SinoIndusFriendship
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There is no reason for alarm. Pakistanis, Chinese, Bangladeshis keep in mind "INDIA CANNOT BE OUR ENEMY". If we remind ourselves of this truth, we will be better off.
India's Cold Start Doctrine
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Spitfighter
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I'm all for the cold start, it sounds great. They've already made some significant advances so it won't be long before we can really put it into practice. However, fighting a war isn't in our interest at the moment, are we doing anything to expand/improve RAW?
What is that supposed to mean anyway?
What is that supposed to mean anyway?
boxer_B
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A bit off topic, but dont you think in these scenarios Internal security should also be strengthened? I mean waging a war against any nation is not a joke, but why bring circumstances for war? Stop them before they strike! We all know that such elements comes from outside, but how do they breach the perimeter?
And even if pakistan is humiliated in war, does that guarantee end of terrorism? So we are back to square one!
Other countries can also be used for launchpad of these terrorists, how would this doctrine apply in that case?
There was a recent sting operation by an indian news channel which showed indian navy personnel sleeping on job on sunday after mumbai attack! Sorry mate, war is too much price for terrorism rather kill them proactively in home or abroad via covert means!
rajeev
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Here is some info that could lot of value to the forum
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/IS3203_pp158-190.pdf
paritosh
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we will all be interested in knowing about it.Please elaborate what the strategy is and how does it work.
@seagull and boxer_b
How useful cold start is depends on the politcal establishment and civil authority. It might have been ready after the mumbai attacks but the GoI thought that it would be counter-productive. We don't really know.
The armed forces jobs is to keep updating and improving their defence capability and this is ongoing. So the basic doctrine of large scale conventional war with land invasion was successful in 1971 and to counter that Pakistani security establishment developed the proxy war strategy which could not be countered the traditional way and required COIN expertise. Later on, keeping other global threats in mind they developed the Cold start doctrine. In the future it might be developed to something else. Its all part of the evolution process. The armed forces should always keep the defense interests in mind and strive to achieve that.
It is the responsibility of the civil and political authority to decide when to use that force after careful evaluation of its pros and cons. Thats why the supreme commander of armed forces is a civilian.
How useful cold start is depends on the politcal establishment and civil authority. It might have been ready after the mumbai attacks but the GoI thought that it would be counter-productive. We don't really know.
The armed forces jobs is to keep updating and improving their defence capability and this is ongoing. So the basic doctrine of large scale conventional war with land invasion was successful in 1971 and to counter that Pakistani security establishment developed the proxy war strategy which could not be countered the traditional way and required COIN expertise. Later on, keeping other global threats in mind they developed the Cold start doctrine. In the future it might be developed to something else. Its all part of the evolution process. The armed forces should always keep the defense interests in mind and strive to achieve that.
It is the responsibility of the civil and political authority to decide when to use that force after careful evaluation of its pros and cons. Thats why the supreme commander of armed forces is a civilian.
Kasrkin
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From what I've heard, Pakistan has 'modified' her riposte strategy to take into account these Indian plans. The dangers Cold Start poses to our own offensive operations has been taken into account, thats all the information we have to be honest.
Creder
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Having enough faith in our military rest assured they have a counter for that. I'm not saying this out of blind faith in their ability to protect our country but due to faith in how they have consistently protected these borders against an aggressor with a far greater strength in numbers and technology, the mere fact that despite having the entire west on its tale Pakistan was so quickly able to deter the nuclear threat should be an example in itself.
Now the indian cold strategy, to me is flawed in a sense that it fails to understand and consistently undermines the counter capabilities Pakistan has. You cannot say that since Pakistan hasnt come out with a response it doesn't have any. The best of the strategies are most effective when they are kept secret.
And if anything this strategy instead of giving India a "cold start" has put Pakistan in a "cold vigilance" state. Furthermore, this strategy assumes that India will be done with Pakistan before international community has had time to interfere. Even after 50 years India fails to understand how greatly the battle dynamics change when you cross over from wahga border. The states have been in Afghanistan for how many years now ? sorry i have lost count. But look at this, That was "Afghanistan" and was attacked by the biggest superpowers in the world and look where they still are. Afghanistan is child's play compared to Pakistan and this isn't me saying that.
As far as my opinion goes, i agree with the author of a report posted here earlier "this is a effed up strategy".
@Creder
I think you have a wrong understanding of the aim of the "Cold start" doctrine. It has nothing to do with holding on to Pakistani terriotory per se like what happened in Afghanistan. So comparing Afghanistan invasions to Cold start is at best flawed and nothing related to what is being discussed here.
You might recall that the 1971 war was over in 2 weeks. Similarly, the conflict envisoned here is probably of a similar timeframe or even lower. There will be no need to rest for logistics or ammo replinishment. It will target major militant camps and training sites as well as military targets. It may even result in capturing some key strategic border areas. But that's it.
Also it doesn't apply just to Pakistan but more increasingly towards China as that is more increasingly the primary military threat.
I think you have a wrong understanding of the aim of the "Cold start" doctrine. It has nothing to do with holding on to Pakistani terriotory per se like what happened in Afghanistan. So comparing Afghanistan invasions to Cold start is at best flawed and nothing related to what is being discussed here.
You might recall that the 1971 war was over in 2 weeks. Similarly, the conflict envisoned here is probably of a similar timeframe or even lower. There will be no need to rest for logistics or ammo replinishment. It will target major militant camps and training sites as well as military targets. It may even result in capturing some key strategic border areas. But that's it.
Also it doesn't apply just to Pakistan but more increasingly towards China as that is more increasingly the primary military threat.
ironman
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Ali Ahmed
January 6, 2010
At a closed door seminar in the last week of the last decade, the Indian Army reviewed its doctrine. Presumably, it is gearing up for facing the challenges of the current decade and beyond. This is apparent from the sound bytes of the Chief on the occasion in which he referred to preparing for a two front scenario. Armies as institutions cater for the worst case. A two front scenario being the worst case for India, the Army is evidently in the midst of thinking through how it would cope. Its earlier largely Pakistan specific Cold Start strategy has been perfected over the past half decade. Over the same period, the Army in conjunction with the Air Force had moved towards a more offensive stance even against China with the IAF moving additional air assets towards that front and the Army raising two mountain divisions as part of a mountain strike corps. The new posture was termed active deterrence as against the dissuasive deterrence that was practiced earlier. The two distinct postures are perhaps being amalgamated to cater for the worst case scenario.
This is part of periodic updation of the doctrine of 2004 being conducted by the Army Training Command. As mentioned in the preface to the 2004 Indian Army Doctrine by the then Army Commander, Part I will be reviewed every five years and updated, as necessary. This main part was earlier accessible on the Armys website; but is now available on the website of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. The second part is classified and is only for restricted circulation. As a whole, the doctrine is to be re-issued every ten years. It is likely that the open document is currently under review, though news reports let on that the Cold Start strategy is also under review. Interestingly, the Cold Start strategy does not find mention in Part I and can be presumed to have been dwelt with in the restricted Part II. In effect, both parts are likely being dealt with in the ongoing review, though only the revised Part I would be placed in the public domain eventually.
The Armys commendable initiative is expectedly as per schedule. The two front aspect is prompted, as the Times of India defence correspondent has it, by a reconfiguration of threat perceptions and security challenges. The backdrop to this is possibly the friction in India-China relations played out in the media late last year, particularly troublesome from the military point of view being border intrusions and the asymmetry brought about by Chinese military modernisation and infrastructure improvements in the Tibetan plateau. The Army Chief has been sanguine in his comment on the Pakistan front, stating as per Pandits report: "A major leap in our approach to conduct of operations (since then) has been the successful firming-up of the cold start strategy (to be able to go to war promptly)."
The point of significance is that even as the Army in keeping with its social responsibility of provision of security prepares for the worst case, it would be a political-diplomatic-strategic exercise to ensure that such a scenario does not arise. Logically, a two front strategy comprises first knocking Pakistan down by a blow from a Cold Start and then transferring the centre of gravity to the relatively slower paced, but more portentous conflict in the eastern Himalayas. As called for in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999, Indias conventional forces are to be of the order as to negate any call on Indias nuclear capability. Therefore any doctrinal and organisational moves of the military to cater for conventional capability to take on the worst case are mandated. However, despite growing defence budgets, the capability requirement of prevailing on both fronts may be an onerous strain. Therefore, it is a political call as to what level the Army needs to tread down this route.
A response to the Armys initiative in terms of political direction from the Cabinet Committee on Security, with input from the National Security Council Secretariat, is called for. This would help assimilate the Army initiative in a whole of government approach to the problem to the levels warranted. The "proportionate focus towards the western and north-eastern fronts" referred to by General Kapoor at the seminar was restricted to force levels and capabilities distribution by the Army to both fronts. Instead, it needs to be widened through such direction to include diplomacy, the relative weight between the three services and between conventional capability and strategic deterrence.
Rajat Pandit, attributing his information to sources, indicates that The (Cold Start) plan now is to launch self-contained and highly-mobile `battle groups', with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours. He states that this is in keeping with the lesson of Operation Parakram and is to undercut any delay that would enable Pakistan to shore up its defences and outside powers to intervene diplomatically. The launch from a standing start is operationally useful in that it would be against limited opposition and would facilitate more options for the subsequent deep-battle. Strategically, it has the advantage of heightening conventional deterrence directed at influencing Pakistani proxy war.
However, it is politically problematic in that it restricts the time window of examining non-military options. In the event of a grave provocation for instance in the form of another 26/11, pressures to proceed on militarily sensible timetables arise. The resulting situation would be reminiscent of the The Guns of August. While preparedness to furnish the political head with options in the circumstance is the Armys prerogative, care needs to be taken against being stampeded. Second, though the Cold Start strategy is reportedly cognizant of the nuclear overhang, a second opinion is necessary. This is not to second guess the Army, but since the judgment is at the interface between the conventional and nuclear planes, it is one best taken jointly between military and civilian principals.
Part I under revision is sketchy on limitation in conflict. Having a section on limitation has the advantage of placing the Army on one page and informing the nation how the Army intends engaging with the nuclear overhang. Communication being useful for deterrence, knowledge of this with the enemy also helps in staying any itchy nuclear fingers. The current doctrine has rightly accepted that victory can be defined in other terms such as reconciliation, stabilisation (acceptance of the status quo) or acceptance of an agreed peace plan. The nuclear backdrop implies that military action supplement diplomacy, and not the other way round, though both are instruments towards the same political ends.
The Army therefore needs to build in suitable exit points in the unfolding of its operation, such as prior to launch of pivot corps offensive resources, prior to launch of strike corps, prior to break out of enemy operational depth and prior to developing a threat to terminal objectives. These would act as cues to maximising diplomatic pressures on the enemy leadership to concede legitimate and reasonable aims. In this conceptualisation, the military threat of incremental coercion brings Schellings concept of deterrence i.e. the threat that leaves something to chance, into the equation. The onus for things getting out of hand, resting with the enemy, serves to deter. That there would be no pauses at these junctures entails getting national political resources in concert. This necessitates explicit inclusion in doctrine after due consultations.
This brings one to the issue of doctrinal formulation and promulgation in India. The absence of a Chief of Defence Staff leads to each service formulating and promulgating respective doctrine on its own. While admittedly this would be after due formal and informal networking with other services, yet organisational theory informs that this cannot be without the contaminating element of inter-service rivalry. The Joint Doctrine released earlier can serve to inform fresh doctrinal reflection, but not much more. The Ministry of Defence, which in the view of critics is by default exercising de-facto CDS functions, cannot be expected to adjudicate. Any faultlines that arise will then await the harsh test of conflict before being dispensed with. This is self-evidently untenable and requires attention at the political level.
Understandably, Pakistans Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit has said that the Armys deliberations betray a hostile intent as well as a hegemonic and jingoistic mindset which is quite out of step with the realities of our time." It appears that even the routine exercise, announced well prior, of doctrinal review has deterrence value. It remains to be seen how the final document addresses what Bernard Brodie described as the principle challenge for militaries of the nuclear age that of deterrence rather than war fighting.
January 6, 2010
At a closed door seminar in the last week of the last decade, the Indian Army reviewed its doctrine. Presumably, it is gearing up for facing the challenges of the current decade and beyond. This is apparent from the sound bytes of the Chief on the occasion in which he referred to preparing for a two front scenario. Armies as institutions cater for the worst case. A two front scenario being the worst case for India, the Army is evidently in the midst of thinking through how it would cope. Its earlier largely Pakistan specific Cold Start strategy has been perfected over the past half decade. Over the same period, the Army in conjunction with the Air Force had moved towards a more offensive stance even against China with the IAF moving additional air assets towards that front and the Army raising two mountain divisions as part of a mountain strike corps. The new posture was termed active deterrence as against the dissuasive deterrence that was practiced earlier. The two distinct postures are perhaps being amalgamated to cater for the worst case scenario.
This is part of periodic updation of the doctrine of 2004 being conducted by the Army Training Command. As mentioned in the preface to the 2004 Indian Army Doctrine by the then Army Commander, Part I will be reviewed every five years and updated, as necessary. This main part was earlier accessible on the Armys website; but is now available on the website of Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff. The second part is classified and is only for restricted circulation. As a whole, the doctrine is to be re-issued every ten years. It is likely that the open document is currently under review, though news reports let on that the Cold Start strategy is also under review. Interestingly, the Cold Start strategy does not find mention in Part I and can be presumed to have been dwelt with in the restricted Part II. In effect, both parts are likely being dealt with in the ongoing review, though only the revised Part I would be placed in the public domain eventually.
The Armys commendable initiative is expectedly as per schedule. The two front aspect is prompted, as the Times of India defence correspondent has it, by a reconfiguration of threat perceptions and security challenges. The backdrop to this is possibly the friction in India-China relations played out in the media late last year, particularly troublesome from the military point of view being border intrusions and the asymmetry brought about by Chinese military modernisation and infrastructure improvements in the Tibetan plateau. The Army Chief has been sanguine in his comment on the Pakistan front, stating as per Pandits report: "A major leap in our approach to conduct of operations (since then) has been the successful firming-up of the cold start strategy (to be able to go to war promptly)."
The point of significance is that even as the Army in keeping with its social responsibility of provision of security prepares for the worst case, it would be a political-diplomatic-strategic exercise to ensure that such a scenario does not arise. Logically, a two front strategy comprises first knocking Pakistan down by a blow from a Cold Start and then transferring the centre of gravity to the relatively slower paced, but more portentous conflict in the eastern Himalayas. As called for in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine of 1999, Indias conventional forces are to be of the order as to negate any call on Indias nuclear capability. Therefore any doctrinal and organisational moves of the military to cater for conventional capability to take on the worst case are mandated. However, despite growing defence budgets, the capability requirement of prevailing on both fronts may be an onerous strain. Therefore, it is a political call as to what level the Army needs to tread down this route.
A response to the Armys initiative in terms of political direction from the Cabinet Committee on Security, with input from the National Security Council Secretariat, is called for. This would help assimilate the Army initiative in a whole of government approach to the problem to the levels warranted. The "proportionate focus towards the western and north-eastern fronts" referred to by General Kapoor at the seminar was restricted to force levels and capabilities distribution by the Army to both fronts. Instead, it needs to be widened through such direction to include diplomacy, the relative weight between the three services and between conventional capability and strategic deterrence.
Rajat Pandit, attributing his information to sources, indicates that The (Cold Start) plan now is to launch self-contained and highly-mobile `battle groups', with Russian-origin T-90S tanks and upgraded T-72 M1 tanks at their core, adequately backed by air cover and artillery fire assaults, for rapid thrusts into enemy territory within 96 hours. He states that this is in keeping with the lesson of Operation Parakram and is to undercut any delay that would enable Pakistan to shore up its defences and outside powers to intervene diplomatically. The launch from a standing start is operationally useful in that it would be against limited opposition and would facilitate more options for the subsequent deep-battle. Strategically, it has the advantage of heightening conventional deterrence directed at influencing Pakistani proxy war.
However, it is politically problematic in that it restricts the time window of examining non-military options. In the event of a grave provocation for instance in the form of another 26/11, pressures to proceed on militarily sensible timetables arise. The resulting situation would be reminiscent of the The Guns of August. While preparedness to furnish the political head with options in the circumstance is the Armys prerogative, care needs to be taken against being stampeded. Second, though the Cold Start strategy is reportedly cognizant of the nuclear overhang, a second opinion is necessary. This is not to second guess the Army, but since the judgment is at the interface between the conventional and nuclear planes, it is one best taken jointly between military and civilian principals.
Part I under revision is sketchy on limitation in conflict. Having a section on limitation has the advantage of placing the Army on one page and informing the nation how the Army intends engaging with the nuclear overhang. Communication being useful for deterrence, knowledge of this with the enemy also helps in staying any itchy nuclear fingers. The current doctrine has rightly accepted that victory can be defined in other terms such as reconciliation, stabilisation (acceptance of the status quo) or acceptance of an agreed peace plan. The nuclear backdrop implies that military action supplement diplomacy, and not the other way round, though both are instruments towards the same political ends.
The Army therefore needs to build in suitable exit points in the unfolding of its operation, such as prior to launch of pivot corps offensive resources, prior to launch of strike corps, prior to break out of enemy operational depth and prior to developing a threat to terminal objectives. These would act as cues to maximising diplomatic pressures on the enemy leadership to concede legitimate and reasonable aims. In this conceptualisation, the military threat of incremental coercion brings Schellings concept of deterrence i.e. the threat that leaves something to chance, into the equation. The onus for things getting out of hand, resting with the enemy, serves to deter. That there would be no pauses at these junctures entails getting national political resources in concert. This necessitates explicit inclusion in doctrine after due consultations.
This brings one to the issue of doctrinal formulation and promulgation in India. The absence of a Chief of Defence Staff leads to each service formulating and promulgating respective doctrine on its own. While admittedly this would be after due formal and informal networking with other services, yet organisational theory informs that this cannot be without the contaminating element of inter-service rivalry. The Joint Doctrine released earlier can serve to inform fresh doctrinal reflection, but not much more. The Ministry of Defence, which in the view of critics is by default exercising de-facto CDS functions, cannot be expected to adjudicate. Any faultlines that arise will then await the harsh test of conflict before being dispensed with. This is self-evidently untenable and requires attention at the political level.
Understandably, Pakistans Foreign Office spokesman Abdul Basit has said that the Armys deliberations betray a hostile intent as well as a hegemonic and jingoistic mindset which is quite out of step with the realities of our time." It appears that even the routine exercise, announced well prior, of doctrinal review has deterrence value. It remains to be seen how the final document addresses what Bernard Brodie described as the principle challenge for militaries of the nuclear age that of deterrence rather than war fighting.
faithfulguy
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So is this the new thread to talk about how India is going to destroy both Chinese and Pakistani army at the same time?
ek_indian
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No it is more about defending india if attacked by two nations at same time or we say multiple front war. It also takes a look at sub-warfare techniques like cyber war, space war etc.
Better do not derail a thread.
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