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N & S Waziristan Taliban Groups Join Forces

^well here it is. Let's assume the countryside would have overthrown the Khalq. They would have installed a leader and that would have been that.

Or the other scenario, the Khalq clean sweeped the insurgents (as it did by driving 400,000 into Pakistan), then the Khalq would have carried on and that would have been that until some other coup.

The point was the Soviets and the US got involved and magnified the whole situation a billion times. No US, no Soviets in Afghanistan, no mujahideen, great!!
 
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"The point was the Soviets and the US got involved and magnified the whole situation a billion times."

No it wasn't. The "point" had been our alleged instigation of the insurgency. Your argument needs to be with those in the Khalq like Karmal who made Amin's life so miserable that he BADGERED the Soviet Government for reinforcements and aid.

Be careful for what you ask. You may get it. Amin died from that maxim.:agree:
 
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"The point was the Soviets and the US got involved and magnified the whole situation a billion times."

No it wasn't. The "point" had been our alleged instigation of the insurgency. Your argument needs to be with those in the Khalq like Karmal who made Amin's life so miserable that he BADGERED the Soviet Government for reinforcements and aid.

Be careful for what you ask. You may get it. Amin died from that maxim.:agree:

Amin was definitely a criminal. But hey, I go right back to Daoud Khan's grab for power in 1973 which started off the whole instability. They were all criminals, supported by one superpower or other.

The insurgency against the Khalq faction was being armed by the US prior to the Soviet invasion/invite. Khalq itself was a Soviet puppet that was armed and supported by the Soviet Union.

Had there not been any arming of anyone, one side would have suppressed the other side, and that would hopefully have been that. Couple of minor civil wars, let's say 10,000 killed per war, but millions ended up killed, and the country littered with mines. More importantly, there'd have been no Mujahideen, no Taliban, no nothing. Is it too much to have asked?
 
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Prescriptions? physician heal ....? Perhaps Pakistanis are missing a key element, that is to say what is that they will do once the US decides, it can live with other than a European state in Afghanistan - What will the pakistani do then?? With no money and friendless, what will pakistan's strategy to extricate itself? give itself to the Talib?


Expectations from Pak-US negotiations
Najmuddin A Shaikh

In what has been termed a historic speech, President Obama laid out to the US Congress on February 24 the vision he has of the measures needed to bring the American economy back on an even keel.

He had little to say on American foreign policy but he did repeat what he has said in somewhat different words — the priority he attaches to what is now known in the American security lexicon as the AfPak problem. “We will forge a new and comprehensive strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to defeat Al Qaeda and combat extremism. Because I will not allow terrorists to plot against the American people from safe havens half a world away

Because it was what he had already said and because the media was primarily interested in the economic measures he was proposing, this received minimal coverage in the American or international media. However, this will set the tone for the discussions that our foreign minister and chief of army staff are currently having in Washington.

What will also be heavily on the minds of the FM’s American interlocutors is the bold statement by Richard Holbrooke in a recent interview on PBS that “There is no way that the international effort in Afghanistan can succeed unless Pakistan can get its western tribal areas under control,” and that even if Afghanistan had the best government in the world; it could not succeed in bringing normalcy to the country if Pakistan’s tribal areas remained out of control.

(This was not part of the interview as broadcast by PBS, but according to a report in Dawn was part of the transcript that its correspondent received from PBS.)

This should be coupled with what Thomas Ricks, author of a new book on Iraq entitled The Gamble, told Newsweek in an interview (“Obama’s real Real ‘Vietnam’”). He maintains that Newsweek was wrong in thinking of Afghanistan as “Obama’s Vietnam” because that honour rests with Pakistan.

Ricks argues that “We could lose Afghanistan, and it would be bad but it would not present an existential threat to this country. If you ‘lose Pakistan’ — and by that I mean if Pakistan collapses or is taken over by Islamic extremists — you face the prospect of Islamic extremists having nuclear weapons. That’s Al Qaeda’s dream. It’s our nightmare. That’s why Pakistan is Obama’s potential Vietnam. There’s no clear solution there. What you may try to do for several years is simply manage it. Kicking the can down the road in both Iraq and Pakistan is not an emotionally satisfying outcome, but it may be the most mature and even best scenario we can come up with.”

Many of us may see this as an exaggeration. Certainly the prognosis for the future is far too pessimistic. But this is a view that prevails in large parts of the American security establishment. Existing apprehensions have clearly been reinforced by the agreement that has been reached in Swat and by the statements that have been made by Maulana Fazlullah while extending indefinitely the ceasefire that he had declared earlier, and by such actions as the abduction of the newly appointed DCO
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The first task for the foreign minister will be to convince the Americans that the agreement in Swat is a local solution to a local problem. The second will be carry conviction in arguing that all power centres, including the army and the ISI, are on the same page in the battle against terrorism and extremism, and to use in this context the obvious success that the army has registered in Bajaur, which has forced the insurgents to declare a unilateral ceasefire.

The FM’s real effort must, however, be on arguing for a greater effort on improving governance and on nation building in Afghanistan. It is not apparent however that the review currently underway is going to do more than pay lip service to nation building. The Americans will be spending some $70 billion annually on maintaining the enhanced military presence in Afghanistan. They will also probably find the $20 billion needed to build and maintain the Afghan National Army. The FM must argue that such funding for “security” must be matched with funding for development
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The FM should support his Afghan counterpart in arguing for the application in Afghanistan, to the maximum extent possible, of the US counterterrorism doctrine which talks of the following division of effort: 15 percent kinetic (military), 20 percent diplomatic (the regional approach) and 65 percent economic and political. By that reckoning, the aid effort in Afghanistan should be huge and should be limited only by absorptive capacity. Every recent report emerging from Afghanistan suggests that all development programmes are under-funded.

A recent report prepared by the Afghan ministry of finance shows that of the $44.5 billion pledged over the years in international conferences, $11 billion was old money re-announced. The study shows that there will be a $3.1bn shortfall for this year, in such sectors as rural development, health, education and infrastructure, and that nearly half of the money that is available will be spent on strengthening the security apparatus.

This clearly needs to change, and our FM should argue that not only should funding for development be increased, it should also focus on the south and east of Afghanistan where the insurgency is strongest. One idea could be to identify three or four major projects in the insurgency-infested area and to give to the Afghan National Army the task of protecting the building and maintenance of these projects.


Three projects that come to mind are:

(a) The Kajaki Dam and its potential for both power generation and irrigation. Making the Kajaki Dam functional, rehabilitating the transmission lines and protecting them would provide power to some 1 million Afghans and water for irrigating a fairly large area. The army could be asked to hire or recruit local youth to reinforce the army effort. This would also help to restore the ethnic balance in the Afghan army, a necessary step for ensuring longer-term stability. It would also give meaning to the idea of village protection forces on which a start has apparently been made in the province of Wardak. Even if the cost of protection reaches $1 billion or more annually, it will be a worthwhile endeavour. Reinforce this by providing micro-financing for small enterprises set up by locals to use this power and irrigation facility.

(b) The rehabilitation of the Kabul-Kandahar and the Kandahar-Herat roads and the famous Ring road, and the completion of the national highway construction as envisaged in the Afghan National Development Strategy. (According to a GAO report published last year, the United States has completed construction of 726 kilometres of national highways and construction of an additional 917 kilometres of these highways is still pending.)

(c) Offering security at government expense to any consortium that undertakes the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline in both the construction and maintenance phase subject to the condition that local people will be employed to the maximum extent. This project’s security costs could be met largely if not wholly by the royalties that the Afghan government would receive from the end users in Pakistan and India.

Similar “signature projects” designed to make a real difference to the people of the region could be identified from the plan for the development of our tribal areas and the devastated areas of Swat, and similar protection arrangements could be made. We should also propose that vocational schools be set up both in the tribal areas and elsewhere in the NWFP to provide skills to the tribal youth both to provide the local manpower needed for development projects and to drain the pool of unemployed and disgruntled youth from which the Taliban draw their recruits
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The writer is a former foreign secretary
 
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Some interesting thoughts by Mr. Shaikh. I missed seeing his thoughts on a nat'l debate that he indicated were forthcoming in an earlier editorial though. Too bad.

"The first task for the foreign minister will be to convince the Americans that the agreement in Swat is a local solution to a local problem. The second will be carry conviction in arguing that all power centres, including the army and the ISI, are on the same page in the battle against terrorism and extremism, and to use in this context the obvious success that the army has registered in Bajaur, which has forced the insurgents to declare a unilateral ceasefire."

Diminish the relevance of SWAT. Highlight the relevance of Bajaur. Sure, if Mr. Shaikh says so...but I don't. I watched a recent CBS show on Pakistan. Tariq Khan and others were showing the CBS reporter the same ruins and tunnels in Loe Sam as seen last fall. However hard the fighting and however brave the effort, Bajaur represents no shining moment in P.A. annals.

SWAT is neither a local problem nor a local solution. This has immense implications nationally and is a clear signpost to future militant/extremist objectives elsewhere. More to the point, with Mr. Shaikh's thoughts on the need for an economic emphasis of tone to Afghan aid, I find it odd that he'd attempt to highlight the military "success" associated with Bajaur.

His thoughts on signature projects are interesting. Kajaki has already seen a considerable effort of money, men, and material. It's failure to complete would be devastating to the west. His other thoughts are fine too. What's missing is knowing the prevalent narrative for aid and the rationales. Somewhere there's a priority of tasks that has been developed and, hopefully, adhered. Adherance is uncertain to my view, btw.

Still, the proportional allocations of expenditures between security, diplomacy, and civil development will not fall this year IAW Mr. Shaikh's warnings. The capacity to absorb at his intended levels isn't there nor is the security to underwrite or sustain such projects.

Security is the first priority still. "Wishing" it ahead to the next steps can't be done, no matter how one sees it as "preliminary" to the real tasks at hand. It's a pre-condition that hasn't been set. Work will be tenuous and finished projects will be held at risk in any zone where security isn't established. That's just the way it is and why this is an insurgency.

Soldiers aren't the targets of the insurgents. Projects such as pipelines and dams ARE the target. Interference with the safe delivery of goods and services remains their foremost operational objectives. So too elections. The taliban will resist any registration efforts, and do so successfully, in any zone where security is not a baseline requirement and already established.

Finally, too much talking and not enough doing. "Perfect" remains the enemy of "good enough". Aid will not be a programmable entity from bottomless pockets. You want to highlight "local solutions" such as SWAT in a diminishing aid pool? Those will be best served from resources provided "locally" then.

If SWAT is that example, though, your days as a sovereign nation are likely numbered and any civil aid, at best, may only defer the inevitable collapse. Pakistan must not compromise and "half-measure" it's nat'l existence to the point of functional irrelevancy before imploding-quite possibly as a quiet whimper and not a bang...just playing out a final sad, lonely scene to a tragedy whose conclusion was foreseen long beforehand.

Thanks.
 
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I missed seeing his thoughts on a nat'l debate that he indicated were forthcoming in an earlier

Indeed, see Swat for clarifications of the content of that so called nat'l debate.

I find it interesting that Mr. Holbrooke and others have signaled that Pakistan is key, yet this signal seems not to have found it's way into any kind of nat'l debate.

What does it mean that Pakistan is key?? What does it or ought it mean to Pakistan??


China breaks its silence on Afghanistan
By M K Bhadrakumar

In the violent, lethal environment in which he lived and survived to eventually lead Beijing's march towards socialism with Chinese characteristics, Deng Xiaoping had great reasons to be cautious. In regards to China's international approach, Deng had this to say: "Observe calmly; secure our position; cope with affairs calmly; hide our capacities and bide our time; be good at maintaining a low profile; and never claim leadership."

Thus, China never spoke its mind on the Afghan problem. The organ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), The People's Daily, has now broken that rule of thumb in a highly nuanced commentary.

Of course, there is a criticality today as the atmosphere in the region surrounding Afghanistan threatens to become sulfurous with blinding speed. But that alone doesn't explain the timing of the Chinese commentary titled "Will adjustments in US anti-terror strategy be successful?"

The context is highly relevant. United States Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has just concluded a landmark visit to China. Beijing is manifestly heaving a sigh of relief about the "sense of certainty" in Sino-American relations under US President Barack Obama's watch. Even more, Beijing is enthralled that Clinton quoted the ancient Chinese aphorism tongzhou gongji - "when on one boat, help each other" - as the spirit of our troubled times. Now, that goes way past George W Bush's tough love aimed at making China a "stakeholder" in the international system.

Afghanistan would have certainly figured in Clinton's talks with the Chinese leaders, especially as her visit coincided with Obama's announcement regarding a troop buildup in Afghanistan.

Fishing in troubled waters

However, there are two other subtexts. The US is palpably shifting gear on its South Asia policy, as is evident from Obama's decision to appoint Richard Holbrooke as special representative on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Holbrooke is no stranger to Beijing.

Clearly, in the immediate aftermath of Holbrooke's visit to the region recently, Beijing has sized up that the US's relationship with India is entering a qualitatively new phase, which has shown some signs of friction. It pays well for Beijing to fish in troubled waters and pile up more pressure on its southern neighbor.

Second, the Russian Foreign Ministry announced last week that invitations had been issued for the long-awaited Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conference on Afghanistan in Moscow on March 27. The time is approaching for Beijing to take a position on the Afghan problem. Prevarication couched in pious homilies may no longer suffice
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Does China have a sense of solidarity with Russia - or with SCO observers like India and Iran? But Beijing cannot afford to dissipate the budding momentum of partnership with the Obama administration, either. And the US (plus its allies) is boycotting the SCO conference.

Thus, we may get to see some amazing trapeze acts by Beijing in the coming period. The People's Daily commentary has virtually called for an expansion of Holbrooke's mandate to include the "Indian-Pakistani problem". True, it stops short of mentioning Kashmir as such but leaves little to the imagination that Kashmir is precisely what it was referring to - that the US should mediate a solution to what Pakistan calls the "core issue" in its tense relationship with India.

The Chinese commentary says the mere dispatch of more US troops to Afghanistan cannot help achieve Obama's "strategic goals" unless Washington stabilizes South Asia, especially Pakistan and the India-Pakistan relationship. The editorial continues:
It is clear that without Pakistan's cooperation, the US cannot win the war on terror. Therefore, to safeguard its own interests in the fight against terrorism in South Asia, the US must ensure a stable domestic and international environment for Pakistan and ease the tension between Pakistan and India. This makes it easy to understand why Obama appointed Richard Holbrooke as special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan issues, and why India is included in Holbrooke's first foreign visit. In fact, the "Afghan problem", the "Pakistani problem" and the "Indian-Pakistani problem" are all related. (Emphasis added).
These are not words that are in the nature of off-the-cuff remarks. And these unfriendly remarks are highly unlikely to go unnoticed in New Delhi. Indian diplomats pulled out all the stops to see that Holbrooke's mandate did not include India, though there is a large body of opinion among American think-tanks and within the US establishment, which insists that so long as the Kashmir problem remains unresolved, underlying tensions in India-Pakistan relations will continue. Beijing now has waded into the debate. It openly expresses support for Pakistan's stance.

Interestingly, Beijing completely overlooks the root cause of the "anti-Americanism" prevalent in Pakistan, which has much to do with the US's interference in that country's internal affairs, especially the American backing for successive military dictatorships or with the wounded Muslim psyche or with the brutal US-led war in Afghanistan. Indeed, the Chinese commentary remained silent on the central issue of the foreign occupation of Afghanistan.

Beijing cannot be naive that India's distaste for third-party intervention in Kashmir is in any way less than China's acute allergy with regard to world opinion on Tibet or Xinjiang. One possible explanation could be that Beijing is nervous that India may again play the "Tibet card" as the 50th anniversary of the Tibet uprising approaches next month.

Beijing is cracking down on Tibetan nationalists in the run-up to the anniversary. Arguably, Beijing would like to put India on notice that it could also flaunt a "Kashmir card". All in all, therefore, Indian strategists will have to analyze carefully the range of Chinese motivations in calling for US mediation in India-Pakistan disputes at this juncture, close on the heels of Clinton's talks with the leadership in Beijing.

Apart from India, Beijing singles out Russia as another regional power that negatively impacts on the US strategy to stabilize Afghanistan. (Incidentally, the commentary ignores Iran altogether, as if it is not a factor of consequence on the Afghan chessboard.) The commentary says, "... the US must make sure that Russia is appeased. The Central Asia region, where Afghanistan lies, used to be Russia's backyard ... While relations between US and Russia show signs of recovery after Obama's assumption of power, Russia's reactions to the US decision of increasing troops in Afghanistan are rather subtle."


So, what does Obama do? Beijing has the following assessment: "Russia's determination to not allow the US enjoying dominant control in the Afghan affair is rather noticeable. The way the US deals with its 'cooperative and competitive' relationship with Russia in the Afghan affair will test the US's capability to realize its strategic goals in Afghanistan."

But then, China is also an interested party apropos the two contentious issues today in US-Russia relations: the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) into Central Asia and the deployment of the US missile defense system. China abhors NATO expansion into its Central Asian backyard and opposes the US missile defense system that will rubbish China's relatively sub-standard nuclear strike capability.

But, as Deng would say, why claim the leadership of opposition to these US moves when Moscow is already doing a splendid job?


The People's Daily commentary differentiates Russia's interests in Afghanistan. By implication, it urges Washington not to take the forthcoming SCO conference as any sort of ganging up by China and Russia. Again, by affirming that the closure of the Manas airbase by the Kyrgyz authorities is part of "a strategy game between the US and Russia", The People's Daily has in effect debunked the forthcoming SCO conference. After all, the conference's raison d'etre is that the Afghan situation poses a threat to Central Asia's security. But the Chinese commentary never once brings up this aspect.

In sum, what emerges is that no matter Moscow's determination to challenge the US's "monopoly over conflict resolution" in Afghanistan, China will not be drawn into such a calculus. As Deng would say, China will observe calmly and maintain a low profile. After all, Russia is forcing its way onto the Afghan turf and if it succeeds, not only the SCO but also China will be a net beneficiary. On the other hand, if the US snubs Russia, that will only dent Moscow's prestige, not Beijing's.

Is Beijing peeved that there are new stirrings in US-Russia relations? There is reason for Moscow to ponder why The People's Daily should have harped on Russia's animus toward the US influence in Central Asia at such a delicate juncture when the Obama administration has decided not to make the Manas airbase closure a factor in US-Russia relations. Moscow would find it embarrassing that it has been portrayed as a "spoiler" in Obama's strategy towards Afghanistan.

Reaching out to Islamists

What is truly extraordinary about the Chinese commentary is its oblique references to the central issue of the Taliban. There are indications that Beijing has no problems as such if the Taliban are accommodated in the power structure in Afghanistan as part of a political settlement. Interestingly, the commentary advises the US to be "pragmatic towards the actual conditions of Afghanistan". It also voices support for the argument that Afghanistan lacks "almost any of the prerequisites of modernity". Besides, it suggests that Afghanistan cannot be a unitary state.

These comments are to be seen in the light of the new thinking in influential circles in the US and Britain that a "bottoms-up" approach involving diffusion of state power in favor of local leaderships might be the answer to the problems in Afghanistan and will be the best way of involving the Taliban in the power structure in the Pashtun regions.

Breaking fresh ground, the CCP invited a delegation of Pakistan's influential Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) to visit China last week. During the week-long visit, the two sides signed a memorandum of understanding enunciating four principles of China-Pakistan relations, including independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in the internal affairs of each country.

Meanwhile, the JI assured full support to China's national and geographical unity and fully backed China's stance on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang issues. Beijing then reciprocated with its "principled stance" on the Kashmir issue and "reiterated that this stance and vital cooperation of China will continue".

Socialism - even with Chinese characteristics - does not easily mix with Islamism
. There is no other way of explaining the CCP's cooperation with Pakistan's leading Islamic party except as a Faustian deal against the backdrop of the ascendancy of the forces of militant Islam in the region.

The People's Daily admits that the outcome of the US's surge strategy in Afghanistan remains uncertain. It takes note that the US is also moving toward "a compromise with moderates within the Taliban", as President Hamid Karzai would not otherwise have ventured onto that track. The commentary lauds such thinking as a manifestation of the use of "smart power", an idea "frequently mentioned" by Clinton. That is to say, while the US troop build-up is a "hard measure", "policies like helping the Afghan government to consolidate its regime for gradually stabilizing the country will be the 'soft measure'."

All the same, Beijing is aware that the real US agenda could be strategic insofar as Afghanistan is located "at the crossroads of Eurasia". While smashing up al-Qaeda indeed constitutes a goal, Washington's strategy will also "enhance NATO cooperation and alliance to guarantee that NATO's first military action out of Europe will not fail". In turn, that will enable the US to "raise its leadership status among its allies and reinforce its presence in the heart of Eurasia by using these means".


It seems China has no problem with such an agenda. China will "hide its capacities" - to quote Deng - even as the US and Russia collide and negate each other and eventually drop down in exhaustion. As The People's Daily concludes, Afghanistan is known as the "tomb of empires". Therefore, China must focus on securing its position and simply bide its time - a strategy Deng could surely appreciate.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.
 
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US looks to China for support on Pakistan, Afghanistan: Pentagon

* American diplomat says US, China have ‘shared objectives’ in Pakistan, Afghanistan

LAHORE: Regular military exchanges between the United States (US) and China are resuming and deepening under the new US administration, particularly on regional issues such as Pakistan and Afghanistan, David Sedney, US deputy assistant secretary of defence for East Asia, said in Beijing on Saturday.

Sedney downplayed tensions over Taiwan, and instead emphasised cooperation on anti-piracy efforts off Somalia and shared concerns in Southeast Asia. “The kinds of discussions we had about Pakistan and Afghanistan, those were where we really had a new level of dialogue that we hadn’t had before,” Sedney told reporters at a press conference.

The talks also marked a resumption, after China froze some exchanges in October to protest a US arms deal with Taiwan, Reuters reported.

“As we’ve had a pause in some things and haven’t been able to do some of the talks, we’ve realised how important it is for us to have continuous, regular dialogue,” he said. Pakistan and Afghanistan were “areas where we do have shared objectives”.

Sedney said the US would welcome Chinese help in Afghanistan to quell the worsening insurgency, and in neighbouring Pakistan. “This is an area where we’re looking to see more contributions from the international community – meaning China – to assist in Afghanistan,” Sedney said. daily times monitor/reuters
 
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