Yet, this line of thinking overlooks the fact that the Indian military is beset by obsolete platforms.
And the Pakistan Army isn't?
Since the end of the Cold War, the manpower balance between the two armies has hovered around a 2:1 ratio in India’s favor. However, just 18 of the army’s 36 divisions are stationed in the states bordering Pakistan, fifteen of which are infantry divisions, with only limited offensive power. In contrast, 18 of the Pakistani army’s 22 divisions—including both of their armored divisions—are deployed in provinces adjacent to the international border. If we account for
the estimated 70,000 Pakistani soldiers that have been temporarily redeployed to confront the Pakistani Taliban, India’s manpower advantage at the theater level at the start of any crisis would be 1.2:1.
Whatever happened to 7,00,000 troops in Kashmir?
I'm glad sane minds prevail.
Although in a longer conflict India could bring its numerical superiority to bear, the military has numerous shortfalls of ammunition and equipment that make a struggle of more than a few weeks duration unlikely. For example, as of August 2014,
the Army lacked ammunition to undertake more than twenty days of “intense fighting” with less than seven days of reserves of key stocks of artillery ammunition, anti-tank missiles and a “critical shortage” of ammunition for its main battle tanks that
would run out after ten days, hardly enough time for additional forces to make a difference.
Two major mistakes here.
1. While the Indian Army's war fighting capability has been mentioned here, Pakistan's has not.
2. The numbers are not the total ammunition stock of the army but the
War Wastage Reserves. We need 40 days of WWR for intense fighting, but that's not all the ammo that the IA has.
Moreover, it is alleged that large numbers of the Indian army’s fleet of tanks are nearing obsolescence and unable to operate at night, while their modern replacements are unsuited for operations in the desert regions around the international border. Unsurprisingly, some Indian defense analysts have suggested that their army requires at least 1,500 modern tanks to gain a conventional edge.
Whatever happened to the 1000+ T-90s that are already in operation?
And what about Pak numbers? How many T-90 class tanks in the PA? There should be a valid comparison. If the PA has no T-90 class tanks, then even a few hundred with the IA are enough to get an advantage, let alone 1500.
Finally, since India does not possess heavy bombers, the ability of fighter jets or missile strikes to significantly damage terrorist bases is open to question.
That's a very weird opinion.
A B-52 can carry 32 tons of bombs.
A B-1B can carry 34 tons internally.
A B-2 can carry 23 tons.
A flight of 4 Su-30MKI can carry the same amount, up to 32 tons.
The bomber's main advantage is range. But that sort of range is irrelevant in our scenario. Highly maneuverable aircraft carrying PGMs are of greater importance than a weapon that can only be used after air superiority is ensured.
In the entire article, the only thing the author has compared is numbers stationed near the borders which gives Pak the advantage. But the rest of the article simply says "the IA sucks" and ends it with that. IA has obsolete tech, but what about Pak? The IA does not have enough ammo, but what about Pak? What about the tanks? How about comparing supporting assets, like the air wing?
The article talks about IA's obsolescence, then it should have also compared future modernization plans. It should have talked about FMBT, FRCV and FICV and compared that similar to Pak programs. It should have talked about the IA's new air wing and brought up PA and PAF's plan to counter it. Where is the comparison on battlefield communication systems and soldier modernization programs?
The title says "India's conventional military superiority over Pakistan is exaggerated" but gives no information to prove it.
