this war lasted for a much longer time for PAF to react and become part of it remember it works on 7 minutes notice anyway and is in state of war, I am surprised that such facts are omitted on purpose by the PAF guys, it wasnt a one day or week war, instead of hiding in the corner they could have provided air support and strikes as well just like the Indian airforce did and lost 2 of its jets in the process no thanks to PAF but by our AAK AAK
There are many reasons why the PAF could not and did not react to the IAF air-strikes and the pounding of the abandoned soldiers on the heights of Kargil.
A/Cmde (R) Kaiser Tufail explains:
From the very beginning of Kargil operations, PAF was entrapped by a circumstantial absurdity: it was faced with the ludicrous predicament of having to provide air support to infiltrators already disowned by the Pakistan Army leadership! In any case, it took some effort to impress on the latter that crossing the LOC by fighters laden with bombs was not, by any stretch of imagination, akin to lobbing a few artillery shells to settle scores. There was no doubt in the minds of PAF Air Staff that the first cross-border attack (whether across LOC or the international border) would invite an immediate response from the IAF, possibly in the shape of a retaliatory strike against the home base of the intruding fighters, thus starting the first round. PAFs intervention meant all-out war: this unmistakable conclusion was conveyed to the Prime Minister, Mr Nawaz Sharif, by the Air Chief in no equivocal terms.
My comment:
So the PAF was trapped into a massive bind. It was damned if it did and equally damned if it didnt! Certainly not an enviable situation for a professional Air Force to be in. But that was the beauty of the Plan(?) that set off Operation Badr!
In the mean-while the scope of the IAF air operations increased exponentially after they went through a short lull and reworked their operating methods. Now the intruders were facing a relentless air-attack while their own Air Force was nowhere to be seen in their support.
Though in all fairness, when the PAF was beseeched by their PA comrades for air-support; it had set up a system of CAPs by their fighters in the air-space over POJK in the hope that some IAF aircraft may be lured over the LOC and engaged in combat. However this would have exposed the PAF aircraft to the hazards of BVR combat for which the PAF then had no capability, while the IAF had BVR capable aircraft. The results of such engagement could have been disastrous. Also the most capable aircraft in the PAF inventory, the F-16 was severely hit by the US imposed embargo after Pakistans Chagai Hills nuclear tests. After some period of flying these jets out of Skardu initially and later out of Minhas and Sargodha (since Skardu was vulnerable to IAF attack), the PAF was faced with the realisation after one week of flying random CAPs with the F-16s; that the limited War Reserves were being consumed and in Air Cmde.Kaiser Tufails words:
that the activity had to be rationalised, a euphemism for discontinuing it altogether.
Kaiser Tufail goes on to explain the conclusion of whatever air ops that were undertaken by by PAF thus::
It also must be noted too that other than F-16s, the PAF did not have a capable enough fighter for patrolling, as the minimum requirement in this scenario was an on-board airborne intercept radar, exceptional agility and sufficient staying power. F-7s had reasonably good manoeuvrability but lacked an intercept radar as well as endurance, while the ground attack Mirage-III/5s and A-5s were sitting ducks for the air combat mission.
Tellingly Kaiser Tufail continues:
In sum, the PAF found it expedient not to worry too much about minor border violations and instead, conserve resources for the larger conflagration that was looming. All the same, it gave the enemy no pretext for retaliation in the face of any provocation, though this latter stance irked some quarters in the Army that were desperate to equal the match. Might it strike to some that PAFs restraint in warding off a major conflagration may have been its paramount contribution to the Kargil conflict?
My comment:
This again points to the inherent incompleteness and inadequacy of the so-called Plan that Operation Badr was based on. Also the plan had not even adequately factored in the actual state of assets and reserves available to the PAF (simply because it blithely assumed that there was no need for Air-Power!).
Actually the PAF had seen through the "idiocy" of this plan(?) and earlier at the outset the CAS had vehemently opposed embarking on a plan(?) which no body knew where it could finally end and for which the PAF was scarcely equipped.
If we refer back to A/Cmde Kaiser Tufail's account of the briefing at 10 Corps HQ on 12th May on what was labelled the "Kashmir Contingency"
Kaiser Tufail describes that briefing thus: Air Cdre Abid Rao, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz and myself were directed by the DCAS (Ops) to attend a briefing on the latest situation in Kashmir at HQ 10 Corps. We were welcomed by the Chief of Staff (COS) of the Corps, who led us to the briefing room. Shortly thereafter, the Corps Commander, Lt Gen Mehmud Ahmad entered, cutting an impressive figure clad in a bush-coat and his trademark camouflage scarf. After exchanging pleasantries, the COS started with the map orientation briefing. Thereafter, Lt Gen Mehmud took over and broke the news that a limited operation had started two days earlier. It was nothing more than a protective manoeuvre, he explained, and was meant to foreclose any further mischief by the enemy, who had been a nuisance in the Neelum Valley, specially on the road on our side of the Line of Control (LOC). He then elaborated that a few vacant Indian posts had been occupied on peaks across the LOC, overlooking the Dras-Kargil Road. These would, in effect, serve the purpose of Airborne Observation Posts (AOP) meant for directing artillery fire with accuracy. Artillery firepower would be provided by a couple of field guns that had been heli-lifted to the heights, piecemeal, and re-assembled over the previous few months when the Indians had been off-guard during the winter extremes. The target was a vulnerable section of Dras-Kargil Road, whose blocking would virtually cut off the crucial life-line which carried the bulk of supplies needed for daily consumption as well as annual winter-stocking in Leh-Siachen Sector. He was very hopeful that this stratagem could choke off the Indians in the vital sector for up to a month, after which the monsoons would prevent vehicular movement (due to landslides) and, also suspend all airlift by the IAF. Come October, we shall walk in to Siachen to mop up the dead bodies of hundreds of Indians left hungry, out in the cold, he succinctly summed up what appeared to be a new dimension to the Siachen dispute. It also seemed to serve, at least for the time being, the secondary aim of alleviating Indian military pressure on Pakistani lines of communications in the Neelum Valley that the Corps Commander had alluded to in his opening remarks. (The oft-heard strategic aim of providing a fillip to the insurgency in Kashmir was never mentioned.)
When Lt Gen Mehmud asked for questions at the end of the rather crisp and to-the-point briefing, Air Cdre Saleem Nawaz opened up by inquiring about the type of air support that might be needed for the operation. Lt Gen Mehmud assured us that air support was not envisaged and that his forces could take care of enemy aircraft, if they intervened. I have Stingers on every peak, he announced. Air Cdre Saleem tried to point out the limited envelope of these types of missiles and said that nothing stopped the IAF from attacking the posts and artillery pieces from high altitude. To this, Lt Gen Mehmuds reply was that his troops were well camouflaged and concealed and, that IAF pilots would not be able to pick out the posts from the air. As the discussion became more animated, I asked the Corps Commander if he was sure the Indians would not use their artillery to vacate our incursion, given the criticality of the situation from their standpoint. He replied that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road links vulnerability to our offensive elements.
My comment:
The PAs (or at least, the Plans proponents) view on the lack of need for PAF involvement or association with the Operation is summarised in the underlined part above.
While, on the other hand; the questions posed by the PAF teams Air Cmdes. Nawaz and Tufail clearly apprehended (and even actually predicted) the possible use of IAF air-power and IAs Artillery power in response to Operation Badr (Kargil Ops).
Also read the fallacy of Lt.Gen. Mehmuds assertion when he replied to Air Cmde. Tufail: that the Dras-Kargil stretch did not allow for positioning of the hundreds of guns that would be required, due to lack of depth; in any case, it would be suicidal for the Indians to denude artillery firepower from any other sector as defensive balance had to be maintained. He gave the example of the Kathua-Jammu Sector where the Indians had a compulsion to keep the bulk of their modern Bofors guns due to the vital road links vulnerability to our offensive elements.
It did not at all happen as Lt. Gen Mehmud thought. The assertion by Mehmud was eventually proved to be hollow when the Indian Army moved up Artillery Guns (of which 130 guns alone were the Bofors FH-77 155 mm Howitzers) and MBRLs into the very same Dras-Kargil Sector in large numbers and unleashed an unrelenting Artillery Barrage on the ridges, peaks and valleys across; eventually expending approx. 250,000 rounds. On one day alone, 9000 shells were lobbed at Tiger Hill!
Seemingly, in the words of one Indian Army officer: the (Indian) infantry started taking Bofors (howitzer) as their section weapon.
The above exchange clearly proves that the PAF was far more prescient and sanguine as to how the planned operation was likely to turn out in its consequences.
Actually it was the PAF's questions at the briefing, that actually predicted what course the Indian response would take. But the architects of the Kargil Plan(?) in the PA were too blinded by "hubris" to notice.
Then Kaiser Tufail sums up the PAFs view as follows:
Back at the Air Headquarters, we briefed the DCAS(Ops) about what had transpired at the 10 Corps briefing.
His surprise at the developments, as well as his concern about the possibility of events spiralling out of control, could not remain concealed behind his otherwise unflappable demeanour. We all were also piqued at being left out of the Armys planning, though we were given to believe that it was a limited tactical action in which the PAF would not be required an issue that none of us agreed with.
Here again the PAF accurately predicted what would happen.
