gambit
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In principle, every form of defense is tacitly 'access denial'. Even the often mocked Maginot Line was one such. Whether it is technically effective or that an adversary can refuse to meet it -- is a different issue.That is exactly what @PeeD tried to explain. That is called access denial. Whether you abort your mission and turn away because you touched an EM wall or you try to go around it and infiltrate the gaps, the system has made you change your behaviour.
A change of behavior is not necessarily a bad thing, but it is worse for the defender if that adversary is determined to find a way to penetrate the defenses.
Of course Iran would know. We fully expect Iran to know of those gaps.And what makes you think Iran doesn't know about those gaps of its own system?
But not necessarily give you the win.Believe me being short on fancy equipment has an interesting effect on you: It makes your smarter.
Breaking the rules. Thinking outside of the box. Etc...Then you should never go to war with nations who have a habit of braking rules. You should also never use an RPG-7 to shoot down a chopper but we did during war with Iraq and actually it worked very well.
Or you should not go after multi thousand ton destroyer with 30' speed boat. But now it doesn't seem like a bad idea at all.
You will find a lot of Dani's in Iran.
We are not interested in jargon and catchy phrases.
Now the debunking begins...Your F-22s are flying near Iranian borders all the time. What makes you think that those "ambiguous" readings have not been recorded and incorporated into Iran's radar software?
You have the wrong understanding of the word 'ambiguous' to start. Then you are confused between 'signal' and 'signature'. They are COMPLETELY different aspects of a target in radar detection. Anything can be a signal, but it takes specific items to be a signature.
Every radar system sees a body as a cluster of voltage spikes. The greater the contrast between the cluster and background, the easier it is for the radar to classify the TOTALITY of the cluster as a radar signal.
Further, target body complexity contribute to that classification. Or so it seems prior to the advent of 'stealthy' designs.
In designing a radar low observability body, three rules, or more like guidance, should be observed.
Control of :
- Quantity of radiators
- Array of radiators
- Modes of radiation
Prior to the advent of 'stealth', none of those rules were observed, leading to complex bodies that truly contribute to the ease of which a radar can classify those bodies as legitimate of un-ambiguous signals or targets.
A 'signature' implies uniqueness, like how your handwriting is unique. Each Boeing 727 is a unique body, but as a model, all 727s are relatively the same as they have common major structures. So for a radar system that sees a cluster of voltage spikes, like the graphic above, day after day, or even hour after hour, you can program your radar to classify an aircraft as a 727 or 737 or 747 or a Citation or a Beech. You do not even need manufacturer's assistance. You see these jets every hr of every day. You can even program your radar to filter out -- ignore -- lower RCS structures on each jet. So for a 727, you can program your radar to seek for a huge voltage spike like that created by the empennage and engines.
This would constitute a unique SIGNATURE for the 727 and would allow the radar to create a valid SIGNAL for display.
For a 747, it should be easy to envision a cluster of voltage spikes that contains four major spikes in a relatively aligned fashion and that would be the four engines on the wings. Every major airliner have a vertical and two horizontal stabs configuration, so this would be a common signature, but the four engines and a front end bulge are unique to the 747. So you can program your radar to filter out lower RCS structures and can still recognize that body as a 747.
This would constitute a unique SIGNATURE for the 747 and would allow the radar to create a valid SIGNAL for display.
You can do this for an F-15 or an A-10 or a Tornado. All complex bodies that are NOT obedient to the three rules above.
The B-2, the F-117, F-22, and F-35 are obedient to the above control rules, making them low radar observable or 'stealthy'.
That is not to say they do not have unique signatures but they are not obligate to give you those unique signatures. That is YOUR burden to create them via your own hardware.
What this mean is that regardless of whether a complex body is 'stealthy' or not, the real signature will NEVER match the perceived signature created by the seeking radar. This is applicable even in the visual spectrum. If you stand 10 meters away from an F-15, your eyes will not be able to discern out the individual panel fasteners so your brain will not create a visual signature that contains those fasteners, so essentially, you are already wrong about the F-15 to some degrees because the real F-15 have a signature that contains all those fasteners. Radar shares the same flaw with you.
So right from the beginning, regardless of whether you use long wavelengths or not, any perceived signature you create will be ambiguous because the 'stealthy' shaping made it difficult for your radar to discern even the major structures.
If you have an ambiguous signature, you cannot have an un-ambiguous signal. This is not an alternate universe with different laws of physics and logic.
You said: "What makes you think that those "ambiguous" readings have not been recorded and incorporated into Iran's radar software?"
An ambiguous radar return means an un-trackable or an unstable signal. It does not mean an un-detectable signal. You detected it. The problem from 'stealth' is that the radar managed to create a signal, from some RCS structures, one second, but failed to create a signal on the next second, and so on. This is what make a 'stealthy' body an ambiguous signal.
Your radar may detect -- over one week -- a cluster of ambiguous signals at 20,000 ft at 0800 hr and 1400 hr.
So what ?
You are going to program your radar to look for a cluster of ambiguous signals at 20,000 ft ? What good will that do ? This is a combat aircraft, not a predictable airliner on airport approach under strict ground control. When something is predictable, you can write codes, procedures, rules, and regulations. But just because a four-ship formation of F-22 is predictable this week, what make you think they will be predictable next week ? Because NATO forced Vega-31 ( F-117 ) to be predictable, thereby made it easier to be shot down, the US is going to force the F-22 to be equally predictable so Iranian air defense can shoot it down ?
This is why I believe you were confused between 'signature' and 'signal' when you made that statement.
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