What's new

Is PAA going for 11-ton ATAK-II with Ukrainian engines?

Imagine if PA had cooperated with Denel for a high altitude Rooivalk 2 with non-Western engines many years ago.

Missed opportunities unfortunately

Rooivalk uses French Engine

and Egypt , Brazil , İndia , Poland did not prefer Rooivalk .......
 
.
Good point, it would have required millions of dollars when Pakistan had no money. It really sucks, PA cant even get a damn helicopter that is sufficient.:(
Well, we can only look forward.

I think the optimal solution is to either work off an in-progress duo (e.g., T625 and T629) or to work on a clean-sheet one. The latter is incredibly unlikely for Pakistan, however, it gives us the opportunity to design our requirements from the get-go -- e.g., hot-and-high, preferable MTOW, etc
 
.
I agree, but I think the OP asked a question in their title and simply offered an opinion.

IMO this is a legit discussion because Pakistan is reaching a point where the next-gen stuff is either mostly unavailable, still going through development, or brand new.

If the PAA wants heavy attack helicopters, then realistically, it doesn't have any option except to wait on the Turks or Chinese.

In both cases, we're talking about programs that are under development.

Likewise, even if the PAF totally scraps AZM and says, "our NGFA will be off-the-shelf," that solution would likely be in development today (e.g., in China), and when available, a brand new design.

The cost of becoming a militarily strong power (especially with limited funds and suppliers) is that we have to deal with stuff that's under development, untested, etc.

So, if the PAA isn't going to seriously consider new projects, then it speaks to an antiquated or misplaced procurement policy.

This might explain why it went with the LY-80 -- i.e., an older SARH-based SAM -- instead of ARM-based SAMs, which other countries are doing, for example.
you have vindicated the OP now. well articulated I am sold.

by the way our Aviation branch in army is relatively small. getting light weight gunships was a big step and it must have met PAF objections. PAF overshadows both the Navy and Army airwing and argues that there is no need for dedicated combat wings for both as PAF can do that job for them and can deploy the assets whenever they are requested.
given the limited resources and very small scope of our aviation branches of army and navy I have to concede to PAF point of view. hence PAA getting a heavy gunship is an overstretch of imagination. I don't even know if its PAF or PAA that operates our male or combat drones.

if it was up to me I would make it a full corps headed by the Lt General armed with CAS fixed wing combat jets, drones and mix of heavy and light gunships given the advent of technology and the way India is being showered with Modern technology by west to fight China which it will only deploy against Pakistan. in the same principle I want PN to have its combat wing to safeguard its ground and surface assets and patrol the sea lane and free PAF from overstretching and not be encumbered. but that is for another thread.

bottom line, heavyweight gunships will make sense if PAA increases its operational scope, we have been denied big viable air transport, we requested Chinooks back in 80s but it was denied.

if PAA gets bigger share (of resources) and scope to cater for the infantry and armored corps by providing logistics and air cover then such heavy gunships will make sense.
 
.
General features:

  • With tandem cockpit
  • High ammunition carrying capacity
  • Asymmetrical weapon loading capability
  • Low IR and acoustic trace
  • Digital cockpit design
  • Modern avionics
  • High accident and ballistic resistant design
  • Ability to operate in high altitude and high temperature conditions
  • Resistant to environmental factors
  • Has a high forward speed limit
  • Advanced electronic warfare and countermeasure systems
  • High-caliber cannon, new generation 2.75 '' rocket, long-range anti-tank missiles with different guidance systems and air-to-air missile systems
  • Basic Equipment:
    • 4-axis autopilot
    • Modular avionic architecture
    • Target Detection Radar
    • Target Detection System
    • Helmet Integrated Imaging System
 
. .
Rooivalk uses French Engine

and Egypt , Brazil , İndia , Poland did not prefer Rooivalk .......
Yes, but they likely could have switched engines and would have given PAC local production for it.

Didnt Turkey want Rooivalk? I have heard that from the member denel on this forum.
 
.
you have vindicated the OP now. well articulated I am sold.

by the way our Aviation branch in army is relatively small. getting light weight gunships was a big step and it must have met PAF objections. PAF overshadows both the Navy and Army airwing and argues that there is no need for dedicated combat wings for both as PAF can do that job for them and can deploy the assets whenever they are requested.
given the limited resources and very small scope of our aviation branches of army and navy I have to concede to PAF point of view. hence PAA getting a heavy gunship is an overstretch of imagination. I don't even know if its PAF or PAA that operates our male or combat drones.

if it was up to me I would make it a full corps headed by the Lt General armed with CAS fixed wing combat jets, drones and mix of heavy and light gunships given the advent of technology and the way India is being showered with Modern technology by west to fight China which it will only deploy against Pakistan. in the same principle I want PN to have its combat wing to safeguard its ground and surface assets and patrol the sea lane and free PAF from overstretching and not be encumbered. but that is for another thread.

bottom line, heavyweight gunships will make sense if PAA increases its operational scope, we have been denied big viable air transport, we requested Chinooks back in 80s but it was denied.

if PAA gets bigger share (of resources) and scope to cater for the infantry and armored corps by providing logistics and air cover then such heavy gunships will make sense.
I agree.

Basically, Pakistan needs a 'Strategic Defence Review' type practice every 5-10 years to set and re-set tri-services and paramilitary priorities.

The PA should have been moving to a technology-centric force where aviation, air lift, and stand-off weapons play a much bigger role than today.

If someone had made that policy decision 10 or 5 years ago, we could've signed onto some in-house or joint dual/attack helicopter platform (similar to India's Dhruv and LCH, or Turkey's T625 and T629) as a solution (we'd need a lot of helicopters for air lift and deep CAS coverage).

E.g., a SDR could establish:

  • the PAA is exclusively responsible for low-altitude CAS, it needs 120 heavyweight attack helicopters;

  • the PAA must deliver an air-lift capacity for X troops and Y artillery pieces; it needs X transport helicopters;

  • the PAF is solely responsible for strategic effects both in conventional and unconventional applications, therefore it requires 100 dual-engine strike-capable fighters

This is the kind of thing the CJCSC should be working on (with input of both NDU and civilian think-tanks) and enforcing across the tri-services.

But alas... ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
 
Last edited:
.
I agree.

Basically, Pakistan needs a 'Strategic Defence Review' type practice every 5-10 years to set and re-set tri-services and paramilitary priorities.

The PA should have been moving to a technology-centric force where aviation, air lift, and stand-off weapons play a much bigger role than today.

If someone had made that policy decision 10 or 5 years ago, we could've signed onto some in-house or joint dual/attack helicopter platform (similar to India's Dhruv and LCH, or Turkey's T625 and T629) as a solution (we'd need a lot of helicopters for air lift and deep CAS coverage).

E.g., a SDR could establish:

  • the PAA is exclusively responsible for low-altitude CAS, it needs 120 heavyweight attack helicopters;

  • the PAA must deliver an air-lift capacity for X troops and Y artillery pieces; it needs X transport helicopters;

  • the PAF is solely responsible for strategic effects both in conventional and unconventional applications, therefore it requires 100 dual-engine strike-capable fighters

This is the kind of thing the CJCSC should be working on (with input of both NDU and civilian think-tanks) and enforcing across the tri-services.

But alas... ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
I agree.

Basically, Pakistan needs a 'Strategic Defence Review' type practice every 5-10 years to set and re-set tri-services and paramilitary priorities.

The PA should have been moving to a technology-centric force where aviation, air lift, and stand-off weapons play a much bigger role than today.

If someone had made that policy decision 10 or 5 years ago, we could've signed onto some in-house or joint dual/attack helicopter platform (similar to India's Dhruv and LCH, or Turkey's T625 and T629) as a solution (we'd need a lot of helicopters for air lift and deep CAS coverage).

E.g., a SDR could establish:

  • the PAA is exclusively responsible for low-altitude CAS, it needs 120 heavyweight attack helicopters;

  • the PAA must deliver an air-lift capacity for X troops and Y artillery pieces; it needs X transport helicopters;

  • the PAF is solely responsible for strategic effects both in conventional and unconventional applications, therefore it requires 100 dual-engine strike-capable fighters

This is the kind of thing the CJCSC should be working on (with input of both NDU and civilian think-tanks) and enforcing across the tri-services.

But alas... ¯\_(ツ)_/¯
A radical change of mind is needed like PAF did an unthinkable with the JF-17 project. but I must say Pak Army suffers from much more of a single minded regressive mindset run by the people belonging to a certain area of Punjab. just to get an idea what I am on about I will find you a video of Gen Tariq Khan where he was lamenting the decision to punish those who joined the army with A levels.

reminds me of a comment by @SQ8 for the baby boomer generation or its mindset that is mind locked in their time and still think that a conventional strategy of using large formations of men without modern and mobile support will suffice facing off Indian mechanized and air assault.
A family friend of mine was in Engineers and when he was deployed in Bahawalpur he said that they were supposed to face off the Indian Harrier jump jets that were going to rain Nepalm bombs on them and all they had were their G3s and the "Iman" of their strategy makers.

just like it was deemed to expensive to fence of PAF base until a boar caused a crash to our F-16, I think our baby boomer generation (or their offspring) think that making smart, small highly mobile and mechanized units instead of static wall of men in trenches is too expensive or complex.
I definitely want a more mobile and better equipped infantry and Armour corps that have a constant short notice support from our aviation without much delay and wait from chain in command to rally the message first to local HQ and then to center and then through the liaison to the PAF HQ and then to their individual airbase to send over air support (requisition trail is just a crude example for the sake of concept).
a better bigger PAA with heavy transport both rotary and fixed wing supported by its own capable heavy/ light combat wing of gunships and drones will save precious time that can mean a difference in success or failure and saving or losing thousands of lives of ground troops and battle space.
 
.
Imagine if PA had cooperated with Denel for a high altitude Rooivalk 2 with non-Western engines many years ago.

Missed opportunities unfortunately :mad:

South Africa can't make an engine. Their Rooivalk uses French engine.
and Egypt , Brazil , İndia , Poland did not prefer Rooivalk .......

Mostly due to politics. South Africa is not a country with a great deal of influence.
 
. .
A radical change of mind is needed like PAF did an unthinkable with the JF-17 project. but I must say Pak Army suffers from much more of a single minded regressive mindset run by the people belonging to a certain area of Punjab. just to get an idea what I am on about I will find you a video of Gen Tariq Khan where he was lamenting the decision to punish those who joined the army with A levels.

reminds me of a comment by @SQ8 for the baby boomer generation or its mindset that is mind locked in their time and still think that a conventional strategy of using large formations of men without modern and mobile support will suffice facing off Indian mechanized and air assault.
A family friend of mine was in Engineers and when he was deployed in Bahawalpur he said that they were supposed to face off the Indian Harrier jump jets that were going to rain Nepalm bombs on them and all they had were their G3s and the "Iman" of their strategy makers.

just like it was deemed to expensive to fence of PAF base until a boar caused a crash to our F-16, I think our baby boomer generation (or their offspring) think that making smart, small highly mobile and mechanized units instead of static wall of men in trenches is too expensive or complex.
I definitely want a more mobile and better equipped infantry and Armour corps that have a constant short notice support from our aviation without much delay and wait from chain in command to rally the message first to local HQ and then to center and then through the liaison to the PAF HQ and then to their individual airbase to send over air support (requisition trail is just a crude example for the sake of concept).
a better bigger PAA with heavy transport both rotary and fixed wing supported by its own capable heavy/ light combat wing of gunships and drones will save precious time that can mean a difference in success or failure and saving or losing thousands of lives of ground troops and battle space.
Let's not forget our multiple paramilitary organizations -- why not re-organize Frontier Corps, Rangers, etc into one single 'National Guard' with an expertise in CT/COIN, HADR, SAR, etc?

If the military is worried, then said National Guard can fall under the MoD as an appendage to the armed forces, i.e., enabling for smooth two-way movement of officers and men. Ironically, a 'National Guard' may have an easier time getting US aid and equipment due to its very focused mandate.
 
.
A radical change of mind is needed like PAF did an unthinkable with the JF-17 project. but I must say Pak Army suffers from much more of a single minded regressive mindset run by the people belonging to a certain area of Punjab. just to get an idea what I am on about I will find you a video of Gen Tariq Khan where he was lamenting the decision to punish those who joined the army with A levels.

reminds me of a comment by @SQ8 for the baby boomer generation or its mindset that is mind locked in their time and still think that a conventional strategy of using large formations of men without modern and mobile support will suffice facing off Indian mechanized and air assault.
A family friend of mine was in Engineers and when he was deployed in Bahawalpur he said that they were supposed to face off the Indian Harrier jump jets that were going to rain Nepalm bombs on them and all they had were their G3s and the "Iman" of their strategy makers.

just like it was deemed to expensive to fence of PAF base until a boar caused a crash to our F-16, I think our baby boomer generation (or their offspring) think that making smart, small highly mobile and mechanized units instead of static wall of men in trenches is too expensive or complex.
I definitely want a more mobile and better equipped infantry and Armour corps that have a constant short notice support from our aviation without much delay and wait from chain in command to rally the message first to local HQ and then to center and then through the liaison to the PAF HQ and then to their individual airbase to send over air support (requisition trail is just a crude example for the sake of concept).
a better bigger PAA with heavy transport both rotary and fixed wing supported by its own capable heavy/ light combat wing of gunships and drones will save precious time that can mean a difference in success or failure and saving or losing thousands of lives of ground troops and battle space.
The change cannot only come within the military and has to transcend into society itself. If a young LT is brought up his entire life on “Inshallah” alone then despite his hard work he will gravitate towards the mediocre mindset.

We have too many nutjobs who believe that somehow “victory” came to the rag tag bearded ones with just an AK, shawl and water bottle - but if one looks at the hell hole that is Afghanistan with the lowest HDI and generally miserable life then that “victory” means naught.

Eventually, even our military cleared out all the rag tags from our territory and given the ROEs of the Russians in Syria the US would have prevailed in AFG as well.

This G3 +Iman goes against everything in the Quran and Prophet’s life that refers to warfare and nation building but has been unfortunately drilled into the national psyche.

The new generation either learns to differentiate between what is religion and what is ancillary dogma or they will be left repeating the same mistakes.

That simply cannot be expected outright from the military since “Yes Sir!” Is a matter of cohesion and survival with discipline an integral requirement.

So - if change is to be implemented(taking liberty and copying some paragraphs from articles which reflect my message and limitations of typing from a cell phone)

1. The hybrid nature of our R&D needs to give additional responsibility to civilian subject matter experts with military becoming more and more of the engaged customer rather than customer owner. Perhaps the most hidden (and sometimes forgotten) enabler of rapid acquisition is a highly skilled workforce which more often than not for R&D is not someone in uniform. However, the uniform needs to tell them what they want to solve X problem which the civilian cannot define on their own.


2. Strict implementation of best project management procedures with qualified personnel both in and out of uniform. The officer in charge of the attack helicopter procurement should ideally know everything there is regarding the requirements, budget, stakeholders involved, manage the scope and perform traceability for all milestones. Evidence cites that the PAF and certainly some in the military have informal knowledge of this but whether it is a formalized education separate from standard courses and not derived is unknown.


3. Change the fundamental incentive patterns that reward gold-plated or poorly thought-out requirements. Things change overnight and so should staff requirements - India doing something or not doing something should not and can not be the primary determinant to military requirements. For e.g, Active troops can be reduced and reserves increased with a focus on using them for NDA response instead of active forces which are kept focused on the borders.

4. Focus on increasing the speed of developing and fielding systems is needed to some degree. Programs that are behind schedule often exhibit other troubling program management and technology development problems. Slow cycle times can also yield platforms that are outdated when they are finally fielded. Is this becoming the case with the SPADA or HQ-7?, which is based of 1980’s tech for 90’s requirements and fielded for 2010’s threats. Speed was essential to rapidly fielding needed equipment like MRAPs during the peak of WoT, where the enemy was exploiting capability gaps and killing hundreds of our troops every year. Some measure of speed in developing and fielding military equipment is clearly necessary but this has to be balanced so useless items aren’t procured or developed whether by contrived champions or corrupt parties.

5. Allow approachability in terms of ideas - almost like a secret shopper this technique means that for each project the stakeholders come from all levels and their opinions matter. In other words, you collect a LT’s analysis and present it to a 2 star without rank or name - just reference to role. That 2-star is compelled to look at the analysis along with all others. The result is that good ideas dont get all lost due to rank or seniority as it is in todays “Badtameez aadmi jawab deta hai” Pakistani society. It is a regressive mentality in our society to simply not speak up to elders outside of family settings which leads to myopic input into decision making.
Plenty of other aspects exist which Ive oft repeated regarding corruption but the easiest way is to take it electronic and advise what the winning bid was and who won it.
 
.

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom