lydian fall
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Some development
BTW we know nothing about Iranian underground bases
BTW we know nothing about Iranian underground bases
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Iranian Nuclear Doctrine
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lydian fall
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Another retreat thanks to liberals
LegionnairE
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İran'ın nükleer silah geliştirme çalışmalarını büyük ilgiyle izliyoruz. Her ne kadar nükleer silahlara karşı olsak da kendini tehdit altında hisseden bir rejimden farklı bir hareket beklenemezdi. Bizim en büyük arzumuz bölgede barışın devam etmesi ve sorunların medeni bir şekilde diyalogla çözülmesidir. Nükleer savaşlarda kazanan olmaz, herkes kaybeder.
lydian fall
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Don't troll
lydian fall
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@waz @Jungibaaz @Irfan Baloch @LeGenD @WebMaster
please delete none english post only purpose for trolling
please delete none english post only purpose for trolling
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Most countries in the world can be divided into three categories
1. nuclear powers.
2. Countries under the nuclear umbrella.
3. Countries in nuclear-free zones.
In the map below, red are nuclear weapon states, orange are states with nuclear weapons deployed, blue are nuclear free zones, and the remainder are yellow.
Most of the yellow areas (Japan, Western Europe, Canada, etc.) are all under the nuclear umbrella.
There were only seven countries in the world that were not protected by nuclear weapons, nuclear umbrella, or nuclear-free zone: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.
After the war began, Biden made it clear that he would use nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack on Ukraine as well, leaving only six remaining countries unprotected.
However, Azerbaijan has the backing of NATO member plus Turkey, a nuclear deployed (shared) country, and Israel, a nuclear power, so there are actually five countries.
As you can see, 4/5 of the total are Shiite states, including Iran.
The number of countries that are defenseless against nuclear weapons is so small that the serious isolation and danger of the Shia states is obvious.
Can only Shiite states survive without being exceptionally defenseless?
I do not think so.
1. nuclear powers.
2. Countries under the nuclear umbrella.
3. Countries in nuclear-free zones.
In the map below, red are nuclear weapon states, orange are states with nuclear weapons deployed, blue are nuclear free zones, and the remainder are yellow.
Most of the yellow areas (Japan, Western Europe, Canada, etc.) are all under the nuclear umbrella.
There were only seven countries in the world that were not protected by nuclear weapons, nuclear umbrella, or nuclear-free zone: Iran, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Ukraine.
After the war began, Biden made it clear that he would use nuclear weapons against a nuclear attack on Ukraine as well, leaving only six remaining countries unprotected.
However, Azerbaijan has the backing of NATO member plus Turkey, a nuclear deployed (shared) country, and Israel, a nuclear power, so there are actually five countries.
As you can see, 4/5 of the total are Shiite states, including Iran.
The number of countries that are defenseless against nuclear weapons is so small that the serious isolation and danger of the Shia states is obvious.
Can only Shiite states survive without being exceptionally defenseless?
I do not think so.
One significant date to keep in mind is October 2025.
Under the JCPOA, all UNSCRs against Iran were terminated, but kept in a strange limbo situation due to the "snapback" mechanism (effectively, any other party to JCPOA can unilaterally snapback all UNSCRs against Iran). The JCPOA included a clause that said this snapback mechanism would expire (and the nuclear file against Iran at the UNSC would be closed) 10 years after Adoption Day (October 2015).
As we approach October 2025 with the JCPOA in a non-functional state, the situation becomes increasingly precarious for Iran. The Europeans will not allow Iran to benefit from that "sunset" and permanently close the Iranian nuclear file at the UNSC without Iran complying with the JCPOA for all these years.
Possible outcomes:
(1) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback. Iran is under orders to cease all enrichment activity pursuant to UNSC Resolutions that carry the highest authority in the current legal world order. All the compromises made from 2015 to end this UNSC case were for nothing and Iran is back in the original position of 2012.
(2) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback, but new deal is reached AFTER snapback, with new, later sunset. Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
(3) Agreement by October 2025 - original sunset is retained (seems unlikely) and the Iranian nuclear file at UNSC is permanently closed in October 2025. If they want to reopen it in the future, they have to convince China AND Russia not to veto. Strong position for Iran and vindicates the JCPOA.
(4) Agreement by October 2025 - sunset date is postponed to reflect 'gap' in JCPOA timeline (2018-date of new deal, at least 5 years). Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
Unfortunately Iran missed the opportunity to quickly return to the JCPOA under the early months of Biden, both during Rouhani and Zarif's last months and in Raisi's early months. It would have been worth it just to close the file at the UNSC in 2025 (although 2024 US elections complicate that) and for the much-needed economic boost. Once the UNSC file is closed, if Iran is confident that China and Russia will not stab Iran in the back again, then it could operate with much more freedom and even renege on the JCPOA post-2025. Almost all restrictions on enrichment would have ended in 2030 (most of them earlier), and Iran needed another 10 years to be able to mass produce IR-8 centrifuges anyway (under the JCPOA, Iran would continue R&D on the IR-8 and even on new prototypes from day 0), so the timings were not so disadvantageous.
Alas, we are where we are and as it stands, I think 3 is the best option. There is not much difference between 2 and 4, except under 2 Iran would be negotiating while under UNSC sanctions/resolutions, which is a very bad negotiating position, so if 3 is not possible then 4 is the next best option. The bottom line is that any agreement as close to the JCPOA as possible is preferable and logical for Iran.
Then the question becomes how to maximise leverage in order to induce the West/USA to agree to that. A few thoughts: maximise accumulated stockpile of 60% HEU (this is progressing at a very slow rate currently), replace all IR-1 centrifuges with IR-2, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, test IR-8 in cascades and feed with uranium, accelerate production and accumulation of uranium metal and do not try to negotiate just before 2025, where the snapback threat will be at its highest and will give the West great leverage.
If Iran cannot achieve 3 or 4, withdrawing from the NPT and removing all IAEA inspectors/surveillance would help to restore leverage for a new deal, although this is of course a very risky move. This should be Iran's stated position in advance of snapback being invoked, to give fair notice.
Note that the above is all based on the assumption that Iran will not make the political decision to actually develop nuclear weapons, since there is a religious fatwa in place against that, and it doesn't really make sense for Iran to suddenly change its entire nuclear modus operandi just because the JCPOA failed.
I welcome the thoughts of others on what I have written above in relation to Iran's options and likely outcomes. @Arash1991 @SalarHaqq @aryobarzan (please no fanboy responses)
Under the JCPOA, all UNSCRs against Iran were terminated, but kept in a strange limbo situation due to the "snapback" mechanism (effectively, any other party to JCPOA can unilaterally snapback all UNSCRs against Iran). The JCPOA included a clause that said this snapback mechanism would expire (and the nuclear file against Iran at the UNSC would be closed) 10 years after Adoption Day (October 2015).
As we approach October 2025 with the JCPOA in a non-functional state, the situation becomes increasingly precarious for Iran. The Europeans will not allow Iran to benefit from that "sunset" and permanently close the Iranian nuclear file at the UNSC without Iran complying with the JCPOA for all these years.
Possible outcomes:
(1) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback. Iran is under orders to cease all enrichment activity pursuant to UNSC Resolutions that carry the highest authority in the current legal world order. All the compromises made from 2015 to end this UNSC case were for nothing and Iran is back in the original position of 2012.
(2) No agreement by October 2025 - UNSC Resolutions and sanctions snapback, but new deal is reached AFTER snapback, with new, later sunset. Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
(3) Agreement by October 2025 - original sunset is retained (seems unlikely) and the Iranian nuclear file at UNSC is permanently closed in October 2025. If they want to reopen it in the future, they have to convince China AND Russia not to veto. Strong position for Iran and vindicates the JCPOA.
(4) Agreement by October 2025 - sunset date is postponed to reflect 'gap' in JCPOA timeline (2018-date of new deal, at least 5 years). Iran nuclear file at UNSC remains open beyond 2025.
Unfortunately Iran missed the opportunity to quickly return to the JCPOA under the early months of Biden, both during Rouhani and Zarif's last months and in Raisi's early months. It would have been worth it just to close the file at the UNSC in 2025 (although 2024 US elections complicate that) and for the much-needed economic boost. Once the UNSC file is closed, if Iran is confident that China and Russia will not stab Iran in the back again, then it could operate with much more freedom and even renege on the JCPOA post-2025. Almost all restrictions on enrichment would have ended in 2030 (most of them earlier), and Iran needed another 10 years to be able to mass produce IR-8 centrifuges anyway (under the JCPOA, Iran would continue R&D on the IR-8 and even on new prototypes from day 0), so the timings were not so disadvantageous.
Alas, we are where we are and as it stands, I think 3 is the best option. There is not much difference between 2 and 4, except under 2 Iran would be negotiating while under UNSC sanctions/resolutions, which is a very bad negotiating position, so if 3 is not possible then 4 is the next best option. The bottom line is that any agreement as close to the JCPOA as possible is preferable and logical for Iran.
Then the question becomes how to maximise leverage in order to induce the West/USA to agree to that. A few thoughts: maximise accumulated stockpile of 60% HEU (this is progressing at a very slow rate currently), replace all IR-1 centrifuges with IR-2, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, test IR-8 in cascades and feed with uranium, accelerate production and accumulation of uranium metal and do not try to negotiate just before 2025, where the snapback threat will be at its highest and will give the West great leverage.
If Iran cannot achieve 3 or 4, withdrawing from the NPT and removing all IAEA inspectors/surveillance would help to restore leverage for a new deal, although this is of course a very risky move. This should be Iran's stated position in advance of snapback being invoked, to give fair notice.
Note that the above is all based on the assumption that Iran will not make the political decision to actually develop nuclear weapons, since there is a religious fatwa in place against that, and it doesn't really make sense for Iran to suddenly change its entire nuclear modus operandi just because the JCPOA failed.
I welcome the thoughts of others on what I have written above in relation to Iran's options and likely outcomes. @Arash1991 @SalarHaqq @aryobarzan (please no fanboy responses)
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Correct me if i'm wrong, but for that "snapback" thing to happen, it does require an international community vote? Trump tried to do this snapback thing in 2018 and barely any state voted for it. Is it this same snapback you are talking about? Like the USA or EU can make that snapback thing instantly without requiring a UN vote procedure?
Blue In Green
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It's a mess for sure, very well put together post! I do agree, Iran needs to come to some sensible agreement/return over the nuclear file in order to receive relief from these unjust draconian sanctions which will help alleviate some problems domestically.
Noteworthy just how phenomenally disastrous President Trump has been for Iranian-American
rapprochement/diplomatic ties. Let's just blow up an international accord that was hard fought and negotiated by both sides all for Israel's sake and his fat-*** sordid ego of "Murican exceptionalism".
aryobarzan
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Considering that US never had any intention to honor JCPOA (even during Obama they did not abide by it) my suggestion would be do not play with "Legalities" ..they will put Iran's freedom of movement in the cement by these legalities without any real Sanction removals.
The Key to sanction removal and re-integration into Western Trade is not in nuclear file ..It is in recognition of Israel..without that they will play Iran endlessly
Assuming that Iran does not change Israel policy then what does Iran should do if "Snapback" is activated (a real possibility)..answer is, Prepare Iran's own "snapback"...which is NPT termination and race to convert to 90%...so to have a good "Iranian snapback" position Iran should entrich as much 60% as she can and be prepared if push comes to shove. Enriched Uranium is the only barrier to stop them activating the snapback.
always remember this if you want sanction removal:
The Key to sanction removal and re-integration into Western Trade is not in nuclear file ..It is in recognition of Israel..without that they will play Iran endlessly
Assuming that Iran does not change Israel policy then what does Iran should do if "Snapback" is activated (a real possibility)..answer is, Prepare Iran's own "snapback"...which is NPT termination and race to convert to 90%...so to have a good "Iranian snapback" position Iran should entrich as much 60% as she can and be prepared if push comes to shove. Enriched Uranium is the only barrier to stop them activating the snapback.
always remember this if you want sanction removal:
It is not the "nuclear" boys, it is Israel
So as long as you have this below you will have sanctions ..(from today's paper)ستاد کل نیروهای مسلح: شمارش معکوس برای فروپاشی صهیونیسم آغاز شده است
Blue In Green
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Is there any version of this where Israel collapses in on itself and Iran gets out unscathed?
aryobarzan
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Israel is the US outpost populated with Jews..The only way this out post can me dismantled is to rationally demonstrate to US that keeping the potpost is detrimental to US interest in this new world order taking shape ..
Iran can not remove the outpost by religious slogans or wishful thinkings or clashes here and there and continue to be sanctioned forever. The Empire will not remove the outpost by force and will only do that by a rational trade off .
My suggestion: recognise that this out post is here to stay..work on that tradeoff ,,show to US how much they are losing to China and Russia by not having 2 billion muslims in their side for the sake of having a foot print in middle east.
Yes, unfortunately you are wrong. That has turned out to be the biggest flaw in Iran's negotiation of the JCPOA (lack of reciprocity in the event of a breach by one of the parties).
Essentially, if Iran is not in full compliance with the JCPOA (which it is not), ANY party to the JCPOA can initiate the snapback process. Once initiated, the only way to stop it is for the parties to pass a UNANIMOUS vote affirming that UNSC sanctions against Iran should continue to be lifted (obviously the party who initiates the process, unless they got what they wanted and changed their mind, would not vote for that). Failing that, all former UNSC Resolutions and sanctions against Iran are reinstated in full.
The reason the US couldn't do that was because they publicly left the JCPOA - only parties to the JCPOA can initiate that process.
SalarHaqq
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There is another clause in the JCPOA which gives Iran the right to stop implementing its original commitments in case another party to the deal did the same.
The EU3 regimes are still party to the JCPOA but they have long been non-compliant with their commitments. Therefore Iran is actually not in breach of the JCPOA as we speak.
This means the snapback mechanism ought not be activated.
Nonetheless Iran should introduce a dissuasive measure to prevent such an eventuality. I concur with user aryobarzan in this regard, Iran should announce she would leave the NPT if snapback is triggered and UN sanctions reinstated.
This would be my take on the question.
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aryobarzan
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Not knowing what else to do...Israel asks China to stop Iran nuclear program
english.alarabiya.net
Israel urges China to use its ‘influence’ to stop Iran’s nuclear program
Israel’s top diplomat on Monday urged China to use its “influence” on Iran to prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, stressing that Israel will take
