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Iran unveils A2A BVR missile Fakour

The idea is simpler. Its a restricted engagement scenario.

The only aircrafts that could use the Fakkur-90 effectively on CAP are the Phantoms and Tomcats, its too heavy for all other fighters of the IRIAF. Phantom and Tomcat could also guide it independently if the former gets its radar upgraded. Engagement ranges would range from 80-150km against 1-10m² RCS i.e 3rd and 4th gen fighters. Of course the Phantom would need to get a data-link for mid course update either built into the radar or as separate array. As said in such a scenario Phantoms could do operations inside enemy airspace and CAPs with two Fakkur-90 plus two Sidewinder/Fatter and Tomcats with up to 4 Fakkur-90 and 2 Sidewinder/Fatters.
So much for conventional scenarios which only need some hardware and software changes.

Then we have the exotic variant in which the aircraft has no radar capable to guide the Fakkur-90 and IADS target data is used. This is a unconventional, less flexible, specialized/limited defensive engagement. An airbase or a city close to it is attacked by fighter-bombers and the well established IADS in friendly territory detected and tracks the attackers in 3 dimensions. Here the data-link connection to the intercepting aircraft is firm and robust and data from radars and other IADS assets are fused for a unified picture of the engagement.
In such a environment a F-5 or MiG-29 can effectively do a interception mission from the airbase with 2 Fakkur-90 and use IADS info via data-link only. There is also the option to use the Fakkur-90 with a updated radar to 60km for the F-5 and 80km for the MIG-29 but in such a close to homebase interception mission IADS data could be a good option for up to 150km shots.
Of course like the first scenario the systems must be upgraded to establish a data-link to the Fakkur-90 for mid-course updates, embedding them into ground radars would complicate the matter. As above the communication could be done via the radar array itself or the secondary IFF array or a whole separate, maybe podded data-link array.

So much for the theory as this is just a IRIAF project and the price for one round should still be high, even if locally made, we should not expect widespeared use outside the F-14 fleet. But the idea to give some new unconventional tooth to the old fleet is surely a nice one. Old, previously sword equipped fighters would get bows to remain useful once they become to old for hand to hand combat.
 
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The idea is simpler. Its a restricted engagement scenario.

The only aircrafts that could use the Fakkur-90 effectively on CAP are the Phantoms and Tomcats, its too heavy for all other fighters of the IRIAF. Phantom and Tomcat could also guide it independently if the former gets its radar upgraded. Engagement ranges would range from 80-150km against 1-10m² RCS i.e 3rd and 4th gen fighters. Of course the Phantom would need to get a data-link for mid course update either built into the radar or as separate array. As said in such a scenario Phantoms could do operations inside enemy airspace and CAPs with two Fakkur-90 plus two Sidewinder/Fatter and Tomcats with up to 4 Fakkur-90 and 2 Sidewinder/Fatters.
So much for conventional scenarios which only need some hardware and software changes.

Then we have the exotic variant in which the aircraft has no radar capable to guide the Fakkur-90 and IADS target data is used. This is a unconventional, less flexible, specialized/limited defensive engagement. An airbase or a city close to it is attacked by fighter-bombers and the well established IADS in friendly territory detected and tracks the attackers in 3 dimensions. Here the data-link connection to the intercepting aircraft is firm and robust and data from radars and other IADS assets are fused for a unified picture of the engagement.
In such a environment a F-5 or MiG-29 can effectively do a interception mission from the airbase with 2 Fakkur-90 and use IADS info via data-link only. There is also the option to use the Fakkur-90 with a updated radar to 60km for the F-5 and 80km for the MIG-29 but in such a close to homebase interception mission IADS data could be a good option for up to 150km shots.
Of course like the first scenario the systems must be upgraded to establish a data-link to the Fakkur-90 for mid-course updates, embedding them into ground radars would complicate the matter. As above the communication could be done via the radar array itself or the secondary IFF array or a whole separate, maybe podded data-link array.

So much for the theory as this is just a IRIAF project and the price for one round should still be high, even if locally made, we should not expect widespeared use outside the F-14 fleet. But the idea to give some new unconventional tooth to the old fleet is surely a nice one. Old, previously sword equipped fighters would get bows to remain useful once they become to old for hand to hand combat.
This unconventional scenario is the most probable one in my opinion. Iran doesn't have any aircraft that can cover the range of this missile independently. And I don't think they can miniaturize their advanced radars to fit inside the fighters they have.

However, they have spent a lot of money in developing their landbased radars and have made significant progress. Using the above approach can enable them to turn any of their jets into an interceptor. The drive behind that is purely economical. It is much cheaper to fire 2 fakoors from a flying jet then firing Taer or S-200/300 missiles.

I recall reading once that IRGC had tracked and engaged one of US drones above Persian Gulf using its SU-25. We all know SU-25 does not have search radar. So it was guided towards the drone using the land based radars. Now imagine the same jet be able to fire Fakoor using the data it receives from ground based radars.

I can see that to be something both IRGC and IRAF interested in.
 
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Arminkh,

In that very limited scenario, that concept would work fine, thanks to your target flying over featureless open water (you couldn't ask for an easier target to track on radar than one flying over open water). Even better when it's a sitting duck like a MQ-1/9, which has no independent ability to even detect it's been fired at, let alone attempt any kind of evasive maneuvers.

In varying terrain however, it's a whole other ball game. The limitations of ground-based radars' ability to successfully search for, let alone track, targets in a wide range of terrains is one of the primary reason the AEW&C concept came to be. Airborne radars have a substantially improved capability of tracking targets regardless of target, especially in the tracking of low-flying targets (since they have the ability to "look-down", something a ground-based simply can't do). Ground based radars aren't completely blind to low-flying targets, the ability to detect them at a "safe distance" is the problematic given their field of view.

Then you have to consider the airborne threat Iran faces. As cocky as the Saudis or their allies maybe, they're not foolish enough to come in for an attack run at any altitude EXCEPT just above the deck. Ground-based radars on the Iranian side of the PG will likely detect the launch of a large force of strike aircraft but they're going to "hit the deck" and stay there until they get to their intended target. They'll be picked up again by ground-based radars but likely not until they are dangerous close to their targets (especially if they intend on using stand-off weapons).

IMHO, while it is a technically possible concept and may have give the IRIAF some extra flexibility, I don't think the benefits will ever pay off for the headaches it will take to put in place and the limitations built-in to it's operation.
 
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Godman,

Nothing beyond the IrAN-140 model from over a decade ago, which given the -140 mediocre/poor service record and uncertain future, will likely remain just that, a model on a desk somewhere.

Then sadly, the ex-Iraqi Adnan AEW aircraft (Iraqi/French modified IL-76MD) met a tragic fate when it broke up in flight in 2009.

"Officially", there IS still an early-warning aircraft in Iran today, but to my knowledge, it's never left the off-ramp/apron area of the Mehrabad airport: the Baghdad-1.

This earlier Iraqi/French IL-76 modification saw a Thompson-CSF Tiger G 2D air search radar fitted in the rear cargo door area, with a fiberglass shell built around it. Definitely not a pretty sight and at a minimum, even under the best of circumstances, it would never have provided much coverage (supposedly, it could cover the 180 degrees behind the aircraft...)

Sadly, this bird has rarely moved from its current location at Mehrabad since it landed in Iran back in 1991. Unlike its Adnan successor, which eventually entered service with the IRIAF.


UPDATE:

Of interest, I looked around Mehrabad on GoogleEarth and found that over the last year or so, the old Baghdad-1 does seem to move around a bit. Going back through their historical images, it rarely if ever moved from its spot near a derelict B747 until sometime in 2014, at which point it "vanished" (I can't find it anyway). It doesn't reappear on that side of the airport until last summer that's where it starts to get really weird. At least twice since last summer, what looks to be a yellow fuel truck has appeared under the wing of this IL-76. This suggests one of two things:

1) This IL-76 is NOT the old Baghdad-1 and just a normal IL-76 parking on this side of the runway (very unusual given the historical imagery, where that type rarely parks in this location)
2) The Baghdad-1 has been restored to flyable status after some 10-15 years of neglect. Whether it's been converted back to a "normal" IL-76 or retains its old radome, impossible to say from the GE imagery (which never showed the radome well in the first place).

We might need a new thread for this stuff...
 
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Godman,

Nothing beyond the IrAN-140 model from over a decade ago, which given the -140 mediocre/poor service record and uncertain future, will likely remain just that, a model on a desk somewhere.

Then sadly, the ex-Iraqi Adnan AEW aircraft (Iraqi/French modified IL-76MD) met a tragic fate when it broke up in flight in 2009.

"Officially", there IS still an early-warning aircraft in Iran today, but to my knowledge, it's never left the off-ramp/apron area of the Mehrabad airport: the Baghdad-1.

This earlier Iraqi/French IL-76 modification saw a Thompson-CSF Tiger G 2D air search radar fitted in the rear cargo door area, with a fiberglass shell built around it. Definitely not a pretty sight and at a minimum, even under the best of circumstances, it would never have provided much coverage (supposedly, it could cover the 180 degrees behind the aircraft...)

Sadly, this bird has rarely moved from its current location at Mehrabad since it landed in Iran back in 1991. Unlike its Adnan successor, which eventually entered service with the IRIAF.


UPDATE:

Of interest, I looked around Mehrabad on GoogleEarth and found that over the last year or so, the old Baghdad-1 does seem to move around a bit. Going back through their historical images, it rarely if ever moved from its spot near a derelict B747 until sometime in 2014, at which point it "vanished" (I can't find it anyway). It doesn't reappear on that side of the airport until last summer that's where it starts to get really weird. At least twice since last summer, what looks to be a yellow fuel truck has appeared under the wing of this IL-76. This suggests one of two things:

1) This IL-76 is NOT the old Baghdad-1 and just a normal IL-76 parking on this side of the runway (very unusual given the historical imagery, where that type rarely parks in this location)
2) The Baghdad-1 has been restored to flyable status after some 10-15 years of neglect. Whether it's been converted back to a "normal" IL-76 or retains its old radome, impossible to say from the GE imagery (which never showed the radome well in the first place).

We might need a new thread for this stuff...
I don't think the Baghdad-1 in that form would be particularly useful. Iran has its own advanced radar tech and a decades old search radar is not required. Conversion to standard Il-76 is my guess.

Having said that, the IRIAF really does need the look down capability of AWACS. It is indispensable in a highly mountainous country like Iran.
 
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ALCON,

Interestingly, I found a report concerning the Tigre radar the Iraqis used for these projects (which were licensed to them to build in-country by Thomson-CSF believe it or not), that suggested that after the 1991 Gulf War, it was discovered that the purpose of the Baghdad-1 was not as a AEW but as a crude equivalent to the E-8 J-STAR aka an airborne ground-surveillance platform. The report suggests however, that it failed to meet expectations.

That would certainly make more sense given the location of the antenna though. What good is a AEW if it can only see behind it?
 
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Godman,

Nothing beyond the IrAN-140 model from over a decade ago, which given the -140 mediocre/poor service record and uncertain future, will likely remain just that, a model on a desk somewhere.

Then sadly, the ex-Iraqi Adnan AEW aircraft (Iraqi/French modified IL-76MD) met a tragic fate when it broke up in flight in 2009.

"Officially", there IS still an early-warning aircraft in Iran today, but to my knowledge, it's never left the off-ramp/apron area of the Mehrabad airport: the Baghdad-1.

This earlier Iraqi/French IL-76 modification saw a Thompson-CSF Tiger G 2D air search radar fitted in the rear cargo door area, with a fiberglass shell built around it. Definitely not a pretty sight and at a minimum, even under the best of circumstances, it would never have provided much coverage (supposedly, it could cover the 180 degrees behind the aircraft...)

Sadly, this bird has rarely moved from its current location at Mehrabad since it landed in Iran back in 1991. Unlike its Adnan successor, which eventually entered service with the IRIAF.


UPDATE:

Of interest, I looked around Mehrabad on GoogleEarth and found that over the last year or so, the old Baghdad-1 does seem to move around a bit. Going back through their historical images, it rarely if ever moved from its spot near a derelict B747 until sometime in 2014, at which point it "vanished" (I can't find it anyway). It doesn't reappear on that side of the airport until last summer that's where it starts to get really weird. At least twice since last summer, what looks to be a yellow fuel truck has appeared under the wing of this IL-76. This suggests one of two things:

1) This IL-76 is NOT the old Baghdad-1 and just a normal IL-76 parking on this side of the runway (very unusual given the historical imagery, where that type rarely parks in this location)
2) The Baghdad-1 has been restored to flyable status after some 10-15 years of neglect. Whether it's been converted back to a "normal" IL-76 or retains its old radome, impossible to say from the GE imagery (which never showed the radome well in the first place).

We might need a new thread for this stuff...
What do you think has prevented Iran from building its own AWACS ?
1- the radar tech 2-lack of a good plane as a platform or 3-lack of ambition? or even all of the above?

it would be really interesting to know that having gone a long way in ground-based radars doesn't mean you can build an air-borne one as well? or maybe you can ?
 
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What do you think has prevented Iran from building its own AWACS ?
1- the radar tech 2-lack of a good plane as a platform or 3-lack of ambition? or even all of the above?

it would be really interesting to know that having gone a long way in ground-based radars doesn't mean you can build an air-borne one as well? or maybe you can ?
We dont know that iran isnt working on one,it could be that other systems like sam and oth radars simply have the higher priority at the moment,also the fact that the airforce seems to have a low priority for resources wouldnt help matters that could be far more likely a reason as iran certainly has the tech and the platforms available to it.
 
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Iran seems to have opted for a IADS with OTH radars providing early warning and a dense network of large mobile radars (backbone being the Matla ol Fajr 2/3) and gap fillers (Kafesh series, Kavosh, Matla ol Fajr 1, etc.).

The main OTH asset hasn't been shown yet and the Ghadir radar has likely no OTH capability but its the OTH radar that is supposed to deliver the look-down capability.

They will try their best to protect those OTH assets. It seems that they believe that protecting a gound object, in the center of the defensive system, against a superior airpower opponent is easier than having a asset in the air. I agree with that considering the much longer ranges a OTH radar offers for look-down purposes.

A AEW asset is good if for a offensive airpower strategy and if you are able to to protect it with advanced airpower. At the moment many are talking about Chinese and Russian long range AAMs and stealth assets designed to take out the vital AEW asset of traditional western airpower via a single high speed long range engagement. The loss of this force multiplier should then create parity for Russian and Chinese airpower. The vulnerability of AEW assets seems to drive Americans to space based early warning.
 
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Iran seems to have opted for a IADS with OTH radars providing early warning and a dense network of large mobile radars (backbone being the Matla ol Fajr 2/3) and gap fillers (Kafesh series, Kavosh, Matla ol Fajr 1, etc.).

The main OTH asset hasn't been shown yet and the Ghadir radar has likely no OTH capability but its the OTH radar that is supposed to deliver the look-down capability.

They will try their best to protect those OTH assets. It seems that they believe that protecting a gound object, in the center of the defensive system, against a superior airpower opponent is easier than having a asset in the air. I agree with that considering the much longer ranges a OTH radar offers for look-down purposes.

A AEW asset is good if for a offensive airpower strategy and if you are able to to protect it with advanced airpower. At the moment many are talking about Chinese and Russian long range AAMs and stealth assets designed to take out the vital AEW asset of traditional western airpower via a single high speed long range engagement. The loss of this force multiplier should then create parity for Russian and Chinese airpower. The vulnerability of AEW assets seems to drive Americans to space based early warning.
It is not easy to hide an OTH radar. Do you mean Ghadir and rest of the sites (one of which Janes wrote about 2 years ago) are not OTH radars?
 
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ALCON,

Can't say that I disagree with PeeD's assessment, though I would say that the idea of protecting a ground-based long-range radar system is fundamentally flawed. Hard to defend something that can be seen from space and can't be moved.

To me, relying too heavily on ground-based long-range radars would be like flying an AWAC into MiG-31 infested airspace and just 'hold the course' and play the odds your on-board EW kit and escorts will be enough to keep you alive.

That said, I do suspect that long-range radar systems like the Ghadir would be cheaper to build, repair, and replace if need be, compared to most AEW aircraft out there (which as rule, are some of the most expensive military aircraft around).

Just reminds me more and more of the "tactical AEW" concept I theorized about years and years ago back at the old IMF...
 
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Hard to defend something that can be seen from space and can't be moved.

I guess the enemy isn't limited to anti radiation missiles like HARM anymore. It can just send in GPS guided Tomahawks to skip the whole "shoot the archer" long ranged SAMs/AAMs. And intercepting cruise missiles is a lot harder than shooting down aircraft.

Just reminds me more and more of the "tactical AEW" concept I theorized about years and years ago back at the old IMF...

Inaccessible :(
 
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IRGC never claimed the Ghadir to be a OTH radar and I have my doubts of the monostatic nature and short wavelenght of the Ghadir would enable OTH operation.
We know Iran operates OTH radar, but I don't think its Ghadir but something not shown yet.

As for the vulnerability of a static ground based radar. Yes its vulnerable, especially against high velocity weapons like BM's. But we always talk about the context of a multilayered IADS and a geographically large country which center is more than 600km away from its borders.
The whole IADS relies on the OTH asset and the whole IADS has to goal to protect the OTH asset.

Reliable PGM, CM protection in a saturation scenario was impossible in 1991 for Iraq against the US. But today we have digital systems like the Pantsir or Mesbah designed to take out such weapons attacking weapons in a reliable and cost effective manner.

Its a similar scenario to a carrier group. Its potent once its defensive system is operating but once the Ageis system breaks down due to saturation and other means, once the nutshell is brocken, the complete system collapses.
 
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