What's new

Iranian Chill Thread

That comes close to Urenco machines currently used and installed around the late 90.
Reliable designs and still too cost effective to be replaced by the world leader Urenco with newer machines.
Seems IR-6 is not far away from mass production. They are designing and building new prototypes before they have a chance to fully test the older ones! It shows a rapid pace of knowledge and improvement to constantly churn out improved designs, but mass production of some newer models (than IR-1/2) must ultimately be achieved as well.


They said there are 60 IR-6 centrifuges installed at Natanz, so I guess there are 2 cascades of 30.
 
.
Seems IR-6 is not far away from mass production. They are designing and building new prototypes before they have a chance to fully test the older ones! It shows a rapid pace of knowledge and improvement to constantly churn out improved designs, but mass production of some newer models (than IR-1/2) must ultimately be achieved as well.


They said there are 60 IR-6 centrifuges installed at Natanz, so I guess there are 2 cascades of 30.
Whats interesting about the video is that going by all of the unused mounting points on the ground this does not appear to even be a full cascade,they may still be in the process of installing many more of these.
 
. . .
IR8 and IR8B and IR8S


777d66e5cc0e44cab018d075fb807715_18.jpg


lol what do these centrifuges even do i can't into physics

they enrich uranium to 100% much much faster if they get the order, tonight at 24:00 12:00 (midnight) they will get the order to enrich uranium again.
 
.
IR-7 (no production variant) is at the performance level of the early 90's vintage Urenco TC-12 machine
IR-8 is at the performance level of the late 90's vintage Urenco TC-12+ machine
IR-9 is at the performance level of the early 2000's vintage Urenco TC-21 machine, deployed in the late 2000's.

Most Urenco machines are still TC-12+ and Urenco 7th generation machines are not ready as of 2019

So if IR-9 is mastered in the 2020's then it would be just one generation behind then probably finished Urenco 7th gen. machines.

Key is machine lifetime, energy consumption and acquisition costs. All of these must be better than the prior generation. That's why late 90's TC-12+ is still the workhorse of the world leading enrichment company Urenco: Machines still run, would be too expensive to replace a working machine with the somewhat better TC-21.
 
.
Fordow is reactivated for uranium enrichment...

Macron said this step showed Iran's desire to quit the deal entirely, and said that with US and Iran wanting to quit the deal, the deal is effectively dead.

Macron said new framework must be created to address Iran's nuclear activities post-2025, and must include ballistic missile and regional security provisions!
 
.
Base on what I remember IR-7 use different methods and technologies to enrich Uranium compare to other Iranian centrifuges.

The IR-s is very unique which I think have designed to enrich uranium under daily bombing or even after nuclear attack on Iran.


The middle one is IR-s.
 
.
AFAIK, the S-series centrifuges are designed to be small and simple to manufacture and operate - boosting latent deterrence even if the Fordow/Natanz sites are attacked by Israel/USA.
 
. .
Base on what I remember IR-7 use different methods and technologies to enrich Uranium compare to other Iranian centrifuges.

The IR-s is very unique which I think have designed to enrich uranium under daily bombing or even after nuclear attack on Iran.


The middle one is IR-s.
I hate how Salehi blatantly lies to the public. The first prototype of IR-8 was unveiled by Ahmadinejad. After 6 years, they have done nothing to turn the prototype of IR-8 into a product and yet he is boasting about their achievements after the JCPOA. Even Salehi himself has interviews about IR-8 before the JCPOA.

Plus, the recent move (the 4th step) is really nothing but hype for local consumption. It adds literally nothing to Iran's enrichment capacity and we are still behind our schedule for producing enriched uranium for the Bushehr nuclear plants and the Tehran Medical Research Reactor.
 
.
I hate how Salehi blatantly lies to the public. The first prototype of IR-8 was unveiled by Ahmadinejad. After 6 years, they have done nothing to turn the prototype of IR-8 into a product and yet he is boasting about their achievements after the JCPOA. Even Salehi himself has interviews about IR-8 before the JCPOA.

Plus, the recent move (the 4th step) is really nothing but hype for local consumption. It adds literally nothing to Iran's enrichment capacity and we are still behind our schedule for producing enriched uranium for the Bushehr nuclear plants and the Tehran Medical Research Reactor.
Salehi said it takes 7-10 years to progress from testing a new centrifuge to its mass production. Iran started testing the IR-8 properly by feeding it with gas 3 years ago now I think. Before that I guess it wasn't ready or some political considerations prevented it. I think we have to wait another 5 years to see what happens, but the important thing is that the IR-8 is being tested and improved every day.

Moving to Fordow is a big signal because Fordow was supposed to be converted totally away from enriching uranium (to medical isotopes only). The S-series are huge steps forward re: latent deterrence even in the event of war, now even Fordow and Natanz can be destroyed and it wouldn't prevent Iran producing enriched uranium.

What do you mean about behind schedule for Bushehr and TRR - behind what schedule?
 
.
Salehi said it takes 7-10 years to progress from testing a new centrifuge to its mass production. Iran started testing the IR-8 properly by feeding it with gas 3 years ago now I think. Before that I guess it wasn't ready or some political considerations prevented it. I think we have to wait another 5 years to see what happens, but the important thing is that the IR-8 is being tested and improved every day.

Moving to Fordow is a big signal because Fordow was supposed to be converted totally away from enriching uranium (to medical isotopes only). The S-series are huge steps forward re: latent deterrence even in the event of war, now even Fordow and Natanz can be destroyed and it wouldn't prevent Iran producing enriched uranium.

What do you mean about behind schedule for Bushehr and TRR - behind what schedule?

He said that we had only 5 types of centrifuges before the JCPOA while now we have 15 types of centrifuges. Iran operated IR-1, IR-2 and IR-2M machines and had already unveiled IR-4, IR-4M, IR-5M, IR-6 and IR-8 machines before the JCPOA.

Where did you read that Iran has tested IR-8? We are still in the testing stage for IR-6 centrifuges. The only machines that have reached mass production are IR-1, IR-2 and IR-2M. So, IR-8 is still a prototype, pretty much like when it was unveiled as the "third generation" of Iranian centrifuges during Ahmadinejad's presidency.

I don't see why it's a big signal. Converting Fordow from a nuclear enrichment facility to a medical isotope facility was a treason in the JCPOA, but now that some of those ridiculous restrictions are partially over, we're pretty much where we were before the JCPOA about Fordow. Where's the strong signal? And why is the S-series a huge step forward? How does smaller size guarantee that they will be safe when Iran is under attack? I'm seriously ignorant about it. Enlighten me.

Iran needs 127,000 Kg U SWU/year to produce the fuel for the Bushehr nuclear reactor annually. That's nearly 190,000 Kg UF6 SWU/year that Khamenei once spoke about in one of his speeches after the US unilaterally pulled out of the JCPOA. Previously, Iran's nuclear capacity was set to be around 19,000 Kg UF6 SWU/year to produce the uranium needed for the Bushehr nuclear reactor in a 10 year interval. Our current enrichment capacity is below 10,000 SWU and we have lost 6 years so far. Now do the math on your own to see how far we are behind the schedule for just the Bushehr nuclear reactor.

It becomes even more worrisome when you realize that the Tehran Research Reactor is nearing the end of its operational lifetime and has to be replaced by a new research reactor. Even if Iran manages to extend the lifetime of the TRR, we need HALEU (20% enriched uranium) to keep it working and we don't have enough HALEU reserves to do that. And nobody is willing to sell HALEU to Iran either. Neither would anyone sell Iran medical isotopes. Considering the fact that Tehran Research Reactor is the only operational medical research reactor in Iran, the lives of hundreds of thousands of cancer patients in Iran will be in danger if we can't provide the fuel it needs.
 
.
Where did you read that Iran has tested IR-8? We are still in the testing stage for IR-6 centrifuges. The only machines that have reached mass production are IR-1, IR-2 and IR-2M. So, IR-8 is still a prototype, pretty much like when it was unveiled as the "third generation" of Iranian centrifuges during Ahmadinejad's presidency.
https://theiranproject.com/blog/2017/01/30/amalvandi-ir-8-centrifuges-tests-line-nuclear-deal/
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/UF-Iran-tests-new-generation-centrifuge-under-JCPOA-3101177.html

I don't see why it's a big signal. Converting Fordow from a nuclear enrichment facility to a medical isotope facility was a treason in the JCPOA, but now that some of those ridiculous restrictions are partially over, we're pretty much where we were before the JCPOA about Fordow. Where's the strong signal? And why is the S-series a huge step forward? How does smaller size guarantee that they will be safe when Iran is under attack? I'm seriously ignorant about it. Enlighten me.
Western powers are very scared about Fordow because it is almost immune to attack, hence the outrage when it was exposed. This was thus a big response by Iran (in the context of the JCPOA at least).

As for the smaller size of S-series, the point is that they can be manufactured at various sites across the country quicker and more easily, and can be operated at smaller and easier to hide locations. Under the JCPOA Iran was only supposed to have one site for enriching uranium - Natanz.

Iran needs 127,000 Kg U SWU/year to produce the fuel for the Bushehr nuclear reactor annually. That's nearly 190,000 Kg UF6 SWU/year that Khamenei once spoke about in one of his speeches after the US unilaterally pulled out of the JCPOA. Previously, Iran's nuclear capacity was set to be around 19,000 Kg UF6 SWU/year to produce the uranium needed for the Bushehr nuclear reactor in a 10 year interval. Our current enrichment capacity is below 10,000 SWU and we have lost 6 years so far. Now do the math on your own to see how far we are behind the schedule for just the Bushehr nuclear reactor.

It becomes even more worrisome when you realize that the Tehran Research Reactor is nearing the end of its operational lifetime and has to be replaced by a new research reactor. Even if Iran manages to extend the lifetime of the TRR, we need HALEU (20% enriched uranium) to keep it working and we don't have enough HALEU reserves to do that. And nobody is willing to sell HALEU to Iran either. Neither would anyone sell Iran medical isotopes. Considering the fact that Tehran Research Reactor is the only operational medical research reactor in Iran, the lives of hundreds of thousands of cancer patients in Iran will be in danger if we can't provide the fuel it needs.
I read recently that Iran has enough 20% uranium for its needs but if it needs more it will produce more.

The 127,000 kg SWU goal was prior to the JCPOA limitations which obviously supersede that for the time being. The plan then became more staggered (delayed), but this was not a 'failure' to meet those goals, just that the goals were adjusted in light of the JCPOA.
 
.
Mechanical tests? Seriously? A nuclear centrifuge is a useless piece of junk before it has been tested with gas injected to it. Once they injected gas into it, then I'll accept that they have tested it. Before that, it's nothing more than a prototype and the SWU they report is nothing but a theoretical limit that will never be fulfilled.

IR-1 was supposed to have a SWU of 3, but the reports from the IAEA claim that the best it performed was below 1.5 SWU. And most of the time it worked in the range of 0.8 to 1 SWU.


Western powers are very scared about Fordow because it is almost immune to attack, hence the outrage when it was exposed. This was thus a big response by Iran (in the context of the JCPOA at least).
Natanz is also immune to attack and it is an underground facility as well. Natanz in fact has a higher density of air defenses. The outrage about Fordow was an excuse to put more pressure on Iran. I still don't understand why it's a big move. A big move is to do something you haven't done before. Like enriching uranium to 50%. After all the threats, the Rouhani administration is still enriching uranium at 4.5%, not even the 5% that Rouhani himself spoke of. Are you effing kidding me?

As for the smaller size of S-series, the point is that they can be manufactured at various sites across the country quicker and more easily, and can be operated at smaller and easier to hide locations. Under the JCPOA Iran was only supposed to have one site for enriching uranium - Natanz.
And how do you conclude that smaller size means less manufacturing time? A dustbin is usually bigger than an iPhone but it doesn't mean that manufacturing an iPhone is easier than a dustbin. Does it?
As far as installation is concerned, the S model seen in the photo seems to have a larger diameter but shorter height. So, you can't really say that it takes up less space on and we can install more of them for cascading either. Can you?


I read recently that Iran has enough 20% uranium for its needs but if it needs more it will produce more.

The 127,000 kg SWU goal was prior to the JCPOA limitations which obviously supersede that for the time being. The plan then became more staggered (delayed), but this was not a 'failure' to meet those goals, just that the goals were adjusted in light of the JCPOA.
Yeah. Another blatant lie by Salehi. He said just few days ago that we have enough 20% HALEU but Iran has no reserves of HALEU besides the HALEU that is currently being consumed by the Tehran Research Reactor. We gave up the excess of our HALEU reserves in the JCPOA. The JCPOA clearly and explicitly states that Iran cannot have more than 300 kilograms of 3.5% LEU and the Rouhani administration got rid of the excess as fast as possible when they were "fulfilling" their commitments under the JCPOA in 2015-2016. So, nope. We don't have any HALEU left and once the TRR consumes its fuel, we will be in trouble. The more we wait, the more difficult it gets to produce it later because it will require a larger number of centrifuges spinning.

The 190,000 Kg UF6 SWU is not a "goal". It's the number required for keeping our nuclear facilities running without purchasing uranium from other countries. Unless your definition of a nuclear industry is to enrich uranium only to send it to Russia for their use, then anything that doesn't meet that demand is treason (which is what happened under the JCPOA). If we can't meet the 190,000 Kg UF6 SWU, Bushehr and TRR will have to go offline. And at the current pace, we will be nowhere near our previous 13,000 kg stockpile of uranium anytime soon.
 
Last edited:
.

Pakistan Defence Latest Posts

Pakistan Affairs Latest Posts

Back
Top Bottom