This is the best and most updated analysis of Iran's air defense systems and the improvements Iran has made in his defense sector for the past few years. Anyone interested in Iran's AD network should read it.
Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part III: Air Defences Section I
For many years Iran’s air defences mainly consisted of aged (pre-1979) American and Soviet-era surface to air missiles (SAMs) and anti-aircraft artillery (AAA). Linking these systems was a radar network also composed of (pre-1979) outdated Soviet-era and pre-1979 American radar. Moreover, Iran’s air force is a pale shadow of its former glory. It has just a few dozen aircraft operational and combat-capable at any time due to a severe shortage of spare parts (mainly for its pre-1979 supplied American aircraft) and an increasingly aging fleet.
Prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the breakdown in relations with the United States, Iran developed a large air force and bought hundreds of the most capable aircraft made in the United States. These aircraft not only allowed Iran to develop a powerful offensive air force, but were also the mainstay of Iran’s air defences. The country’s vastness and its mountainous terrain are not conducive to ground-based air defences. As such, analysts looking at Iran’s air defences in the context of a Israeli and/or American airstrike on nuclear facilities have prudently written off Iran’s air defences. But in the past few years, Iran has revealed impressive developments that while insufficient for
preventing the United States from engaging in a pre-emptive air strike, certainly reduce Israel’s chances and increase the risk for both Washington and Jerusalem.
The first sign of Iran’s air defence modernization emerged with the unveiling of the Mersad SAM system in 2010. The Mersad is a reverse engineered derivate of the American medium-range Hawk SAM system (40km range), the mainstay of Iran’s SAM forces. The ‘original’ American-supplied Hawk is old in terms of its electronic components, and has insufficient range to deal with aircraft conducting ‘standoff’ (i.e., long way from target) airstrikes with precision guided munitions. Nevertheless, the Mersad provides Iran with a Hawk SAM system that is
fully digital and is Iran’s first serious attempt to address the shortcomings of its air defence system. In addition to upgrading the Hawk system’s radar, Iran has also upgraded the system’s missiles with the Shahin and Shalamcheh missiles. Iran has also developed a mobile version of the Mersad system known as the
Ghader.
Iran has also been busy upgrading its older air defence systems. It has been upgrading the missiles and the launchers of the (very) long-ranged static SA-5 system, reportedly even making the system mobile to an unspecified degree (the SA-5 is a very heavy and bulky system). Similarly, the Chinese derivate of the French Crotale system, the FM-80, has been modernized into the Ya Zahra towed short-range system and its mobile truck-mounted variant, the Herz-9. Iran has also upgraded its medium-range SA-6 system. Most noticeably, it has developed a more cost-effective and lower-signature truck-based launcher to replace the tracked launcher the system was originally mounted on. This upgraded system,
the Ra’ad-1, also incorporates at least two new sensors (
1,
2) that combine radar and electro-optical detection in addition to the SA-6’s organic sensors.
The increasing use of electro-optical sensors is important in that they will function even in a heavily jammed electronic environment where radar may cease to function. A similar system utilizes a missile similar to that used by the Russian/Soviet Buk system, the Soviet successor system to the SA-6. This system, the
Ra’ad-2, is believed to utilize the same combined radar and electro-optical detection systems used by the Ra’ad-1 and a new missile, believed to be derivate from that used by the Buk, known as the Taer missile family (more below). In other words, Iran has adopted a newer, longer-ranged and more sophisticated missile for its upgraded SA-6 SAMs.
The origins of the Ra’ad-2 system are unclear in that Iran is not reported to have received the Buk system from Russia or any other country. While Iran may have received the systems from Syria and/or Belarus (amongst others), the large number of units displayed makes the Iranian claim that the system is being nationally produced more credible. Moreover, the missiles exhibit a number of important design distinctions that makes them more than mere copies.
The Ra’ad-2 and its associated missiles (Taer-1, Taer-2, Taer-2B; no details are given on the difference(s) between the models) are utilized by a confusing array of mobile launchers. Moreover, these launchers utilize different radar systems in addition to the system apparently associated with the SA-6. The Taer missile is used by two different SAM systems that utilize two distinct search/engagement radar systems. The least-sophisticated radar that used on the
Tabaslauncher, is similar to the ‘Fire Dome’ radar used by the Buk M1. The other launcher, the
Third of Khordad, uses a phased array radar similar in general appearance, but different from the radar used on the latest version of the Buk, the Buk M2. Regardless of the launcher or radar used, the Taer missile has a range of approximately 50 kilometers, making it a medium-range system. It should be noted that the Taer missiles have a much higher reported flight ceiling (altitude) than the missiles used by Iran’s HAWK SAMs.
In addition to the aforementioned radar, there is also a longer-ranged search radar system known as the
Bashir. Notably, it is used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and not the Islamic Republic of Iran Air Defence Forces (IRIADF). As such, the system is likely intended to defend vital political infrastructure (such as the Supreme leader’s palace) and protect Iran’s ballistic missile units.
Iran also appears to have produced an enlarged version of the Taer missile family. This missile,
the Sadid-630, has been depicted on a poster present at a major Iranian arms exhibition alongside the
Alam-ol-Hoda radar. The Alam-ol-Hoda is said to be a very high frequency (VHF) fire control radar that will guide the Sadid-630. Little is known about the Sadid-630 and the Alam-ol-Hoda radar. However, the imagery of the radar and the missile indicate that these systems have already been built and are at least at the prototype stage of development.
While the IRGC has adopted the various Taer missile equipped SAM systems, the IRIADF has adopted a different new medium-range SAM system, the
Talash-2 SAM. The Talash utilizes the
Sayyad-2 missile, a reverse-engineered derivate of the American RIM-66 Standard missile. The range of the Sayyad-2 missile is not known but is almost certainly at least 60km. It is unclear what radar(s) the Talash II utilizes, but an unknown multi-spectral sensor was
displayed at a recent parade alongside the system. Iranian officials have previously described the Talash-2 SAM as being developed to serve as a medium-range component of the (very) long range SA-5 SAM system, but Iran will likely deploy the system as an independent SAM system as well.
Prior to the unveiling of the new surface to air (SAM) systems mentioned in the previous article, Iran’s air defence modernization’s success appeared predicated on it receiving a number of Russian-made S-300 SAM systems. The S-300 in its latest of many variants constitutes what is perhaps the most capable SAM system in the world. In 2010, due to new United Nations Security Council sanctions on Iran over its alleged nuclear weapons program, Russia cancelled the deal, beginning a diplomatic and economic dispute between the two countries that has not yet been resolved.
Complicating matters, an Iranian military officer told semi-official news in 2010
that Iran had received four S-300 batteries. The officer reportedly stated that two came from Belarus and two from an unspecified source. Further confusing matters, it later became known that Iran reportedly obtained an unspecified number of S-300s
from Croatia.Adding to the confusion, while Russia cancelled the delivery of S-300s to Iran, in 2010 Iran unveiled what were widely considered to be
crude mock-ups of a S-300 battery’s components at a military parade.
At the same parade, Iran displayed an extremely sophisticated
Nebo SVU VHF radar. The Nebo SVU is an optional component of the S-300 system and Iran may have received it prior to the delivery of the S-300 battery itself. In addition, Iran displayed
a radar similar to the 30N6 radar of early S-300 variants, raising suspicions that Iran received at least some S-300 components from Russia (the Nebo SVU) and from other sources (the ‘30N6’ radar).
After the S-300 deal with Russia was cancelled, Iranian officials announced a project to build an indigenous SAM system equivalent to the S-300 dubbed the Bavar-373. While the claim was not taken seriously in most circles, in late summer 2014 Iran unveiled two radar (
Mersad and
unknown) and two missiles (
Bavar and
Sayyad-3) assumed to be associated with the Bavar-373. If these systems work as advertised, Iran may have developed an analogue to the S-300 system. If true, it is likely that Iran received a number of S-300 components from a variety of sources over a number of years to assist in reverse-engineering parts of the system. It should be noted that the Sayyad-3 might also be
paired with the S-200 SAM system, thus improving the capabilities of the S-200. Moreover, the Mersad radar may also be utilized for other tasks, such as a punitive medium-long range SAM system that utilizes the Sayyad-2 and Sayyad-3 missiles.
Beyond air defence missiles, Iran has also been upgrading its sensors and air defence command and control. Seeking to enhance its (very) long-range air surveillance capabilities, Iran has developed a number of systems. No information is available other than the name and whatever can be ascertained from the sole image of the radar on the Najm-802, a new phased array radar.. It also unveiled an unnamed
static VHF early-warning radar in 2014.
Two over-the-horizon (OTH) radar have also been discussed by Iranian officials. The first, the 1,000 km range
Ghadir OTH radar was unveiled in 2014. The second, the Sepehr radar, has not yet been unveiled as it is believed to be
under construction. The Sepehr is said to have a 3,000 km range. These systems will allow Iran to conduct very long range air surveillance and will provide Iran early warning of any impending air strikes coming its way.
Beyond (very) long range air surveillance, Iran has been busy purchasing and developing a large number of sensors, most of them unique and quite distinctly ‘Iranian.’ In addition to radar mentioned in conjunction with Iran’s SAM systems, the country has developed two variants of the Matla-ul Fajr mobile VHF radar, as well as the mobile
Alim passive sensor, the mobile
Kaihan VHF radar, the mobile
Fath-2 passive sensor, a number of variants of the mobile
Kashef radar, the static
Arash radar, the
Asr naval radar, the semi-mobile Melli radar, the mobile
Kavosh radar, and a number of other unnamed but unveiled systems.
In addition to the Russian mobile Nebo radar already mentioned, it has also purchased a number of systems from China, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. Iran is known to have acquired Russian mobile
Kasta 2E radar, Russian mobile Avtobaza passive sensors, Belorussian mobile
Vostok-E radar, and is suspected of having acquired the Ukrainian mobile Kolchuga passive sensor. In addition, it has acquired a number of Chinese radar systems such as the
static JY-14. Iran has also developed a number of other radar systems and sensors, most of which are unidentified by name or have not been identified in publicly available imagery.
To connect this impressive growing array of sensors, Iran has been working on a mobile Line of Sight (LOS) communications systems (
1 and
2) and
tropospheric communications systems. These mobile communications system facilitate the
transfer of radar data and commands between surveillance radar, command posts, and mobile SAM batteries.
At the lowest tier, that of last-ditch short-range air defence against aircraft, bombs, and cruise missiles, Iran has mainly resorted to anti-aircraft artillery (AAA), not missiles. Iran already has large quantities of the Soviet/Russian-origin ZU-23-2 twin-barrelled 23mm AAA and the Swiss-origin Oerlikon twin-barrelled 35mm AAA and its associated Skyguard radar system. Iran has apparently reverse engineered the Skyguard radar system and the
Oerlikon-35mm and added a number of new optical sensors to it. This system, along with the
Mesbah radar and a number of optical sensors serve to guide Iran’s AAA.
Iran has also
developed a three-barrelled ‘gattling’ gun version of the 23mm cannon used in the ZU-23. It has also developed
an eight-barrelled version of the 23mm AAA system to destroy incoming targets. To target incoming munitions at higher altitudes, Iran has
reverse-engineered and upgraded the World War II era Soviet KS-19 100mm AAA system, pairing it with the Mesbah radar and EO sensors. It should be noted that these AAA are increasingly
becoming automated.
To complement these AAA systems in last-ditch defence, Iran has purchased 29-32 units of the Russian
Tor M1 self-propelled short-range SAM and is rumoured to have acquired a smaller number of Russian Pantsyr S1 self-propelled short-range combined SAM/AAA systems via Syria. These two systems were designed at the outset to protect high value facilities and vehicles against all kinds of incoming munitions, as well as aircraft. It is unclear if Iran is trying to develop an indigenous system similar in function to the Tor and the Pantsyr, but such a development should be unsurprising.
Iran’s air defence modernization has become increasingly visible in recent years. Just a decade ago, Iran’s air defences posed little if any threat to American and/or Israeli aircraft trying to strike Iran’s nuclear program. This is no longer true as Iran has invested significant financial and industrial resources to purchase, copy, and develop an impressive array of radar, passive sensors, missiles, and SAM systems. Moreover, the vast majority of these systems are mobile, improving their survivability, and are connected to Iran’s air defence network by a number of mobile communications systems. In coming years, Iran’s air defences will only increase in sophistication and pose a greater threat to any potential enemy conducting an aerial bombardment campaign over the country.
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part III: Air Defences Section I
Atlantic Council of Canada » Iran’s Developing Military Capabilities Part IV: Air Defences Section II
S300-PMU2
