAS.

 

[Armstrong]

If its the seniority to be followed, then Gen. Haroon Aslam is to be the Chairman Joint Staff. Followed by Rashad Mahmood for CoAS.

I think if the Army, again, gets the CJS spot than that would be unfair to the other two forces !

 

[tarrar]

I hope I voted for the right person but who ever the Chief is going to be, he should always do what is right for Pakistan & he is nothing like mute Gen. Kayani.

 

[alibaz]

If its the seniority to be followed, then Gen. Haroon Aslam is to be the Chairman Joint Staff. Followed by Rashad Mahmood for CoAS.

I don't think it would be army this time. Most probably would go to Navy.

 

[truthseeker2010]

Why has the name for the next COAS, CJCSC not announced yet, there is little over a month left in their retirement?

 

[Rao Sahab]

if triq khan became general on the basis of his son sacrifies then i will prefer Lt Gen Raheel Sharif who is the brother of shabeer sharif shaeed (NH)

 

[fatman17]

Once bitten, Sharif to pick new army chief


Salahuddin Haider


Published — Thursday 19 September 2013



More Pakistan was rife with speculations of an army backlash in the wake of brutal killing of two high profile military officers, including a two-star general and a colonel in the tribal belt near Afghanistan border last week.

Apart from blocking the projected negotiations with the Taleban, the prime minister may also have found it difficult to replace Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani with a new army chief of his choice.

Contrary to expectations, Kayani showed a lot of maturity and issued a statement supporting the elected government in its efforts to negotiate with the Taleban. Kayani, in his statement, categorically stated that dialogue alone could help solve the problem of terrorism.

The menace of terrorism has not only crippled the economy but has also threatened the integrity of the country.

The soft line taken by Kayani — on his way out after serving two terms as the army chief — shows that the military has no doubt over the civil government’s ability to handle the crisis on its own.

Of course, the army chief, retiring in November, did stress that the military was fully capable of meeting the challenges of war with militants, and handling the terrorists, but preferred negotiations over constant engagement as a better option.

His latest statement, coming in the wake of a grim tragedy, displayed tremendous change in the military’s attitude towards civilian administration, which can easily be interpreted as accepting the latter’s authority to run the country without any interference.

Most analysts see this as a very positive sign for a country roughed up by repeated military coups aimed at keeping the democratically elected regimes under the military’s thumb.

Kayani’s statement has raised hopes that the task of selecting the next army chief has become much easier for the prime minister.

Though, Kayani still has two months to go but his successor has to be named earlier so as to allow the outgoing chief time to dine out and make farewell calls on heads of state, other VIPs and to bid farewell to his own men in various cantonments.

Speculations regarding further extensions to the tenures of Kayani and Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry (whose tenure ends in December) were shot down by Information Minister Pervez Rashid.

He made it abundantly plain that neither of the two has requested for extension nor it is being considered.

While the change in the Supreme Court will come automatically on the basis of seniority. Justice Tassaduq Hussain may be the obvious choice.

There is, however, a little irritant, which the prime minister has to sort out. Chaudhry reportedly has asked for giving him the six months of time lost during his forced resignation in March 2007, and ultimate restoration following a long march by Nawaz Sharif, who had to part company with the then President Asif Zardari over the issue.

But the army chief’s choice is the sole prerogative of the prime minister. Seniority does count but is not the only criteria for selection for the top slot. A number of other considerations, including professional competence and loyalty to democratic dispensation also need to be kept in mind. A number of instances could be cited in support of this contention. Former Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto handpicked Gen. Ziaul Haq, then only a corps commander of Multan, for showing to the former his personal loyalty. Eight senior most generals including Majeed Malik, who later became a minister in the Sharif government in 1997, were forced out of job. There is no compulsion under the rules for seniors to retire if a junior supersedes, but convention holds them back from saluting a person junior to him while being in service.

Yet another example was of Nawaz Sharif himself, who picked Gen. Pervez Musharraf, then corps commander of the country’s most sensitive military sub-headquarter at Mangla near Jehlum, and annoyed his Foreign Minister Gauhar Ayub Khan, for ignoring his brother-in-law, Gen. Ali Quli Khan, for the coveted post. No explanations were needed, neither was any given. Earlier, Nawaz had forced former Army Chief Gen. Jahangir Karamat to quit for demanding a supreme council for defense and security. The idea was mooted many a times and was implemented in Musharraf days but was discarded after Zardari took over as the president.

Experts, however, considered this a masterstroke from Sharif to save himself from a possible coup d'état. Musharraf was a migrant from India, coming from Lal Haveli, a well known area in the Indian capital, Delhi, and therefore was thought, would be toothless, and incapable of overthrowing an elected government from the Punjab, enjoying support of the Punjabi dominated army.

But just as Ziaul Haq had overthrown Bhutto and later hanged him in 1979, Musharraf too proved a hard nut to crack, and commanded his men to take over control of the country from Sharif while still in the air on a return flight from Sri Lanka in October 1999.

Sharif says he wants to disentangle the military from politics and he has taken over the foreign affairs and defense portfolios in an apparent show of determination to wrest those responsibilities from the army. He has done that tactfully by taking the army chief into confidence, and consulting him on all matters of defense and security, learning from the bitter experience of the past perhaps that over ambition may once again prove fatal.

Kayani has backed the premier in all major decisions and now Sharif has owned and executed the idea of a supreme council for defense and security, which he had dismissed with utter contempt in his earlier stint in the office. As a recent media report suggested that it’s not just that Sharif wants someone he can trust and whom he can use to neutralize the army’s political role.

The army also wants someone who will be able to work with Sharif.

The job has been at the center of a drawn-out guessing game and officials would not speculate publicly on it. But in private interviews with army officers, politicians and diplomats, several names have emerged as possible contenders.

Those include Lt-Gen. Rashad Mahmood, the current chief of general staff, Lt-Gen. Tariq Khan, who is considered pragmatic on US relations and Lt-Gen. Haroon Aslam, the most senior official after Kayani. The balance, as at present, is tilted in Gen. Haroon’s favor. The task is not easy, but general environment in the country, where politicians and political parties have made themselves absolutely plain that army’s domination must end in civilian matters and that army should work under the prime minister, and the Parliament, perhaps has been well understood by the army now.

arab news.

 

[rockstar08]

let the pentagon decide , as always

 

[fatman17]

•According to a report by The News on Thursday, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif will indicate who he intends to pick to replace Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as army chief by October 7th. When Sharif appoints a new chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, the next most senior general will become next in line to be Kayani’s replacement.[19]

 

[fatman17]

August 2013.



The Race for become Pakistan Army chief is on :



It’s almost official. By October or November, Pakistan’s military at large, and then its army in particular, are going to have new commanders.

First, the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee is going to get a new chairman. The probable is Lt-Gen Haroon Aslam and, by fall, he will be the 15th Four-Star (and the 12th general) to assume what is essentially a ceremonial role in an organisation that is toothless but potentially – if it ever dares to change itself – a key platform for the future of war in Pakistan.

By the way, the chairman of the JCSC is supposed to be the highest-ranking military official in the country. So it’s only fitting that Haroon, the senior-most ‘survivor’ in khaki after the retirement axe falls collectively on the four top generals ahead of him this autumn, is chosen for this top slot. However, in Pakistan’s power structures, there are a lot of rules that are supposed to be but that are never meant to be for real. Case in point: the CJCSC ‘top slot’ is going to be fancy reward for Haroon, but not a particularly useful one, because the real prize – chief of army staff – seems to be going elsewhere.

How’s this possible? How does the senior-most man in the structure get a ceremonial job? It’s the tragedy of the matrix, really.

Haroon comes in line after Pakistan’s most famous chain-smoker, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who is followed by the fail-safe General Khalid Shamim Wynne (the current CJCSC, who – technically but not practically – outranks Kayani), the dapper and extroverted Lt General Khalid Nawaz (of the country’s largest and politically powerful X Corps in Chaklala) and the almost cherubic but very academic ‘Pakhtunist’, Lt General Alam Khattak (of the strategically pivotal Southern Command, headquartered in Quetta). This gang of the top four will go golfing this autumn.

In effect, Haroon’s appointment in Wynne’s stead will not be a controversial affair as his seniority will make him the perfect fit for what is – but again, only on paper – the top military job in the land. He has commanded an ostensibly important formation, operations-wise, in Bahawalpur’s XXXI Corps; he’s done the paramilitary bit as the DG of Punjab Rangers; he’s been general officer commanding of the Special Service Group during key operations (yes, he is one of those lead-from-the-front commandos who jumps off helicopters); he’s served as a director in the elite Military Operations Directorate; he’s completed a foreign war course which, in the army, sets apart the haves from the have-nots; he’s served as an administrative top gun as chief of staff of another corps as a brigadier; and he’s an infantryman, making him a representative of the largest arm of the army, the infantry, where he represents the post-’71 Azad Kashmir Regiment (but not the older, more prestigious battalions). And surprise, surprise: he’s a Punjabi.

But as he currently serves as a principal staff officer to Kayani, Haroon wears the rather unspectacular ultra-coordinator’s hat as the chief of logistics staff (CLS): Though not the most glamorous of the GHQ’s powerful PSO desk jobs, the role makes him perfect for the drag CJCSC office which, essentially, is that of a glorified commissar who coordinates between the three services – army, navy and air force.

That means a lot of photo-ops, a lot of foreign trips, no operational control, but also much required inter-service synchronisation, maybe even harmonisation, between the dominant khakis and the relatively puny whites and blues. And what better way to keep the sailors and aviators in check than sending in a burly, bespectacled, cane-wielding commando, with 200 pounds and over 50 jumps on his ‘red wings’ to ‘coordinate’ between the three services at the very classy and colonial, but still rather single-storey, Joint Staff Secretariat.

Thus, Haroon’s is the classic case of an honourable send-off: as a one and two-star, he was a star. But consolatory desk jobs (like a stint as chairman of the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority), the current CLS gig (which was a post lying vacant for bit, waiting for him as he got his commander’s notch at XXXI Corps), and the nominal command of Bahawalpur (it’s no Lahore, Karachi or even a strike formation) indicate that his grooming has been carefully managed by the chief’s secretariat to be good – but not good enough.


The bottom-line, then, on why the actual number one in the army will get the not-actually-number-one job in the tri-services military combine is simple, but a masterstroke by Kayani: Haroon as CJCSC will be good for army morale (even a ‘grunt commando’ from a non-pedigree regiment can rise to the top, without superseding anyone); he will be a blunt, by-the-book answer for the recently elected purveyors of rules and regulations (the ‘top general must get the top job’, as PM Nawaz Sharif and his waistcoated boys insist), and he will carry on with the army’s control of even the marginally empowered triad of the joint chiefs (where, let’s be honest, he will be better qualified than anyone the air force or the navy can churn out, only because his recent, though clerical, staff posts as well as his special forces focus qualify him for where the joint service operations are headed). More importantly, the army will look like it follows the rules, ‘sacrificing’ its senior-most warrior to the beast of official protocol: That last bit is key.

But, even more importantly, in a country made for blue-eyed boys, Haroon’s appointment in October will clear the way in November for a man who will take direct control of the fifth largest fighting force in the world. This will probably be an officer known as Lt-Gen Rashad Mahmood. Spelt differently from ‘Rashid’, though pronounced as such, Rashad will be the eighth chief of army staff (before General Tikka Khan, the COAS was called the commander-in-chief, which was too grand a title for Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto not to change) and the 15th general to command the Pakistan Army.

Frankly, Rashad as the 15th chief is much more interesting than Haroon as the 15th chairman. On the seniority list, Rashad comes in seamlessly after Haroon, and will move in as seamlessly into Army House. Why? Because, for now, he seems to be the epitome of the army’s command and staff matrix, and his boss has done a remarkable job of grooming him as an heir-apparent. But first, some background on how the chief’s matrix works, and how the cards are stacked to prepare grounds for the most powerful job in Pakistan.

Long before the May elections, General Kayani pulled a knight’s move by pre-empting debate and combat with any elected government over the future leadership of the army by grooming and promoting (even retiring) different types of brass for different types of roles. The four autumn retirees (listed above) notwithstanding, the race had boiled down to five by earlier this year. The commando, Lt-Gen Haroon Aslam at number one; the contender, Lt-Gen Rashad Mahmood, at number two; the legatee, Lt-Gen Raheel Sharif, at number three; the soldier’s soldier, Lt-Gen Tariq Khan, at number four. And the spook, Lt-Gen Zahir-ul-Islam, at number five.

The chief’s secretariat’s options were limited, but Kayani’s choices were further complicated by challenges that no mere military secretary could help him solve. How would he manoeuvre any elected PM into making a by-the-book decision that would also feature his own choice? How would he ensure that his constituency, the army itself, would remain impressed with such a choice, and its codes – written and unwritten – would be followed?

And, as importantly, how would he keep the Americans relaxed and other ‘patrons’ satisfied? The die was cast long ago by Kayani as far back as 2010/11; and its colour was khaki.


The army prides itself on two categories when it comes to positioning its ranks: seniority (age and date of commission) and grooming (tasks assigned on merit). Seniority can’t be meddled with, except by superseding a ranking officer, and/or by out-grooming him. As he decided not to take the ill-rumoured ‘second extension’, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s options eventually lay with grooming the top five soldiers who would survive the retirement axe which he himself wouldn’t this fall; some more junior than others, but all as different as continents are apart.

Kayani’s matrix had to be fail-safe: with the 2013 elections imminent, his line-up had to be ready before a new prime minister – any new prime minister – would assume office and be in a position to choose his successor. Ultimately, the choice had to be the best of both worlds: Kayani’s own, as well as what the rules said. This would induce a premier of any hue to pick Kayani’s man – by default as well as design – with almost no room to navigate, short of political scandal. Thus, the administrative strategist in Kayani went to work a few years ago, circa 2010/11, to groom his successor(s) by charting them across the only two slots that matter in the army: command and staff posts.

Simply, command posts are those that grant an officer operational control of deployed forces over a specified covered area. At three-stars, that means a corps command. All five potential successors would play that gig: Haroon Aslam would get Bahawalpur’s XXXI; Rashad Mahmood would get Lahore’s IV; Raheel Sharif would get Gujranwala’s XXX; Tariq Khan would get Mangla’s I; and Zahir-ul-Islam would get Karachi’s V.

So, check, check, check, check and check on his could-be successors’ command CVs, making them all equally qualified for the top slot? Not really, and not so fast.

Armies are beasts of hierarchy, but they’re also creatures of legend. While all contenders made it to a corps command, they all knew that, much like George Orwell’s Animal Farm, all corps commanders are created equal, but some corps commanders are created more equally than others.

In the army’s jungle of myth and law, Lahore and Karachi are more prestigious commands; they come with an informal degree in politics for the commander, just because of where they are headquartered. Battle-focused, Mangla is an elite ‘strike’ formation, hard-tasked to knife into India. Bahawalpur and Gujranwala are ‘holding’ formations, assigned to assist other, larger corps.

Thus, the tactics of their deployments disclosed the strategy of their boss. Rashad and Zahir were meant for bigger things (the politically sensitive chief of general staff and DG-ISI after Lahore and Karachi, respectively). Tariq, the tough guy of the western front (by 2010, he had done two serious stints with the 14th Infantry Division and the Frontier Corps in counterinsurgency/counterterrorism operations in Fata/KPK, liaised with US Centcom and commanded another strike formation in the famed 1st Armoured Division) would now harden his troops for the ‘perpetual threat from the east’.

As for Haroon (GoC of SSG) and Raheel (commandant of Pakistan Military Academy plus another premier infantry division’s GoC), not top guns but not lightweights either, thus, still worth rewarding, would get secondary corps in Bahawalpur and Gujranwala. To those who can read the code, the math was clear: though all had three-stars, some brass was worth more – and better polished, too.

But besides command, there comes a time in every officer’s life when he has to do a more ‘political’ desk job – the staff job – and at the three-star level, that means serving as a principal staff officer (where one is within walking/whispering/wooing distance away from the boss). The PSO job reinforces the best and singles them away from the rest. It’s also where one gets to lunch, talk golf and of course, work with and impress Kayani.

In this darker world of staff jobs, the chief’s matrix would become clearer: The number two, Rashad, would get the choice chief of general staff (after Lahore, this would peg him as a ‘favourite’ for COAS). The number one, Haroon, would get the less-glamorous chiefdom of Logistics Staff (readying him for the coordinative role at CJCSC). The number three, Raheel, a war-hero legatee (after all, he is Nishan-e-Haider Shabbir Sharif’s brother, but severely underrated by analysts), would get the cumbersome IGT&E (inspector general training and evaluation, a bean counter of sorts).

Zahir, at five, would take the fearsome ISI (not a PSO, but an adjutant to the real ISI chief, Kayani himself, a trustworthy title further enshrined after Karachi’s politics and terror). Only Tariq Khan, who lives for the field, would remain in the command world and not get a staff job, drilling his strike corps for the day of reckoning with India.

As for the hot favourite, Rashad may have a novice’s handicap of minus-two in polo, but Kayani’s fellow ‘Baluchi’ is a contender by the very fact that he’s led the sensitive Lahore Corps – where he duly interacted with the Sharifs as they held Punjab in the previous administration – and is now Kayani’s premier PSO.

This is a double whammy. As the chief’s eyes and ears of the operations and intelligence directorates (MO and MI), Rashad is the institutional Lancelot to Kayani’s Arthur – minus the affair with Guinevere. Since his induction as the CGS, he’s quickly scored an unsung feat: hauling Pakistan out of a potentially scandalous international mess (anyone remember Fatima Fertiliser and sanctions being debated in US Congress till last winter?) by chairing cooperative task forces and quieting Nato/Isaf down about tackling the flow of IEDs from Pakistan into Afghanistan.

But clearly, there’s more to the man than his ‘coveted’ CGS job. The unremarkable tenets of Rashad’s remarkable resume feature the same-old-yet-stellar postings: GoC of an infantry division, a foreign war course, chief of staff, etc. But there are two standout jobs that underscore his run for chiefdom.

First, Brig Rashad Mahmood served as military secretary to Nawaz Sharif’s favourite president, Rafiq Tarar. On the trust-scale, this weighs him above the others and especially his senior, Haroon Aslam, who was also a brigadier in 1999, but serving as director military operations in a directorate that was tasked to launch the bloodless coup that would depose Sharif in a few hours on October 12 of that year. Coupled with his Lahore command, that accounts for two safe ‘ins’ for Rashad with the Sharifs, advertently or inadvertently.

Second, Rashad has had an excellent record at the ISI as a two-star. He is the senior-most of a select few ‘general-spies’ that Kayani – Pakistan’s first DG-ISI to serve as COAS – has moulded in his own image to bridge the gap between Aabpara and Chaklala (even parliament and GHQ). Credited for reforming – in fact, creating – a critical cell to enhance the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence’s efforts at countering violent extremism, Rashad is a living intel legend, hailed from Pindi to the Pentagon. Thus, though he was not conducting airborne assaults in Peochar (like Haroon) or firing his Glock empty from helicopters like Tariq (in Operation Zalzala), he was the brains behind the brawn. That’s big.

But is it big enough? Is Rashad Mahmood’s well-constructed Infantryman/ Baluchi/MS/COS/Foreign Course/GoC/Spy Legend/Corps Commander/CGS CV going to work in his favour as October will absorb Haroon – the official number one – as CJCSC, leaving him to be deftly appointed COAS in November, by default and design? Or is the chief really that predictable and all this is smoke and mirrors? Is Nawaz Sharif going to get cornered into a ‘meritorious decision’ which has been expertly calibrated as Kayani’s own? Are the ‘family-friend’ ties of another contender with the Sharifs going to create a new matrix? Is the ‘anti-Indianess’ of yet another candidate going to come into play?

What about the warm ‘operational contacts’ of at least three contenders with the Americans? What about the immense ‘political power’ that one of the more junior men holds? And who can predict the unwritten rule that after a gunner in Musharraf, and an infantryman in Kayani, it’s now a cavalryman’s turn? The codes of the chief’s matrix are complex, but there is only one challenge for any soldier: the army must remain united.

AsianAge

 

[farhan_9909]

Lt Gen Raheel sharif

Lt Gen rashad Mahmood

Lt Gen Haroon Aslam

And the one i want to win

Lt Gen Tariq Khan

 

[Rafi]

TK chances have just improved, he has a serious chance now, of becoming the new COAS.

 

[Fist_of_God]

TK chances have just improved, he has a serious chance now, of becoming the new COAS.

Lt. Gen Tariq Khan ??


how ?

 

[Zarvan]

TK chances have just improved, he has a serious chance now, of becoming the new COAS.

NO Sir I think it would be Haroon Aslam because now Nawaz will not go for any junior even if he is only few months junior Sir

 

[Saleem]

One year extension in COAS Kayani's service proposed - Video Dailymotion