Iranian Second Space & Strategic Rocket Launch Center

[PeeD]

@Galactic Penguin SST

I'm aware about North Korean testing and production infrastructure for missiles up to the size of this new Iskander-like missile.

It's larger solids such as PK-3/4/5 for which I don't see the footprint.
You say it's hidden. Possible but rather unlikely.

 

[TheImmortal]

More than likely someone (China) gave NK the R-27 ToT.

Because North Korea was stuck on the failed Tapedong project for years with failure after failure and then “magically” switched to a stable design that was nothing like what it was working on.

The chances it was a natural R&D progression of its long range missile program is highly unlikely.

 

[PeeD]

More than likely someone (China) gave NK the R-27 ToT.

Because North Korea was stuck on the failed Tapedong project for years with failure after failure and then “magically” switched to a stable design that was nothing like what it was working on.

The chances it was a natural R&D progression of its long range missile program is highly unlikely.

They actually progressed to the R-27 but failed to get it working reliably and then got to the higher thrust but lower efficiency RD-250 series.

Only Iran went for the R-27, as it fitted its range requirements and mastered a producable design.

I doubt China had the slightest thing to do in all of this.

 

[TheImmortal]

They actually progressed to the R-27 but failed to get it working reliably and then got to the higher thrust but lower efficiency RD-250 series.

Only Iran went for the R-27, as it fitted its range requirements and mastered a producable design.

I doubt China had the slightest thing to do in all of this.

Mastering RD-250 without foreign aid seems highly unlikely especially given NK‘a paltry military budget.

What NK did in last 4-6 years eclipses what it has done since 1980’s.

 

[Galactic Penguin SST]

North Korea has only shown aramid/fiberglass motor casings up until now. Iran already uses carbon fiber, so the source is not North Korea.

To date, carbon fiber casings are not larger than 1 meter diameter (Salman-1) in Iran, when North Korea produces up to 1.8 meter diameter carbon fiber casings.

Indeed, North Korea leads the way.

United Nations Security Council

4 March 2021

Annex 20:Key items, including materials and equipment, used in the DPRK ballistic missile program.

S/2021/211

According to a Member State, among the items identified in the annex of “North Korea Ballistic Missile Procurement Advisory”, 1 September 2020 (available from https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/financial-sanctions/recent-actions/20200901), that DPRK has sought for its ballistic missile development efforts were items such as multi-axle heavy vehicles, specialty steel and aluminum, filament winding equipment, carbon fiber for composite motor cases; and aluminum powder and ammonium perchlorate. The Member State reaffirmed that DPRK’s ability to procure the types of technologies identified in the advisory from foreign suppliers is critical to its ongoing efforts to advance and expand its missile capabilities.

Page 133/419

https://web.archive.org/web/20210331160049/https://undocs.org/S/2021/211​

And here North Koreans supporting an Iranian space launch:

Annex 19-1: Regarding technical and logistics cooperation

According to a Member State, within the past several years, Iranian missile technicians from SHIG traveled to North Korea regarding an 80-ton rocket booster under development by the North Korean government. According to the Member State, 13 DPRK specialists may have travelled to Iran to support KOMID's work there, based on their experience with liquid propellant ballistic missiles systems (see table 19-1). The partnership between KOMID and SHIG is also alleged by the Member State to have developed in the area of logistics through shipments to Iran, using vessels belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and routinely operating non-stop voyages from one third country ports to Iran. According to the Member State, these shipments included valves, electronics, and measuring equipment suitable for use in ground testing of liquid propellant ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

According to the Member State, the following Iranian SHIG officials are alleged to be involved in the KOMID-SHIG cooperation.

Asghar Esma’ilpur and Mohammad Gholami, who participated in Iran and supported the launch of an SLV that was launched with support and assistance from North Korean missile specialists.

Page 130/419

https://web.archive.org/web/20210331160049/https://undocs.org/S/2021/211​