lydian fall
BANNED
- Joined
- Feb 11, 2022
- Messages
- 1,184
- Reaction score
- 0
- Country
- Location
Some development
BTW we know nothing about Iranian underground bases
BTW we know nothing about Iranian underground bases
Last edited:
Follow along with the video below to see how to install our site as a web app on your home screen.
Note: This feature may not be available in some browsers.
İran'ın nükleer silah geliştirme çalışmalarını büyük ilgiyle izliyoruz. Her ne kadar nükleer silahlara karşı olsak da kendini tehdit altında hisseden bir rejimden farklı bir hareket beklenemezdi. Bizim en büyük arzumuz bölgede barışın devam etmesi ve sorunların medeni bir şekilde diyalogla çözülmesidir. Nükleer savaşlarda kazanan olmaz, herkes kaybeder.
Correct me if i'm wrong, but for that "snapback" thing to happen, it does require an international community vote? Trump tried to do this snapback thing in 2018 and barely any state voted for it. Is it this same snapback you are talking about? Like the USA or EU can make that snapback thing instantly without requiring a UN vote procedure?One significant date to keep in mind is October 2025.
Under the JCPOA, all UNSCRs against Iran were terminated, but kept in a strange limbo situation due to the "snapback" mechanism (effectively, any other party to JCPOA can unilaterally snapback all UNSCRs against Iran). The JCPOA included a clause that said this snapback mechanism would expire (and the nuclear file against Iran at the UNSC would be closed) 10 years after Adoption Day (October 2015).
As we approach October 2025 with the JCPOA in a non-functional state, the situation becomes increasingly precarious for Iran. The Europeans will not allow Iran to benefit from that "sunset" and permanently close the Iranian nuclear file at the UNSC without Iran complying with the JCPOA for all these years.
Possible outcomes:
(1) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback. Iran is under orders to cease all enrichment activity pursuant to UNSC Resolutions that carry the highest authority in the current legal world order. All the compromises made from 2015 to end this UNSC case were for nothing and Iran is back in the original position of 2012.
(2) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback, but new deal is reached AFTER snapback, with new, later sunset. Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
(3) Agreement by October 2025 - original sunset is retained (seems unlikely) and the Iranian nuclear file at UNSC is permanently closed in October 2025. If they want to reopen it in the future, they have to convince China AND Russia not to veto. Strong position for Iran and vindicates the JCPOA.
(4) Agreement by October 2025 - sunset date is postponed to reflect 'gap' in JCPOA timeline (2018-date of new deal, at least 5 years). Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
Unfortunately Iran missed the opportunity to quickly return to the JCPOA under the early months of Biden, both during Rouhani and Zarif's last months and in Raisi's early months. It would have been worth it just to close the file at the UNSC in 2025 (although 2024 US elections complicate that) and for the much-needed economic boost. Once the UNSC file is closed, if Iran is confident that China and Russia will not stab Iran in the back again, then it could operate with much more freedom and even renege on the JCPOA post-2025. Almost all restrictions on enrichment would have ended in 2030 (most of them earlier), and Iran needed another 10 years to be able to mass produce IR-8 centrifuges anyway (under the JCPOA, Iran would continue R&D on the IR-8 and even on new prototypes from day 0), so the timings were not so disadvantageous.
Alas, we are where we are and as it stands, I think 3 is the best option. There is not much difference between 2 and 4, except under 2 Iran would be negotiating while under UNSC sanctions/resolutions, which is a very bad negotiating position, so if 3 is not possible then 4 is the next best option. The bottom line is that any agreement as close to the JCPOA as possible is preferable and logical for Iran.
Then the question becomes how to maximise leverage in order to induce the West/USA to agree to that. A few thoughts: maximise accumulated stockpile of 60% HEU (this is progressing at a very slow rate currently), replace all IR-1 centrifuges with IR-2, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, test IR-8 in cascades and feed with uranium, accelerate production and accumulation of uranium metal and do not try to negotiate just before 2025, where the snapback threat will be at its highest and will give the West great leverage.
If Iran cannot achieve 3 or 4, withdrawing from the NPT and removing all IAEA inspectors/surveillance would help to restore leverage for a new deal, although this is of course a very risky move. This should be Iran's stated position in advance of snapback being invoked, to give fair notice.
Note that the above is all based on the assumption that Iran will not make the political decision to actually develop nuclear weapons, since there is a religious fatwa in place against that, and it doesn't really make sense for Iran to suddenly change its entire nuclear modus operandi just because the JCPOA failed.
I welcome the thoughts of others on what I have written above in relation to Iran's options and likely outcomes. @Arash1991 @SalarHaqq @aryobarzan (please no fanboy responses)
One significant date to keep in mind is October 2025.
Under the JCPOA, all UNSCRs against Iran were terminated, but kept in a strange limbo situation due to the "snapback" mechanism (effectively, any other party to JCPOA can unilaterally snapback all UNSCRs against Iran). The JCPOA included a clause that said this snapback mechanism would expire (and the nuclear file against Iran at the UNSC would be closed) 10 years after Adoption Day (October 2015).
As we approach October 2025 with the JCPOA in a non-functional state, the situation becomes increasingly precarious for Iran. The Europeans will not allow Iran to benefit from that "sunset" and permanently close the Iranian nuclear file at the UNSC without Iran complying with the JCPOA for all these years.
Possible outcomes:
(1) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback. Iran is under orders to cease all enrichment activity pursuant to UNSC Resolutions that carry the highest authority in the current legal world order. All the compromises made from 2015 to end this UNSC case were for nothing and Iran is back in the original position of 2012.
(2) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback, but new deal is reached AFTER snapback, with new, later sunset. Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
(3) Agreement by October 2025 - original sunset is retained (seems unlikely) and the Iranian nuclear file at UNSC is permanently closed in October 2025. If they want to reopen it in the future, they have to convince China AND Russia not to veto. Strong position for Iran and vindicates the JCPOA.
(4) Agreement by October 2025 - sunset date is postponed to reflect 'gap' in JCPOA timeline (2018-date of new deal, at least 5 years). Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
Unfortunately Iran missed the opportunity to quickly return to the JCPOA under the early months of Biden, both during Rouhani and Zarif's last months and in Raisi's early months. It would have been worth it just to close the file at the UNSC in 2025 (although 2024 US elections complicate that) and for the much-needed economic boost. Once the UNSC file is closed, if Iran is confident that China and Russia will not stab Iran in the back again, then it could operate with much more freedom and even renege on the JCPOA post-2025. Almost all restrictions on enrichment would have ended in 2030 (most of them earlier), and Iran needed another 10 years to be able to mass produce IR-8 centrifuges anyway (under the JCPOA, Iran would continue R&D on the IR-8 and even on new prototypes from day 0), so the timings were not so disadvantageous.
Alas, we are where we are and as it stands, I think 3 is the best option. There is not much difference between 2 and 4, except under 2 Iran would be negotiating while under UNSC sanctions/resolutions, which is a very bad negotiating position, so if 3 is not possible then 4 is the next best option. The bottom line is that any agreement as close to the JCPOA as possible is preferable and logical for Iran.
Then the question becomes how to maximise leverage in order to induce the West/USA to agree to that. A few thoughts: maximise accumulated stockpile of 60% HEU (this is progressing at a very slow rate currently), replace all IR-1 centrifuges with IR-2, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, test IR-8 in cascades and feed with uranium, accelerate production and accumulation of uranium metal and do not try to negotiate just before 2025, where the snapback threat will be at its highest and will give the West great leverage.
If Iran cannot achieve 3 or 4, withdrawing from the NPT and removing all IAEA inspectors/surveillance would help to restore leverage for a new deal, although this is of course a very risky move. This should be Iran's stated position in advance of snapback being invoked, to give fair notice.
Note that the above is all based on the assumption that Iran will not make the political decision to actually develop nuclear weapons, since there is a religious fatwa in place against that, and it doesn't really make sense for Iran to suddenly change its entire nuclear modus operandi just because the JCPOA failed.
I welcome the thoughts of others on what I have written above in relation to Iran's options and likely outcomes. @Arash1991 @SalarHaqq @aryobarzan (please no fanboy responses)
Considering that US never had any intention to honor JCPOA (even during Obama they did not abide by it) my suggestion would be do not play with "Legalities" ..they will put Iran's freedom of movement in the cement by these legalities without any real Sanction removals.
The Key to sanction removal and re-integration into Western Trade is not in nuclear file ..It is in recognition of Israel..without that they will play Iran endlessly
Assuming that Iran does not change Israel policy then what does Iran should do if "Snapback" is activated (a real possibility)..answer is, Prepare Iran's own "snapback"...which is NPT termination and race to convert to 90%...so to have a good "Iranian snapback" position Iran should entrich as much 60% as she can and be prepared if push comes to shove. Enriched Uranium is the only barrier to stop them activating the snapback.
always remember this if you want sanction removal:
It is not the "nuclear" boys, it is IsraelSo as long as you have this below you will have sanctions ..(from today's paper)
ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح: شمارش معکوس برای فروپاشی صهیونیسم آغاز شده است
Israel is the US outpost populated with Jews..The only way this out post can me dismantled is to rationally demonstrate to US that keeping the potpost is detrimental to US interest in this new world order taking shape ..Is there any version of this where Israel collapses in on itself and Iran gets out unscathed?
Yes, unfortunately you are wrong. That has turned out to be the biggest flaw in Iran's negotiation of the JCPOA (lack of reciprocity in the event of a breach by one of the parties).Correct me if i'm wrong, but for that "snapback" thing to happen, it does require an international community vote? Trump tried to do this snapback thing in 2018 and barely any state voted for it. Is it this same snapback you are talking about? Like the USA or EU can make that snapback thing instantly without requiring a UN vote procedure?
Essentially, if Iran is not in full compliance with the JCPOA (which it is not), ANY party to the JCPOA can initiate the snapback process.