US embassy cable - 05PARIS174 (original version)
MTAG 04 - 04: DEMARCHE ON FRENCH FIRM'S ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)
Identifier: 05PARIS174
Origin: Embassy Paris
Created: 2005-01-10 17:42:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PARM PREL ETTC HK PK CM GM FR MTCRE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 000174
SIPDIS
NOFORN
FOR NP/CBM, EUR/PRA, EUR/WE
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/10/2025
TAGS: PARM, PREL, ETTC, HK, PK, CM, GM, FR, MTCRE
SUBJECT: MTAG 04 - 04: DEMARCHE ON FRENCH FIRM'S
ASSISTANCE TO PAKISTAN'S MISSILE PROGRAM (S)
REF: SECSTATE 270425
Classified By: EST Counselor Robert W. Dry for Reasons 1.5 (b) and (d).
1. (S) On 30 December 2004, EST officer delivered a
demarche to French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)
Point of Contact (POC) David Bertolotti, MFA Deputy Director
of Disarmament and Nuclear Non-proliferation, concerning the
10 December shipment of telemetry equipment from the French
firm In'Trad to Pakistan, with the possible end-user being
New Technologies Islamabad, which is associated with
Pakistan's ballistic missile program. Prior to the EST
officer presenting the demarche, Bertolotti asked if the
issue pertained to a shipment to Pakistan, to which EST
officer replied in the affirmative. Bertolotti then noted
that the issue had been raised in Washington, and that
British government officials had been actively engaging the
French. Following these comments, EST officer then presented
the demarche.
2. (S) In response to the demarche, Bertolotti provided
EST officer with comprehensive comments on the shipment and
the reasons behind the Government of France's (GOF) decision
not to examine its contents and to allow it to continue on to
Pakistan. The reasons provided included logistical
considerations, timing issues, legal concerns, and
insufficiently precise information. Bertolotti said that
while the GOF was fully engaged and concerned about this
transaction, it was operating within the constraints imposed
by French law, and that the onus of responsibility rested on
the British and United States governments to provide more
specific, actionable information regarding the purportedly
illegal cooperation between In'Trad and Pakistan's ballistic
missile program.
3. (S/NF) Bertolotti said that a British Embassy officer
had brought this same matter to his attention on 10 December,
only hours before the shipment was set to depart Charles de
Gaulle/Roissy airport for Pakistan. He added, however, that
British security representatives in Paris had met with French
security counterparts earlier in the day and had requested
French intervention to investigate, and, if appropriate, to
stop the shipment from departing France. French POC told EST
officer that his assumption was that the U.S. Government
(USG) was acting on the basis of information provided by the
British government, and was double-tracking the British
efforts. Bertolotti claimed that the eleventh-hour
notification and the non-specific nature of the information
provided by the British had left the GOF in an untenable
position. He then briefed EST officer on the legal and
logistical hurdles the GOF had to contend with regarding the
shipment, as well as the broader considerations that went
into the French decision to allow the shipment to reach
Pakistan.
4. (S) Bertolotti noted that not all telemetry equipment
was subject to dual-use licensing in France, and that the
equipment may have, in fact, been legal for export. He added
that the 10 December shipment had already cleared customs,
and that, short of a direct threat to the safety of the
flight, GOF customs officials had no legal authority to seize
and then search the shipment. Bertolotti added that the
imprecise nature of the information provided by British
government officials supporting their concerns had made it
all the more difficult for the French to take direct action.
Bertolotti further remarked that, from a logistical
standpoint, the request for seizure of the shipment had
presented obstacles. Primary among these was the fact that
the physical location of the shipment was unknown, and that
it could have been stored in one of twenty customs storage
facilities at the airport. Bertolotti also noted that a
similar shipment of telemetry equipment from In'Trad to the
Pakistani National Development Complex (NDC) had been
investigated and then cleared for delivery to Pakistan by
British Customs officials at a London area airport on 04
April.
5. (S) Regarding plans for future French action and
monitoring of In'Trad, Bertolotti informed EST officer that
French authorities had contacted the director of the
four-employee In'Trad firm, and that he had adamantly denied
that the telemetry equipment shipped had been prohibited for
export, and insisted that the firm was involved only in
completely legitimate transactions. These denials
notwithstanding, the GOF had, as of 11 December, begun to
monitor the activities of this company more closely and was
prepared to check all future exports from it. Bertolotti
added that, starting sometime in early 2005, the GOF was
planning to begin an official, interagency investigation into
the company, but added that this was a formal process and
often took months to complete.
6. (S/NF) Finally, Bertolotti noted that the GOF wanted to
be more helpful regarding the suspect cooperation between
In'Trad and Pakistani missile entities, and to implement the
necessary action against In'Trad if the firm was, in fact,
complicit in shipping prohibited equipment for use in
Pakistan's ballistic missile program. He added, however,
that in order to take focused, legal action against In'Trad,
the GOF needed more precise information regarding the type of
equipment being exported, as well as clearer indications that
the end-users were associated with Pakistan's ballistic
missile program. He then informed EST officer that French
security services had already requested more specific
information from their British security counterparts linking
In'Trad to the NDC, but had not yet received any such
information. Bertolotti then queried EST officer if he knew
whether the USG was basing its suspicions of In'Trad solely
on information provided to it by the British government, or
if it was acting in part on corroborating information
obtained independently of the British. EST officer replied
he was not privy to the sourcing of the information regarding
In'Trad, but would raise the issue with Washington.
Bertolotti then requested that the EST officer pass on the
GOF request for the USG to provide additional, more precise
information that would aid the GOF in its investigation of
In'Trad. EST officer replied that he would raise this
request with Washington. EST officer said that the USG in
any event would appreciate French government investigation
and enhanced watchfulness of In'Trad
Leach
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