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N & S Waziristan Taliban Groups Join Forces

AgNoStIc MuSliM:
I truly love you optimism in this.
My comments re Swat have nothing to do with Shariah as such. It is more to do with the outcomes short and long term. I have not seen it written but Shariah must cohabitate with national law as well. Different argument not for here.

I sincerely hope the GoP does not let you down.

I am optimistic and confident about the PA's ability to mold a potent COIN force out of the FC, and for the PA itself to accomplish military objectives (not necessarily equivalent to a lasting peace in FATA/Swat) if it has the opportunity to deploy the necessary resources.

Unlike S-2, I do not see the argument of 'reluctance to fight neighbors' as a major issue here, rather the constraints imposed by the need to maintain an effective deterrent in the East. Pakistan cannot guarantee by any means that some other nut jobs will not take it upon themselves to go blow themselves up in Mumbai, and given the reaction from the GoI this time, we cannot chance leaving ourselves open to military aggression by India.

I am less optimistic and confident of the GoP's ability to make the right decisions. The ANP, for whom I had high hopes, has already disappointed me, not so much in that it chose to enter into a peace deal with the Swat Taliban when it came into power, but that chose to stick its head in the sand while the TTP-S ran rampant and the military just stood by, only to then finally allowing the military to launch a 'token operation' before offering another 'peace deal'.

While I have argued that the final conditions of the Taliban-GoP negotiations need to be understood before terming the most recent political effort a 'failure', I am extremely pessimistic about its chances of success.
 
AgNoStIc MuSliM
I am optimistic and confident about the PA's ability to mold a potent COIN force out of the FC, and for the PA itself to accomplish military objectives (not necessarily equivalent to a lasting peace in FATA/Swat) if it has the opportunity to deploy the necessary resources.


First lets not confuse COIN with basic CI. At present COIN is way outside the FC's reach and to some extent the PA reach.
CI is within the ability of the PA and with training the FC's reach.

Molding is one thing and to do so will requier a lot of effort, culturally especially and politically. Motivation to actually do it is a big if issue.


While I have argued that the final conditions of the Taliban-GoP negotiations need to be understood before terming the most recent political effort a 'failure', I am extremely pessimistic about its chances of success.

We sort of agree .
 
First lets not confuse COIN with basic CI.
How would you explain the difference?

Molding is one thing and to do so will requier a lot of effort, culturally especially and politically. Motivation to actually do it is a big if issue.
However reports from Pakistan suggest that the motivation at the leadership level, military and civilian (provincial and national) does exist, and the effort is being made, though obviously not at the pace that all sides would like, which hopefully we will see an improvement in going forward.

I am not clear about what you are implying when you say 'culturally'.
 
Pamphlets call for holy war against Obama, Zardari, Karzai

Daily Times - Leading News Resource of Pakistan

Monday, February 23, 2009
By Haji Mujtaba

MIRANSHAH: The Taliban in Waziristan announced forming a ‘Shura Ittehadul Mujahideen’ (Council of United Mujahideen) on Sunday to wage jihad ‘in an organised manner’.

Pamphlets distributed in the Miranshah Bazaar and other areas of the agency headquarters said the forces led by Mullah Muhammad Omar and Osama Bin Laden were fighting against ‘infidels’ led by US President Barack Obama, Pakistani President Asif Zardari and Afghan President Hamid Karzai.

They quoted verses of the holy Quran calling people to fight a holy war against ‘infidels’, who they said were killing innocent Muslims.

The announcement was made by Taliban leaders Hafiz Gul Bahadur, who is the Taliban emir in North Waziristan, Baitullah Mehsud, the top Taliban commander in South Waziristan, and Maulvi Nazir, the chief of Taliban in Wana, who said they wanted to “stop the infidels from carrying out acts of barbarism against innocent people”.
 
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Schmitt and Perlez must have read our minds ...;)

Check out the slide show for some pictures of the FC in training on the NYT site.

February 23, 2009
Secret U.S. Unit Trains Commandos in Pakistan

By ERIC SCHMITT and JANE PERLEZ

BARA, Pakistan — More than 70 United States military advisers and technical specialists are secretly working in Pakistan to help its armed forces battle Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country’s lawless tribal areas, American military officials said.

The Americans are mostly Army Special Forces soldiers who are training Pakistani Army and paramilitary troops, providing them with intelligence and advising on combat tactics, the officials said. They do not conduct combat operations, the officials added.

They make up a secret task force, overseen by the United States Central Command and Special Operations Command. It started last summer, with the support of Pakistan’s government and military, in an effort to root out Qaeda and Taliban operations that threaten American troops in Afghanistan and are increasingly destabilizing Pakistan. It is a much larger and more ambitious effort than either country has acknowledged.

Pakistani officials have vigorously protested American missile strikes in the tribal areas as a violation of sovereignty and have resisted efforts by Washington to put more troops on Pakistani soil. President Asif Ali Zardari, who leads a weak civilian government, is trying to cope with soaring anti-Americanism among Pakistanis and a belief that he is too close to Washington.

Despite the political hazards for Islamabad, the American effort is beginning to pay dividends.

A new Pakistani commando unit within the Frontier Corps paramilitary force has used information from the Central Intelligence Agency and other sources to kill or capture as many as 60 militants in the past seven months, including at least five high-ranking commanders, a senior Pakistani military official said.

Four weeks ago, the commandos captured a Saudi militant linked to Al Qaeda here in this town in the Khyber Agency, one of the tribal areas that run along the border with Afghanistan.

Yet the main commanders of the Pakistani Taliban, including its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, and its leader in the Swat region, Maulana Fazlullah, remain at large. And senior American military officials remain frustrated that they have been unable to persuade the chief of the Pakistani Army, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to embrace serious counterinsurgency training for the army itself.

General Kayani, who is visiting Washington this week as a White House review on policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan gets under way, will almost certainly be asked how the Pakistani military can do more to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban from the tribal areas.

The American officials acknowledge that at the very moment when Washington most needs Pakistan’s help, the greater tensions between Pakistan and India since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November have made the Pakistani Army less willing to shift its attention to the Qaeda and Taliban threat.

Officials from both Pakistan and the United States agreed to disclose some details about the American military advisers and the enhanced intelligence sharing to help dispel impressions that the missile strikes were thwarting broader efforts to combat a common enemy. They spoke on condition of anonymity, citing the increasingly powerful anti-American segment of the Pakistani population.

The Pentagon had previously said about two dozen American trainers conducted training in Pakistan late last year. More than half the members of the new task force are Special Forces advisers; the rest are combat medics, communications experts and other specialists. Both sides are encouraged by the new collaboration between the American and Pakistani military and intelligence agencies against the militants.

“The intelligence sharing has really improved in the past few months,” said Talat Masood, a retired army general and a military analyst. “Both sides realize it’s in their common interest.”

Intelligence from Pakistani informants has been used to bolster the accuracy of missile strikes from remotely piloted Predator and Reaper aircraft against the militants in the tribal areas, officials from both countries say.

More than 30 attacks by the aircraft have been conducted since last August, most of them after President Zardari took office in September. A senior American military official said that 9 of 20 senior Qaeda and Taliban commanders in Pakistan had been killed by those strikes.

In addition, a small team of Pakistani air defense controllers working in the United States Embassy in Islamabad ensures that Pakistani F-16 fighter-bombers conducting missions against militants in the tribal areas do not mistakenly hit remotely piloted American aircraft flying in the same area or a small number of C.I.A. operatives on the ground, a second senior Pakistani officer said.

The newly minted 400-man Pakistani paramilitary commando unit is a good example of the new cooperation. As part of the Frontier Corps, which operates in the tribal areas, the new Pakistani commandos fall under a chain of command separate from the 500,000-member army, which is primarily trained to fight Pakistan’s archenemy, India.

The commandos are selected from the overall ranks of the Frontier Corps and receive seven months of intensive training from Pakistani and American Special Forces.

The C.I.A. helped the commandos track the Saudi militant linked to Al Qaeda, Zabi al-Taifi, for more than a week before the Pakistani forces surrounded his safe house in the Khyber Agency. The Pakistanis seized him, along with seven Pakistani and Afghan insurgents, in a dawn raid on Jan. 22, with a remotely piloted C.I.A. plane hovering overhead and personnel from the C.I.A. and Pakistan’s main spy service closely monitoring the mission, a senior Pakistani officer involved in the operation said.

Still, there are tensions between the sides. Pakistani F-16’s conduct about a half-dozen combat missions a day against militants, but Pakistani officers say they could do more if the Pentagon helped upgrade the jets to fight at night and provided satellite-guided bombs and updated satellite imagery.

General Kayani was expected to take a long shopping list for more transport and combat helicopters to Washington. The question of more F-16’s — which many in Congress assert are intended for the Indian front — will also come up, Pakistani officials said.

The United States missile strikes, which have resulted in civilian casualties, have stirred heated debate among senior Pakistani government and military officials, despite the government’s private support for the attacks.

One American official described General Kayani, who is known to be sensitive about the necessity of public support for the army, as very concerned that the American strikes had undermined the army’s authority.

“These strikes are counterproductive,” Owais Ahmed Ghani, the governor of North-West Frontier Province, said in an interview in his office in Peshawar. “This is looking for a quick fix, when all it will do is attract more jihadis.”

Pakistani Army officers say the American strikes draw retaliation against Pakistani troops in the tribal areas, whose convoys and bases are bombed or attacked with rockets after each United States missile strike.

Eric Schmitt reported from Bara, Peshawar and Islamabad, Pakistan, and Jane Perlez from Islamabad.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/world/asia/23terror.html

94dacf3bf6166eab572f60288ffe9dce.jpg
 
Schmitt and Perlez must have read our minds ...;)

Check out the slide show for some pictures of the FC in training on the NYT site.

February 23, 2009
Secret U.S. Unit Trains Commandos in Pakistan

By ERIC SCHMITT and JANE PERLEZ

BARA, Pakistan — More than 70 United States military advisers and technical specialists are secretly working in Pakistan to help its armed forces battle Al Qaeda and the Taliban in the country’s lawless tribal areas, American military officials said.

The Americans are mostly Army Special Forces soldiers who are training Pakistani Army and paramilitary troops, providing them with intelligence and advising on combat tactics, the officials said. They do not conduct combat operations, the officials added.

They make up a secret task force, overseen by the United States Central Command and Special Operations Command. It started last summer, with the support of Pakistan’s government and military, in an effort to root out Qaeda and Taliban operations that threaten American troops in Afghanistan and are increasingly destabilizing Pakistan. It is a much larger and more ambitious effort than either country has acknowledged.

Pakistani officials have vigorously protested American missile strikes in the tribal areas as a violation of sovereignty and have resisted efforts by Washington to put more troops on Pakistani soil. President Asif Ali Zardari, who leads a weak civilian government, is trying to cope with soaring anti-Americanism among Pakistanis and a belief that he is too close to Washington.

Despite the political hazards for Islamabad, the American effort is beginning to pay dividends.

A new Pakistani commando unit within the Frontier Corps paramilitary force has used information from the Central Intelligence Agency and other sources to kill or capture as many as 60 militants in the past seven months, including at least five high-ranking commanders, a senior Pakistani military official said.

Four weeks ago, the commandos captured a Saudi militant linked to Al Qaeda here in this town in the Khyber Agency, one of the tribal areas that run along the border with Afghanistan.

Yet the main commanders of the Pakistani Taliban, including its leader, Baitullah Mehsud, and its leader in the Swat region, Maulana Fazlullah, remain at large. And senior American military officials remain frustrated that they have been unable to persuade the chief of the Pakistani Army, Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, to embrace serious counterinsurgency training for the army itself.

General Kayani, who is visiting Washington this week as a White House review on policy for Afghanistan and Pakistan gets under way, will almost certainly be asked how the Pakistani military can do more to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban from the tribal areas.

The American officials acknowledge that at the very moment when Washington most needs Pakistan’s help, the greater tensions between Pakistan and India since the terrorist attacks in Mumbai last November have made the Pakistani Army less willing to shift its attention to the Qaeda and Taliban threat.

Officials from both Pakistan and the United States agreed to disclose some details about the American military advisers and the enhanced intelligence sharing to help dispel impressions that the missile strikes were thwarting broader efforts to combat a common enemy. They spoke on condition of anonymity, citing the increasingly powerful anti-American segment of the Pakistani population.

The Pentagon had previously said about two dozen American trainers conducted training in Pakistan late last year. More than half the members of the new task force are Special Forces advisers; the rest are combat medics, communications experts and other specialists. Both sides are encouraged by the new collaboration between the American and Pakistani military and intelligence agencies against the militants.

“The intelligence sharing has really improved in the past few months,” said Talat Masood, a retired army general and a military analyst. “Both sides realize it’s in their common interest.”

Intelligence from Pakistani informants has been used to bolster the accuracy of missile strikes from remotely piloted Predator and Reaper aircraft against the militants in the tribal areas, officials from both countries say.

More than 30 attacks by the aircraft have been conducted since last August, most of them after President Zardari took office in September. A senior American military official said that 9 of 20 senior Qaeda and Taliban commanders in Pakistan had been killed by those strikes.

In addition, a small team of Pakistani air defense controllers working in the United States Embassy in Islamabad ensures that Pakistani F-16 fighter-bombers conducting missions against militants in the tribal areas do not mistakenly hit remotely piloted American aircraft flying in the same area or a small number of C.I.A. operatives on the ground, a second senior Pakistani officer said.

The newly minted 400-man Pakistani paramilitary commando unit is a good example of the new cooperation. As part of the Frontier Corps, which operates in the tribal areas, the new Pakistani commandos fall under a chain of command separate from the 500,000-member army, which is primarily trained to fight Pakistan’s archenemy, India.

The commandos are selected from the overall ranks of the Frontier Corps and receive seven months of intensive training from Pakistani and American Special Forces.

The C.I.A. helped the commandos track the Saudi militant linked to Al Qaeda, Zabi al-Taifi, for more than a week before the Pakistani forces surrounded his safe house in the Khyber Agency. The Pakistanis seized him, along with seven Pakistani and Afghan insurgents, in a dawn raid on Jan. 22, with a remotely piloted C.I.A. plane hovering overhead and personnel from the C.I.A. and Pakistan’s main spy service closely monitoring the mission, a senior Pakistani officer involved in the operation said.

Still, there are tensions between the sides. Pakistani F-16’s conduct about a half-dozen combat missions a day against militants, but Pakistani officers say they could do more if the Pentagon helped upgrade the jets to fight at night and provided satellite-guided bombs and updated satellite imagery.

General Kayani was expected to take a long shopping list for more transport and combat helicopters to Washington. The question of more F-16’s — which many in Congress assert are intended for the Indian front — will also come up, Pakistani officials said.

The United States missile strikes, which have resulted in civilian casualties, have stirred heated debate among senior Pakistani government and military officials, despite the government’s private support for the attacks.

One American official described General Kayani, who is known to be sensitive about the necessity of public support for the army, as very concerned that the American strikes had undermined the army’s authority.

“These strikes are counterproductive,” Owais Ahmed Ghani, the governor of North-West Frontier Province, said in an interview in his office in Peshawar. “This is looking for a quick fix, when all it will do is attract more jihadis.”

Pakistani Army officers say the American strikes draw retaliation against Pakistani troops in the tribal areas, whose convoys and bases are bombed or attacked with rockets after each United States missile strike.

Eric Schmitt reported from Bara, Peshawar and Islamabad, Pakistan, and Jane Perlez from Islamabad.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/23/world/asia/23terror.html

94dacf3bf6166eab572f60288ffe9dce.jpg

good read - however there is a major contradiction in the article. to say that Gen. Kiyani is not supportive of the CI trg for the regular army dosnt make sense, because if he (Kiyani) is not supportive, then the positive things mentioned in the article are not happening! - this is his domain and if he says no then it means no - even if the FC is reporting to the Interior Ministry. further CI is now part of basic infantry training in the army - once again the western press is creating "doubts" in the minds of US lawmakers on the "intentions" or "resolve" of the army and the "do more" slogans will once again fly in the halls of congress and the pentagon. a few months ago Kiyani was the "darling" of the pentagon!

The "do more" will start just as Kiyani will present his wish-list for transport helos (CH-47s), more Cobras and spares, 105mm howitzers and F-16 upgrades for the air force. the 'do more" is one way of "delaying" the equipment which is required to "do more" more effectively.

Mullen is quite right in stating that there is "mis-trust" between the two militaries and the aforementioned will only widen this "mis-trust" at a time when "closer" co-operation is the need of the hour!
 
further CI is now part of basic infantry training in the army -

Yes - I do believe that has been confirmed by multiple sources, and Gen. Kiyani and DG ISI Gen. Shuja Pasha are both record calling the insurgency a bigger threat than India.

However, the criticism may stem from Pakistan's concerns vis a vis India preventing a larger deployment to the North West.

That said, I believe under Musharraf the idea was to expand the FC to about 80,000 and engage in capacity building so that it was capable of taking on the insurgency with the Army playing a supporting role. I believe that long term plan is still in place.
 
"Gen. Kiyani is not supportive of the CI trg for the regular army..."

There may be higher oriented individual training for NCOs and officers that's being resisted. Too, collective unit training tasks in a COIN environment may not be getting taught and exercised to our satisfaction. It's hard to say as I suspect these trainers are also assessing skills in a variety of areas and I doubt the P.A. knows the full briefs of each trainer.

Remember-they train but they also are professional observers. We'd be very interested to assess the current acumen of your combined arms battalion and brigade commanders, their staffs, and their subordinate platoon and company commanders.

There are also specialized areas of COIN ops that have evolved in the last eight years, particularly battlefield intelligence operations as part of a brigade or battalion's to-do list. These tactical intelligence officers are expected to drive their unit's collection efforts. It's not the same as preparing for "the first battle of the next war" as we used to euphemistically refer to the Fulda Gap. Different intelligence inputs altogether.

This stuff starts to broach OPSEC so I'll stop here but there's more than meets the eye to C.I. operations and it only starts at basic infantry training.

Some thoughts...
 
there's more than meets the eye to C.I. operations and it only starts at basic infantry training.

...and that's where we r starting... all your other stuff sounds very interesting indeed.
 
"...all your other stuff sounds very interesting indeed."

Lot of money involved in training units. Not a lot of cost-saving simulators for COIN training. Which units gets the training, if any? Who DOES the collective training? Weren't Americans only training the trainers?

Operational and standard training cycles would be disrupted. Deployment schedules would be altered. Do you want American officers and NCOs interacting with battalion and brigade battle-staffs? What might we learn at what benefit to you?

Do you want our trainers down with your platoons and companies too? That, of course, is where the real nitty-gritty goes on.

How safe would our trainers be at the platoon and company levels?

These are considerations that Kiyani and our senior leaders may be trying to figure out. It's really hard work and has to be staffed exceptionally well from both ends and is just another thing that needs doing within their very long workdays.
 
"...all your other stuff sounds very interesting indeed."

Lot of money involved in training units. Not a lot of cost-saving simulators for COIN training. Which units gets the training, if any? Who DOES the collective training? Weren't Americans only training the trainers?

Operational and standard training cycles would be disrupted. Deployment schedules would be altered. Do you want American officers and NCOs interacting with battalion and brigade battle-staffs? What might we learn at what benefit to you?

Do you want our trainers down with your platoons and companies too? That, of course, is where the real nitty-gritty goes on.

How safe would our trainers be at the platoon and company levels?

These are considerations that Kiyani and our senior leaders may be trying to figure out. It's really hard work and has to be staffed exceptionally well from both ends and is just another thing that needs doing within their very long workdays.

got no "truck" with that - except it will take time and there "could" be language issues thus the going will be slow naturally!
 
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"there "could" be language issues thus the going will be slow naturally!"

Well "language" brings up a lot of issues. Do you mean "language" within the MOA/MOU between nations or between trainers/trainees? If Special Forces are doing the work, my guess is we've both Pashtu and Urdu speakers with these teams. I'd be surprised and a little disappointed if not.

As the program expands, it'll be hard to find enough pashtu or urdu speaking trainers for all your platoons/companies. Fortunately, we're not talking permanent advisors who'd accompany troops into battle as in Afghanistan now or Vietnam. Instead, perhaps, units could cycle through a permanent training facility.
 
good read - however there is a major contradiction in the article. to say that Gen. Kiyani is not supportive of the CI trg for the regular army dosnt make sense, because if he (Kiyani) is not supportive, then the positive things mentioned in the article are not happening! - this is his domain and if he says no then it means no - even if the FC is reporting to the Interior Ministry. further CI is now part of basic infantry training in the army - once again the western press is creating "doubts" in the minds of US lawmakers on the "intentions" or "resolve" of the army and the "do more" slogans will once again fly in the halls of congress and the pentagon. a few months ago Kiyani was the "darling" of the pentagon!
maybe this facade of mutual unaccommodation is no longer a critical component of us-pak relationship? how much of it is a facade, and how privy are us lawmakers to this delicacy? all these questions need not be asked anymore imo especially if the anti-american anti-pa segment in pakistan is growing as powerful as the article implies, and if the us congressmen continue to stick their feet in their mouths.
,
The "do more" will start just as Kiyani will present his wish-list for transport helos (CH-47s), more Cobras and spares, 105mm howitzers and F-16 upgrades for the air force. the 'do more" is one way of "delaying" the equipment which is required to "do more" more effectively.

Mullen is quite right in stating that there is "mis-trust" between the two militaries and the aforementioned will only widen this "mis-trust" at a time when "closer" co-operation is the need of the hour!
can't help but notice that the only positive assesment of us-pak cooperation in this article came from RETIRED gen. masood.
 
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