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Iran's SAM Coverage

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This is the first of a 2 part post focusing on the current and future of Iran's air defence coverage, based on current basing and air defence sites.

Background

I will be relying on work done by Sean O'Connor of IMINT & Analysis blog (he now works for IHS Janes) who already identified existing sites, and in essence modernising the record of what systems are occupying these sites.

But we must first, still, look at the old picture provided by Sean, from his old blog.







As you can see, the majority of Iran's air defences in 2010 were outdated. HAWK and HQ-2/Sayyad-1 made up the majority of Iran's medium range air defences. 2K12 Kub and the only modern type, the TOR-M1E, made up short and very short range air defences (VSHORAD) components of the Iranian air defences. 7 S-200 sites (with 2 S-200 missiles on launch rails each) made up the very long range component of the IRIADF.

For the full analysis of Iran's old network, read Sean O'Connor's analysis here.

Follow the link below for the current air defence analysis!

http://irangeomil.blogspot.com/2017/08/irans-sam-coverage.html

@PeeD and @eagle2007 would appreciate any additions or comments you guys may have.

Even Baluchistan has S-200's so I would say this map is quite incorrect!
 
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While there are no SAM sites in the East, Iran could have easily moved the Electronic assets required for taking down the RQ-170 to the East (since I believe it had done multiple missions already and Iran had to plan its capture).

Moreover, just because Iran there are 5000 air defence points doesn't mean there are 5000 SAM sites. That 5000 includes every radar (which can include early warning radar, acquisition radar, engagement radar, and height finder radar), AAA gun, and probably every individual missile launcher/TEL.

I kindly invite you to search for 5000 SAM sites in Iran and then criticise others' supposed naivety.
can you give me one logical reason for not having any sam sites in the east?!
what's the point of having hundreds of surveillance locations in the east when you have nothing to fire with?! gonna move the sams after spotting too?! though you even denied the existence of surveillance sites by saying "Iran could have easily moved the Electronic assets required for taking down the RQ-170 to the East"!
That map is a joke, I mean it, literally, even I through my general info know sam sites which are not in that map, let alone the hidden sites.
 
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Even Baluchistan has S-200's so I would say this map is quite incorrect!

Well then show me and I will add it to the map! That's why I asked for additions and comments.

can you give me one logical reason for not having any sam sites in the east?!

Because Iran doesn't have enemy countries in the east. Pakistan, Afghanistan etc. historically have not been enemy countries.

A lot of you guys seem to forget that Iran's SAM sites are old. The Hawk sites have been around since before the revolution. The HQ-2 and S-200s were all bought when Saddam was still around (I think, but am not sure, that the HQ-2s were bought in the war).

what's the point of having hundreds of surveillance locations in the east when you have nothing to fire with?!

Because many of Iran's static early warning radars are American radars from before the revolution. At that time we actually had a proper air force and SAMs were less important for air defence.

though you even denied the existence of surveillance sites by saying "Iran could have easily moved the Electronic assets required for taking down the RQ-170 to the East"!

I said "electronic assets", not radars. By electronic assets I mean electronic warfare assets that could be used to hack or otherwise trick the RQ-170 into our territory. Like the Avtobaza system.

That map is a joke, I mean it, literally, even I through my general info know sam sites which are not in that map, let alone the hidden sites

Show me then!

I already told everyone, I only looked at SAM sites that Sean O'Connor had identified in his 2010 analysis. Even if I had looked for more sites, I wouldn't have published them, because unlike Sean I don't want everyone to know where Iran's SAM sites are, for OPSEC reasons.
 
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Well then show me and I will add it to the map! That's why I asked for additions and comments.
put Iran's map in front of yourself, put each square meter within at least one of those circles.


Because Iran doesn't have enemy countries in the east. Pakistan, Afghanistan etc. historically have not been enemy countries.
oh boy, you forgot our friendly neighbor in east, west, south and north! it's name is United States of America.
iran-usmap.jpg


Because many of Iran's static early warning radars are American radars from before the revolution. At that time we actually had a proper air force and SAMs were less important for air defence.
I'm talking about today, either you believe that we have no radar in the east, or you believe we have radars but don't have the sams!


Show me then!

I already told everyone, I only looked at SAM sites that Sean O'Connor had identified in his 2010 analysis. Even if I had looked for more sites, I wouldn't have published them, because unlike Sean I don't want everyone to know where Iran's SAM sites are, for OPSEC reasons.
well, open up google map, search "Iran air defense", it's impossible you would miss it. almost all Iranian who go to Asalooyeh or cross it will pass through the front of this sam site. if you ask the locals they will tell you stories about undergrounds and mountains!

but a brotherly advise, don't waste your time, location of our sites isn't something some overseas guy (friend or foe) could find. it's a primary concept for surprise element.
 
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right now Iran air defense forces have stretched in 5000 locations, it was 3600 locations in 2013.
this article is for those naive enough to think they know anything about Iran's air defense forces.


Yeah, like this one:
iran-december-2011-rq-170.n.jpg

Apparently you have reading comprehension problems. I said fighter jets flying low at high speed. Not a UAV flying at 45,000 feet at 500 mph.

Furthermore, it is beyond stupid to have radar coverage and not SAM coverage. Enemies will exploit this and try to stay in the blind spots of radars and when they need to deploy electronic warfare to jam signals.

Let's not act like Iran's air defense is impenetrable even during the revolution the US was able to land several helicopters in Iranian airspace. Back then Iran had the latest radars of its time as well.

Iran's Air defense certaintely has improved in last decade, but more improvements must be made.
 
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oh boy, you forgot our friendly neighbor in east, west, south and north! it's name is United States of America.
iran-usmap.jpg

Before 1979 we didn't face this threat, and besides, the major threat is from the south and west. From the US Navy and Saudi in the south, and Israel in the west. US presence in Pakistan and Afghanistan is not a major threat to Iran (though it isn't a non-threat).

I'm talking about today, either you believe that we have no radar in the east, or you believe we have radars but don't have the sams!

I didn't say we don't have radars in the east.

Even though we are talking today, Iran's current military is heavily made up of its old military. Especially American systems from before revolution and Russian/Chinese systems from 1980s & 90s. Air Defence is no exception.

well, open up google map, search "Iran air defense", it's impossible you would miss it

Not in the east...

gh7AV8c.jpg


almost all Iranian who go to Asalooyeh or cross it will pass through the front of this sam site.

Also not in the east.

but a brotherly advise, don't waste your time, location of our sites isn't something some overseas guy (friend or foe) could find. it's a primary concept for surprise element.

Anything on the surface can be found in Google Earth, with enough time.

Furthermore, it is beyond stupid to have radar coverage and not SAM coverage.
Not necessarily. Iran, like most countries, focuses its SAM sites in strategic locations like Tehran, Bandar Abbas, Esfahan, Bushehr etc. This way, military power is not spread thin.

I foresee Iran investing in more military resources in protecting Chabahar as that area becomes more strategically important. The obvious one is Chabahar port. That will become economically important as a major port. As Iran looks to expand its A2/AD range, it may want to position naval and even air forces (the latter being long term) in Chabahar. There is also a large satellite launch site being built. Sooner or later this will require better air defence capacity.
 
.
This is the first of a 2 part post focusing on the current and future of Iran's air defence coverage, based on current basing and air defence sites.

Background

I will be relying on work done by Sean O'Connor of IMINT & Analysis blog (he now works for IHS Janes) who already identified existing sites, and in essence modernising the record of what systems are occupying these sites.

But we must first, still, look at the old picture provided by Sean, from his old blog.







As you can see, the majority of Iran's air defences in 2010 were outdated. HAWK and HQ-2/Sayyad-1 made up the majority of Iran's medium range air defences. 2K12 Kub and the only modern type, the TOR-M1E, made up short and very short range air defences (VSHORAD) components of the Iranian air defences. 7 S-200 sites (with 2 S-200 missiles on launch rails each) made up the very long range component of the IRIADF.

For the full analysis of Iran's old network, read Sean O'Connor's analysis here.

Follow the link below for the current air defence analysis!

http://irangeomil.blogspot.com/2017/08/irans-sam-coverage.html

@PeeD and @eagle2007 would appreciate any additions or comments you guys may have.

I made this amateurish map base on available info on the net , in eastern parts of country at least we have 5 TAB that base on O'Connor's analysis have no SAM site to protect themselves , or the other facilities like nuclear facilities and ... I even didn't add Iran BM bases or other military related sites ....

Iran_location_map.jpg


Iran_location_map3.jpg
 
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Well then show me and I will add it to the map! That's why I asked for additions and comments.



Because Iran doesn't have enemy countries in the east. Pakistan, Afghanistan etc. historically have not been enemy countries.

A lot of you guys seem to forget that Iran's SAM sites are old. The Hawk sites have been around since before the revolution. The HQ-2 and S-200s were all bought when Saddam was still around (I think, but am not sure, that the HQ-2s were bought in the war).


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Iran's Air Defense bases in Sistan Baluchestan is far more extensive than you think!


Iran is building a large Blue Water Naval port there & it may take over a decade to completely finish it but Iran already has an extensive network of Air Defense bases there!

Also, as you go up Iran's eastern boarder there are extensive military bases like in Iran Shahr and surrounding cities where Iran keeps everything from HELO's, Tanks to Missile bases there

And honestly I don't want to put out a lot of the info I know! Why would I?
 
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Good analysis, of course limited by basing on SOCs old and sometimes wrong analysis for opsec reasons.

Some points that SOC missed: Iran only bases a early conflict detachment of its static SAM systems. It bases just two of likely 6 per battery launchers of it's S-200, so that these static objects are not killed via CM and stand-off PGM attacks early on, but can react to a threat. For the same reason HAWK batteries are only at half strength to have the other half dynamical deployed and still maintain instant firing ability.
HQ-2/Sayyad-1 sites are specialized for low maneuverability but high flying targets and special task, they always have a few more potent systems around.

This minimal deploying tactic also means that all other systems are at unknown positions and mobile. Furthermore SOC missed that Iran has a effective high volume AAA protection system up to automatic 100mm AAA. These will protect all those lonely looking static sites. A few hours or even dozen minutes into a conflict the other half of the SAM sites would be active at random position and the static visible part in google earth would have moved to new positions. But the real deal would be all those GE invisible mobile sites, especially the 3rd Khordad.

For your discussion: yes, there are several SAM sites in the east. But the east is regarded as least vulnerable side.

A analysis of the visible, static, already disclosed part of Irans air defense is good but of course the other, more serious half are the mobile newer systems which only go active in wartime besides of training.
 
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Good analysis, of course limited by basing on SOCs old and sometimes wrong analysis for opsec reasons.

Some points that SOC missed: Iran only bases a early conflict detachment of its static SAM systems. It bases just two of likely 6 per battery launchers of it's S-200, so that these static objects are not killed via CM and stand-off PGM attacks early on, but can react to a threat. For the same reason HAWK batteries are only at half strength to have the other half dynamical deployed and still maintain instant firing ability.
HQ-2/Sayyad-1 sites are specialized for low maneuverability but high flying targets and special task, they always have a few more potent systems around.

This minimal deploying tactic also means that all other systems are at unknown positions and mobile. Furthermore SOC missed that Iran has a effective high volume AAA protection system up to automatic 100mm AAA. These will protect all those lonely looking static sites. A few hours or even dozen minutes into a conflict the other half of the SAM sites would be active at random position and the static visible part in google earth would have moved to new positions. But the real deal would be all those GE invisible mobile sites, especially the 3rd Khordad.

For your discussion: yes, there are several SAM sites in the east. But the east is regarded as least vulnerable side.

A analysis of the visible, static, already disclosed part of Irans air defense is good but of course the other, more serious half are the mobile newer systems which only go active in wartime besides of training.

About the mobile sites, there are a few "garrisons" here and there of mobile systems like the Kub (SA-6), notably in Tehran. I would expect, in the event of a conflict, that these vehicles would be driven out of their garrisons to dispersed, probably random locations, and would prepare for firing.

As for the AAA, I think SOC mentioned that he intentionally left those out since they weren't "strategic" systems which he was focusing on.

Iran's Air Defense bases in Sistan Baluchestan is far more extensive than you think!


Iran is building a large Blue Water Naval port there & it may take over a decade to completely finish it but Iran already has an extensive network of Air Defense bases there!

Also, as you go up Iran's eastern boarder there are extensive military bases like in Iran Shahr and surrounding cities where Iran keeps everything from HELO's, Tanks to Missile bases there

And honestly I don't want to put out a lot of the info I know! Why would I?

I had a quick look near Konarak airport and only saw an empty Hawk site.
 
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About the mobile sites, there are a few "garrisons" here and there of mobile systems like the Kub (SA-6), notably in Tehran. I would expect, in the event of a conflict, that these vehicles would be driven out of their garrisons to dispersed, probably random locations, and would prepare for firing.
Wrong.

The only reason why the dispersal would be random if it is for survival, but if the intention is to increase survivability AND be an effective defense network, the dispersal must be calculated where each position can provide as much coverage as possible with as little gap as possible.

Take it from a Desert Storm F-16 veteran -- me. When we went SCUD hunting, it was truly random because the SCUD were not intended for US and allies but to provoke Israel into the fight. The SCUD TELs were ordered to simply scattered and launch at the local commander's convenience, meaning as opportunities arises. No tasking orders. No feedback. Nothing about surviving, just launch until all missiles expended and abandon your post. Saddam Hussein wanted the SCUDs to be more weapons of annoyance than weapons of tactical value. But precisely because the SCUDs were ordered to scatter with no guidance, they were just as ineffective as weapons of annoyance as we were at hunting them.

SAMs are completely different. Each unit is allowed some degrees of movement freedom inside a geographical area, each cannot, or should not, breach that area lest there are gaps, and even as small as a couple of kms wide gap, we will find it and exploit it. Nobody is better than US at hunting SAM sites. We have it down to both science and art.
 
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The only reason why the dispersal would be random if it is for survival, but if the intention is to increase survivability AND be an effective defense network, the dispersal must be calculated where each position can provide as much coverage as possible with as little gap as possible.

A fair point. Dispersal does have to be calculated to remain within a certain area.

Maybe that's part of the reason why Iran has so many unoccupied but prepared SAM sites. By prepared I mean there are already concrete platforms or cleared/flattened land where vehicles can be positioned. They are also useful for dispersion. The downside of having prepared dispersion sites is that their locations are known and so the aggressor does not have to search for vehicles, but through a shortlist of sites, and see if they are occupied or not.

Thinking about it, how common are unprepared, but pre-allocated SAM sites? The side of a road, a disused car park, a flat stretch of dirt?
 
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@gambit

Yes you might be the best at it. However it does not mean you are good enough at it to be effective against mobile SAMs. Soltan Danis old SA-3 on trucks created a nightmare for NATO forces and killed and damaged from F-16 to F-117 down to Predaors (more importantly his SAM survived the war unscratched).

The art of DEAD still has hurdles to become really effective. Iranians have learned the lesson from Dani and the new systems are BUK-M2 like small and mobile units. SOCs analysis on static SAMs was quite ok back in 2009 but he didn't know that Iranians have stopped the development of static SAMs. The real deal back then was the 3rd Khordad in making.

As F-16 pilot you know what kind of insecurity and limited operations a few professional BUK-M2s could create in a large country and the 3rd Khordad has even smaller footprint. This tools create access denial.

@AmirPatriot

Any mobile system can shoot from anywhere they want and if it is pre-organized in the IADS, the better. Earth berms increase survivebility quite much. In coordination with their communication team, mobile SAMs can have a "playground" in the size of a county or province. Gambit is right that timing would be dictated by the IADS, one sites goes offline once another system covers it and so on.
 
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@gambit

Yes you might be the best at it. However it does not mean you are good enough at it to be effective against mobile SAMs. Soltan Danis old SA-3 on trucks created a nightmare for NATO forces and killed and damaged from F-16 to F-117 down to Predaors (more importantly his SAM survived the war unscratched).
That again ?

NATO flew over 30,000 sorties and we lost only two aircrafts. That is not an air defense combat record to boast about at the bar. The only saving grace is that he got lucky with on F-117, otherwise, he is just another failed commander of a failed army.
 
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