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I have already address this concern

Mesh alloy nets deployed when entrances are closed would be set at specific angles and would pre-detonate PGMs or CMs before they could hit the blast doors at the entrance. Much like cage armour on tank.

Furthermore that is the fail safe mechanism, in addition there would also be CIWS, SOHRADs, Mobin and such covering the short range air defenses of the facility key areas (entrances/ventilation shafts/electrical systems)

The concern that these would be put out of operation are far overblown considering how vulnerable Iran’s airfields are in a prolonged conflict.

China’s built nuclear proof Air Force shelters and bases in anticipation of war with with USA in 60’s and 70’s.
Short of heavy EW over the sites, their shouldn't be much of an issue to intercept GBU series bunker busters munitions.
 
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opening of the runways from under-mountain bases are set opposite to the direction of threat with the giant mountains providing impregnable cover. This strategy saves the runway opening from being attacked with a direct BM/CM/SOW attack. Like e.g. to hide such tunnel opening from PGCC and Turkey, the opening should be guarded against both directions by Mountains and open towards North from where a small RCS interceptor can come out make a climb at 50000+ ft/min and turn towards the battle theatre, get coordinates from IADS's and fire away its BVR missiles to disrupt the invading party.

the only way for the enemy to attack such a place will be to use highly maneuverable loitering drones that somehow have to breach through already airborne interceptors and IADS of Iran.
 
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opening of the runways from under-mountain bases are set opposite to the direction of threat with the giant mountains providing impregnable cover. This strategy saves the runway opening from being attacked with a direct BM/CM/SOW attack. Like e.g. to hide such tunnel opening from PGCC and Turkey, the opening should be guarded against both directions by Mountains and open towards North from where a small RCS interceptor can come out make a climb at 50000+ ft/min and turn towards the battle theatre, get coordinates from IADS's and fire away its BVR missiles to disrupt the invading party.

the only way for the enemy to attack such a place will be to use highly maneuverable loitering drones that somehow have to breach through already airborne interceptors and IADS of Iran.
Could you not use CMs that can be pre-programed with a flight path that allows to take a wide & slow turn to strike the entrance.
 
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Could you not use CMs that can be pre-programed with a flight path that allows to take a wide & slow turn to strike the entrance.

that will require a long-range and highly maneuverable CM/SOW which regional enemies do not have.

Even if at some point they do purchase such a formidable weapon, because of its trajectory, it will have a higher chance of being shot down by IADS than something that has to target a tunnel opening up front with no natural cover.
 
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I have already address this concern

Mesh alloy nets deployed when entrances are closed would be set at specific angles and would pre-detonate PGMs or CMs before they could hit the blast doors at the entrance. Much like cage armour on tank.

Furthermore that is the fail safe mechanism, in addition there would also be CIWS, SOHRADs, Mobin and such covering the short range air defenses of the facility key areas (entrances/ventilation shafts/electrical systems)

The concern that these would be put out of operation are far overblown considering how vulnerable Iran’s airfields are in a prolonged conflict.

China’s built nuclear proof Air Force shelters and bases in anticipation of war with with USA in 60’s and 70’s.
first those mesh alloys don't detonate the bunker buster bomb because they simply are not stronger than the frontal part of bombs , if you search the net you will see a lot of videos that show how bunker busters rip through such measurement as id they are paper
those facilities are in mountain areas and so those shorads have very limited detection range as the mountain itself will block those CIWS..
in warfare the first strike is more important , you think those airfields are wolunerable then use 1/100 of the money you want to spend on those underground base for fixing those airfields.
a 60-70 technology when there was no PGM.
Sweden used BAS-90 strategy to counter USSR first strike threat in 80s and they again thinking implementing it again

its what they did in 1945
swaf-bases1945.png

in the end of cold war
swaf-airbases.png


and i believe that's the best way to protect interceptors, if you like underground bases , use it for your strike aircraft not fighters , those fighters must be ready to fly at given notice m you can't afford don't have access to it and by what i see iran store its strike platforms in those underground bases as Missiles and Drones are strike equipment , you never see 3rd of Khordad or Bavar stored in those facilities and so you will never see any interceptor there
 
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Short of heavy EW over the sites, their shouldn't be much of an issue to intercept GBU series bunker busters munitions.
you are completely wrong . your assumption is that there will be only one or two . no there be a lot more and only one is enough . on other hand what i say even if they send one thousand it will be divided between hundreds of targets not 4-5 target the density will be a lot lower and it will be a lot easier to intercept them
opening of the runways from under-mountain bases are set opposite to the direction of threat with the giant mountains providing impregnable cover. This strategy saves the runway opening from being attacked with a direct BM/CM/SOW attack. Like e.g. to hide such tunnel opening from PGCC and Turkey, the opening should be guarded against both directions by Mountains and open towards North from where a small RCS interceptor can come out make a climb at 50000+ ft/min and turn towards the battle theatre, get coordinates from IADS's and fire away its BVR missiles to disrupt the invading party.
those weapons not only can do 180 degree u-turn before strike they can do 720 degree even more , the draw back is their range will be reduced
and there is no hiding them from the eye of satellites
 
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I care zero for the personal opinions of people, I care for numbers and real evidence. Political affiliations has nothing to do with the evidence at hand which matters. Rest does not.

Tom Cooper's claims regarding inner lobbyism in IRIAF and MoD is supported by the fact that we have seen multiple meaningless good for nothing projects getting funded. According to him that is because of lobbyism.

Examples:

-F-7N offers nothing due to its short range, lack of any decent radar, avionics, no good weapon yet the plane is not being retired and some group (its handling squadrons?) have the balls to waste $ on its continuous overhauls and paintjobs. In a conflict these will serve as sitting ducks for enemies. We have seen its wings, VS being made inside Iran.

-Mirage F1 fleet is even worst than F-7N since the fleet has no radar, weapons or even the pylon to carry weapons. Why is it being overhauled and kept alive is beyond logic. Plane has virtually no value except for jet based aerial tourism perhaps.

F-5E/F fleet has 45-50 years old avionics yet the fleet is not being dismantled to provide help in Saegheh/Kowsar pproduction. They can barely track a F-4 size fighter at ~36 KM with their antique APQ153 (search upgraded). Good luck in a conflict against F-16V, F-18, EF-2000. Then somebody wasted money and years on Saegheh testbeds calling them in production fighters while they were just practice platforms for HESA to test/practice their manufacturing skills on. 6 airframes were wasted on that PR stunt, before that 3 were wasted on Azarakhsh, what could have been achieved by just 1-2 airframes.

All the while the actual fighters that we need are facing severe $ shortages.

- 60 airframes of F-14A yet only 34 are flyable. Only 10-16 are F-14AM upgraded which have the duty to .. get this .. provide Quick Reaction Alert from 4 TABs. Stretched out force !
- 23 airframes of MIG-29 fleet lack ARH BVR, E-warfare suites, they fly with MIG-23ML's radar
- Saegheh/Kowsar program is moving very slow despite the fact that these fighters can provide lots of value in E-warfare CAPs.
- No local light weight BVR
- Delayed local modern WVR
- Delayed Turbofans for next generation of Saeghe/Kowsar

Now Tom Cooper, BT, Cordesman may all be Zionists but these above written words are facts that we saw with our own eyes. We can sit here and call eveyone a liar but can we deny what we ourselves are seeing ? I would not.
Unfortunately everything you listed is not ‘data’. You have access to ‘data’ only if you have access to the item of interest. Everything else is ‘editorial’ based on someone else’s access to data or their personal reasoning and bent.

Barring access, the only thing you and I can rely on other’s editorials (which immediately subjects us to challenges that are hard to overcome—like exactly how you’re being validly challenged here) or rely on our own mind experiments and power of incremental deductive reasoning (which again is hit and miss and again subjects us to challenges)..

So no, you can’t make the claim that you are ‘data’ driven if you don’t have access to data.

And finally, imagery is also a good source if demonstrably untouched.

But to drive the point home, a great recent example is the JWST ‘chorizo’. Caution your ‘data’ are often ‘chorizos’ especially when it comes to matters discussed here:

 
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those weapons not only can do 180 degree u-turn before strike they can do 720 degree even more , the draw back is their range will be reduced
and there is no hiding them from the eye of satellites

The range will be reduced so will speed meaning the IADS will find it much easier to search, track and engage. Taking coordinates of such a hidden target covered by Mountains is also difficult for PGCC if we take out Sats out of the equation.

Iran can hide top notch upgraded further upgraded F-14AM (Maghsoud, Azarakhsh), future Kowsar-II inside these tunnels to quickly pop out guarded by mountains, making a fast climb and turn towards enemy with TDl provided data to engage invaders.
 
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Unfortunately everything you listed is not ‘data’. You have access to ‘data’ only if you have access to the item of interest. Everything else is ‘editorial’ based on someone else’s access to data or their personal reasoning and bent.

Barring access, the only thing you and I can rely on other’s editorials (which immediately subjects us to challenges that are hard to overcome—like exactly how you’re being validly challenged here) or rely on our own mind experiments and power of incremental deductive reasoning (which again is hit and miss and again subjects us to challenges)..

So no, you can’t make the claim that you are ‘data’ driven if you don’t have access to data.

F-7N flying with 3rd generation avionics, tiny Sy-80 radar or Mirage F1 never been see with a pylon let alone a A2A missile (except for one flight 20 years ago) has nothing to do with data, these are universally known facts. F-5E/F fleet is flying with 55 years old APQ-153 is a fact too. These are not someones opinions these are facts unless we start believing that IRIAF is hiding secret weapons and modern level avionics in its Chinese or Shahi era fighter's noses for which we have zero evidence.

Unlike that we have seen F-14AM upgradation resulting into plane tracking and firing local LR-BVR Fakour-90, Kowsar-I's modern avionics package or Dowran F-4E/D upgrade so we have visual evidence of those changes being made. The 130 x benign fleet of Mirages, F-7N and F-5 have no such upgradations, why are these fighters alive in IRIAF is beyond logic. Tom C and BT claim lobbyism so they could be true .... Or .... they are zionist liars. Make of it as you will.

And finally, imagery is also a good source if demonstrably untouched.

IRIAF is one of the most camera-friendly AF in the world so serial number verifications are the easiest.

The entire Wiki of AF's around the globe cites "World Air Forces" which provides number count by serial number imagery. They are unbiased and never wrong. They counted Saegheh-I/II as 6 testbeds/fighters (5 F-5E, 1 F-5F) some 7 years ago when some officials in Iran were claiming "Mass production" of fleet. Now after almost a decade we have the same magic digit of "6" weapon less fighters at our hand. Same goes for MIG fleet which stands at 23 fighters. They are never wrong.
 
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I found some old images, now I Will post Iranian ARH and SARH seekers and Russian ARH and SARH seekers for Buk and A2A missiles just for comparation
View attachment 874305View attachment 874306View attachment 874307

First 3 images are Iranian seekers, there are ARH seekers(on right side) and SARH(left) ... And 4th one is Buk SARH ,5th and 6th ARH
View attachment 874308View attachment 874309View attachment 874310

Here is good comparation of two seekers for Buk, built by Agat... Left SARH
( 9E420 digital CW dual plane monopulse semiactive radar homing seeker)
On right:also Agat ARGS monopulse active radar homing seeker for Buk missiles
View attachment 874316



None of these are Fakour-90's seekers. The above pics are of the Khordad system which is a product of IAIO-IEI while Fakour-90 comes from Babaei Group (Ex Shahid Kazemi Industries, banned being related to IRGC's IRSSJO). Two separate Entities. Fact remains that Fakour-90 terminal guidance has never been clarified. Authors like BT claims SARH with based upon its origin of AIM-23C / Shalamche. We will need officially released stats/slides to confirm the truth.

PS. Can you post the above pics in Aryobarzan's Iranian aviation products thread? we are gathering data there.
 
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The range will be reduced so will speed meaning the IADS will find it much easier to search, track and engage. Taking coordinates of such a hidden target covered by Mountains is also difficult for PGCC if we take out Sats out of the equation.

Iran can hide top notch upgraded further upgraded F-14AM (Maghsoud, Azarakhsh), future Kowsar-II inside these tunnels to quickly pop out guarded by mountains, making a fast climb and turn towards enemy with TDl provided data to engage invaders.
as i said enemy won\t send one two or 10 of the missile , when they wanted to hit a warehouse in syria they sent more than 40.
as i said both IRGC and army only put strike equipment inside the tunnels no defensive equipment will go there, the reason is what i said and the fact that how fast you can send aircraft out of these tunnels , you can do it faster from normal airbases

Taking coordinates of such a hidden target covered by Mountains is also difficult for PGCC if we take out Sats out of the equation.
the war with Iraq showed for how long those Sats stayed out of equation , only for the first year that we were only trying to stop iraq advance , when we start counter attack their data were given to Iraq
 
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a 60-70 technology when there was no PGM.

Yeah in 60’s and 70’s there was something called nuclear bomb. Maybe you heard of it, it was going to be used against hardened C & C bases and other HVT targets.

China built their underground airforce bases in mountains with nuclear proof strike because they believed US wouldn’t hestitate to use nukes. They were right, recent declassified Pentagon war plans against China back in the Cold War included open acknowledgement of the possibility of nuclear bombs being used on Chinese targets.

Also the only bunker buster that can affect new generation (post Fordow) Iranian underground sites is the MOAB which can realistically only be carried by the B-2 during war time in hostile airspace. Sending a B-52 or C-130 would be a death sentence.

Lastly these tunnels all have pressurized blast doors at X meters for a reason. You won’t be able to cause a concussive blast wave from the entrance to create a tunneling effect and reach deeper into the base, thus the Bunker buster will have to dropped more on the mountain if you want a deeper hit inside the base. And that means more bedrock to cut thru = less probability of penetration.

Pre-Fordow, Iran designed Fordow assuming the bunker buster bombs of early 2000’s +- a margin of error. Debatable if Fordow is truly nuke proof. However, US ended up building bigger bunker busters. Thus Iran when it came to designing Missile bases and the next gen nuclear enrichment hall + centrifuge parts facility (currently being built), built them to withstand a tactical nuclear strike.

So I do trust Iranian military engineers in this regard over us amateurs on a military forum.

Pataramesh agrees with my assessment btw



and i believe that's the best way to protect interceptors, if you like underground bases , use it for your strike aircraft not fighters , those fighters must be ready to fly at given notice m you can't afford don't have access to it and by what i see iran store its strike platforms in those underground bases as Missiles and Drones are strike equipment , you never see 3rd of Khordad or Bavar stored in those facilities and so you will never see any interceptor there

This makes zero sense. First Strike aircraft don’t exist in modern Iranian military philosophy to a significant degree they are replaced by missiles. This isn’t a land invasion of Iran and your enemy (US or Israel) will not be right next to Iran that you can fly over to their country and bomb their targets a la Iraq war.

Iran‘s most important DEFENSIVE task during a war is to protect the skies and take the strain off Iran’s air defense systems from shouldering all the burden and getting exposed. Because if Iran’s air defense rings collapse than it doesn’t matter how many missiles you have, the war is going to leave Iran a bloody mess and will not end in a ceasefire on Iranian terms.

I don’t understand why you cannot understand this basic military premise. It’s shocking you were even in the military (or military police) it seems you lack basic military planning.
 
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