Nehru sought US assistance during 1962 Indo-China war Nehru sought

[Hindustani78]

Hello there.

It starts with the proposition that Nehru asked the US for help after his eastern front collapsed, and according to some incredible people, the PLA declared a ceasefire and withdrew because of the threat of the US coming in on the side of India.

I nagged you to come to this thread only to be amused. We are now being told all over again how the 1962 war was fought, and with some opinions and extra thoughts which are entertaining. Personally, this was the funniest time: just read #65, smile and relax. It is not much of a thread except for these little jokes and entertainments.

Hope you are well.

I had also kept a very low profile for some time, but that was because I was teaching professionally, and needed my wits about me all the time.

India was expecting to settle the border issues by talks under ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ 29th April 1954

• Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty

• Mutual non-aggression

• Mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs

• Equality and mutual benefit; and

• Peaceful co-existence.

Chinese adopted a policy in which they were changing the whole regional situation.

Burma military coup occured in 2 March 1962 ,

Negotiations between the China and Pakistan officially began on October 13, 1962,

The Sino-Mongolian border treaty was signed in 1962

Nepal share a border of 1,415 km, which was demarcated according to a 1961 treaty.

China begin border talks with Afghanistan in 1962 which was settled in 1963.

 

[chauism]

Hello there.

It starts with the proposition that Nehru asked the US for help after his eastern front collapsed, and according to some incredible people, the PLA declared a ceasefire and withdrew because of the threat of the US coming in on the side of India.

I nagged you to come to this thread only to be amused. We are now being told all over again how the 1962 war was fought, and with some opinions and extra thoughts which are entertaining. Personally, this was the funniest time: just read #65, smile and relax. It is not much of a thread except for these little jokes and entertainments.

Hope you are well.

I had also kept a very low profile for some time, but that was because I was teaching professionally, and needed my wits about me all the time.




I am not aware of ANY concern with Chinese nuclear devices among any of the generals involved in this fighting.

Some one calling you a kid is indeed hilarious.

Anyways can you give me a quick summary of what is the main point that you were debating?

Two things I want to clarify here is that from PLA's prospective there was no way it could hold its position in India in a long run logistically nor did central government had any intention to stay. I must say that even after 62's war China always wanted to solve this disbute on a negotiation table rather than on the battle field.

As for the question of US direct involvement, I can only say . I don't know whether Nehru did ask US for help, but one thing I am sure is US wouldn't come at all.

During the Vietnam War, one of the major factors that US decided never to set a foot north of 17
parallel was the fear of intervention from China. Here I am not saying US is scared of China's military might or anything, but rather after Korean War US didn't want to confront China on the battle field directly unnecessarily. Unless someone here can provide the necessity of why US want to fight a land war in Asia against China.
Chapter V:

 

[Joe Shearer]

This is how urban legends are born - repeat a half truth or lie often enough.

You need the source?

We have moles within ourselves..rats.. ' 62 was Nehru's fault.. He was intimidated by the military takeover in Pakistan and scared by what Field Marshall Kariappa had to say about it.

Probably out of context, probably not, Rajiv Gandhi had termed Kolkata as a 'dying city' once. Now, personally, I never felt at home in Kolkata, but, I do take offense..

Your points are individually correct, but I didn't see the connection. Why should the military take-over in Pakistan, and the resultant acute discomfort in Indian circles, have had anything to do with 1962 being Nehru's fault? (It was, but the connection is not clear).

Rajiv Gandhi's remark about Kolkata was asinine. Nothing more, nothing less.

Some one calling you a kid is indeed hilarious.

Anyways can you give me a quick summary of what is the main point that you were debating?

Two things I want to clarify here is that from PLA's prospective there was no way it could hold its position in India in a long run logistically nor did central government had any intention to stay. I must say that even after 62's war China always wanted to solve this disbute on a negotiation table rather than on the battle field.

As for the question of US direct involvement, I can only say . I don't know whether Nehru did ask US for help, but one thing I am sure is US wouldn't come at all.

During the Vietnam War, one of the major factors that US decided never to set a foot north of 17
parallel was the fear of intervention from China. Here I am not saying US is scared of China's military might or anything, but rather after Korean War US didn't want to confront China on the battle field directly unnecessarily. Unless someone here can provide the necessity of why US want to fight a land war in Asia against China.
Chapter V:

@chauism

I suppose it has come down to a question of why there was a unilateral ceasefire by the PRC, and a withdrawal from the point of presence of the PLA, with a return of prisoners held and remains buried or cremated, as well as the guns and ammunitions, vehicles and other assets.

There is one school of thought that simply cannot accept that this was an entirely Chinese decision, and keeps trying to link it to other things, like, for instance, a US intervention on the battle field. I've been trying to say on the purely documentary, historical side, that there is no evidence of any such US decision, or extension of any such reassurance to India by the US, and its being made public by the US side.

Your point, in terms of military strategy, is perfectly correct. After the Korean War, there was a marked reluctance by the US to engage with the PLA in land engagements.

 

[chauism]

You need the source?
@chauism

I suppose it has come down to a question of why there was a unilateral ceasefire by the PRC, and a withdrawal from the point of presence of the PLA, with a return of prisoners held and remains buried or cremated, as well as the guns and ammunitions, vehicles and other assets.

There is one school of thought that simply cannot accept that this was an entirely Chinese decision, and keeps trying to link it to other things, like, for instance, a US intervention on the battle field. I've been trying to say on the purely documentary, historical side, that there is no evidence of any such US decision, or extension of any such reassurance to India by the US, and its being made public by the US side.

Your point, in terms of military strategy, is perfectly correct. After the Korean War, there was a marked reluctance by the US to engage with the PLA in land engagements.

There is continuous debate over why there was an unilateral ceasefire by PRC within China's netizens as well. What I can understand here is whatever success China was able to gain during the 62's war was not sustainable in a long run at all. Considering the stituation China was in at that time, aftermath of Great Leap Forward, 3 years of natural disaster and constant threat of KMT's plan of retaking mainland. I don't think China wanted to commit to a lasting war from the start as there wasn't even a national military mobilization after the war has broken out. Then let's say China just wanted to hold the position of Arunachal Pradesh it claims after the initial military success, how much force do you think China has to commit to defend that position from India retaking it? Unilateral ceasefire and withdraw actually put China into a very favourable position as now it can go back to the negotiating table with the new chips it just won (the appearance of PRC's ability of taking AP back at will). I think that was PRC leadership's ultimate goal back then.

 

[Dungeness]

There is continuous debate over why there was an unilateral ceasefire by PRC within China's netizens as well. What I can understand here is whatever success China was able to gain during the 62's war was not sustainable in a long run at all. Considering the stituation China was in at that time, aftermath of Great Leap Forward, 3 years of natural disaster and constant threat of KMT's plan of retaking mainland. I don't think China wanted to commit to a lasting war from the start as there wasn't even a national military mobilization after the war has broken out. Then let's say China just wanted to hold the position of Arunachal Pradesh it claims after the initial military success, how much force do you think China has to commit to defend that position from India retaking it? Unilateral ceasefire and withdraw actually put China into a very favourable position as now it can go back to the negotiating table with the new chips it just won (the appearance of PRC's ability of taking AP back at will). I think that was PRC leadership's ultimate goal back then.

I think it also had something to do with Mao's personal ego to be THE leader of the 3rd world, from a higher moral ground, see I can teach you a lesson at will, but I don't grab the land as trophy. The logistic difficulties could be overcome by cutting off Siliguri Corridor and take the whole NE. Aside from Assam, Indian was just a new colonial master to the rest of NE at that time, and not more legitimate to claim the land as its own than Chinese. India was ready to give up entire NE including Assam after the defeat.

 

[Joe Shearer]

There is continuous debate over why there was an unilateral ceasefire by PRC within China's netizens as well. What I can understand here is whatever success China was able to gain during the 62's war was not sustainable in a long run at all. Considering the stituation China was in at that time, aftermath of Great Leap Forward, 3 years of natural disaster and constant threat of KMT's plan of retaking mainland. I don't think China wanted to commit to a lasting war from the start as there wasn't even a national military mobilization after the war has broken out. Then let's say China just wanted to hold the position of Arunachal Pradesh it claims after the initial military success, how much force do you think China has to commit to defend that position from India retaking it? Unilateral ceasefire and withdraw actually put China into a very favourable position as now it can go back to the negotiating table with the new chips it just won (the appearance of PRC's ability of taking AP back at will). I think that was PRC leadership's ultimate goal back then.

Completely agree.

The PLA also gained a psychological edge, which remains intact till date.

I think it also had something to do with Mao's personal ego to be THE leader of the 3rd world, from a higher moral ground, see I can teach you a lesson at will, but I don't grab the land as trophy. The logistic difficulties could be overcome by cutting off Siliguri Corridor and take the whole NE. Aside from Assam, Indian was just a new colonial master to the rest of NE at that time, and not more legitimate to claim the land as its own than Chinese. India was ready to give up entire NE including Assam after the defeat.

In military terms, two points: the Siliguri corridor is at the end of mountain terrain equal to Arunachal Pradesh, and was (and is) defended by far more stable military deployments than was the case then in AP. Second, you are right in pointing out a harsh reality: as far as AP was concerned, India had just started deploying administrators barely a decade before. That is however not true of

1. Assam
2. Manipur
3. Tripura
4. Meghalaya
5. Mizoram
6. Nagaland

At that time, Nagaland had insurgency; Mizoram was still calm, and the others were unaffected.

I am not sure how you meant the phrase,"India was ready to give up entire NE including Assam after the defeat." Nehru made a defeated broadcast and said farewell to Assam and other points in the NE. Is that what you were referring to?

 

[chauism]

Completely agree.

The PLA also gained a psychological edge, which remains intact till date.

That I don't know much about, since as far as I can remember 62's war in China is a lost memory in mainstream media. It wasn't even mentioned at all in history lessons unless you want to study it in college, most people in China doesn't even know anything about it. Maybe you can shine some light on how did this war affect India and its people at all psychologically.

Also there is a question I always wanted to ask is that 62's war indeed put a heavy strain on India and China's relationship, however 10 years later India fully supported PRC in UN taking back the seat was occupying by ROC.

 

[Tiger Genie]

Nehru had Utopian view of the world and thought Indo-Chini-bhai-bhai meant anything to the Chinese....little did he realize the Chinese administrations of those years only respected power such as what the Japs did to them. Had Nehru studied Indian statecraft as much as he did the oxbridgian texts, he would have known better

 

[Joe Shearer]

That I don't know much about, since as far as I can remember 62's war in China is a lost memory in mainstream media. It wasn't even mentioned at all in history lessons unless you want to study it in college, most people in China doesn't even know anything about it. Maybe you can shine some light on how did this war affect India and its people at all psychologically.

Also there is a question I always wanted to ask is that 62's war indeed put a heavy strain on India and China's relationship, however 10 years later India fully supported PRC in UN taking back the seat was occupying by ROC.

I believe that there was, and is, a moral point of view running through Indian politics, perhaps a moralistic one even, which can be disconcerting to those from a more practical and realistic way of looking at things.

The UN Security Council seat clearly belonged to Mainland China and her administration. Only chicanery had kept the ROC in that seat for so long after the CPC victory over the KMT. There was no way in which anyone could justify allocating that very critical seat to a defeated regime hanging on to power on an offshore island. Although Mrs. Indira Gandhi was a tough enough Prime Minister to have taken a hostile stand against the PRC taking the seat, it was so obviously wrong that I am sure that there was no real possibility of India opposing that candidature - or, strictly speaking, that correction.

That I don't know much about, since as far as I can remember 62's war in China is a lost memory in mainstream media. It wasn't even mentioned at all in history lessons unless you want to study it in college, most people in China doesn't even know anything about it. Maybe you can shine some light on how did this war affect India and its people at all psychologically.

Also there is a question I always wanted to ask is that 62's war indeed put a heavy strain on India and China's relationship, however 10 years later India fully supported PRC in UN taking back the seat was occupying by ROC.

The impact, I imagine, has been the same as there might have been in Pakistan towards India after 1971: a permanent suspicion, a permanent unexpressed fear that this 'betrayal' might happen again.

Obviously a large number of people in India are not familiar with the incident and its background. But almost everyone in an Indian city above school-going age 'knows' that China betrayed India in 1962 (the dates might not be well remembered, just that it happened some time ago), and that she is still threatening war or war-like conditions on the borders. I believe that unless a serious effort at explaining things and preparing people to accept present-day reality is made, this will linger on for a few more decades.

 

[Dungeness]

Completely agree.

The PLA also gained a psychological edge, which remains intact till date.



In military terms, two points: the Siliguri corridor is at the end of mountain terrain equal to Arunachal Pradesh, and was (and is) defended by far more stable military deployments than was the case then in AP. Second, you are right in pointing out a harsh reality: as far as AP was concerned, India had just started deploying administrators barely a decade before. That is however not true of

1. Assam
2. Manipur
3. Tripura
4. Meghalaya
5. Mizoram
6. Nagaland

At that time, Nagaland had insurgency; Mizoram was still calm, and the others were unaffected.

I am not sure how you meant the phrase,"India was ready to give up entire NE including Assam after the defeat." Nehru made a defeated broadcast and said farewell to Assam and other points in the NE. Is that what you were referring to?

I thought apart from Assam, the rest of sates in NE did not have the historical/cultural/ethnically bond with mainland India, and people on the land were largely tribal people who did not have the modern day "nation-state" concept at the time. They became parts of Indian Union was totally the legacy of British Raj . The momentum of British colonial rule took them well into after India's independence. Hence the calm and lack of resistance. For them, under either Indian or Chinese rule could meant the same thing.

Yes to the bold part.

 

[chauism]

The impact, I imagine, has been the same as there might have been in Pakistan towards India after 1971: a permanent suspicion, a permanent unexpressed fear that this 'betrayal' might happen again.

Obviously a large number of people in India are not familiar with the incident and its background. But almost everyone in an Indian city above school-going age 'knows' that China betrayed India in 1962 (the dates might not be well remembered, just that it happened some time ago), and that she is still threatening war or war-like conditions on the borders. I believe that unless a serious effort at explaining things and preparing people to accept present-day reality is made, this will linger on for a few more decades.

That is the problem with history, there is not prefect way to heal the wound left by it expect time itself. People often compare Japan and Germany after WW II, however one thing they don't realize is that Germany after Hitler was a totally different country where as in case of Japan it is not.

Back to the matter of 62's war, I think that everyone was at fault there as I stated years before, and there is no definite answer of who had more to blame than the other. Even there was a time machine to take all of us back in time to witness everything and every decisions that were made back then, I don't think we are able to make judgement of whether they are right or wrong simply we are not living in their time (I am not sure about your case though).

 

[scorpionx]

now i have 2 questions here:

1. Pandit Nehru asking for US help first is a bit baffling as one it goes against very founding principle of NAM and two India's closeness to Soviet Union? What actually conspired this move?
2. US foreign policy in entire Cold war era was containment of spread of communism. now as the story tells, even if US administration had not agreed for supply of supply of hardware on such large scale, even diplomatic efforts could have meant a lot. that didn't come. later India leaned towards USSR, and it took nearly half a century for situation to change. Is it a case of missed opportunity for US policy or whether US was not hoping for Indian Democracy to survive in long run.

@AUSTERLITZ @scorpionx

Answering the second part is easier than the first one. It was not an missed opportunity for the US. The American reinforcement arrived in the end of November. To many those reinforcement meant several different significance; While Some saw those as failure to NAM, Galbraith saw them as opportunity to contain a communist power more threatening than Soviet Russia. But before the large scale military equipment could have been sanctioned, the Chinese withdrew, quick as they came. If in an unlikely scenario, the Chinese lingered the war large scale American hardware was imminent.

Answering the first part is quite difficult. Like many educate elites in India, Nehru shared a contemptuous belief about the US. It was seen as a country with imperialistic ambition, political corruption and cultural bankruptcy. This feeling was in general complemented, though for a short period managed o improve during Chester Bowles’ tenure as ambassador, by the others in America. From the beginning of the 50’s mutual distrust grew larger. Nehru’s policy of non-alignment was interpreted as a threat to American obsessive sensibilities against communism. They quickly recognized Pakistan, though of late in the line of British thinking as a necessary ally to defend Afghanistan from Soviet influence.

On the other hand Nehru was much closer to Soviet Union. He toured USSR two decades before he traveled to North America. He was visibly impressed by the economic and technological progress there, the absence of class hierarchy and the peasant collectives. Soviet assistance began to pour in steel and hydroelectric plants. It is not difficult to understand why V.K. Krishna Menon abstained from the UN meeting to discuss the resolution calling upon the soviets to withdraw their forces from Budapest. The double standard of NAM was exposed in front of the world.
.........................................................................................................................................................

Now the above part cannot explain why in the midst of 1962 crisis Nehru had to look to UK or US and not the USSR for military aid. The answer lies in the complexities of Sino-Soviet relations in those days. Since the beginning of the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Soviets maintained a position of neutrality if not slightly tilted towards India. They repeatedly dismissed the Chinese claim that India had been the primary aggressor and requested both countries for a peaceful and friendly border settlement citing the Soviet-Iran border agreement. The Chinese diligently refused. Despite mounting pressure from USSR and East European communists, the Chinese held firm in their stand.

But this situation dramatically changed with the Cuban missile crisis. The political and military dividends from such crisis became so alluring to USSR that they decided to compromise their stand of neutrality or fairly which can be termed as a pro-Indian one to garner Chinese support. By spring of 1962, the Chinese and the Soviets came to an understanding on the frontier dispute. Quite contrary to their earlier position, the Soviets started to see Indians as a necessary aggressor against the legitimate Chinese claims and it was an act of betrayal to stay neutral if the Chinese are attacked. This abrupt change of stance by the Soviets fractured Indo-Soviet relationship. Pravda on 25th October still hoping for Chinese support for Moscow’s Cuban policy indicated that if it came to a choice the Soviets will stand behind the Chinese. “The overriding emergency touching Soviet interests in Cuba was more vital than to preserve the Soviet position on India.” But the Chinese were meagre in reciprocating as the Soviet Union hoped. Through the entire missile crisis affair, the Soviets lingered on the hope of Chinese support which never arrived.

This is precisely the reason, in my opinion that Cuban missile crisis made the Soviets to compromise India, a great strategic blunder which they realized very quickly and never repeated again in the coming years.

 

[dadeechi]

I think it also had something to do with Mao's personal ego to be THE leader of the 3rd world, from a higher moral ground, see I can teach you a lesson at will, but I don't grab the land as trophy. The logistic difficulties could be overcome by cutting off Siliguri Corridor and take the whole NE. Aside from Assam, Indian was just a new colonial master to the rest of NE at that time, and not more legitimate to claim the land as its own than Chinese. India was ready to give up entire NE including Assam after the defeat.

The reasons are

1) India prior to the war was supporting and/or providing base for US support for Independent Tibet.

2) After the loss in 1962, India has recognized Tibet as being part of China and provided China an assurance that it's land would not be used for anti-china activities.

3) India also assured that it will never ever host any foreign forces on its land and will always stay neutral

4) Based on this agreement, china has pulled back it's troops to pre-war positions

5) Retaining Tibet was more important to China than prolonging the war

 

[anant_s]

Answering the second part is easier than the first one. It was not an missed opportunity for the US. The American reinforcement arrived in the end of November. To many those reinforcement meant several different significance; While Some saw those as failure to NAM, Galbraith saw them as opportunity to contain a communist power more threatening than Soviet Russia. But before the large scale military equipment could have been sanctioned, the Chinese withdrew, quick as they came. If in an unlikely scenario, the Chinese lingered the war large scale American hardware was imminent.

Answering the first part is quite difficult. Like many educate elites in India, Nehru shared a contemptuous belief about the US. It was seen as a country with imperialistic ambition, political corruption and cultural bankruptcy. This feeling was in general complemented, though for a short period managed o improve during Chester Bowles’ tenure as ambassador, by the others in America. From the beginning of the 50’s mutual distrust grew larger. Nehru’s policy of non-alignment was interpreted as a threat to American obsessive sensibilities against communism. They quickly recognized Pakistan, though of late in the line of British thinking as a necessary ally to defend Afghanistan from Soviet influence.

On the other hand Nehru was much closer to Soviet Union. He toured USSR two decades before he traveled to North America. He was visibly impressed by the economic and technological progress there, the absence of class hierarchy and the peasant collectives. Soviet assistance began to pour in steel and hydroelectric plants. It is not difficult to understand why V.K. Krishna Menon abstained from the UN meeting to discuss the resolution calling upon the soviets to withdraw their forces from Budapest. The double standard of NAM was exposed in front of the world.
.........................................................................................................................................................

Now the above part cannot explain why in the midst of 1962 crisis Nehru had to look to UK or US and not the USSR for military aid. The answer lies in the complexities of Sino-Soviet relations in those days. Since the beginning of the Sino-Indian border conflict, the Soviets maintained a position of neutrality if not slightly tilted towards India. They repeatedly dismissed the Chinese claim that India had been the primary aggressor and requested both countries for a peaceful and friendly border settlement citing the Soviet-Iran border agreement. The Chinese diligently refused. Despite mounting pressure from USSR and East European communists, the Chinese held firm in their stand.

But this situation dramatically changed with the Cuban missile crisis. The political and military dividends from such crisis became so alluring to USSR that they decided to compromise their stand of neutrality or fairly which can be termed as a pro-Indian one to garner Chinese support. By spring of 1962, the Chinese and the Soviets came to an understanding on the frontier dispute. Quite contrary to their earlier position, the Soviets started to see Indians as a necessary aggressor against the legitimate Chinese claims and it was an act of betrayal to stay neutral if the Chinese are attacked. This abrupt change of stance by the Soviets fractured Indo-Soviet relationship. Pravda on 25th October still hoping for Chinese support for Moscow’s Cuban policy indicated that if it came to a choice the Soviets will stand behind the Chinese. “The overriding emergency touching Soviet interests in Cuba was more vital than to preserve the Soviet position on India.” But the Chinese were meagre in reciprocating as the Soviet Union hoped. Through the entire missile crisis affair, the Soviets lingered on the hope of Chinese support which never arrived.

This is precisely the reason, in my opinion that Cuban missile crisis made the Soviets to compromise India, a great strategic blunder which they realized very quickly and never repeated again in the coming years.

one thing that has amazed me is how Pandit Nehru who had his education in England, had a rather opposing view of capitalist ideology.
another thing after WWII, in an era when India along with sseveral nations had gained freedom, rebuilding was a priority. in that era US goverments Marshal Catlet plan was proving far more successful than what was seen in eastern europe and under communist regimes. now maybe we didn't want help but rejection of free market policies and follow what we know as Socialist policies, may be in hindsight, not a very wise thing to do.
i'm not suggesting India should have moved into US led block but embracing a rather antiquated diplomatic and economic policies not much different from communist ones could be one thing, i wish changed.

 

[Joe Shearer]

I thought apart from Assam, the rest of sates in NE did not have the historical/cultural/ethnically bond with mainland India, and people on the land were largely tribal people who did not have the modern day "nation-state" concept at the time. They became parts of Indian Union was totally the legacy of British Raj . The momentum of British colonial rule took them well into after India's independence. Hence the calm and lack of resistance. For them, under either Indian or Chinese rule could meant the same thing.

Yes to the bold part.

Yes, and no.

Manipur and Tripura were different; they had got transmogrified. The phrase that fits but I don't want to use is 'Sanskritised'. What you are saying is more true of Nagaland and Mizoram, and less true of Meghalaya.

Incidentally, when considering Nagaland, and parts of Manipur, it must be borne in mind that colonial conquests created an Africa-like situation, where some tribes were trifurcated, among two states governed by the British under the rubric India, and one geographical location within Burma. It would take too long to go into the details, but the Nagas, for instance, are split among Nagaland, Manipur and Burma.

Actually, it is too tempting to avoid a small detour: the tribe in question is the Tangkhul Naga tribe. They are thought to have originated around twenty centuries ago in China, and migrated in stages across Burma to the location of the Burma-Manipur boundary. This boundary was a creation of the British and the Burmese, and the Tangkhul had no idea that they were being partitioned!

Because they are considered a Naga tribe, the Nagas want them all in one state of Nagaland, all including the Tangkhul in Manipur and those in Burma. The Tangkhul themselves are quite happy to be Tangkhul, and don't especially yearn for absorption within the greater Naga masses. Tripura is far more 'settled' in character (an unlovely word, implying that others are less 'settled', and I cringe at having had to use it).

That is the problem with history, there is not prefect way to heal the wound left by it expect time itself. People often compare Japan and Germany after WW II, however one thing they don't realize is that Germany after Hitler was a totally different country where as in case of Japan it is not.

Back to the matter of 62's war, I think that everyone was at fault there as I stated years before, and there is no definite answer of who had more to blame than the other. Even there was a time machine to take all of us back in time to witness everything and every decisions that were made back then, I don't think we are able to make judgement of whether they are right or wrong simply we are not living in their time (I am not sure about your case though)*.

*I acknowledge being a troglodyte. Give me a little time; very soon now, I shall emerge from my cave and re-enter the human race at least in the eighteenth century. It may take a little while to complete the remaining three hundred years.

Personally, I think it was an egregious mistake by Nehru, and his complete lack of experience in diplomacy and external relations. He tried to apply his Fabian socialist background, and some of the ideals of the freedom struggle, meaning Gandhi's thoughts cleaned up for international consumption and couched in graceful terms, to relations between India and her neighbours, and really made a mess. I hate it when he is criticised in the vulgar, gutter language that some really uncouth young Indians use, but that is because they seem to overlook the cementing force that he was in the early years of the republic.