India - Pakistan conflict analysis - aims, tactics, strategy, results

[The Terminator]

Despite the forward placement of PA troops, they still were surprised once IA offensive opened up across the international border.

Our military has the tendency to expect best possible behavior from the enemies while being in active conflict with them. Same happened in 1999.

On the other hand obviously far superior in numbers. Indians had always the chance to resort back to their numerical advantage and broaden the conflict to international borders or increase the magnitude of force in a local conflict. That shouldn't be so surprising for any person to understand. Expecting from the rival to comply with one's wishes is foolishness at best.

 

[PanzerKiel]

Our military has the tendency to expect best possible behavior from the enemies while being in active conflict with them. Same happened in 1999.

On the other hand obviously far superior in numbers. Indians had always the chance to resort back to their numerical advantage and broaden the conflict to international borders or increase the magnitude of force in a local conflict. That shouldn't be so surprising for any person to understand. Expecting from the rival to comply with one's wishes is foolishness at best.

In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

 

[The Terminator]

he should take the overall command but let me go up to Akhnur as his subordinate,

How much devoted he wasto his cause . It reminds me of our history's legend Hazrat Khalid bin Waleed RA. Rarely seen this kind of sacrifice from a top military officer to give up his command and still fight for the greater cause.

If I got you by the throat, it would be silly for me to expect that you will kiss me for it.

But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians.

But in the long run it would be an unpatriotic act. It will destroy the morale of the army, lower its prestige among the people, be banned in Pakistan, and become a textbook for the Indians. I have little doubt that the Indians will never forgive us the slight of 65 and will avenge it at the first opportunity. I am certain they will hit us in E. Pak [East Pakistan]

He deserved to lead the military not Yahya Khan. His leadership could have proved to be our savior and may be we wouldn't be chatting about the rest of the conflicts between the 2 sides today. Alas! We ditched a true patriotic and visionary General and no doubt that we had to pay the unimaginable price for that sin we commited for years to come. It's totally unbearable for me to imagine

 

[PanzerKiel]

We ditched a true patriotic and visionary General and no doubt that we had to pay the unimaginable price for that sin we commited for years to come. It's totally unbearable for me to imagine

List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famous 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

 

[The Terminator]

In short, maybe, Indians are trying to achieve opposite of TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE... Which is... Too much in a very short time.... Once this occurs, then the gaps widens between mass and quality.... And battlefield performance suffers, and then reluctance for prolonging a tactical action for own desired results creeps in... 27 Feb may fit in here.... Indians failed to use their one, ultimate trump card which is superiority in numbers.... Even if IAF had lost a couple maybe, but then following it, the skies should have been filled with IAF aircraft for potential fighter sweeps and CAPs busting.... But IAF showed no inclination of pressing their quantity advantage.....

Again.... Brings us to the same thing.... India always feels reluctant to bring in its quantity advantage... Maybe it tries for QUALITY advantage like USA does, but then Indians don't have this corresponding military assets to match their doctrine.... Yet.

Typical Failure upon failures from both the sides resulted in a stalemate for better part of the century

Maybe the end result is better suited for both the countries

 

[Raja Porus]

List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famour 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

Brigadier Amjad Ch, Bde commander IV corps arty; Brig AQ Sher, Bde commander 22 inf bde of 10div, MG Tajammul Hussain in 71 and the list goes on..

 

[The Terminator]

List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famour 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

How could we stop that leadership brain drain? What lessons our military has learnt from those accounts and are there any systems placed to not repeat those mistakes we committed?

I probably guess that it still happens in present times too!

 

[PanzerKiel]

How could we stop that leadership brain drain? What lessons our military has learnt from those accounts and are there any systems placed to not repeat those mistakes we committed?

I probably guess that it still happens in present times too!

Its a vicious cycle, and it still remains...whenever egos come into play and take precedence over greater interests then brain drain and other losses are bound to happen.

 

[Raja Porus]

Many officers including Sword of honours of Dhera Dhun were not inducted in the army after independence because they had joined INA which dealt a major blow to our military thinking.

List of such people ditched by us is long... apart from Gen Akhtar Malik (GOC 12 Div), we had Brig Nisar (25 Cav, CHawinda), we had Maj Gen Abrar (GOC 6 armored division), Brig Amjad Chaudhary, commander of famour 4 Corps Artillery in 65 and Maj Gen Sarfraz (GOC 10 Division at Lahore) as well. These men, and many more like them, were nowhere to be found in 1971.

MG Shahid Ali Hamid, Sher Ali khan Patudi Brigadier Amjad Ch, Bde commander IV corps arty; Brig AQ Sher, Bde commander 22 inf bde of 10div, Yaqub Khan in 71;MG Tajammul Hussain after 71 and the list goes on..

One of the major reasons why there was so much confusion and shyness in every offensive launched by us in 65 was because of the lack of confidence and determination shown by the GHQ and especially the CinC, an ACR written by the British CO of Musa Khan in Burma sats that he was Tactically Timid. Thus no gains could be made due to the sudden change of Commands and objectives, AORs and Ad hocism

 

[PanzerKiel]

an ACR written by the British CO of Musa Khan in Burma sats that he was Tactically Timid. Thus no gains could be made due to the sudden change of Commands and objectives, AORs and Ad hocism

That ACR was of Ayub Khan, not Musa.

In Friends Not Masters, Ayub Khan gives a very sketchy account of his exploits and role in the Burma front during World War II: he was made second in command of the First Assam regiment -- which fought its way to Mandalay -- and after 18 months was transferred back to India. More information has come to light in recent years. A confidential note --declassified in recent years -- of the British Commonwealth Relations Office on Ayub Khan, prepared after he seized power in 1958, refers to this phase of his career: “He (Ayub Khan) was, according to our record, a failure as a Commanding Officer (Lt. Col.) on active service and had to be relieved.” Details about this episode have emerged from accounts of others. Ayub Khan served in Burma during 1944-45. When the Commanding Officer of the regiment, Lt Col. WF Brown was killed, he was given command but later removed by Maj. Gen. TW Rees, Commander of the Indian 19th Infantry Division, for “tactical timidity”, and replaced by Lt.Col. Hugh Parsons.

 

[The Terminator]

@PanzerKiel sir, I have a rather bizzare question for you.

Our military has the history of being bold, aggressive, packs a bigger punch than its actual size, doesn't shy away image. But as time moved on specially at the turn of the century our military's tone and perception has gone from aggressive to mere peacekeepers.

Can you please elaborate us what's going on in reality?

As disparity between the 2 forces is concerned, we started of rather poorly in the 40s and 50s but that gap has been shrinking since then. So why our top leadership don't roar like it used to do in 20th century!

 

[PanzerKiel]

@PanzerKiel sir, I have a rather bizzare question for you.

Our military has the history of being bold, aggressive, packs a bigger punch than its actual size, doesn't shy away. But as time moved on specially at the turn of the century our military's tone and perception has gone from aggressive to mere peacekeepers.

Can you please elaborate us what's going on in reality?

As disparity between the 2 forces is concerned, we started of rather poorly in the 40s and 50s but that gap has been shrinking since then. So why our top leadership don't roar like it used to do in 20th century!

Reality is entirely opposite....the last two decades have rapidly transformed the military as far as fighting capability and AGGRESSIVENESS is concerned....previously finding aggressive guys was an exception, now its the opposite.....
but the last two decades has also seen army taking an ever greater role in the country affairs.....now in these situations, aggressiveness does not pay off.....we have to be a but subtle....

Indians, till late 80s and early 90s had one big fear.....our officers and men were those who had taken part in 1971 war and were burning to avenge that.....that thing almost eroded in late 90s.....but the last two decades has brought it back....this danger will now loom on our eastern neighbour till minimum 2040.

 

[Raja Porus]

He (Ayub Khan) was, according to our record, a failure as a Commanding Office

I read it in Crossed Swords and was searching to copy the exact words. Thanks.

 

[The Terminator]

Reality is entirely opposite....the last two decades have rapidly transformed the military as far as fighting capability and AGGRESSIVENESS is concerned....previously finding aggressive guys was an exception, now its the opposite.....
but the last two decades has also seen army taking an ever greater role in the country affairs.....now in these situations, aggressiveness does not pay off.....we have to be a but subtle....

Indians, till late 80s and early 90s had one big fear.....our officers and men were those who had taken part in 1971 war and were burning to avenge that.....that thing almost eroded in late 90s.....but the last two decades has brought it back....this danger will now loom on our eastern neighbour till minimum 2040.

We have a powerful military department which India lacks ie ISPR. ISPR played a vital role by motivating the public and shape the mindset towards war on terror and brutal within borders fight against TTP, BLA etc. We constantly heard the voice of our hearts being propagated through ISPR and the famous phrases of giving surprise to our arch rival and be a dominant side in escalation ladder felt melody to the ears for the general public as their heart's voice was constantly been suppressed by the traditional political leadership.

ISPR wields the power to shake the Earth. But when you try to mixup foreign office with ISPR then matters quickly turn from serious to hilarious. It doesn't suite a uniformed person to say that we don't want to fight or we don't wish for war. Whatever the circumstances may come but when a senior military official globally relaying that message turns lion into sheep, at least in perception.

This is the Era of hybrid warfare where usually perception (either within our own nation or globally) matters a lot, sometimes more than the actual capability. IMHO ISPR should only represent the true defenders and warriors of the nation and let foreign office guys handle the sweet talking and diplomatic conversations.

 

[The Terminator]

@PanzerKiel sir, as Pakistanis we generally know what Indian military lacks or what blunders they made in the past and they are more open in expressing that publicly than us as their military doesn't carry any political capital.

But there isn't enough material available on mainstream media what the shortcomings or the mistakes committed by our military in the past. What lessons our military have learned from them and improved upon, and how the present and future looks from that perspective?

We have viewed a sh*t ton load of debates about the unceremoniously removal of General Mausharraf, his midflight issues and the subsequent coup détat. Which bears no effect upon our defense capabilities. But we tend to ignore and completely forget to discuss for example, the miscalculations on our part in 99's skirmish and to have a healthy debate on it openly.

There is some great pieces of work from some extremely knowledgeable members here about India's militarily shortcomings and what they could have done. Good food for thought for indian viewers.

Would you plz also elaborate the mistakes the Pakistani side committed in the past conflicts, what lessons we learnt from that and how we won't do the same mistakes in the future? Plz, Enlighten duds like me about them too.
Thanks