National Air Defense Command (NADCOM) - Updates & Discussions.

[Donatello]

Electronic CounterMeasures (ECM) is broad and that would include the radar warning receiver (RWR) set. Does the JF-17 has a 'built-in' ECM capability similar to an external ECM pod? I doubt it. We can safely assume that it does have an RWR set. The internal volume space of a fighter is very limited, particularly in the forward fuselage section where the cockpit and the avionics bays resides. For self-screening ECM an external pod is necessary. But even if a fighter aircraft can be fitted with some offensive ECM capability, it would still be considerably less capable than an external pod simply because of size.

You state some very good points.
At the moment JF-17's space needs to be optimized for more powerful radar for it's primary role is Air to Air attack and Air-defense.

But the way electronics industry is making advances we can always retrofit the JF-17s later.

I mean, no one would have thought that F-16 would end up as powerful as the BLK52+



But hey this is SAM thread, so lets keep it that way.
We can move to JF-17 thread.


Good post Gambit, nonetheless.

 

[ANG]

Hi Mani2020, the Su-27/35 planes have wingtip mounted ECM jamming pods. The is the case even for such large airplanes which have a lot more internal volume. As such, having an external jamming pod is no reflection on the capability of the fighter. In fact most modern fighters carry external jamming pods. The F-16 also does. This allows for more upto date technology/pods to be used, rather then having to re-wire the internals of a plane. Take care.

AN/ALQ-184 Electronic Attack Pod

 

[gambit]

I may have missed it, but are these frequency agile? How robust is the ECCM?

For every weapon "X", there is a weapon "Y" designed to counter it, like HARM and similar anti-radiation missiles.

Any air defense radar that does not have frequency agility is not worth putting in front of the service chiefs on paper, let alone the market in readied form. Frequency agility was difficult with analog technology, but no longer with the digitized age we are in today.

For interested readers...

Assume the above is a three-pulses pulse train in a transmission period. Frequency agility is the ability to shift -- higher or lower -- the frequency per train. The burden for the radar is to remember what freq was used in WHICH pulse train over time if that time period contains many trains. Pulse amplitude agility can also be incorporated but there would be an increase in data processing complexity in terms of hardware -- memory capacity -- and software sophistication to sort out the echoes' differences. Pulse level agility is possible and naturally required even more data processing capability. Keep in mind that for any pulse radar system, transmission characteristics manipulation is best reserved per train.

Another level of pulse train characteristics manipulations, or agility, is 'PRI jittering'.

For now...Focus on 'stable', 'stagger', and 'jitter'.

The 'stable' pulse repetition interval (PRI) type of pulse train is quite standard. Airport radars need not be more sophisticated to have effective traffic control. Police speed radars need not be more sophisticated to catch all you drivers who would defy governmental authority on the roads regarding speed limits.

The 'stagger' PRI type is where -- per pulse train -- there are 'time frames' or lower level pulse trains where the PRI has a variable but PREDICTABLE pattern. This pattern repeat from 'frame' to 'frame'. Helpful in tracking and analyzing the internal workings of a storm, for example...

Multi-PRI Signal Processing for the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar. Part I: Clutter Filtering - Journal of Atmospheric and Oceanic Technology | HighBeam Research - FREE trial

Multiple pulse repetition interval (multi-PRI) transmission is part of an adaptive signal transmission and processing algorithm being developed to aggressively combat range-velocity ambiguity in weather radars.

The 'jitter' PRI waveform has practically no widespread civilian use. At the pulse train level, the PRI is usually as unpredictable as the data processing can make it. The longer the pulse train, the greater the demand for the radar to remember that pattern and to try to discern the same pattern from the echoes, if any. The target, of course, cannot predict when the next pulse will come.

The above two illustrations just give different graphical perspectives on these PRI manipulated waveforms.

The last waveform is 'dwell-and-switch', technically similar to 'stagger' but different in application. For the EW crowd, often it is called 'bait-and-switch'. The application here is electromagnetic (EM) and electronic warfare (EW) reconnaissance and this is where those RC-whatever aircrafts come into play. What happens is that the recon aircraft will transmit a series of pulses with predictable characteristics then switch to another set of pulses with another set of predictable pulses. In other words, this pulse train can have many 'frames' of predictable pulses but the frames themselves are unpredictable. The goal is to provoke or 'bait' the air defense radars into responding, hence 'bait-and-switch'. The 'dwell' time can vary according to those responses. This is sort of a passive ECM between the two sides. Active ECM is where the next response will contain missiles.

One can argue and ask that the air defense radars not respond at all to conceal its true capabilities as far as penetration of ECM attacks goes. Anyone does fencing? Any fencer will learn early into the sport on why it is important to learn how to 'read' his opponent's foil pressure against his own. Asking an air defense radar not to respond to a recon probe is like asking a boxer never to spar. The Soviets knew what we were doing with those orbiting RC-whatever aircrafts and they knew they had to respond in order to learn how quickly can we change our probing waveforms as it would indicate our technical prowess. The advantage is with the provocateur. If we do not know or can reasonably guess about the Soviets' air defense radar capabilities, we can safely assume the worst while the Soviets would be in the dark about how we could start an ECM attack based upon that 'worst' assumption. They had to respond to learn about US but the question is to what level lest they gave too much away about themselves.

The above is may be 1/100th of the many variations of radar waveforms based upon the four characteristics: freq, pulse amplitude, pulse width, and pulse repetition. The US has decades of experience at producing radars and ECM gears with these capabilities and at probing to find out what our adversaries can do that could degrade an actually assault at the EW level. If there is a shooting war between US and Iran/China/North Korea, many have argued that none of them are Iraq where the Iraqi air defense failed spectacularly. The argument is based upon the premise that the technological gap between Iran/China/NKR and the US are less than between Iraq and the US. True that they have made much progress since Desert Storm but if that technological gap is relatively the same because of US progress in this arena, then the odds are very good that the result will be similar to Iraq.

 

[malikkhawar]

good news to have SAM System. in PAF

 

[abaseen99]

chanies air defence system

 

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[abaseen99]

The PLA's Air Defense Missile Systems

The PLA's airborne surveillance radar effort has paralleled the deployment of a range of advanced Eastern European and indigenous air defense radars and passive detection systems, some of which are intended to support interceptors, and some missile batteries.

The indigenous CETC YLC-20 emitter locating system is modeled on the Czech Tamara/Vera and Ukrainian Kolchuga M, several of which were procured by the PLA. The United States has in the past blocked the export of the Czech Vera system. These networked sensors can precisely track aircrafts by exploiting their radar and network terminal radio frequency emissions.

The most prominent counter-stealth radar developed to date is the two meter band CETC JY-27, similar to the Russian NNIRT Nebo SV/SVU series. The Russians are claiming that radars in this class can track stealth aircraft such as the F-117A stealth fighter at ranges of around 200 nautical miles.

The centerpiece of the PLA’s SAM system is the imported variants of the formidable Russian Almaz S-300PMU/PMU1 (SA-10 Grumble / SA-20A Gargoyle) and S-300PMU2 Favorit (SA-20B Gargoyle), which are Russian equivalents to the U.S. Patriot PAC-1 and PAC-2 systems. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, the PLA has deployed 32 S-300PMU launch systems, 64 S-300PMU1 launch systems, and 32 new S-300PMU2 launch systems. These numbers amount to 16 to 32 batteries, subject to composition [14].

Russia is now deploying its first Almaz-Antey S-400 (SA-21) batteries, the system formerly known as the S-300PMU3. It incorporates much more powerful radars, the improved 48N6E3 missile, shorter range 9M96E/E2 missiles for self-defense against anti-radar weapons such as the US HARM, and the 200-nautical-mile long-range 40N6E missile. The latter is intended to kill surveillance aircraft like the E-3 AWACS and RC-135V/W Rivet Joint, as well as electronic warfare aircraft like the EA-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler. There are claims that China contributed funding to the development of the S-400, as well as claims that the S-400 is now being marketed to the PLA, but no hard evidence has surfaced to date (China Brief, July 17).

Unlike the U.S. Patriot missile system, the Russian S-300P series systems are highly mobile and include a diverse range of supporting radars, including the 30N6 Flap Lid and Tomb Stone phased array engagement radars, the 36D6 Tin Shield acquisition radar, and in the later variants 64N6 Big Bird series phased array acquisition radars. The S-300P series systems were built to engage low-flying cruise missiles and aircraft at all altitudes. The systems include the earlier 5V55 series missiles with ranges of up to 50 nautical miles and the more recent 48N6E series missiles with up to 110 nautical miles of range. The latter missiles allow a coastal battery in the Taiwan Strait to deny the use of airspace above Taiwan. There are claims that the PLA has experimented with the integration of two meter band radars as an acquisition component in these missile batteries [15].

The S-300P systems are supplemented by the HQ-9 missile and associated HT-233 radar, which use technology from the S-300PMU, with 64 launch systems deployed. The FT2000 “counter-AWACS” missile is part of this package. The indigenous mobile HQ-12/KS-1A missile and HT-200 radar are employed as gap fillers [16].

The most capable short-range missile system is the imported Russian 9K331 Tor M/M1 or SA-15 Gauntlet, which would be used to protect targets against smart munitions and cruise missiles. The Crotale has been further developed [17].

Conclusions

China’s air defense system is maturing into the largest, most capable and technically advanced in Asia, and will be capable of inflicting very heavy attrition on any aircraft other than upper tier U.S. stealth systems. Until the U.S. deploys its planned “New Generation Bomber” post-2020, the United States will have only 180 F-22 Raptors and 20 B-2A Spirit bombers capable of penetrating the PLA’s defensive shield. This may not be enough to act as a credible non-nuclear strategic deterrent. The weakness of the U.S. strategic posture relative to China is further exacerbated by a limited number of bases across the West Pacific, with key sites at Kadena AFB on Okinawa and Andersen AFB on Guam unhardened and thus unusable were the PLA to launch DF-21 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles, or cruise missiles, against these sites in the event of a conflict [18].

The existing U.S. military posture in Asia with close regional allies such as Japan, Australia and South Korea are predicated on the United States retaining a non-nuclear strategic capability advantage over the PLA. If that advantage continues to erode with improving PLA capabilities and declining United States relative capabilities, a seismic shift may eventually occur in Asia as the strategic balance in the West Pacific swings away from the United States in favor of China. The United States still has strategic options available that will however require the incoming administration depart fundamentally from the policy of ignoring PLA capability growth.

 

[abaseen99]

SAM System PLA Designation
Engagement Radar Acquisition Radars Status







SA-2/CSA-1
HQ-2B/J SJ-202 Gin Sling A
P-12/18 Spoon Rest
YLC-8
Legacy

SA-2/CSA-2 HQ-2B SJ-202 Gin Sling B
P-12/18 Spoon Rest
YLC-8
Legacy
HQ-61
HQ-61 Type 341/342
P-15 Flat Face Legacy
HQ-64
HQ-64/LY-60
LY-60 Track/Illuminate
LY-60 Acquistion
Production
CSA-4
HQ-7/FM-80
FM-80FS/Type 345 FM-80SS Production
CSA-5 HQ-7/FM-90
FM-90FS FM-90SS
Production
FB-6A
FB-6A
FB-6A
FB-6A Production
Yi Tian
Yi Tian WZ551 Yi Tian Yi Tian Production
FLV-1
FLV-1/FLG-1/FL-2000 FLV-1 FLV-1 Production
LS-II
LS-II LS-II LS-II Production
HQ-12
HQ-12/KS-1A H-200 / SJ-231
JY-11/JY-11B
YLC-18
JYL-1
Production

HQ-9/FD/FT-2000
HQ-9
HT-233
Type 305A
Type 305B
Type 120
Production

 

[abaseen99]

The L-band JY-29/Type 120 (depicted), YLC-18, JYL-1 and YL-11B are typical of the new generation of PLA self-propelled tactical 3D acquisition radars, designed to support a range of SAM systems.