Yours is, of course, a realistic voice, urging caution, and a conservative approach: not to be underplayed in such vital and delicate matters. Taking the wrong direction could totally founder the ship of state, and I appreciate and understand where you are coming from. However, it may not be possible to continue to maintain such bloated armed forces of such average quality and capability and effetiveness indefinitely.
Our Army musters slowly, and the Pakistanis have ample time to break off whatever they are doing and report to their stations and mobilize; thereafter, the two are matched so closely in incompetence leadership above a battalion, at best a brigade, that division-level, leave alone Corps level campaigns are unlikely (1971 was an exception, and I am pessimistic about those conditions recurring). In terms of technology and doctrine, both sides have armies that date back to the Vietnam era, only with almost no worthwhile artillery on one side. Their speed of movement is about the same, and is again several decades old. It is more or less the same story for the respective Air Forces; the PAF has lost its technical edge over the IAF due to a shortage of money, but th IAF has lost its numerical edge thanks to the death-wish of the country's political classes. Only the IndianNavy has a thin edge over its rivals, and it is not much, not enough to win wars.
We can either radically re-design and re-orient the armed forces, with a smaller, far more mobile (by an order of magnitude) Army, packing far more fire power than today, tightly integrated with tactical air power on land and with a serious marine amphibious capability at sea, or we forget about resolving any problems militarily, and have to adopt your recommended clenched teeth stance.
Let us return to this choice after addressing your points.
We can & we must. It is simply not our concern & it is downright dangerous to believe it is. We also put at risk any chance of success they may have in steering Pakistan away from the hardliners if we are seen to be their allies.
My suggestion was not to mount loud and visible campaigns of support to the liberals; that would be the kiss of death for any section of society in Pakistan. Instead, it was to do nothing to play into the hands of the hardliners; that will not help in any foreseeable way.
Without doubt they are decent people but we simply are in no position to do anything for them.
There is no implication of 'doing' something for them. The point is to make a permanent and lasting peace, or to fight a decisive and defining war. Anything but this imitation of a Russian peasant determined to last through all of life's miseries.
Whilst agreeing in theory, it is simply hard for anyone to influence Pakistan's eventual course or choice of destination & even more so from India. To defend ourselves, it is imperative that we leave all muddle headedness out of our thinking & act on very simple & basic premises.
It seems we are agreed in principle so far, but cannot find a common approach forward. Let us see. I agree with you about the muddle-headedness, but put it to you that to endure in patience is hardly guaranteed to improve this situation.
That, in my humble opinion, is muddle-headedness.
It serves us to find ways to contain the threat rather than opt for either retaliation (may still become necessary) or close engagement. Terrorism emanating from Pakistan (atleast at the level it is now) is more damaging to Pakistan & its cause than it is to India regardless of the loss of lives that will unfortunately take place. In a very odd manner, the terrorism emanating from Pakistan removes any premise of morality from Pakistani arguments & causes a substantial part of the population to be less gung-ho about the cause. Time is India's greatest asset & Pakistan's enemy. Peace will only come when the causes that separate us become less relevant(not irrelevant, just less relevant). For that to happen, Pakistan must see India moving further & further away from them on the economic scales. That alone will cause some rethinking in their priorities. The best we can hope for is a forced calm, imagining anything else at this point risks putting our population in harm's way.
Is there any guarantee that this will happen, that our increasing prosperity will set the Pakistani man in the street thinking, and bring about a radical change in the structure of that state?
Will the man in the street, and the rational elements of Pakistani society (which elements I tend to identify with the liberals and moderate servicemen and administrators) be able to counter the flood of money from Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and thwart the increasing radicalization of Pakistani society?
For that matter, will the man in the street and rational Pakistanis severe the link between the deep state and the terrorist apparatus? Even now, there is a demented person suggesting that they continue with this policy of retaining their irregulars, as being an effective part of the order of battle for them.
Leaving aside the me-too motif, which will motivate Pakistanis to seek more economic prosperity such as India's and will cause a change in heart, or the name-and-shame motif, where the increasing isolation of Pakistan will force her to introspect, if we wait for condemnation of Pakistan to increase, what should we hope for as a practical outcome?
Sir,
We dont have the luxury of time to make such plans and moreover our AF is no US AF having Stealth Bombers and Pakistani AF is no Iraqi AF.Hence we have to put the Army in very early which would work together with the AF and the Navy.
I think the plan is best what has been decided in Cold Start.Our Generals have realised that we dont have the luxury of time and hence we need to act fast and achieve our objectives as soon as possible.Thats why you can see the IA working on IBGs.
I am not so sure that what we have today will take us one millimetre ahead of where we were for the last forty years. Will Cold Start speed up the average speed of a combat formation? Will IBGs fight better with identical weapons inventories and firepower?
