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JF-17 Thunder Multirole Fighter [Thread 5]

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offcourse it is low in clean config, not loaded, but doesnt this rule apply to all fighters including the "mighty" gripen?
 
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offcourse it is low in clean config, not loaded, but doesnt this rule apply to all fighters including the "mighty" gripen?

Real stealth capabilities during wartime come from large scale jamming and spoofing carried out by sophisticated networks working in conjunction with advanced jets, not by individual aircraft.
 
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Real stealth capabilities during wartime come from large scale jamming and spoofing carried out by sophisticated networks working in conjunction with advanced jets, not by individual aircraft.

define stealth
 
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= / I though Block II is already in PAF's inventory. Thanks for the heads-up yoo.

Current ACM stated to media that JFT with IFR would be flying by mid of 2013.

You are not so wrong in assuming, that block ii is already in PAF inventory. :tup:
 
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In one word: undetectability.

there is no such thing as "undetectability" or pure stealth, rather RCS reduction through various means.

the key is to reduce detection time as much as possible. Even F-22 has an RCS 0.0001 which means it can be detected, though by the time it is detected, it would have done the job.
 
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there is no such thing as "undetectability" or pure stealth, rather RCS reduction through various means.

the key is to reduce detection time as much as possible. Even F-22 has an RCS 0.0001 which means it can be detected, though by the time it is detected, it would have done the job.

You asked me to define stealth, so I did. What happens in real life is never perfect, but various ways can get us closer to the ideal situation.

Even the F-22 would work with a huge network, not by itself. The point is that even with non-stealth aircraft like loaded JF-17s, the detectability during missions can be reduced.
 
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Does Pakistan manufacturer MK-16 MB seats?
 
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there is no such thing as "undetectability" or pure stealth, rather RCS reduction through various means.

the key is to reduce detection time as much as possible. Even F-22 has an RCS 0.0001 which means it can be detected, though by the time it is detected, it would have done the job.

In fact the F-22 was designed so it can remain undetected until it can been seen on IRSTs on Russian and Chinese jets,which would be too late as it would destroy any target at BVR range. However it can be detected at a long range when it opens its bays.
 
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Further RCS reduction measures for the jf-17 don’t make much sense, moving forward. The lower the observability of an aircraft, the likelier it is to escape a hostile environment unscathed, so I do believe it is a crucial piece of the puzzle as far as the future of air combat is concerned. But the problem we face with the jf-17 is of an aircraft that was not developed from inception with the foremost goal of low observability. Any RCS reduction measures, short of a radical resign with internal weapons bays and twin canted tails, will go down the drain as soon as the jf-17 takes off with a fuel tank and a couple of sd-10s lighting up enemy radars. In an ideal world, with unlimited funding, RCS reduction could be justified. But Pakistan’s foremost concern is of low cost effectiveness and efficiency and not low observability. So we must be realistic in what we decide we want from the aircraft, while keeping in mind the limited funds that can be allocated to the various parallel projects regarding the jf-17.

Of equal importance is the role the jf-17 will play in the tactical plans of the PAF and the strengths and weaknesses brought about by its physical limitations. An aircraft with such limited range and payload is unlikely to strike deep within India with any effectiveness. Its capability as an air superiority option will likewise be limited by those concerns. If it’s operational radius will be limited to Pakistan proper and the shallow Indian territory close to the border, then the RCS reduction measures mentioned on this thread will be of far less value. The jf-17’s role will be decidedly reactionary if it operates as an interceptor and a CAS aircraft. By the very definition of those roles, it will be required to engage Indian assets that will know some sort of response is forthcoming when they partake in aerial strikes in Pakistani territory or have their ground forces pummel Pakistani positions on the border. So taking a potshot on an unsuspecting enemy and turning around and leaving the hostilities isn’t a realistic option for us, in the way it is for the USAF with the f-22 or f-35. Those are the advantages of operating on the offensive, something neither our wider armed forces are capable of nor an advantage the jf-17 is able to provide.

Within the scope of what the jf-17 is supposed to provide, the aircraft delivers an effective punch. Trying to expand on the initial role it was developed for is, at best, unrealistic and, at worst, a dangerous idea. This isn’t an aircraft designed to dominate the subcontinent skies, so it is unfair to expect it to measure up those expectations.
 
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Further RCS reduction measures for the jf-17 don’t make much sense, moving forward. The lower the observability of an aircraft, the likelier it is to escape a hostile environment unscathed, so I do believe it is a crucial piece of the puzzle as far as the future of air combat is concerned. But the problem we face with the jf-17 is of an aircraft that was not developed from inception with the foremost goal of low observability. Any RCS reduction measures, short of a radical resign with internal weapons bays and twin canted tails, will go down the drain as soon as the jf-17 takes off with a fuel tank and a couple of sd-10s lighting up enemy radars. In an ideal world, with unlimited funding, RCS reduction could be justified. But Pakistan’s foremost concern is of low cost effectiveness and efficiency and not low observability. So we must be realistic in what we decide we want from the aircraft, while keeping in mind the limited funds that can be allocated to the various parallel projects regarding the jf-17.

Of equal importance is the role the jf-17 will play in the tactical plans of the PAF and the strengths and weaknesses brought about by its physical limitations. An aircraft with such limited range and payload is unlikely to strike deep within India with any effectiveness. Its capability as an air superiority option will likewise be limited by those concerns. If it’s operational radius will be limited to Pakistan proper and the shallow Indian territory close to the border, then the RCS reduction measures mentioned on this thread will be of far less value. The jf-17’s role will be decidedly reactionary if it operates as an interceptor and a CAS aircraft. By the very definition of those roles, it will be required to engage Indian assets that will know some sort of response is forthcoming when they partake in aerial strikes in Pakistani territory or have their ground forces pummel Pakistani positions on the border. So taking a potshot on an unsuspecting enemy and turning around and leaving the hostilities isn’t a realistic option for us, in the way it is for the USAF with the f-22 or f-35. Those are the advantages of operating on the offensive, something neither our wider armed forces are capable of nor an advantage the jf-17 is able to provide.

Within the scope of what the jf-17 is supposed to provide, the aircraft delivers an effective punch. Trying to expand on the initial role it was developed for is, at best, unrealistic and, at worst, a dangerous idea. This isn’t an aircraft designed to dominate the subcontinent skies, so it is unfair to expect it to measure up those expectations.


We need to give more thrust,AESA radar and better ECM,Avionics,HMD/S,HOBS missiles, to the JF-17. As you said that low observability is not worth the investment.
 
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