Indian Army ORBAT Against Pakistan-Visualised

[Joe Shearer]

By threatening not Lahore, but Karachi. Mirpur Khais and Hyderabad.

True. Then we have to sit and solve the environmental problem that a force attacking across the fine-grained sand of the Thar would face.

That desert kills tanks.

But, of course, you already know the answer to that problem.

By threatening not Lahore, but Karachi. Mirpur Khais and Hyderabad.

You mustn't forget, however, that there is a huge concentration of rather unfriendly looking formations up in the north. They won't go rushing down south, they are likely to do Operation Re-wind Up.

Tea in the Delhi Gym. Ugh. Are those all clubbable people? We need to ask ourselves some very serious questions.

 

[JX-1]

By threatening not Lahore, but Karachi. Mirpur Khais and Hyderabad.

Karachi is defended by Kutch, the Indus Delta, and the River itself, on top of being armed to the teeth. India can try going for Hyderabad but that comes dangerously close to the tactical nuclear threshold. In my opinion, this threshold will be before Indian forces can reach the "Green Belt."

Does India have the logistical capability for such a deep offensive? The Russians tried dashing for Kiev and it isn't going well for them. Driving supply trucks across the Indus Delta or the Thar desert isn't a pleasant experience once you sink into the ground. Neither is flying helicopters which will be shredded by MANPADS.

And if India does pose an existential threat to Pakistan by attacking Karachi, will China sit by idly? By the time India has 45 divisions and 300 ships, the PLA will be comparable to the US Military. Let's not forget that Pakistan itself will have plenty of time to find some way to counter India's threat, as it historically has in far worse circumstances.

 

[SQ8]

True. Then we have to sit and solve the environmental problem that a force attacking across the fine-grained sand of the Thar would face.

That desert kills tanks.

But, of course, you already know the answer to that problem.


You mustn't forget, however, that there is a huge concentration of rather unfriendly looking formations up in the north. They won't go rushing down south, they are likely to do Operation Re-wind Up.

Tea in the Delhi Gym. Ugh. Are those all clubbable people? We need to ask ourselves some very serious questions.

Karachi is going to present Kyiv 2.0 - simply because all it will take is some overcharged religious message sent through the local mullah mosque announcement and you suddenly have armed people in the streets. This may actually serve as a deterrent to the inevitable criminal element rise that comes from national crisis as well. Long term it will be a mess to clean up again for the paramilitary forces but in the context of just putting a 100k armed guns in the street it will work… one of the very limited and few benefits of gun culture.

Not that it’s a smart move to try anything other than a blockade of Karachi or Hyderabad.

 

[JX-1]

Karachi is going to present Kyiv 2.0

Karachi will literally be Afghaistan 2.0. It has a population 10 times larger than Kyiv, close to the size of Afghanistan's.

 

[SQ8]

Karachi will literally be Afghaistan 2.0. It has a population 10 times larger than Kyiv, close to the size of Afghanistan's.

More importantly a lot will be BYOG (Bring your own gun) and a few thousand (if not a few tens of thousands) Jihadis in waiting.

Frankly a city where the state itself is at a loss on what to do doesn’t make a good place to try and land troops to take key areas. Unless they want to do a wild goose chase of looking for Dawood as a context.

The attempt in 71 should be an example of why that route down is just not worth it - cutting through in half through the axis @Joe Shearer highlighted is and based upon the strength there a high probability of achieving this exists

 

[Joe Shearer]

To be perfectly honest, I had hoped that @surya kiran would answer this. Having spotted an apparent opportunity arising out of the deployment of defensive forces, he needs to apply his mind to what else goes into the mix.

First, the PA must receive the same courtesy that the IA expected to be extended: there ought to be a 3:1 superiority in force to allow for an attack even a chance of success.

Second, between Hyderabad, Karachi (Malir) and Pano Aqil, there is sufficient force to defend, to require perhaps the equivalent of nine divisions - around 135,000 jawans, with their train of vehicles, of armour, of artillery, and of reconnaissance and scouting units, not to mention close air support, to be mustered. The question is not about the ratio; it is about the assembling of such a force swiftly enough, secretly enough to be able to mount an attack.

Where will they assemble? Where will they form up before commencing the assault? How will they fare, traversing extremely difficult and hostile desert terrain, to face an enemy safely parked on armour-friendly terrain?

Third, if the Pakistani forces are not dumb and deaf, and blind as well, they should be able to make out that things are going on in Jaisalmer and Barmer that need close examination.

This is Bhatti country (Jaisalmer); we have it on the evidence of @Goenitz that Bhattis are disinclined to jump around in the terrible heat that prevails. Nevertheless, the presence of 135,000 troops looking for a swimming pool would arouse curiousity in the mind of the corps commander, V Corps; he would at least want to know if it was expected of him to provide supplementary quantities of swimming trunks.

Fourth, how much ammunition will be consumed by 9 divisions attacking a well-entrenched enemy? How will that ammunition - and fuel, and food, and evacaution of casualties - be replenished?

Karachi is defended by Kutch, the Indus Delta, and the River itself, on top of being armed to the teeth.

It is not armed to the teeth. Not in any formal manner.

On second thoughts, I agree that the large number of gun-loving people could be a major difficulty for an occupying force, but it should probably be the responsibility of any attacking commander with his wits about him to blockade the city, and refuse to have anything else to do with it.

It does not NEED to be armed to the teeth; the harsh operating environment through which an attack must come will take care of that.

India can try going for Hyderabad but that comes dangerously close to the tactical nuclear threshold. In my opinion, this threshold will be before Indian forces can reach the "Green Belt."

For the purposes of us civilians learning why generals do the things they do, thinking nuclear is not necessary, not at first blush.

Does India have the logistical capability for such a deep offensive? The Russians tried dashing for Kiev and it isn't going well for them. Driving supply trucks across the Indus Delta or the Thar desert isn't a pleasant experience once you sink into the ground. Neither is flying helicopters which will be shredded by MANPADS.

Um, it is not quite clear that helicopters will be shredded by MANPADS; flying conditions might be less than ideal.

And if India does pose an existential threat to Pakistan by attacking Karachi, will China sit by idly? By the time India has 45 divisions and 300 ships, the PLA will be comparable to the US Military. Let's not forget that Pakistan itself will have plenty of time to find some way to counter India's threat, as it historically has in far worse circumstances.

Oh, please, that was a sardonic remark.

Karachi is going to present Kyiv 2.0 - simply because all it will take is some overcharged religious message sent through the local mullah mosque announcement and you suddenly have armed people in the streets. This may actually serve as a deterrent to the inevitable criminal element rise that comes from national crisis as well. Long term it will be a mess to clean up again for the paramilitary forces but in the context of just putting a 100k armed guns in the street it will work… one of the very limited and few benefits of gun culture.

Not that it’s a smart move to try anything other than a blockade of Karachi or Hyderabad.

A truly horrific thought, considering the large numbers of Pathans with attitudes resident in and around Karachi and its suburbs. A little like invading Glasgow, and having to deal with Glaswegians and their attitudes and their razor blades; avoidable.

More importantly a lot will be BYOG (Bring your own gun) and a few thousand (if not a few tens of thousands) Jihadis in waiting.

Frankly a city where the state itself is at a loss on what to do doesn’t make a good place to try and land troops to take key areas. Unless they want to do a wild goose chase of looking for Dawood as a context.

I was just thinking of the shock and horror of a well-behaved, polite, and well-mannered Purbiyya up against this lot. Somehow, if it were possible, if this confrontation could be organised, it might resolve our Indian problem of socialising the Purbiyya. For all eternity.

 

[Joe Shearer]

The attempt in 71 should be an example of why that route down is just not worth it - cutting through in half through the axis @Joe Shearer highlighted is and based upon the strength there a high probability of achieving this exists

While I am very glad that @surya kiran got to see this. it is not out of place to remember that the 'Battle' of Longewala was a smokescreen for an entirely different effort. Googling Maj. Gen. Khambatta might help.

 

[Joe Shearer]

Frankly a city where the state itself is at a loss on what to do doesn’t make a good place to try and land troops to take key areas. Unless they want to do a wild goose chase of looking for Dawood as a context.

OK, got it.

Shell Clifton flat, from a great distance, and leave the rest of the city alone.

 

[SQ8]

OK, got it.

Shell Clifton flat, from a great distance, and leave the rest of the city alone.

You think that if a godfather of the Indian criminal underworld with enterprises from Dubai to Malaysia would be in Karachi he would live in a flat? Huzoor apki masoomiat ki kya daad don.. doon

 

[Joe Shearer]

You think that if a godfather of the Indian criminal underworld with enterprises from Dubai to Malaysia would be in Karachi he would live in a flat? Huzoor apki masoomiat ki kya daad don.. doon

Oh, this treacherous language, English.

Let me re-word it, huzoor.

Flatten Clifton, and leave the rest of Karachi strictly alone.

 

[SQ8]

Oh, this treacherous language, English.

Let me re-word it, huzoor.

Flatten Clifton, and leave the rest of Karachi strictly alone.

Clifton is old history now - think of DHA.. no infact don’t in case you don’t want radiation poisoning.. hell hath no fury as the rebuff to an attempt to take over DHA.

However, back the topic - the paper you posted makes a few omissions especially with regards to Pakistani responses to Indian efforts in the past(which can be forgiven considering the narrative’s subject and the author’s own nationality) that would play into the whole IBG concept still rests on mobility and C4ISR which as recent developments both in public and “between the lines” eyes seem to indicate the arms race is still fairly well matched in that domain for now. Moreover, aspects of 27th February which @PanzerKiel quietly hints at and thankfully never goes beyond is the exact recommendations provided to the IA in terms of being a supportive arm for punitive actions have been adapted(not adopted less it be misconstrued) by the Pakistani military.

Pravin has been most generous(especially with the backlash of the Bhaktora brigade and other jingoistic variety) on why the nuclear overhang while present isn’t such a hanging knife as assumed by those in RAND and other places. However , it doesn’t imply that the placed ORBATs wont eventually break through but even with the current training and command levels of both forces needs the cooperation of weather and political environment in Pakistan to be successful. Ill timed and the result may not be too different to what plays out in Ukraine albeit the force ratios along with access to firepower would be even more balanced.

But since the subject is ORBATs, the 21 IBGs which based upon the published material is more akin to 1990-2003 doctrines of US military in terms of designated units and support groups led by local commanders will require not just the IA to go through a makeover but also the IAF especially in terms of operational deployments and tempo. To me, the folly of putting the rotary winged aviation assets with IAF (and now the IA will buy its own so it has to coordinate both internally and with a third arm through a liason unless that inter service bhai chara has been resolved to the idea of “Thy word master” ) is another hump in the idea of a IBG.

Keep in mind that the epitome of mobility that is the US military fought off the Taliban using special forces and some 400 combat aircraft in theatre.. and then when it came time to take over the deployment and clearing operations despite unmatched C4I took years.

Even the IDF took its beating with having IBGs ready to go within 12 hours notice. On the flipside the Brits took Jerusalem and pretty much routed the Turks within a relatively short period of time during the Palestine offensive due to better C3I.

If anything, India might be better off with 20 IBGs if it can leverage the funds for one for a massive force dedicated to dominating the electronic spectrum.. yes there is one now but its still “matched”.

 

[Goenitz]

This is Bhatti country (Jaisalmer); we have it on the evidence of @Goenitz that Bhattis are disinclined to jump around in the terrible heat that prevails.

I said we are lazy else, "Heat didn't bother Bhattis anyway" from 'cooked'

 

[Joe Shearer]

Clifton is old history now - think of DHA.. no infact don’t in case you don’t want radiation poisoning.. hell hath no fury as the rebuff to an attempt to take over DHA.

However, back the topic - the paper you posted makes a few omissions especially with regards to Pakistani responses to Indian efforts in the past(which can be forgiven considering the narrative’s subject and the author’s own nationality) that would play into the whole IBG concept still rests on mobility and C4ISR which as recent developments both in public and “between the lines” eyes seem to indicate the arms race is still fairly well matched in that domain for now. Moreover, aspects of 27th February which @PanzerKiel quietly hints at and thankfully never goes beyond is the exact recommendations provided to the IA in terms of being a supportive arm for punitive actions have been adapted(not adopted less it be misconstrued) by the Pakistani military.

Pravin has been most generous(especially with the backlash of the Bhaktora brigade and other jingoistic variety) on why the nuclear overhang while present isn’t such a hanging knife as assumed by those in RAND and other places. However , it doesn’t imply that the placed ORBATs wont eventually break through but even with the current training and command levels of both forces needs the cooperation of weather and political environment in Pakistan to be successful. Ill timed and the result may not be too different to what plays out in Ukraine albeit the force ratios along with access to firepower would be even more balanced.

But since the subject is ORBATs, the 21 IBGs which based upon the published material is more akin to 1990-2003 doctrines of US military in terms of designated units and support groups led by local commanders will require not just the IA to go through a makeover but also the IAF especially in terms of operational deployments and tempo. To me, the folly of putting the rotary winged aviation assets with IAF (and now the IA will buy its own so it has to coordinate both internally and with a third arm through a liason unless that inter service bhai chara has been resolved to the idea of “Thy word master” ) is another hump in the idea of a IBG.

Keep in mind that the epitome of mobility that is the US military fought off the Taliban using special forces and some 400 combat aircraft in theatre.. and then when it came time to take over the deployment and clearing operations despite unmatched C4I took years.

Even the IDF took its beating with having IBGs ready to go within 12 hours notice. On the flipside the Brits took Jerusalem and pretty much routed the Turks within a relatively short period of time during the Palestine offensive due to better C3I.

If anything, India might be better off with 20 IBGs if it can leverage the funds for one for a massive force dedicated to dominating the electronic spectrum.. yes there is one now but its still “matched”.

Personally, I think that the attempt to convert to IBGs is already outdated; not just Pravin, but others have pointed out that this paradigm of military build-up in competition with each other will result only in piling up more and more foot-soldiers, with nowhere near the levels of equipment - vehicular equipment, supporting air support, logistics systems and processes, ordnance, tubed and missile artillery alike - or the doctrines governing the deployment of the smallest units at the leaf level that are needed.

We already have the answers in the budget allocations; so much is consumed in pensions and retirement benefits that there is hardly anything left over with which to modernise and to keep at the cutting edge the existing formations, whether brigade level or divisional. That path of recruiting more and more foot-soldiers is a blind alley.

This is where Tarapore's criticism comes in handy, not as a complete solution, but as a starting point. The Indian Army is ill-advised to keep seeking a fixed-position pitched battle within a conventional war framework, because whatever it attempts to do can be countered with the utmost ease, given their better location and their better lines of communications on the Pakistani side. When we do these ORBAT exercises, it is the first step to re-thinking the whole purpose of our army, its structure, and its purpose (strictly with regard to Pakistan only). There is nothing that we gain by right-sizing to Independent Brigade Groups; nothing to be gained by enhancing the fire-power with more mobile artillery, and multi-barrel rocket launchers; no point in the turf games being played out with an IAF inflamed with jealousy at losing its monopoly over everything that flies.

India cannot make relevant territorial gains, and cannot affect the geographical integrity of the existing Pakistani state through military means. Why are we still trying? Why not accept reality and look to see how to meet our real objectives, the insulation of our civilian population from fourth-generation warfare by the Pakistani state (our wishing to achieve these insulating goals in no way connects to arms of the government continuing to make their own covert efforts at waging fourth-generation warfare on their own part). That war is one that India is winning at the moment; perhaps we should build on that and figure out some other way of achieving our objectives than warfare, either third generation conventional warfare or this new version.

That is my point of view after examining the ORBATs and after listening to Pravin Sawhny, nothing new, nothing specifically due to either phenomenon, just something that has come to be brutally evident over the years since 1999.

One last clarification: In fairness to the Indian side, we should leave aside the spasmodic reactions of a truly imbecile civil administration from all other strategic considerations. The special overlay they have added really needs to be treated at the same level of engagement as lava-flow from a suddenly revived volcano.

 

[Joe Shearer]

 

[Sayfullah]

Indians wouldn’t even be able to hold Mirpur Khas.
Being from Mirpur Khas and having many family there and knowing the city very well, Mirpur Khas alone is enough to be Kyiv 2.0 or worse. A blockade won’t work either because there’s many urban farms there as well inside the city. Water isn’t a issue. And there’s probably hundreds of VETERAN pro pak Jihadist in Mirpur Khas alone and many have fought Indians in Kashmir in 90s. Many jamaats have strong presence there. Many guns there as well both legal and illegal including many full automatics. It’s a very densely populated city and any tanks or other vehicles will be sitting ducks there and there’s many other cities close by from which many fighters could come to help.
Also there’s many canals built that can be used as a defence.
Jamrao canal protects Mirpur Khas and its surrounding villages from Indians. Indians won’t be able to cross Jamrao Canal and if they manage to there’s many more canals and the agriculture land there is all fertile land that still use flood irrigation system. They can make the land super muddy within moments notice so Indian vehicles would get stuck in the mud there.
Also before even getting go Jamrao canal there’s at least a dozen such canal protecting every city in the green belt in sindh before Indians can even get to Mirpur Khas and from those canals there’s many big canals as well.
Indians won’t ever be able to hold onto Mirpur Khas AND that’s if they even make it to Mirpur Khas.
Hur’s are still around and much stronger then they were in 65. If in 65 Hur mujahideen had 50 000 volunteers that fought alongside pak army, that number will be in hundreds of thousands right now.

For Indians to capture Karachi from land via Hyderabad, they will first have to cross the desert where they’ll face mujahideen and pak army then they’ll enter the green belt in sindh where they will have to face heavy resistance from locals and cross dozens of canals and go over muddy land, then they’ll have to capture Mirpur Khas and hold it (Mirpur Khas would be Kyiv 2.0), then they’ll have to cross dozens of more canals and very muddy land and they’ll have to occupy dozens of more rebellious cities before reaching Hyderabad. Once they reach Hyderabad they’ll have to hold onto it (which is impossible and I know it is since I know the city very well I have family there) and then they’ll have to cross Indus River which is impossible if the bridges are blown up and then they’ll have to use the roads to go towards Karachi which have many many suitable places for very good ambushes and then they’ll finally reach Karachi a city of 30 million heavily armed people with madressas which hosted almost every well know jihadist in the world.

So essentially these three cities are a wet dream for Indians which will never come true.

In fact any approach towards Karachi by land is suicide. In sindh IF you reach the green built and that’s a big IF you’ll face a canal every 5 kms probably and you’ll go through some very muddy land. But as I said it’s a big IF for Indians to even get to there because logistics would be a nightmare and there’s many very good places to set up ambushes in the desert and there is many mujahideen waiting to fight Indians.
Indians at max could capture the Hindu villages in the desert but the cost would be so high and it would be useless land with 0 strategic value and Indians would be wasting their resources on nothing while Pakistan would probably be attacking up north where there’s strategic valuable land to be captured.