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Iranian Air Defense Systems

So the reporter asked whether Iran has a Pantsir-like system in development and he said yes we have such a system in development.

He didn't say it's a Pantsir copy, could also be a Tor-M1 copy.
Furthermore the wind tunnel model of the Pantsir like missile is significantly different to the Pantsir missile design.

Remains to be seen. Plus we still have the IRIADF and the IRGC-ASF, maybe two short range SAM projects are ongoing.
Both have a short range SAM against aircrafts in production, the Ya-Zahra. But for a anti-PGM/CM SAM something like the Tor/Pantsir is needed that is highly cost effective.
 
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Hypersonic missiles are an extension of MAD (mutual assured destruction) China, Russia, US will have their hypersonic missiles equipped with MIRV nuclear warheads. Russia already has an active Hypersonic missile project, was shown off recently.

For conventional use the technology is not cost effective at this stage. But who knows how “cheap” it becomes in say 30-40 years.

Thus for Iran, defending against Hypersonic Glide vehicles are the least of their concern in the next two decades.
wrong , by increased rate of advancement in technologies and science we see today at most it will be 5-10 years and developing a solution against that problem (from scratch) also take at least a decade
 
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Another point from the interview:
Talash-3 is not yet operational.

The Talash-1 was the first step, a fire control radar for the S-200 batteries to add the Sayyad-2 missile to it.
It was replaced by the Talash-2 before entering widespread service.
The Talash-2 could guide the improved Sayyad-2 to its max. range of 70km (the Talash-1 was limited to 50km).
The Talash-2 is for some technical reasons quite unique and very cost effective, it was also taken into service by the IRGC-ASF.

The Talash-3 is the mobile replacement for the S-200's Square Pair radar. It was shown once I believe but is not yet in service. It is more complex and expensive than the Talash-2 and is probably used to guide Sayyad-3 and the S-200 to their max. range of 150-200km.

With all stages operational the IRIADF S-200 sites will have the follwing systems:
- Sayyad-2/Talash-2 combination for high altitude targets up to 70km
- Sayyad-2/Talash-3 combination for targets up to 120km away
- Talash-3 as mobile survivable radar for the S-200 for ranges of 150-200km
- Sqaire Pair static fire control radar for back-up of Talash-3 radar and very long range engagements of 200-250km.

That makes at least 3 independent fire control radars at a single site, of which two are mobile.
Thats 3 different missiles each optimized for a special envelope of an engagement.
In most cases the "city/base defense SAM system", the HAWK/Mersad will offer those "strategic" S-200-Talash SAM sites with an additional layer of mid-altitude mid range cost effective SAM defense.

This will complete the IRIADF's static 24/7 SAM structure for the future.

The future mobile component will be made of Bavar-373 and Sayyad-2/3. In that scenario, the Bavar-373's Sayyad-4 missile can be used as extra or replacement of S-200 missiles, once they can't be kept in service anymore. A semi-truck based launcher with Sayyad-4 working in combination with Talash-3 fire control radar would then end the S-200's career, while not being the complex, high performance Bavar-373 yet.

Now something about the IRGC-ASF. The replacement of their Sayyad-1/HQ-2 sites with Sayyad-2/Talash-2 is wise, improving range and missile load ~ 2 times while adding mobility and smaller system size.
So as Iran is not a capitalist system, they will probably concentrate the replaced batteries at a single site. Either keep them in service and form a Tehran super battery of 6-8 batteries, which would make a 8 channel, 48 launcher super site, or as individual sites. That super-site would still be a good capability for today's standard against high altitude targets, similar to the SA-1 for Moscow. That could free up one of the two Tehran S-300 sites for Bandar Abbas. The point is that the HQ-2 is a complex system to operate, better keep one unit proficient with this legacy system than keep existing units trained with it, plus all the trouble with the old support infrastructure.
 
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The Talash-2 is for some technical reasons quite unique and very cost effective, it was also taken into service by the IRGC-ASF.

It's been deployed at least 3 sites already. https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/irans-sam-coverage.510086/page-6#post-10780537

So as Iran is not a capitalist system, they will probably concentrate the replaced batteries at a single site. Either keep them in service and form a Tehran super battery of 6-8 batteries, which would make a 8 channel, 48 launcher super site, or as individual sites. That super-site would still be a good capability for today's standard against high altitude targets, similar to the SA-1 for Moscow. That could free up one of the two Tehran S-300 sites for Bandar Abbas. The point is that the HQ-2 is a complex system to operate, better keep one unit proficient with this legacy system than keep existing units trained with it, plus all the trouble with the old support infrastructure.

Why even keep this very old system active? Surely it would be far more effective to remove it from service completely, and replace it with Sayyad-2 which is better in every way?
 
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If you are not a capitalist system with a strong military industrial complex it makes no sense to replace a system if you have manpower that could man and maintain the legacy system.

Iran has the manpower to keep the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 in service. Why do it? Because any target that would make it into Tehran region airspace and fly above ~10km would be cost effectively dealt with a Sayyad-1. Anything lower is for the HAWK/Mersad. Anything beyond the borders of the Tehran region above medium altitude is dealt with Sayyad-2/3/4 and S-200/300.

So the Sayyad-1 takes a small portion of the IADS envelope, that of targets that make it above Tehran airspace and fly at high altitudes and high speeds. For that portion a 8 channel, 48 ready to fire missile battery would be quite suited.

The IADS will automatically select when it would be a waste of resources to use a S-300 or Sayyad-2 and use a Sayyad-1 instead.
Be sure that the IRGC-ASF has modified the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 until now, so that it has chances to do such a job.
Maybe it will be put into storage for a desperate war scenario where other systems are knocked out.

The portion described for a Sayyad-1 super battery would maybe just make 8% of wartime engagements and for that task, a upgraded legacy system could be well sufficient. Don't underestimate the Sayyad-1 upgraded and inside a modern IADS.
 
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If you are not a capitalist system with a strong military industrial complex it makes no sense to replace a system if you have manpower that could man and maintain the legacy system.

Iran has the manpower to keep the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 in service. Why do it? Because any target that would make it into Tehran region airspace and fly above ~10km would be cost effectively dealt with a Sayyad-1. Anything lower is for the HAWK/Mersad. Anything beyond the borders of the Tehran region above medium altitude is dealt with Sayyad-2/3/4 and S-200/300.

So the Sayyad-1 takes a small portion of the IADS envelope, that of targets that make it above Tehran airspace and fly at high altitudes and high speeds. For that portion a 8 channel, 48 ready to fire missile battery would be quite suited.

The IADS will automatically select when it would be a waste of resources to use a S-300 or Sayyad-2 and use a Sayyad-1 instead.
Be sure that the IRGC-ASF has modified the HQ-2/Sayyad-1 until now, so that it has chances to do such a job.
Maybe it will be put into storage for a desperate war scenario where other systems are knocked out.

The portion described for a Sayyad-1 super battery would maybe just make 8% of wartime engagements and for that task, a upgraded legacy system could be well sufficient. Don't underestimate the Sayyad-1 upgraded and inside a modern IADS.

Considering the Sayyad-1 upgrade was made in 1999, don't you think it would be vulnerable to ECM and jamming?
 
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First and foremost it is a kinematically strong missile in its rather small operation envelope. At high speeds and high altitude it can make up for its maneuverability deficits.
Plus it is command guided, which means that it can work with other radars as guidance source or even better, ground based optical/TI guidance.
So if upgraded well, and we know that they did works in that direction (Sayyad-1A), ECM can be countered to a good extend.
 
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بنظر میرسد که سامانه های پدافندی اچ کیو دو در حال جایگزین شدن با سامانه پدافندی صیاد هستند...

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استقرار سامانه پدافنی تلاش بصورت ترکیبی با سامانه اس-۲۰۰

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First and foremost it is a kinematically strong missile in its rather small operation envelope. At high speeds and high altitude it can make up for its maneuverability deficits.
Plus it is command guided, which means that it can work with other radars as guidance source or even better, ground based optical/TI guidance.
So if upgraded well, and we know that they did works in that direction (Sayyad-1A), ECM can be countered to a good extend.

Command guided only system means they rely on frequencies to guide them post launch for most of the way at least which would make them highly susceptible to any kind of jamming and for all we know the U.S. could have Sat's in space with massive directional antenna's capable of flooding every area their fighters go too with massive data going to every within range frequency imaginable except the specific ones used by them and have Aircraft's in the air escorting their fighter that do the same for short wave frequencies.

For an SA-2 type system that at max is used for targets within 25km of the launch site that has a large fixed launcher that can point towards the target and is equipped with missiles that can get to most targets within 30 seconds with a missile with a diameter over 2ft the best upgrade would be various type of expensive internal sensors with fire and forget capability

But I don't think Iran should produce the Sayyad at all!!!!!! Just upgrade the ones we already have because they are simply too big for the capability they have and lack of mobility makes them susceptible to cheaper and or longer ranged systems
 
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Iran wouldn’t risk stoking Russian anger by reverse engineering TOR-m1 or Pantsir system.

Furthermore, I assume there are contract clauses that would prevent Iran from reverse engineering TOR system for at least X amount of years.

I think Iran would worry about the political fallout of such a move especially in future arms deals with russia.
 
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@VEVAK

For short ranges command guidance is good enough. The Tor and Pantsir are also command guided with no fear of any kind of satellite-borne jamming.

They simply loose accuracy at long ranges and the farther they are away from the command emitter, the weaker single could get prone to jamming. Still S-300PS and 2000-vintage KS-1 were command guided to much longer distances than a Sayyad-1 would be.

30km is robust enough and a TI guidance to that range is also no issue, which means no need to use the old ECM prone x-band guidance radar (the weakpoint for ECM in the system).

No. The Sayyad-1/HQ-2 are good as they are for that specific task and whats needed is a TI camera at the radar, a upgrade that (if not already done), is cheap and easy for Iran.
The airspace directly above the Tehran region is most protected and at best some stealth asset would try their chance, no heavy ECM support expected in those phases.

The command guided SA-1 protected Moscow airspace for 25 years, only replaced by the S-300. The role would be the same as Sayyad-2 in Tehran, a limited task.
 
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@PeeD This is regarding Talash systems and Bavar.
It seems to me the Bavar-373 will only use one missile i.e a sayyad-4. What's the point of having a separate long range air defence system called Talash-3. Why not just incorporate the sayyad-3 into the Bavar system? Is there some other "uniqueness" about this whole Talash system to merit it being an entire separate system? Is the main difference simply a matter of range?

I much rather them develop some dedicated anti missile systems like david's sling and combine this with bavar than have 2 long range air defence systems with both focusing mainly on anti aircraft etc. Unless, like I said, I am missing something about Talash.
 
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@VEVAK

For short ranges command guidance is good enough. The Tor and Pantsir are also command guided with no fear of any kind of satellite-borne jamming.

They simply loose accuracy at long ranges and the farther they are away from the command emitter, the weaker single could get prone to jamming. Still S-300PS and 2000-vintage KS-1 were command guided to much longer distances than a Sayyad-1 would be.

30km is robust enough and a TI guidance to that range is also no issue, which means no need to use the old ECM prone x-band guidance radar (the weakpoint for ECM in the system).

No. The Sayyad-1/HQ-2 are good as they are for that specific task and whats needed is a TI camera at the radar, a upgrade that (if not already done), is cheap and easy for Iran.
The airspace directly above the Tehran region is most protected and at best some stealth asset would try their chance, no heavy ECM support expected in those phases.

The command guided SA-1 protected Moscow airspace for 25 years, only replaced by the S-300. The role would be the same as Sayyad-2 in Tehran, a limited task.

They may be good enough to upgrade with the right upgrade but NOT really good enough to produce!

Fact is for it's size, range and capabilities the missile is too large and requires a massive launcher which is NOT a system that's worth taking into production and the main reason against it would be lack of mobility.

In a war with any country with the capability of going to war with Iran the enemy would conduct detailed analysis of where our systems are located and what the range capability of each system is and they'll upgrade the maps of their Aircraft and Cruise Missiles to take countermeasures and unless you use the time given to you by your early warning systems to take countermeasures of your own and move your systems to a 2ndary location previously planed to lay traps you will be in trouble

And systems like the Tor & Pantsir's are highly mobile short ranged systems mainly meant for low altitude engagement like a volley of cruise missiles before the fighters come, intercepting projectiles fired from aircraft, helo's & lower altitude UAV's and in that role they can do their job adequately and cheaper command guidance backed by high processing capability is sufficient at their range and what they'll be used against but it is NOT sufficient for aircrafts that will NOT even attempt to enter a high threat area like Tehran unless backed by various type of jammers and countermeasures

+ The SA-1 or Sayyad-1 is 35ft long & 28 inches in diameter the dam thing is a good 6 inches wider in diameter and well over 10ft longer than a Tomahawk cruise missile which means they are 5ft longer and 8 inches wider than the Fateh-110 and with that size they are usually engaged within 25km of their which would have been OK if they were a mobile system capable of laying traps but they are NOT!

And if your a Un-bunkered high value fixed target that can't lay traps, you can't be well hidden due to a lack of mobility and your engagement range against fighters is less than 60km then fighters can simply use relatively low cost glide bombs like the SDB and a single F-15 can carry 18 of them or 14 & external fuel without breaking a sweet

Which makes them a ridicules SAM to produce at this day and age! Iran would be far better off just building another Zolfaghar factory to allow us to go after more targets and hit their aircraft where they land because Sayyads are just too easy to take out for various reasons which can't even intercept cruise missiles & even if they could they are far too big of a missile for such a task

Plus it's time Iran starts mass producing various types of sensors & electronics with automated factories so they come out cheaper for the military to install them on wide range of platforms from pulse doppler SAR radars to thermal imaging to HD camera's to our own advance processor and memory storage devices & SSD and we need to get our hands on an AESA radars or have our engineers try to develop our own by gathering as much data on them as they can
 
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Iran wouldn’t risk stoking Russian anger by reverse engineering TOR-m1 or Pantsir system.

Furthermore, I assume there are contract clauses that would prevent Iran from reverse engineering TOR system for at least X amount of years.

I think Iran would worry about the political fallout of such a move especially in future arms deals with russia.

Right, Iran would never do what now???








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