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India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

The Terminator said:
@PanzerKiel sir, as Pakistanis we generally know what Indian military lacks or what blunders they made in the past and they are more open in expressing that publicly than us as their military doesn't carry any political capital.

But there isn't enough material available on mainstream media what the shortcomings or the mistakes committed by our military in the past. What lessons our military have learned from them and improved upon, and how the present and future looks from that perspective?

We have viewed a sh*t ton load of debates about the unceremoniously removal of General Mausharraf, his midflight issues and the subsequent coup détat. Which bears no effect upon our defense capabilities. But we tend to ignore and completely forget to discuss for example, the miscalculations on our part in 99's skirmish and to have a healthy debate on it openly.

There is some great pieces of work from some extremely knowledgeable members here about India's militarily shortcomings and what they could have done. Good food for thought for indian viewers.

Would you plz also elaborate the mistakes the Pakistani side committed in the past conflicts, what lessons we learnt from that and how we won't do the same mistakes in the future? Plz, Enlighten duds like me about them too.
Thanks
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This is exactly what this thread was made for. You start reading it from page 1 and you'll get almost all the answers.
 
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The Terminator said:
That change in command was the reason why unfortunately Pakistan lost its only chance to paralyze the Indian forces in Jammu and Kashmir. Don't know how that same General Yahya Khan managed to be the highest ranking officer in the military and later seized control of the Pakistan and our bad luck continued from failure of operation grand slam to fall of Dhaka.
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There was never any doubt that Yahya Khan was a good soldier, as far as that goes. To trace back his political ineptitude during the East Pakistan crisis in 1971 and assume that he was equally incompetent in purely military matters is a gross error.

The failure of Grand Slam is partially due to the hiatus resulting from the replacement of the commanding officer of the 12th Division, but there were other factors as well. Pakistani observers in particular need to look at this and other battles on 1965 with a broader vision than they have demonstrated so far.
 
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PanzerKiel said:
In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.
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You ignore the constant theme in Indian politics, underlying the self-aggrandising, ultra-jingoistic theme that jars a Pakistani listener (and most sensible Indian listeners as well). That theme has been the theme of strategic caution, of fearing to ask for everything and getting it.

Should we have overrun all of the former state of J&K in 1947-48, would we have been better off today? Sure, Pakistan would have its sensitive pressure points within howitzer range of Indian lines, but would that have contributed in any way to peace on the LOC? Would that have reduced the zeal to pursue adventures with half-baked irregulars that goes on year in and year out even as we speak?

Should we have thrust at a single point of any of the three that Harbaksh set out to do in 1965, and should we have achieved a thundering success, what then? Would India have seriously held on to territory controlled at the end of the inevitable cease fire - knowing, as we do, with perfect hindsight that Pakistan was scraping the bottom of the barrel in all respects with regard to war resources?

Should we have made a push to rationalise the Chicken's Neck in Jalpaiguri - the infamous Siliguri gap - in that same year? At that time, all that happened was that three battalions of armed policemen, and one battalion of the EFR faced five battalions of the East Pakistani armed forces - let us call it a gendarmerie for lack of a better word - under Brigadier Torgul; instead, if one corps had been diverted to East Pakistan from the committed forces facing China, would the situation for Pakistan have been better? Would the East Pakistani have felt better about the defence of East Pakistan, and would Ayub Khan have succeeded in recovering the 30 or 40 kms of territory in Rangpur that would have been the Indian side's most pressing need? We know from (again) hindsight that even Haji Pir Pass was returned, and it is possible that even this hypothetical gain might have been returned, but who knows? When we spin alternate history scenarios, anything can be made to look plausible.

Should we have dispensed with a poltroon Bewoor, and swiftly acted to replace Khambatta, and countered Eftekhar's successes in the north, would we have gained? I ask in the same spirit as the previous questions.

We can go on in this way.

The fact is that as events progress, it becomes increasingly more dangerous for India to win any victory of any substantial nature over Pakistan, for two obvious reasons, that apart from the civilian heroes of PDF who launch nuclear wars every day of the week, and twice on Fridays, nobody would like to face an unstable Pakistan that is today crumbling at the edges and is financially at its wits end, not with the spectre of a far worse enemy waiting to sweep aside established Pakistani institutions and put half the population into blue-coloured shuttlecocks; second, it would destroy India if such an event were to take place in today's conditions, because it would confirm and seal in concrete the dreadful destruction of democracy that is taking place in India today, and it would legitimise all the nauseating wounds inflicted on the country by a dangerous set of bigots.

I hope that some sensible souls will tell the utterly obnoxious fanboys who crowd this forum today that India winning a decisive military victory over Pakistan is to be dreaded by the sub-continent almost as much as Pakistan winning a decisive victory over the Indian cricket team today*.

*Apologies for being unable to resist that piece of pure mischief.
 
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Joe Shearer said:
You ignore the constant theme in Indian politics, underlying the self-aggrandising, ultra-jingoistic theme that jars a Pakistani listener (and most sensible Indian listeners as well). That theme has been the theme of strategic caution, of fearing to ask for everything and getting it.

Should we have overrun all of the former state of J&K in 1947-48, would we have been better off today? Sure, Pakistan would have its sensitive pressure points within howitzer range of Indian lines, but would that have contributed in any way to peace on the LOC? Would that have reduced the zeal to pursue adventures with half-baked irregulars that goes on year in and year out even as we speak?

Should we have thrust at a single point of any of the three that Harbaksh set out to do in 1965, and should we have achieved a thundering success, what then? Would India have seriously held on to territory controlled at the end of the inevitable cease fire - knowing, as we do, with perfect hindsight that Pakistan was scraping the bottom of the barrel in all respects with regard to war resources?

Should we have made a push to rationalise the Chicken's Neck in Jalpaiguri - the infamous Siliguri gap - in that same year? At that time, all that happened was that three battalions of armed policemen, and one battalion of the EFR faced five battalions of the East Pakistani armed forces - let us call it a gendarmerie for lack of a better word - under Brigadier Torgul; instead, if one corps had been diverted to East Pakistan from the committed forces facing China, would the situation for Pakistan have been better? Would the East Pakistani have felt better about the defence of East Pakistan, and would Ayub Khan have succeeded in recovering the 30 or 40 kms of territory in Rangpur that would have been the Indian side's most pressing need? We know from (again) hindsight that even Haji Pir Pass was returned, and it is possible that even this hypothetical gain might have been returned, but who knows? When we spin alternate history scenarios, anything can be made to look plausible.

Should we have dispensed with a poltroon Bewoor, and swiftly acted to replace Khambatta, and countered Eftekhar's successes in the north, would we have gained? I ask in the same spirit as the previous questions.

We can go on in this way.

The fact is that as events progress, it becomes increasingly more dangerous for India to win any victory of any substantial nature over Pakistan, for two obvious reasons, that apart from the civilian heroes of PDF who launch nuclear wars every day of the week, and twice on Fridays, nobody would like to face an unstable Pakistan that is today crumbling at the edges and is financially at its wits end, not with the spectre of a far worse enemy waiting to sweep aside established Pakistani institutions and put half the population into blue-coloured shuttlecocks; second, it would destroy India if such an event were to take place in today's conditions, because it would confirm and seal in concrete the dreadful destruction of democracy that is taking place in India today, and it would legitimise all the nauseating wounds inflicted on the country by a dangerous set of bigots.

I hope that some sensible souls will tell the utterly obnoxious fanboys who crowd this forum today that India winning a decisive military victory over Pakistan is to be dreaded by the sub-continent almost as much as Pakistan winning a decisive victory over the Indian cricket team today*.

*Apologies for being unable to resist that piece of pure mischief.
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It is not worth it - better to pander to the crowd and slip in some introspective thought inception disguised as jibes instead of trying to debate with quasi-religious-fascist warrior hellbent on their daily conquest fantasies that distract from the very miserable reality facing them today.
 
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Desert Fox 1 said:
Z

I think Pakistan won it. Pakistan was able to chase 151 without any loss; but not before Afridi had bamboozled the Indian top order.
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Serves them right. Time they got rid of Kohli as Captain. He's a little tinpot dictator, pushing his personal favourites at every opportunity.
 
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Joe Shearer said:
The failure of Grand Slam is partially due to the hiatus resulting from the replacement of the commanding officer of the 12th Division, but there were other factors as well. Pakistani observers in particular need to look at this and other battles on 1965 with a broader vision than they have demonstrated so far.
Click to expand...
Replacement of the commander was just one of the reasons...others included the permanent affiliations of brigade commanders with old / new commanders, personal rivalries, old affiliations of PA / IA officers (afterall, they were part of the same army hardly 18 years back)....
 
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PanzerKiel said:
Replacement of the commander was just one of the reasons...others included the permanent affiliations of brigade commanders with old / new commanders, personal rivalries, old affiliations of PA / IA officers (afterall, they were part of the same army hardly 18 years back)....
Click to expand...
I've read somewhere that one particular bde cmdr refused to take any further orders from Gen Akhtar after his outposting (but before handing taking) when one particular objective lay to be captured. Akhtar even begged him but he refused saying he is no more his commander.
How true it is, I don't know.
 
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Desert Fox 1 said:
I've read somewhere that one particular bde cmdr refused to take any further orders from Gen Akhtar after his outposting (but before handing taking) when one particular objective lay to be captured. Akhtar even begged him but he refused saying he is no more his commander.
How true it is, I don't know.
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It is true, unfortunately. Brigadier Azmat Hayat, 10 Brigade.
 
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