If SU-30MKI is the most advanced a/c in asia, then why India is craving for Rafale?
That Rafale buying consideration is already a solid indication that IAF realize their SU-30MKI may not be able to handle J-10B or J-11B.
Case closed.
First You are Wrong here currently IAF has not Chosen Any AESA for Mki MLU. ZhuK AE is Just Rumor Played Longtime
Chinese defense forums have posted copies of the image above which claim to cite the J-20’s AESA T/R module count at 1,856, the J-16’s at 1,760, and the J-10B at 1,200 T/R modules. It is likely the J-10B is the first Chinese fighter aircraft to feature an AESA; J-10B units achieved initial operational capability (IOC) in October of 2014. The volume of the J-10s nose cone is not substantially different from that of the F-16 or the Israeli Lavi from which the J-10 is partially based. Therefore, if one were to assume China had reached parity with the United States in packaging technology, the 1,200 T/R module figure would be plausible but slightly high. For comparison, the APG-80 AESA for the F-16C/D Block 60 has 1,000 T/R modules (DSB, 2001). However, it is unlikely that China has been able to reach parity with the United States in terms of packaging technology on their first generation AESA design. Neither Russia nor Israel was able to field 1,000 T/R element arrays within their first generation fighter mounted AESAs for similar nose volumes as the F-16 with the Mig-35 and Israeli F-16 respectively.
Russia’s first fighter mounted AESA radar, the Zhuk-AE, contained 652 T/R modules and was unveiled in 2007. The Israeli ELM-2052 AESA radar, which has been marketed for both the F-16 and the FA-50 – a joint Korean Aerospace Industry and Lockheed Martin F-16 derivative, has roughly 512 T/R modules (Trimble, 2014). The only firm outside of the United States that was able to produce a 1,000 T/R element within one generation was the French avionics firm Thales with its RB2E radar (Avionics Today, 2009). While the relative technological maturity of European, Israeli, and Russian AESAs is not directly indicative of the relative technological maturity of China’s packaging technology, it is an indicator that the first generation AESA produced by China is likely not on par with the US which is generally recognized as having the most technological mature T/R packaging technology (Kopp, 2014).
The prospect of China’s TR packaging technology being on par with US firms within a single generation of radars is even more dubious when one examines the preference for an incremental technological development within the Chinese aerospace industry. Several Chinese aviation authors have hypothesized that the J-10B serves as a “technological stepping stone” with respect to the development of the more advanced J-20. For example, Feng Cao argues the J-10B and the J-16 AESAs were likely used to test technology related to the J-20’s AESA which would be a second generation Chinese design. By virtue of the larger nose volumes in the J-16 and J-20 airframes, it is highly probable the two aircraft will feature radars with more T/R modules than the J-10B’s radar.
The J-16 utilizes the Su-27BS airframe which has room for a 0.9-1.1 meter aperture in the nose which is on par with the F-15 and F-22 in terms of volume (Kopp, 2012). The 1,500 element N036 Tikhomirov NIIP AESA has a similar aperture size to the electronically scanned array (ESA) Irbis-E radar featured in the Su-35 series of fighters which shares the base Su-27 airframe. If the 1,760 T/R figure is correct it would indicate the Chinese aerospace industry has eclipsed Russian T/R module packaging technology as the N036 is arguably the most advanced Russian fighter mounted AESA. Similarly, the most advanced US fighter mounted AESAs such as the APG-77(V)2 and APG-82(V)1 contain 1,500 T/R modules*. While the prospect of Chinese avionics firms reaching parity with US and Russian firms is more plausible within two generations of designs, the author is skeptical the 1,760 figure is correct given the unsubstantiated nature of the image and the fairly substantial 260 T/R discrepancy between the J-16 radar figure compared to the most advanced US and Russian AESA designs. Therefore, the author speculates it would be more reasonable to assume a figure between 1,200 and 1,500 TR modules for the J-16 rather than the 1,760 figure.
The tentative designation for the J-20's AESA is the Type 1475. While the nose volume of the J-20 is certainly large, the jet overall is longer and heavier than the F-22, no credible figures for nose volume were available at the time of this publication. As with the J-16 T/R figure, the J-20 figure is substantially greater than that of the most advanced US and Russian designs. Even if the Nanjing Research Institute of Electronics Technology (NRIET) or the China Leihua Electronic Technology Research Institute (607 Institute) was able to develop sufficient packaging technology that would enable 1,856 T/R modules within the J-20's nose, the density of the T/R modules would create significant cooling problems. For example, Phazotron's single greatest difficulty in designing the Zuk-AE was the AESA's thermal management system (Kopp, 2008). Without an effective cooling system, the Type 1475 would not be reliable at peak power output and would cause significant maintenance issues. Furthermore, with such a high number of T/R modules, the Type 1475 would be vulnerable to radar warning receiver (RWR) systems such as the ALR-94 without a very capable low probability intercept (LPI) mode.
Many discussions with respect to the "relative stealthiness" of fighter aircraft are limited to merely comparing radar cross section estimates while entirely neglecting alternate means of detecting aircraft such as RWRs or other emission locator systems. David Axe succinctly compares the process of how RWRs function to how a flash light carried by another person is easily visible in a dark room. AESAs emit a substantial amount of energy, especially designs with a greater number of T/R modules, which enables passive emission locator systems to detect an AESA. The addition of an LPI software for AESAs mitigates the risk of RWR detection.
"The radar's signals are managed in intensity, duration and space to maintain the pilot's situational awareness while minimizing the chance that its signals will be intercepted.More distant targets get less radar attention; as they get closer to the F-22, they will be identified and prioritized; and when they are close enough to be engaged or avoided, they are continuously tracked" - Bill Sweetman, 2001
Graphic 1: The data present in graphic 1 are assembled from numerous sources which are cited below. The formula: "(km known) * (new rcs/rcs known)^(0.25) = detection range of new rcs" was used to calculate many of the figures. T;E = maximum number of targets tracked & maximum number of targets engaged simultaneously.
In summary, the high T/R module counts detailed in image 3 are likely too high to be considered legitimate. This is not to marginalize the significant advancements made by the Chinese aerospace industry in avionics, but the level of misinformation and disinformation prevalent within publications detailing Chinese military systems necessitates a strict research approach. The figures cited in image three are not consistent with what one could reasonably assume given the technological development of fighter mounted AESAs within other countries such as Russia, Israel, and the United States. Ultimately, determining the exact T/R module count for various Chinese AESAs is of little consequence when compared to the underlying trend that Chinese avionics firms have made staggering advancements over the past decade.
The vast majority of fighter aircraft currently deployed by the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) use Soviet designed MSAs such as the N010 and N001 series. Even the most capable of China's MSAs, the N0001VEP equipped on the Su-30MKK, can only track ten targets while engaging two simultaneously. Originally, the J-11 could only track ten targets and engage one before being upgraded to engage two targets simultaneously after 2003 (Global Security, 2014). The addition of even a comparatively primitive AESA would significantly increase the lethality of China's fourth and fifth generation fighter forces. One of the main constraints of China's existing fighter force detailed in graphic one is the limited detection range, tracking, and engagement numbers of the MSAs relative to Russian ESAs and American AESAs.
In a 2008 RAND report, Air Combat Past, Present and Future, John Stillion and Scott Perdue state the PLAAF has at least a three to one numerical superiority over the United States in a conflict over the Taiwanese strait around 2020. As part of the Russian method of fighter employment, each Flanker is equipped with between eight and twelve beyond visual range (bvr) air-to-air missiles in which multiple missiles are fired against each target to increase the probability of a kill (pk). In a modern digital radio frequency memory jamming environment, even capable radar guided missile such as the AIM-120 will likely have lower than a 0.50 pk (RAND, 2008). Hence the Russian bvr doctrine of launching at least two missiles against a single target as the pk increases as the number of missiles fired increases.
The addition of fighter mounted AESA radars would enable Chinese pilots to launch missiles against a larger number of targets in the opening salvo of an air-to-air engagement as well as providing increased situational awareness for Chinese pilots when compared to current MSAs. The ability to engage more targets at beyond visual range effectively complements the PLAAF's numerical superiority by allowing each aircraft to make full use of their comparatively larger payload of air-to-air missiles. It is worth noting that the United States will continue to deploy large numbers of fourth generation aircraft such as the F-15C, F-16C/D, and F/A-18E/F into the late 2020s to 2030s; these aircraft will be especially put at risk as a result of improvements in Chinese avionics with respect to improved PLAAF bvr capabilities.
The enhancement of situational awareness gained by the deployment of AESAs is especially important given the shift within the PLA from Soviet and Russian inspired doctrines towards embracing an increasing number of American combat doctrines such as network centric warfare:
"Almost all of the PLA’s 2013 exercises focused on operating in 'informationized' conditions by emphasizing system-of-systems operations, a concept that can be viewed as the Chinese corollary to U.S. network-centric warfare. This concept requires enhancing systems and weapons with information capabilities and linking geographically dispersed forces and capabilities into an integrated system capable of unified action. These operational training reforms are a result of the Outline of Military Training and Evaluation (OMTE), which was last published in mid-2008 and became standard across the PLA on January 1, 2009. Since that time, the PLA has pushed to achieve OMTE objectives by emphasizing realistic training conditions, training in complex electromagnetic and joint environments, and integrating new technologies into the PLA force structure." - Department of Defense, 2014
Image 8: PLAAF Su-30MKK aggressor unit. Image retrieved via Sinodefense.
PLAAF pilots continue to improve their skills as a result of realistic large scale exercises such as Red Sword/Blue Sword and accumulate higher numbers of practice flight hours per year. PLAAF pilots accumulate200 flight hours per year compared to pre-sequestration US fighter pilots accumulating 250 to 300 flight hours per year in their aircraft. The combination of new AESAs, adoption of new fighter employment doctrines, and improved pilot training will make the PLAAF an increasingly formidable fighting force and a near peer competitor to the USAF. While the PLAAF is unlikely to reach parity with the USAF in the near future, the advancements made by the PLAAF are substantial enough to pose a significant threat to US forces in the region given the PLAAF's in theatre numerical superiority. A USAF official interviewed by the National Interest astutely summarized the PLAAF's ongoing modernization program:
"I think we can probably keep a slight advantage for quite some time, but a slight advantage means significant losses and less of a deterrent...Lets pretend the F-22 confronts current air-to-air threats outside of a SAM [surface-to-air missile] environment and has a 30 to one kill ratio today versus a [Sukhoi] Su-30 or [Shenyang] J-11. When the J-20 and J-31 come around, even a three to one kill ratio advantage becomes costly...Our competitors know the current reality and are working very hard to avoid the wide gap we have created by investing in those planes,they represent their attempt and creating parity in the skies."
AN/APG-77 – the 1,500 T/R figure comes directly from a Defense Science Board report published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense in 2001. The author judged credibility of direct source material to be more authentic than the commonly cited 2,000 or 1,994 T/R figure. The latter of the three figures was determined by counting the T/R modules visually by members of the F-16.net forums. Neither the APG-77(V)1 nor the APG-77(V)2 upgrades include added T/R modules. Rather, the version one upgrade adds surface aperture radar mode and (V)2 adds commonality with the APG-81 with respect to maintenance purposes.
*The F-22 is likely able to overcome the limitations of LPI in an actual combat with the assistance of the ALR-94, sensor fusion, and tactics described by Bill Sweetman in article "The Next Generation" published in the Journal of Electronic Defense in 2000 (An online copy of the article is available in the source 41 citation courtesy of F-16.net).
*EL/M-2035 - figures are from the EL/M-2032 of which the EL/M-2035 is a derivative. Also the figure provided is the maximum detection range of the radar in an air-to-air and does not give a corresponding rcs target
*Type 1493 - the name and tracking numbers provided by Sinodefense "PLAAF Su-27/J-11 Flanker". Kopp states the J-11B radar strongly resembles the Zhuk-27 (N010) radar, the J-8II is equipped with a N010 derivative, the Zhuk-811. Numerous Chinese internet sources claim the J-11B is equipped with an AESA radar but these claims are baseless and unsubstantiated. An official SAC image (below) clearly show a mechanically scanned array within the nose of the aircraft (available on Air Power Australia website). Similarly, many Chinese internet sources claim the J-11B incorporates stealth coatings and a reduced radar cross section along with an AESA. David Shalpak, The Chinese Air Force: Evolving Concepts, Roles, and Capabilities, dismisses the reduced rcs claims (pg. 196). Clearly a great deal of misinformation exists with respect to the J-11B.
Type 1473 - The maximum detection range figures listed for the Type 1473 are from the EL/M-2032 which is arguably its closest analogue with published performance data (the Israelis supplied EL/M-2032s to China in the early 1990s which was developed into the Type 1473). The tracking and engagement figures for the Type 1473 are provided by Sinodefense.
*AN/APG-81 - 2015 service date refers to the scheduled first F-35B deployment by the USMC
Source:American Innovation: The Technological Maturity of Chinese AESA Technology & Strategic Impacts
Nice & Professional Assessment
Yes i'm quite sure j-11b has a radar more powerful than f-22 raptor or pak-fa.
So? does SU30MKI use the same AESA used on F-22? otherwise your argument has no point.
Nobody know how far China has progress on AESA capability. If China can surpass US in supercomputing technology and 5G mobile technology, there is no reason to deny the same thing on chinese AESA radar progress.
However for now it is safe to say that Chinese AESA radar is still behind US.
Due Fact the Fact J11b has No Significant Mature AESA than Russian Ones which has Generation Ahead Experience in Radar Development than Chinese
Yeah i Think you Should Go through My Previous Post Link About Chinese AESA Capability to Enlighten Yourself
Yeah i Think you Should Go through My Previous Post Link About Chinese AESA Capability to Enlighten Yourself
American Innovation: The Technological Maturity of Chinese AESA Technology & Strategic Impacts
Yeah Chinese who are still Importing Russians Engine,aircrafts,Air-defence Weapons Etc
Yeah they are Really Ahead
antonius123 said:That is your own assumption.
Superficial and reckless assumption precisely.
Russia was a generation ahead long time ago. Now it is on the other way round. You forget that China put a lot of money and resource for the R&D.
Even russian expert admit that they are behind chinese in term of avionics.
I State it From your Source only 
This Ignorant Claim is From your Part
Please Bother to read Before Posting Something your making Mockery of yourSelf on International Forums
The Shenyang J-11 (Chinese: 歼-11) with NATO reporting name: Flanker B+ is a single-seat, twin-engine, jet fighter, whose airframe is based on the Soviet-designed Sukhoi Su-27 (NATO reporting name: Flanker) air superiority fighter. It is currently manufactured by the Shenyang Aircraft Corporation. The People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) is the sole operator of the aircraft.
The J-11 was finally born in 1995 as a Chinese version of the Soviet-designed Sukhoi Su-27SK air superiority fighter after China secured a $2.5 billion production agreement which licensed China to build 200 Su-27SK aircraft using Russian-supplied kits. Under the terms of the agreement, these aircraft would be outfitted with Russian avionics, radars and engines.
Your Source :Shenyang J-11 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
PS: Like I Said Please Prepare Yourself For Technical and Factual Debate Before Coming on the Defense Forums for Self-boosting.Do Not Engage Any Senior Member Unless you got Technical Facts to Counter their Arguments
TC
NKVD
What Fact that you bring to support your claim that MKI is better?? none!
All J-11B, J-15, J-16, and J-11D are using AESA.
- A new group of photographs which shows it with a grey nose, likely an active electronically scanned array radar from the Chengdu-based 607th Institute, has emerged and may be evidence that the aircraft has undergone or plans to undergo retrofit with AESA radar.[31]
Shenyang J-11 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
- J-11D - An upgraded variant of the J-11B, featuring an AESA radar from the 14th Institute, increased use of composite materials, more radar absorbent material, two extra hardpoints, in-flight refueling probe, an upgraded WS-10 engine with FADEC, new electronic warfare systems, and a new cockpit. The J-11D uses a similar fly-by-wire system as the J-16.[38][39]
Even your source mention about it. It seems you drag a source without reading carefully - only read what you prefer to see.
Did you??
Did you read it?? or you read but cannot comprehend?? or maybe idiot??
Do you understand when people say it improve?? What make you so difficult to comprehend?
Now I am sure I am talking with an idiot
Please Bother to read Before Posting Something your making Mockery of yourSelf on International Forums
The indigenous J-11B variant incorporates various Chinese material modifications and upgrades to the airframe with improved manufacturing methods in addition to the inclusion of domestic Chinese technologies such as radar, avionics suites and weaponry,[4][5][6][7] including anti-ship and PL-12 air-to-air missiles presumably for the role of a maritime strike aircraft. The alleged reason for the sudden stop in the production line of the J-11 was because it could no longer satisfy the PLAAF's requirements,[4] due to elements such as the obsolete avionics and radar, which were structured for aerial missions.[8]
Shenyang J-11 - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Stop using big size font, it is more important that you read, comprehend and think!
STOP Humiliate your self
Since when PESA is better than AESA??
Did you improve the RCS of SU-30 with MKI, as Chinese did with J-11A and J-11B?
Stop jingoistic.
