Learning from 9/11 Anniversaries??

[muse]

Learning from eight anniversaries



Friday, September 11, 2009
Mosharraf Zaidi

Today marks the eighth anniversary of the atrocities of Sept 11, 2001. The United States and its allies may have launched a poorly planned war in Afghanistan, and a poorly motivated one in Iraq. However, eight years since almost 3,000 innocent people from 90 different countries were killed in New York City, in Washington DC and in the skies above Pennsylvania, it is Pakistan that is identified as the location of the epicentre of the 21st century global terrorist enterprise. In every major world capital, around every important boardroom, and across the booming security, counter-terrorism and ****** analysis industry, there is almost total consensus and unanimity that the war to secure ordinary people from the horrors of terrorist attacks will be won (and lost) in Pakistan.

On this sombre anniversary of a horrific human tragedy, Pakistanis of all persuasions must begin to embrace some simple facts of geopolitical economy. It doesn't matter who conducted the 9/11 attacks. It doesn't matter that most Pakistani Muslims aspire to be good Muslims, and that a good Muslim cannot possibly support terrorist attacks. It doesn't matter that Pakistan has suffered, especially since 2005, perhaps the most significant death toll, and the deepest scars to its young, immature and undernourished institutions of public life. It does not matter that, at last count, according to the South Asian Terrorism Portal, almost 7,000 Pakistani citizens have been killed in terrorist attacks since 2003. It does not matter that more than 3,500 of those citizens were killed since January 2008 alone. It does not matter, even, that more than 2,600 of Pakistan's brave soldiers, have given the ultimate sacrifice, making up for the mistakes and missteps of a handful of megalomaniac generals. And it matters little that the Pakistani middle class, the military, and the political elite have come together in the war against terrorists in Pakistan to drive them out of Swat and its surrounding areas.

What matters, eight years after 9/11 altered the very DNA of global politics, Muslim identity in the 21st century and Pakistan's sense of itself, is whether Pakistan has a comprehensive strategy to deal with the direct threat of terrorism and the indirect impacts it has had on the country. It doesn't. That should not surprise us, given how poorly served the Pakistani people are by their state. It should however scare us. After all, it scares everyone else.

Instead of measuring and preparing for the elemental challenges that this young nation faces, the Pakistani state is engaged in an almost constant obsession with the news ticker. Like a lost puppy chasing its own tail, Pakistan's military and political elite are constantly engaged in feeding the beast of the news cycle. The ISPR and the Ministry of Information are the Pakistani versions of Dan Rather and Lucille Ball--always on the airwaves, always sharing a snippet or two of breaking news. The news media that enables this obsession, contrary to the myopic criticism that has been piled on it in recent weeks, is one of the only solid urban and middle class institutions that Pakistan has (no wonder the crusty old elite are gunning for it). Feeding the news cycle is vital to the sustenance of a broad-based and democratic public discourse, but it cannot be the only vocation of those that determine how Pakistan's resources--human, financial and military--are deployed.

Beyond the news ticker lies Afghanistan--the place where 9/11 began, and where it will eventually have to be buried. In eight years the Pakistani state has demonstrated no real awareness of its closest and most important neighbour. It seems plausible to conclude therefore that Pakistan is not at all prepared to deal with Afghanistan. Dealing with Afghanistan requires some crucial adjustments in expectations in Pakistan.

The first is that national security in Afghanistan and in Pakistan are, for the next generation, and maybe for longer, deeply inter-linked.

The second is that Afghanistan's national security interests, for the foreseeable future, will be tied to fiscal, operational, strategic and instrumental support from two regional powerhouses, namely India and Iran.

The third, by deduction, is that the ambient dysfunction of Islamabad's relationship with New Delhi and with Iran needs to be moderated. With India, in particular, Pakistan needs to get real. It needs to stop pretending that Kashmir is still the core bilateral bone of contention, because it is not. The core bone of contention between Islamabad and New Delhi now, whether either side is able to admit it or not, is Afghanistan.

Underpinning these three deeply interlinked geopolitical realities are some hard-to-digest domestic policy nuts and bolts. Without dramatically improved investments in the capacity of Pakistan's civilian law enforcement infrastructure, the military will have an overwhelmingly important role to play in Pakistan's international political future. As long as the GHQ has a default seat at the table on issues that are primarily of a political nature--such as Kashmir, Afghanistan, Sir Creek, the Indus River--the balance of power among Pakistan's young, immature and undernourished institutions of public life will continue to be entirely out of whack. The police in Pakistan has to be transformed in short order, from a parasitical organ of political patronage to an instrument of thorough professionalism that shoots bad guys and protects ordinary citizens. The best reminder of how good the police in this country needs to be is what has taken place in Swat over the last two years. No army in any country should have to be responsible for the displacement of over two million of its own people. Pakistan cannot sustain this imbalance between civilian and military force capacity.

State capacity, in the minds of many Pakistanis at least, is the real reason why former State Department tough guy Richard Armitage never could have lived up to his alleged threat to former President Musharraf to bomb Pakistan back to the stone age, in those heady days following 9/11. Of course, since 2001 Pakistani state capacity has been exposed for what it is--an enormous and glimmering heap of unrealized potential that has more loose ends than there are counters. The dapper suits, Cambridge accents and razor-sharp wit of its landed politicians, its privileged civil servants, and its Sandhurst-esque generals, all produce the mirage of a Pakistan that is much more capable of both damaging and fixing things than it really is.

An over-reliance on this mirage is what put Pakistan in the position of becoming the handmaiden of the Armitages and Holbrookes, in the first place. The urgency of embracing the realities of the neighbourhood it occupies and the role it must play in it could not be overstated. On this eighth anniversary of 9/11 Pakistan needs to look further into the future than it ever has before.



The writer advises governments, donors and NGOs on public policy. He can be reached through his website Mosharraf Zaidi

 

[muse]

Strategic miscalculations

By Cyril Almeida


Friday, 11 Sep, 2009 | 08:17 AM PST |






IF it wasn’t obvious within days of 9/11, then it should be obvious by now, eight years later: things were never going to be the same for Pakistan.

The security state’s security environment had changed irreversibly. The question was, did we have the wherewithal and nous to adjust to a new reality?

Events to date suggest that while for years we did not, the more recent record is a mixed bag of success and failure. We needed to do two things. Recognise that the time of ‘non-state actors’, terrorists, militants, call them what you will, as a policy instrument in pursuing our security agenda had passed. And recognise that the old model of exerting influence in Afghanistan had to be dismantled.

But we came up against a familiar foe: ourselves. Or more precisely, the ability of the security establishment to perhaps correctly identify all the dots but then proceed to connect them wrongly.

Bush’s America made it easy for us; for years the Americans were satisfied if we netted Al Qaeda types for them, leaving them to focus on Iraq and bungle the post-war phase in Afghanistan.

If we did eventually wake up to the dangers posed by militants who mixed and matched groups and networks for tactical purposes while trying to stitch together a common strategic aim, we only did so after they, quite literally, blew up in our face.

For those who have followed the arc of militancy and are not ideologically wedded to a state of denial, it was apparent in the ‘90s that the tail was preparing to wag the dog. Al Qaeda’s ideologues, fervent proponents of a militant transnational Islamic agenda and rabid sectarians to boot, were harnessing those we thought were, if not quite in our harness, unlikely to harm our agenda.

The first savage wake-up call to our somnambulist security policymakers in the army high command came with the attacks on Musharraf in December 2003. The second came with the orgy of violence unleashed since 2007.

Admittedly, we had helped create a mess of such epic proportions that perhaps we could not help but cherry-pick from among the militants. The Laskhar-i-Taiba, for example, has eschewed attacks inside Pakistan and its leadership remains amenable to listening with a sympathetic ear to some of the security establishment’s concerns. Decapitate its leadership, however, and you run the risk of splintering the group and untethering its more rabid elements. Better then to start with the worst offenders – the Al Qaeda types, Baitullahs, Fazlullahs, etc – than to take on everyone at the same time.

But eight years is a long time, and it’s a measure of how poorly we have fared that retaking control of Swat is regarded as a ‘victory’. Victory, properly, morally defined, should be the security of the people of this country, security from the threat of suicide bombings and fidayeen attacks, security from the risk of abductions to finance a war machine in Fata, security from the ravages of all-to-easily available drugs, security from other states needing to pump billions of dollars into the country to fight a war against elements living among us, security from the world regarding us as a danger to ourselves and a menace to everyone else.

That’s not to say we should be all warm and cuddly and just walk away from Afghanistan and ask nothing of India. We have a legitimate interest in ensuring a dispensation in Afghanistan in the long term that is reasonably amicable towards us, and it is a reality that not every combination which could emerge fits that description. And setting aside cockamamie ideas of parity with India here, there are genuine concerns that India is unwilling to conclude a peace that involves meaningful give and take and a live-and-let-each-other-grow outcome.

But there is a nagging sense that we remain hostage to the past, a pre-9/11 framework in which we regard what has become a millstone around our necks as a still-viable bargaining chip in a high-stakes game. Fine, we’ll think about pulling the plug on our policies of old and work harder with you to shut down the militant networks, but can we also talk about what you can offer us in Afghanistan and on India, we seem to be saying to the world.

The problem is, the security establishment seems unaware that it may perhaps have connected the dots wrongly. It is so sure of Pakistan’s centrality, so convinced that the Americans will not be able to engineer the outcome they desire in Afghanistan, so ready to pooh-pooh the idea that we could possibly ever be on a slippery slope towards truly losing our internal sovereignty, so sure it is playing its cards right.

But consider this: what if the Americans do succeed in Afghanistan? Succeed not in the sense of eliminating Al Qaeda or defeating the Taliban with a surge of troops as everyone seems to be debating nowadays, but succeed in a $20bn plan to build Afghanistan’s army into a force of a quarter million troops trained and equipped primarily to fight a counter-insurgency.

What if the Americans do take that plan off the drawing board, implement it and then walk away from Afghanistan with everything else remaining the same i.e. Pakistan still dreaming of its importance, the competing strategic interests of Afghanistan’s neighbouring countries still unresolved and India growing ever more friendly with Afghanistan and leery of engaging Pakistan?

Would that not be the ultimate two-front nightmare come true, the very nightmare that contributed partly to us vying to be the predominant outside influence in Afghanistan? To be sure, the Americans will not create an army that could be a match for our conventional forces, but what’s to stop a future Afghan government from building its army’s conventional strength with help from other eager countries?

Where will that leave us? Checkmated? Perhaps not, but at the very least our security policymakers will be patting themselves on the back less and holding their heads more.

cyril.a***********


DAWN.COM | Columnists | Strategic miscalculations

 

[muse]

OK, so we have a couple of thoughtful articles - and now for the silly, the conspiratorial:


Fifty questions on 9/11
By Pepe Escobar

It's September 11 all over again - eight years on. The George W Bush administration is out. The "global war on terror" is still on, renamed "overseas contingency operations" by the Barack Obama administration. Obama's "new strategy" - a war escalation - is in play in AfPak. Osama bin Laden may be dead or not. "Al-Qaeda" remains a catch-all ghost entity. September 11 - the neo-cons' "new Pearl Harbor" - remains the darkest jigsaw puzzle of the young 21st century.

It's useless to expect US corporate media and the ruling elites' political operatives to call for a true, in-depth investigation into the attacks on the US on September 11, 2001. Whitewash has been the norm. But even establishment highlight Dr Zbig "Grand Chessboard" Brzezinski, a former national security advisor, has


admitted to the US Senate that the post-9/11 "war on terror" is a "mythical historical narrative".

The following questions, some multi-part - and most totally ignored by the 9/11 Commission - are just the tip of the immense 9/11 iceberg. A hat tip goes to the indefatigable work of 911truth.org; whatreallyhappened.com; architects and engineers for 9/11 truth; the Italian documentary Zero: an investigation into 9/11; and Asia Times Online readers' e-mails.

None of these questions has been convincingly answered - according to the official narrative. It's up to US civil society to keep up the pressure. Eight years after the fact, one fundamental conclusion is imperative. The official narrative edifice of 9/11 is simply not acceptable.

Fifty questions
1) How come dead or not dead Osama bin Laden has not been formally indicted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) as responsible for 9/11? Is it because the US government - as acknowledged by the FBI itself - has not produced a single conclusive piece of evidence?

2) How could all the alleged 19 razor-blade box cutter-equipped Muslim perpetrators have been identified in less than 72 hours - without even a crime scene investigation?

3) How come none of the 19's names appeared on the passenger lists released the same day by both United Airlines and American Airlines?

4) How come eight names on the "original" FBI list happened to be found alive and living in different countries?

5) Why would pious jihadi Mohammed Atta leave a how-to-fly video manual, a uniform and his last will inside his bag knowing he was on a suicide mission?

6) Why did Mohammed Atta study flight simulation at Opa Locka, a hub of no less than six US Navy training bases?

7) How could Mohammed Atta's passport have been magically found buried among the Word Trade Center (WTC)'s debris when not a single flight recorder was found?

8) Who is in the possession of the "disappeared" eight indestructible black boxes on those four flights?

9) Considering multiple international red alerts about a possible terrorist attack inside the US - including former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice's infamous August 6, 2001, memo - how come four hijacked planes deviating from their computerized flight paths and disappearing from radar are allowed to fly around US airspace for more than an hour and a half - not to mention disabling all the elaborate Pentagon's defense systems in the process?

10) Why the secretary of the US Air Force James Roche did not try to intercept both planes hitting the WTC (only seven minutes away from McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey) as well as the Pentagon (only 10 minutes away from McGuire)? Roche had no less than 75 minutes to respond to the plane hitting the Pentagon.
11) Why did George W Bush continue to recite "My Pet Goat" in his Florida school and was not instantly absconded by the secret service?

12) How could Bush have seen the first plane crashing on WTC live - as he admitted? Did he have previous knowledge - or is he psychic?

13) Bush said that he and Andrew Card initially thought the first hit on the WTC was an accident with a small plane. How is that possible when the FAA as well as NORAD already knew this was about a hijacked plane?

14) What are the odds of transponders in four different planes be turned off almost simultaneously, in the same geographical area, very close to the nation's seat of power in Washington, and no one scrambles to contact the Pentagon or the media?

15) Could defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld explain why initial media reports said that there were no fighter jets available at Andrews Air Force Base and then change the reports that there were, but not on high alert?

16) Why was the DC Air National Guard in Washington AWOL on 9/11?

17) Why did combat jet fighters of the 305th Air Wing, McGuire Air Force Base in New Jersey not intercept the second hijacked plane hitting the WTC, when they could have done it within seven minutes?

18) Why did none of the combat jet fighters of the 459th Aircraft Squadron at Andrews Air Force Base intercept the plane that hit the Pentagon, only 16 kilometers away? And since we're at it, why the Pentagon did not release the full video of the hit?

19) A number of very experienced airline pilots - including US ally Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, a former fighter jet pilot - revealed that, well, only crack pilots could have performed such complex maneuvers on the hijacked jets, while others insisted they could only have been accomplished by remote control. Is it remotely believable that the hijackers were up to the task?

20) How come a substantial number of witnesses did swear seeing and hearing multiple explosions in both towers of the WTC?

21) How come a substantial number of reputed architects and engineers are adamant that the official narrative simply does not explain the largest structural collapse in recorded history (the Twin Towers) as well as the collapse of WTC building 7, which was not even hit by a jet?

22) According to Frank de Martini, WTC's construction manager, "We designed the building to resist the impact of one or more jetliners." The second plane nearly missed tower 1; most of the fuel burned in an explosion outside the tower. Yet this tower collapsed first, long before tower 2 that was "perforated" by the first hit. Jet fuel burned up fast - and by far did not reach the 2000-degree heat necessary to hurt the six tubular steel columns in the center of the tower - designed specifically to keep the towers from collapsing even if hit by a Boeing 707. A Boeing 707 used to carry more fuel than the Boeing 757 and Boeing 767 that actually hit the towers.

23) Why did Mayor Rudolph Giuliani instantly authorized the shipment of WTC rubble to China and India for recycling?

24) Why was metallic debris found no less than 13 kilometers from the crash site of the plane that went down in Pennsylvania? Was the plane in fact shot down - under vice president Dick Cheney's orders?

25) The Pipelineistan question. What did US ambassador Wendy Chamberlain talk about over the phone on October 10, 2001, with the oil minister of Pakistan? Was it to tell him that the 1990s-planned Unocal gas pipeline project, TAP (Turkmenistan/Afghanistan/ Pakistan), abandoned because of Taliban demands on transit fees, was now back in business? (Two months later, an agreement to build the pipeline was signed between the leaders of the three countries).

26) What is former Unocal lobbyist and former Bush pet Afghan Zalmay Khalilzad up to in Afghanistan?

27) How come former Pakistani foreign minister Niaz Niak said in mid-July 2001 that the US had already decided to strike against Osama bin Laden and the Taliban by October? The topic was discussed secretly at the July Group of Eight summit in Genoa, Italy, according to Pakistani diplomats.

28) How come US ambassador to Yemen Barbara Bodine told FBI agent John O'Neill in July 2001 to stop investigating al-Qaeda's financial operations - with O'Neill instantly moved to a security job at the WTC, where he died on 9/11?

29) Considering the very intimate relationship between the Taliban and Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and the ISI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), is Bin Laden alive, dead or still a valuable asset of the ISI, the CIA or both?

30) Was Bin Laden admitted at the American hospital in Dubai in the United Arab Emirates on July 4, 2001, after flying from Quetta, Pakistan, and staying for treatment until July 11?

31) Did the Bin Laden group build the caves of Tora Bora in close cooperation with the CIA during the 1980s' anti-Soviet jihad?

32) How come General Tommy Franks knew for sure that Bin Laden was hiding in Tora Bora in late November 2001?

33) Why did president Bill Clinton abort a hit on Bin Laden in October 1999? Why did then-Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf abort a covert ops in the same date? And why did Musharraf do the same thing again in August 2001?

34) Why did George W Bush dissolve the Bin Laden Task Force nine months before 9/11?

35) How come the (fake) Bin Laden home video - in which he "confesses" to being the perpetrator of 9/11 - released by the US on December 13, 2001, was found only two weeks after it was produced (on November 9); was it really found in Jalalabad (considering Northern Alliance and US troops had not even arrived there at the time); by whom; and how come the Pentagon was forced to release a new translation after the first (botched) one?

36) Why was ISI chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmad abruptly "retired" on October 8, 2001, the day the US started bombing Afghanistan?

37) What was Ahmad up to in Washington exactly on the week of 9/11 (he arrived on September 4)? On the morning of 9/11, Ahmad was having breakfast on Capitol Hill with Bob Graham and Porter Goss, both later part of the 9/11 Commission, which simply refused to investigate two of its members. Ahmad had breakfast with Richard Armitage of the State Department on September 12 and 13 (when Pakistan negotiated its "cooperation" with the "war on terror") and met all the CIA and Pentagon top brass. On September 13, Musharraf announced he would send Ahmad to Afghanistan to demand to the Taliban the extradition of Bin Laden.
38) Who inside the ISI transferred US$100,000 to Mohammed Atta in the summer of 2001 - under orders of Ahmad himself, as Indian intelligence insists? Was it really ISI asset Omar Sheikh, Bin Laden's information technology specialist who later organized the slaying of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Karachi? So was the ISI directly linked to 9/11?

39) Did the FBI investigate the two shady characters who met Mohammed Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi in Harry's Bar at the Helmsley Hotel in New York City on September 8, 2001?

40) What did director of Asian affairs at the State Department Christina Rocca and the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan Abdul Salam Zaeef discuss in their meeting in Islamabad in August 2001?

41) Did Washington know in advance that an "al-Qaeda" connection would kill Afghan nationalist commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, aka "The Lion of the Panjshir", only two days before 9/11? Massoud was fighting the Taliban and al-Qaeda - helped by Russia and Iran. According to the Northern Alliance, Massoud was killed by an ISI-Taliban-al Qaeda axis. If still alive, he would never have allowed the US to rig a loya jirga (grand council) in Afghanistan and install a puppet, former CIA asset Hamid Karzai, as leader of the country.

42) Why did it take no less than four months before the name of Ramzi Binalshibh surfaced in the 9/11 context, considering the Yemeni was a roommate of Mohammed Atta in his apartment cell in Hamburg?

43) Is pathetic shoe-bomber Richard Reid an ISI asset?

44) Did then-Russian president Vladimir Putin and Russian intelligence tell the CIA in 2001 that 25 terrorist pilots had been training for suicide missions?

45) When did the head of German intelligence, August Hanning, tell the CIA that terrorists were "planning to hijack commercial aircraft?"

46) When did Egyptian President Mubarak tell the CIA about an attack on the US with an "airplane stuffed with explosives?"

47) When did Israel's Mossad director Efraim Halevy tell the CIA about a possible attack on the US by "200 terrorists?"

48) Were the Taliban aware of the warning by a Bush administration official as early as February 2001 - "Either you accept our offer of a carpet of gold, or we bury you under a carpet of bombs?"

49) Has Northrop-Grumman used Global Hawk technology - which allows to remotely control unmanned planes - in the war in Afghanistan since October 2001? Did it install Global Hawk in a commercial plane? Is Global Hawk available at all for commercial planes?

50) Would Cheney stand up and volunteer the detailed timeline of what he was really up to during the whole day on 9/11?

Pepe Escobar is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War (Nimble Books, 2007) and Red Zone Blues: a snapshot of Baghdad during the surge. His new book, just out, is Obama does Globalistan (Nimble Books, 2009).

 

[TruthSeeker]

The Almeida and Zaidi articles are ones that resonate with my American mindset. I find myself saying "Right on!" to every paragraph. So, like the authors imply, Pakistanis may not believe these authors have captured THE truth or even part of it, but a whole lot of Americans wish that a majority of Pakistanis could or would take the sentiments of these authors to heart.

The fifty questions article is trash. I feel genuine hatred for people who share the mindset of Escobar. I would like to actually smash such people in the face. I would like to see them bleed.

 

[gambit]

OK, so we have a couple of thoughtful articles - and now for the silly, the conspiratorial:


Fifty questions on 9/11
By Pepe Escobar

<snipped>

You are correct. It is silly. Enough of those 'questions' have been so thoroughly debunked for so long only silly people continue to believe.

 

[muse]

Interesting responses, though it's their economy that strikes me - the fact that it is an issue that did not interest our Pakistani forum members is fascinating.

Both Messrs Zaidi and Almeida have pointed to a new understanding of Afghanistan and the role of India and Iran in Afghanistan -- news flash, that's not new, neither is the call to capitulate to these what is for Pakistan, an important element of it's vital interest -- so on this score messrs Zaida and Almeida may want to reconsider.

The bet is the US will evacuate after declaring victory before the end of Obama's First and maybe only term - will the bet be wrong? That's not as important as how that bet is hedged.

And what of Al Qaida? Messrs Zaidi and Almeida is spot on with Pakistani opinion when they do not acknowledge the issue at all -- destroying Islamism in Pakistan is a vital interest of the Pakistani state, and yet it cannot negotiate this - lesson? stalemate is a condition the Pakistani public can live with -- Querry: Can the Pakistani public live with a active Islamist movement (read suicide bombings)?

 

[TruthSeeker]

Interesting responses, though it's their economy that strikes me - the fact that it is an issue that did not interest our Pakistani forum members is fascinating.

I don't think it is fascinating. I think it shows the difficulty of engaging in critical introspection -- no matter if you are American contemplating the Iraq invasion or a Pakistani confronting the rise of Pakistani jihadi groups. The self-defense mechanisms of the human mind recoil at self-criticism ....

 

[Developereo]

I think much of this internal reform, including compating extremism, has been already discussed in other threads.

I think Afghanistan is actually a much easier 'problem' for Pakistan. We already have a demographic advantage in that majority Afghans are ethnic Pashtuns. We should promote even closer ties between Pakistani and Afghan Pashtuns to create a pro-Pakistan mindset in the Afghans. Getting the Taliban to renounce extremism and Al Qaeda ideology would be a good start.

Perhaps the most important foreign policy move for Pakistan would be to build solid ties with Iran. I think it is so vital to Pakistan's national interests that it trumps every other foreign policy issue. Consider the benefits:
- it will neutralize India's attempt to encircle Pakistan
- it will break the Iran/India alliance in Afghanistan
- it will isolate Afghanistan so they will have to abandon India and ally themselves with Iran/Pakistan
- it will pave the way for even better cooperation with Turkey, Russia and the CARs

The people who will oppose this Pak-Iran friendship would be the West, the Arabs, and India. We can ignore India and work out an understanding with the Arabs. As for Western countries, that's a tricky one. As long as we are dependent on foreign aid, we will never be masters of our own destiny.

 

[muse]

Develpero


Pakistan had excellent relations with Iran, once Pakistan under Zia decided to buy into the Wahabization of Pakistan in a effort to create a monolith to confront Iran, things went south - now Pakistan is not entirely to blame for this, the Iranian must accept responsibility for imagining that it is sovereign in Pakistan - Pakistan is the world second largest Shi'ah muslim nation, they are however; Pakistani first. This same lesson we will insist the Saudi and his Islamist in Pakistan learn.

Whether Iran and Shi-ism, or Saudi and Wahab-ism - Pakistan has a much greater role to play, which is to reject both because of their insistence on exclusive claims - Pakistan can assert the reality of pluralism in Islam and the reality of exclusive claims to truth for the individual adherent, all under the banner of Jinnah's Pakistan guided by values of Islam, for free Muslims, Free citizens of any Faith, and Firg:-

"Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State...Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State." Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid e Azaam e Pakistan

This magnificent vision can be Pakistan's contribution to all Islamia and to the world, to bring an end to this destructive, malignant conflict between the Wahabi and the Iranian state, a conflict which has ravaged Pakistan and threatens the destruction of Islam itself.

And then there is Afghanistan - below is the 3rd article in 2 days examining Pakistani policy towards Afghanistan, I think our forum readers recognize the attention the issue is receiving, I invite readers to offer us analysis of these articles, their substance is radically different:

Pakistan's Afghan policy
By Farhan Bokhari, Special to Gulf News
Published: September 12, 2009, 22:40


The eighth anniversary of the New York terrorist attacks went largely unnoticed in Pakistan, in spite of the heavy price paid by the country in becoming wrapped up in Washington's so-called 'war on terror'.

For the past eight years, Pakistan has pursued its own citizens along with foreign nationals, notably along the Afghan border, in an attempt to root out militants who crossed the border after the US-backed invasion of 2002.

While US President Barack Obama marked the tragic New York terrorist attacks on Friday, there was little reaction from Pakistan's ruling and opposition leaders who were largely unmoved. This said much about the country's failure to articulate a new future for itself in a turbulent world.

One country that has a great deal of influence on Pakistan is Afghanistan, where conflict has been a recurring feature for almost 30 years since the 1979 invasion by the former Soviet Union. Almost 20 years after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, conflict is still raging.

The occasion of the anniversary of the New York terrorist attacks should prompt Pakistan's leaders to clearly reassess their own national interests in relation to Afghanistan. Events in recent months have made it clear that the US and its Nato allies are beginning to come under pressure at home and will not be able to retain an Afghan presence indefinitely.

On the one hand, the battle to take charge of Afghanistan is looking increasingly like a lost cause as it becomes clear that a military victory is far from assured. Once again, Afghan fighters have proven their supremacy in fighting across their country's treacherous terrain. Even faced with some of the world's most sophisticated armaments, Afghans who are resisting foreign forces are determined to fight on.

On the other hand, public opinion in Western countries that have contributed troops to the Afghan military campaign is clearly turning against this battle. In a year when Western military casualties have been at an all time high, it is difficult to imagine that public opinion will continue to support the war.

This emerging picture creates both a challenge and an opportunity for Pakistan. As the military effort in Afghanistan falters, it is clear that the criticism of Pakistan's role in fomenting this unrest is bound to gather momentum. This is largely because many believe that Pakistan is the primary host for Afghan militants. Consequently, there is a chance that Western decision makers will consider striking suspected militant targets in Pakistan.

It is therefore vital that Pakistan move quickly and decisively so that it is seen to be trying its best to eradicate any militant sanctuaries on its soil. Pakistan must take decisive action, knowing that the prospect of a military defeat in Afghanistan will make Western governments eager to secure some sort of victory - even if it is in neighbouring Pakistan rather than Afghanistan - before withdrawing troops.

It is equally important for Pakistan to begin to articulate a new security regime for Afghanistan's long-term future, in which Islamabad has a key role as a supporter of future governments in Kabul. By coming up with arrangements to tighten the policing of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan or helping the Afghans to improve their own internal security, Islamabad could assume an important role in the region.

If Pakistan is to make progress towards fulfilling such a role, its ruling elite needs to be clear on exactly how they plan to chart a course for the future. Such a future course must be built upon creating platforms for civilian and military leaders to stand together in carving out what is seen as the best way for Pakistan to assume a wider future role. By contrast, the failure to articulate exactly such a position may lead to squandering what appears to be a unique opportunity for Pakistan, even as conditions remain deeply troubled in its neighbourhood.


Farhan Bokhari is a Pakistan-based commentator who writes on political and economic matters.

 

[Developereo]

Pakistan had excellent relations with Iran, once Pakistan under Zia decided to buy into the Wahabization of Pakistan in a effort to create a monolith to confront Iran, things went south - now Pakistan is not entirely to blame for this, the Iranian must accept responsibility for imagining that it is sovereign in Pakistan - Pakistan is the world second largest Shi'ah muslim nation, they are however; Pakistani first. This same lesson we will insist the Saudi and his Islamist in Pakistan learn.

ZAB and the Shah had very good relations, to the point of proposing a joint confederation, but Zia and the Ayatollahs derailed the plans.

The good news is that the Iranians seem to be getting tired of the Ayatollahs; they rule mostly in name. I think most Iranians are not hardcore Shia fanatics; they are much more nationalistic than religious.

Iran has gotten close to India precisely because they believe we have become a Saudi pawn. We need to allay those fears by reversing the Saudi influence, as you rightly pointed out. The trick would be to do it diplomatically without annoying the Saudis. This will take a lot of skill. We need them to understand that our alliance with Iran would be based on geopolitical concerns. An equally strong alliance with Turkey would dispel any fears of a Shia agenda. Turkey also has excellent relations with Syria and Lebanon, as does Iran, so it should allay any Arab concerns about a non-Arab alliance.

Whether Iran and Shi-ism, or Saudi and Wahab-ism - Pakistan has a much greater role to play, which is to reject both because of their insistence on exclusive claims - Pakistan can assert the reality of pluralism in Islam and the reality of exclusive claims to truth for the individual adherent, all under the banner of Jinnah's Pakistan guided by values of Islam, for free Muslims, Free citizens of any Faith, and Firg:-

"Therefore, we must learn a lesson from this. You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place or worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State...Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as citizens of the State." Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Quaid e Azaam e Pakistan

This magnificent vision can be Pakistan's contribution to all Islamia and to the world, to bring an end to this destructive, malignant conflict between the Wahabi and the Iranian state, a conflict which has ravaged Pakistan and threatens the destruction of Islam itself.

I agree. We need to make the people understand that a repudiation of Wahhabism is not a matter of rejecting Sunnis and favoring Shias. Jinnah's vision of religion as a private matter needs to be inculcated into people's minds. Question is, who will do it? I don't see any politicians who are on board with this idea.

By Farhan Bokhari, Special to Gulf News
While US President Barack Obama marked the tragic New York terrorist attacks on Friday, there was little reaction from Pakistan's ruling and opposition leaders who were largely unmoved. This said much about the country's failure to articulate a new future for itself in a turbulent world.

I am actually immensely pleased that the 9/11 anniversary didn't receive inordinate attention in Pakistan. It was barely noticed in Australia and Europe. It shows that we are not the 51st state; we are more concerned with our own problems. 9/11 has become synonymous with the GWOT, which has become a cover for anti-Muslim agendas.

 

[muse]

I agree. We need to make the people understand that a repudiation of Wahhabism is not a matter of rejecting Sunnis and favoring Shias. Jinnah's vision of religion as a private matter needs to be inculcated into people's minds. Question is, who will do it? I don't see any politicians who are on board with this idea

The Iranians I remember were party animals, there were national holidays in the honor of Imams, the Iranian took the oportunity to pack a picnic and party - and Iran was the first nation to recognize Pakistan -- we really must get a handle on this relationship with Saudi Arabia, while we still can. And the Saudi should think twice about getting too close to us, that house of Saud is safer maintaining a respectful distance from us.


You know develpero, I continue to think that leadership is all - leaders are in short supply but maybe we can go another route eople first - first the pakistani people must buy into it, must own it before we can go to others and say, hey you guys just have to listen and get real.

You know that I have what I think is a sober view of the American so far as relations with Pakistan are concerned, on the other hand, we must be extra careful to be fair to them - because ultimately America more than most other nations, has the ability to change it's course.

You saw the PEW survey in "Being Muslim in the US" do think of the courage and honesty it takes to come up with a number like 58% saying they think Muslims face "a lot" of discrimination - that number is a sad reflection, but it is also a hopeful one -- if we are sober and clear and fair and deliver on what we promise, we have every right to demand the same of the American - good for everybody.

 

[Developereo]

The Iranians I remember were party animals, there were national holidays in the honor of Imams, the Iranian took the oportunity to pack a picnic and party - and Iran was the first nation to recognize Pakistan -- we really must get a handle on this relationship with Saudi Arabia, while we still can. And the Saudi should think twice about getting too close to us, that house of Saud is safer maintaining a respectful distance from us.


You know develpero, I continue to think that leadership is all - leaders are in short supply but maybe we can go another route eople first - first the pakistani people must buy into it, must own it before we can go to others and say, hey you guys just have to listen and get real.

I think the way to combat extremism in Pakistan is through the three Ms: media, madrassah and mullahs.

I am utterly disappointed in the Pakistani media. They have failed to foster any kind of patriotism or national unity in Pakistan. It's all very well to be self-critical, but you have to also instill a sense of pride, hope, community and patriotism in the people. Indian media has been much more responsive to national needs in this respect.

The madrassahs are funded by Saudi money, so that's going to be a tough one.

The mullahs seem to be content to be tools in the hands of the political elite. I don't really know how to get to them.

You know that I have what I think is a sober view of the American so far as relations with Pakistan are concerned, on the other hand, we must be extra careful to be fair to them - because ultimately America more than most other nations, has the ability to change it's course.

You saw the PEW survey in "Being Muslim in the US" do think of the courage and honesty it takes to come up with a number like 58% saying they think Muslims face "a lot" of discrimination - that number is a sad reflection, but it is also a hopeful one -- if we are sober and clear and fair and deliver on what we promise, we have every right to demand the same of the American - good for everybody.

I have a lot of fondness and friendship for ordinary Americans, but I have a VERY BAD feeling about the neocon agenda. I think there is a much bigger game brewing with Iraq, Afghanistan, India, China and Russia. And Pakistan is right smack in the middle of it all. Uncle wants to groom India as a deterrant to China, and part of that policy involves neutralizing Pakistan so India can focus on China.

And I'm not even a Zaid Hamid listener!

 

[muse]

I think the way to combat extremism in Pakistan is through the three Ms: media, madrassah and mullahs.

I know what you mean and wouldn't it be great if the Madaress were genuine centers of learning, critical and scholarly debates and publishing and the Mullah, genuine scholars trained in ethics, in multiple disciplines with advanced degrees and the media of substance instead of being FOX news clones of talking heads belonging to different political parties --- Alas.

But we have always had the answer, it was and is in M. A. Jinnah.

Now, I am a fan of Zaid Hamid and Mr. Qureshi, however; their analysis is incomplete, they imagine the US as a sort of "Prime Mover", man supposes and US disposes - nothing could be further from the truth.

When it comes to India and the US, the role of opening India to private investment, the focus on building the Indian nation, the role of Indians in US society, the lunacy which was Pakistan, these combined to shape American perspectives and choices - and as far as US confronting China - it just will not happen - these are two countries who understand the investment they have in each other and the calibration of animosity is done with a great deal of circumspection.

With India, it is their desire to be seen a credible global power to go with their history and culture - it makes them vulnerable - they want it very much.

The American has no beef against the Pakistani, it's just that they perceive the world very differently, the American with an amoral behavioural worldview and Pakistan with a traditional worldview - what has been scary is the suicide binge Pakistan has been on - Saudi funded madaress school children which are the responsibility of the Pakistani state, a responsibility it had abdicated, a political class given to kleptomania, an economy addicted to "aid" -- lets be real, one would have to have a tremendous faith to maintain relations with those on such a trajectory, you know, can't help those who refuse to help themselves.

Anyway, the American is not 10 feet tall and for Pakistan, that understanding is a good place to start when contemplating relations with the US.

 

[Developereo]

as far as US confronting China - it just will not happen - these are two countries who understand the investment they have in each other and the calibration of animosity is done with a great deal of circumspection.

On the contrary, I think the neocon agenda is geared precisely towards this confrontation. They know it will happen sooner or later -- sooner if China and Russia form a military alliance against the US. The world has limited resources, and there will be contention eventually. As they say, hope for the best but prepare for the worst.

The American has no beef against the Pakistani, it's just that they perceive the world very differently, the American with an amoral behavioural worldview and Pakistan with a traditional worldview - what has been scary is the suicide binge Pakistan has been on - Saudi funded madaress school children which are the responsibility of the Pakistani state, a responsibility it had abdicated, a political class given to kleptomania, an economy addicted to "aid" -- lets be real, one would have to have a tremendous faith to maintain relations with those on such a trajectory, you know, can't help those who refuse to help themselves.

Anyway, the American is not 10 feet tall and for Pakistan, that understanding is a good place to start when contemplating relations with the US.

I am not concerned about the ordinary American, but the neocon agenda. They don't care about democracy or religion. They would sacrifice Western Europe if it ultimately served their agenda.

I know it sounds paranoid, but the American moves in our region are very consistent with this scenario.

 

[hack]

Good articles except the 3rd paranoid conspiracy one.

I think India should disengage from Afghanistan. It does not suit or is required for a country as big as India to try and encircle a much smaller country like Pakistan.

BTW Developero is right on on the neo-con agenda. The way Obama is screwing things up here,it won't be long before they are in power again.