India being left out of Afghan matrix

[AZADPAKISTAN2009]

I SAY PAKISTAN SHOUDL TAKE OVER AFGHANISTAN NOW ..

 

[ek_indian]

anybody is a fool if he thinks india is failing in afghanistan.remember all the new afghan civil servants are trained in india.they hav been brainwashed with an indian touch.besides social approach to afghanistan is the best way to win confidence of those people.lots of afghan boys are studying in india and they are all going back to afghanistan to help indians and natives lead norml lives. nato isnt leavin anytime soon.10 years more atleast.by that time all afghan civil servants will be india trained.raw is doing agood job there.

Anything to back up all these??

 

[foxbat]

I SAY PAKISTAN SHOUDL TAKE OVER AFGHANISTAN NOW ..

funny...

 

[karan.1970]

I SAY PAKISTAN SHOUDL TAKE OVER AFGHANISTAN NOW ..

why do you say such things friend.. ??

 

[H2O3C4Nitrogen]

or when the GoA funds/collaborates on missile and nuke tech with Pakistan...

can you plz elaborate this point ..? What problem ..?

 

[Fighter488]

US ties India-Pak talks to Afghanistan
Chidanand Rajghatta, TNN, 6 February 2010, 01:37am


WASHINGTON: The persuasive hand behind the India-Pakistan thaw has welcomed New Delhi’s decision to talk to Islamabad while underscoring the
dialogue’s importance to the situation in Afghanistan rather than to Pakistan’s peeves about Kashmir.

Two senior US officials who gave thumbs up to India’s move explicitly linked the decision to the complex situation in Afghanistan where New Delhi and Islamabad are locked in shadow boxing that could prove detrimental to Washington’s goals of enforcing peace and exiting from there. Neither of them mentioned Pakistan’s obsession with the unresolved Kashmir issue or India’s focus on terrorism.

''We are supportive of dialogue among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan as a key component of moving ahead and achieving a stable region,'' P.J.Crowley, Assistant Secretary of State who is also the state department spokesman said on Thursday when asked about the Indian offer, adding, ''We certainly have been encouraging steps that both Pakistan and India could take to address mutual concerns and to take appropriate steps so that tensions can be reduced, cooperation can be increased, and as a result, you have a more stable region that is focused on threats – both interests that they share and threats that they share.''

The US concern about Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan’s Kashmir agenda was made even more explicit by Washington’s special Representative to ****** Richard Holbrooke, who made an important pronouncement – that will be music to New Delhi’s ears – by endorsing India’s stake in the war-torn country where Pakistan is questioning its locus standi.

''The Indians have a legitimate series of security interests in that region, as do a number of other countries, including, of course, Pakistan, China and all the other countries that neighbor on Afghanistan,'' Holbrooke said at a briefing for the international media. ''And any search for a resolution of the war in Afghanistan requires that the legitimate security interests of every country be understood and taken into account.''

''The dilemma arises when those security interests tend to be in conflict,'' Holbrooke continued in his exposition of the India-Pakistan face-off. ''And Afghanistan has suffered throughout history by the fact that it has sometimes become the terrain for surrogate struggles for power. We do not want to see that happen.''

While some US analysts have suggested resolving the Kashmir issue is central to US success in Afghanistan, Holbrooke declined to endorse the line of thinking, in keeping with the counter-view that Kashmir was just a symptom of Pakistan dysfunction, not the cause. Asked how important Kashmir is for reducing tension between
India and Pakistan, Holbrooke dismissed the issue from the US agenda while declining to even mention the K-word at a time when Pakistan is poised to put it back on the front-burner.

''On the specific you talked about, we are not going to negotiate or mediate on that issue. And I'm going to try to keep my record and not even mention it by name, Holbrooke said, adding, “But I want to be clear that anything that the two countries do to reduce tensions or improve relations will be something we would applaud and encourage.”

“But we are not going to act as intermediaries between Islamabad and New Delhi. That is not what we are here to do. I'm not just talking about myself,” Holbrooke maintained, suggesting that it was broadly the policy of the Obama administration and a continuation of the Bush White House’s policy of not highlighting the Kashmir issue.

Statements from the two officials on a day Pakistan pushed the envelope on Kashmir (with Kashmir Day rallies across the country) in response to India’s offer on talks indicated that US did not share Islamabad’s agenda on key issues, including downsizing New Delhi’s role in Afghanistan. The global think tank Stratfor has already forecast a deadlock without American help.

"India will want to talk about Pakistani-sponsored militancy and Taliban negotiations. Pakistan will want to talk about everything else. It will be up to the United States to attempt to bridge this difficult gap," Stratfor said in an analysis on Thursday.

Though little progress has been made in India's efforts to get Islamabad to crack down on India-focused militants operating on Pakistani soil, India's concerns over Taliban appeasement in Afghanistan are driving New Delhi toward engagement with Islamabad, the think tank said.

US officials were clearly in the loop on the Indian olive branch, with various administration mandarins having made known for weeks that Washington prefers engagement to India’s posture of no-talks till Pakistan acts on 26/11. The reasoning in Washington was that India’s ''obdurate'' position was allowing Pakistan’s militaristic constituency to up the ante and build up a hostile atmosphere at the expense of its peace-seeking civil society, undermining US goals in Afghanistan

 

[Fighter488]

Afghanistan: Most invaded, yet unconquerable ​

ADITYA MENON , 6 February 2010, 01:07pm

Since the 8th Century B.C., the area today called Afghanistan has incessantly been roiled by external invasion or internal strife. Geography had The national game, buzkashi, is said to have been invented as a defence against Genghis Khan’s army. Afghanistan has remained the playground of world powers over centuries placed it such that it became a natural theatre of the Great Games between imperial powers fighting to control trade routes and expand influence as well as the object of a political Buzkashi between local feuding elites. Great emperors like Darius I, Alexander, Kanishka, Genghis Khan, Timur, Babur and Nadir Shah all fought their way through Afghanistan. Yet it has never been completely conquered or colonised. This is the paradox of Afghanistan - most invaded and yet unconquerable. Because of this, regimes were always weak and susceptible to foreign pressure. Yet its society has been resilient and uncompromising towards alien rule. How does one then explain the Afghan paradox? There are a number of contextual factors such as its rugged topographical features, existence of deep and multifaceted cleavages among the population, the centrality of tribal social groupings, and the negative role played by neighbours and external powers. However, central to this paradox is the inhibited development of political institutions in Afghanistan.

The foundations of the modern Afghan state are said to have been laid by Ahmad Shah Durrani in the 18th Century . A central role was played by Amir Abdur Rahman Khan who was called 'Iron Amir' for his brutality and ruthless expansionism. Over the years, Afghan rulers have utilised the discourses of Islam, tribe, kinship, Durrani supremacy and Pashtun nationalism to legitimise their rule. However, the dominant feature of Afghan polity has been internal colonialism by a Pashtun (especially Durrani Pashtun) dominated political culture. The Taliban in many ways represented a culmination of this trend. This lies at the root of the deep ethnic fissures that are central to Afghanistan.

A weak Afghanistan has served the interests of all, right from the Mughal-Safavid rivalry, the power politics between Czarist Russia and Great Britain and the Pakistani search for 'strategic depth' . It was the theatre where the Cold War was played out by the Americans and the Soviet Union. This lack of a centre and weak political institutions is crucial in the context of the various external invasions that have taken place; external powers have mostly been successful in capturing major cities like Kabul, Kandahar and Herat. But external occupation has always failed when faced with guerrilla opposition in the countryside. Historically , the Afghan concept of authority has based on tribal lines. Central leadership has been more like a 'first among equals' rather than a more hierarchal structure as has been the case in India or Iran. Moreover, being an arid and agriculturally poor region, there has never been sufficient resources for the creation of centralized state institutions. Therefore, there has been limited political institutionalisation and penetration of the society by the state. As a result, regimes such as that of Amir Abdur Rahman Khan and the Taliban showed their 'strength' by public displays of power such as brutal punitive punishments and moral policing.

Factors such as topography and the tribe-centered nature of society cannot be changed. Therefore, the focus of any efforts at securing a stable future for Afghanistan should be on creating stable political institutions. Free and fair elections are an important step in this direction. But as recent attempts at negotiating with the Taliban indicate, the way to political power in Afghanistan is still through the barrel of a Kalashnikov. There is a long way to go before Afghanistan moves beyond the Great Game and the political buzkashi.

THE GREAT GAME
Coined by Arthur Conolly, an intelligence officer of the British East India Company, the term "The Great Game" acquired widespread popularity thanks to Rudyard Kipling's novel, Kim (first published in 1901). It referred to the strategic rivalry between Britain and Russia for supremacy in Central Asia, which began around 1813. Worried about the prospect of a Russian invasion of India, the British were determined to maintain Afghanistan as a buffer state. Constant efforts were made by the British and Russians to influence the politics of Afghanistan , through diplomacy, espionage and occasionally, force. The British twice attacked Afghanistan. The first war (1839-42 ) ended in disaster with just one Briton, Dr William Brydon, surviving a retreat begun by a 16,000-strong contingent. The second Anglo-Afghan war (1878-80 ) was more successful, ensuring British control of Afghanistan's foreign policy. The classic Great Game ended with the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, under which Russia accepted Britain's control over Afghanistan, as long as the British did not attempt any regime change.

 

[Fighter488]

IS THE NEIGHBOURHOOD SET TO GET EVEN MORE
DANGEROUS​

?



INDRANI BAGCHI DIPLOMATIC EDITOR


In December, 2007, Hamid Karzai, president of Afghanistan, threw out two Britons — Michael Semple and Mervyn Patterson— for allegedly bribing Taliban leaders in Musa Qala, Helmand, where British troops were fighting — not always to advantage. Karzai, apparently enraged that the British were paying off the Taliban behind his back and demanding that these “leaders” be accommodated in the Afghan government, refused to comply, and in the face of British displeasure, expelled them.
Semple, said security officials in Afghanistan, is probably best described as the Afghanistan-Taliban brains trust for the UK’s MI6, its external intelligence arm. In a re-run of the 19th Century ‘Great Game’ adventurers, Semple has been a prime advocate of ‘reintegration’ and ‘reconciliation’ with the Taliban as a key strategy to win the war in Afghanistan.
His background is equally interesting — Semple’s father was a general in the British army and his wife Yamima’s father, General Mirdha, a buddy of former Pakistani president Yahya Khan, putting him on an inside track to military-intelligence decision makers in Pakistan. The idea of wooing over softer Taliban leaders and quelling Pashtun anger isn’t new or novel. Today, it is largely Semple’s doctrine of ‘reconciliation’ that’s driving the present British-led initiative to sift the ‘good’ Taliban from the ‘bad’, and bring the ‘good’ into the tent. It’s a line that Pakistan has pushed, leveraging the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and army’s deep contacts with the Taliban. Islamabad is peddling a promise, once betrayed in 1996 when the group overran Kabul, that the Taliban could be persuaded to control violence and create a backdrop that would allow the West to make a face-saving exit from Afghanistan. Alongside, the Taliban could be persuaded to be a replacement for Karzai, despised by Pakistan and slowly disgraced in Washington.

LONDON MOVE STUNS INDIA

The Afghanistan conference in London last week was a shocker for Indian mandarins who had hoped to muscle in and get a larger say in Afghan policy given the money and effort New Delhi has put into the reconstruction efforts. But what happened was that India got blindsided by the British swallowing the Pakistani line that Islamabad could deliver peace by negotiating a deal with the Taliban. Shivshankar Menon, the new national security adviser, along with foreign secretary Nirupama Rao, is leading a massive review of India’s own ****** policy, which will determine not just India’s approach to Afghanistan, but also craft out a new policy of engagement with Pakistan. The announcement on Thursday of resumption of foreign secretary-level talks between New Delhi and Islamabad is a movement in that direction. (More of that, later in the story.)
Pakistan has pushed hard to remain in the driver’s seat on Afghan policy. And, at least for now, it appears to be winning by hard-selling the line that without the involvement of the ISI, re-integration will remain a non-starter. That was evident first at the Istanbul ****** meeting leading up to the January 28 London conference, where Pakistan insisted India be kept out of the talks, and even a feeble attempt by Karzai to get India to the table was brushed off. India fretted and fumed impotently, but found itself completely dealt out of the game by Pakistan and the UK leading the charge, letting Karzai announce that he was going to draw his brothers back into the tent, and requesting the Saudis to mediate a ‘reintegration and reconciliation’ with the Taliban.
This was only formalizing a process that had started in 2009, when the Taliban leadership had met with the Afghan government in the desert kingdom. These meetings broke the ice, even quietly blessed by US special envoy to ******, Richard Holbrooke. After the London conference, Saudi envoy to India Faisal Tarab told Crest in a carefully worded comment, “We are ready to mediate with the Taliban, but we will not talk to terrorists.’’ Saudi King Abdullah has just met Karzai and the outcome of that conversation could determine the success or otherwise of the proposed venture.
For India, global approval of the reconciliation process implies Pakistan, with its ISI and army, is likely to take a leading role. As Holbrooke told MK Narayanan, who was till recently NSA, and Nirupama Rao quietly during his last visit a couple of weeks ago, Pakistan has worked itself into a paranoia about India’s presence in Afghanistan; India would have to be removed from all decision-making on Afghanistan, they insisted. As London showed, Islamabad got its way.
For the US and UK, even though India’s assistance programme punches all the right buttons, India had to be sacrificed. Therefore, when British foreign secretary David Miliband was asked about India’s role, he hummed and hawed saying “by and by”. In London, India insisted on putting in phrases like the process should be “Afghan-led’’ and “transparent and inclusive’’ — words to prevent the British and Pakistanis from controlling it. But as every diplomat understands, these are words than cannot, and indeed, will not be enforced.
The Pakistani demand has been succinctly laid out by Munir Akram, one of its top diplomats: “Pakistan’s cooperation should be offered only in exchange for tangible and immediate US support for Pakistan’s national objectives: an end to Indian-Afghan interference in Baluchistan and FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas); a Kashmir solution; a military balance between Pakistan and India; parity with India on nuclear issues; transfer of equipment and technology for counter-terrorism; unconditional defense and economic assistance; free trade access.’’

KARZAI CORNERED?

Steve Coll in his book Ghost Wars recounts an event in the life of Hamid Karzai that bears repetition, because it might be instructive even today. In 1999, when his father, Abdul Karzai, a respected Pashtun tribal leader, made an overture to Mullah Omar against Al Qaida, he was gunned down by the Taliban leader’s henchmen in Quetta, Pakistan.
The man is now being pushed into dealing with his father’s killers on an equal footing. A weakened, sullen Karzai has been battered into submission in a game where a lot of money ($500 million, $140 million of it in 2010) will be thrown at yet another attempt to win over the Taliban. US officials told Crest that while they maintain a healthy skepticism about flipping the Taliban, the US is not entirely dismissive of the fresh initiative either. This is as much to keep the British by their side as a reflection of the fact that there are serious doubts about the success of the US military strategy in Afghanistan.
The pragmatist that he is, Karzai has been half-way down this path before. In 2004, after Karzai won his first presidential election, he held out an olive branch to the Taliban, in a ‘reconciliation’ exercise. This was called Tahkim-e-Solh (Strengthening Peace). Established in May, 2005, it tried giving Taliban not guilty of criminal activity a way to return to society. It did not work, because the process was imperfect, the reintegration did not happen in many cases, the payments were delayed or not made at all. Since most were neither provided security nor money, they soon returned to the Taliban, which was more lucrative. Officials say that will be fixed, because the US-UK duo will now control the funds. But Gen David Petraeus (who’s credited with the success of the coalition forces in Iraq and now heads the US central command) is skeptical. “If you have an area that is insecure to begin with, then it is difficult, though not undoable, to guarantee security for somebody who wants to come in from the cold.’’

CAN INDIA PROJECT HARD POWER?

Afghanistan and its future will prove to be India’s real test as a regional power. For the past decade, India has successfully turned itself into a huge presence and influencepeddler in Afghanistan — through its biggest-ever use of soft power: roads, hospitals, schools, scholarships, community development projects. India’s financial commitment in Afghanistan is upwards of $1.2 billion. Opinion polls put India’s popularity rating among Afghans at 71 per cent, in extreme contrast to only 2 per cent for Pakistan.
India has refrained from using hard power in Afghanistan, and, in many ways, the Indian presence is guaranteed by the US’ security role. As soft-power author, Harvard University’s Joseph Nye says, “Achieving transformational objectives may require a combination of both hard and soft power.’’ Soft power is only credible when it is matched by or surpassed by hard power. India is paying the price, because, beyond a point, roads and dams don’t help buy influence. As one top-level Afghan official said, wryly, “We love India, but we fear Pakistan. That is a stronger emotion.’’ India’s power projection in Afghanistan has been primarily by showing its “goodness’’. Pakistan, on the other hand, negotiates with the world with a gun held to its own head. That, as India has discovered several times in its history, is far more persuasive.
For the moment, Pakistan has the upper hand, because both the UK and US need it more than ever. Pakistan is playing an adroit diplomatic game of chicken with the US — and winning. Islamabad may be hopelessly dependent on Washington’s money, but that doesn’t stop it from refusing to give visas to US officials, refusing money that comes with ‘conditions’. Pakistan has made it clear it will not stop supporting the Afghan Taliban; there is absolutely no attempt to tackle al Qaida; and Mullah Omar’s Quetta Shura functions unimpeded. In short, it holds veto power over whether the Obama surge succeeds in Afghanistan. Washington, said an Indian official scornfully, is “kowtowing to Pakistan just like they did to China.”
Harsh perhaps, but this view is prevalent in the upper reaches of the Indian government — to the extent that even the PM is believed to have remarked that if India and Pakistan have another fracas, Washington may not weigh in on India’s side.
According to high-level officials in New Delhi, a successful Taliban reintegration is another term for a Taliban takeover in Kabul. “Look at Yemen and you see the Afghan future. If and when that happens, we may be looking at a pre-9/11 situation,” said one of them.
Will Karzai survive? Unlikely. But if he is to avoid the kind of fate that befell Afghanistan’s president Mohammed Najibullah — who was tortured and strung up from a light post by the Taliban in Kabul in 1996 after the Soviets withdrew — Karzai needs new and improved survival strategies. These must include working out deals with warlords — tribal leaders who can help him survive the Taliban — because despite everything, the average Afghan still prefers the present government to the harsh rules of the Taliban. He can’t look to the UK, US or Pakistan for help. He can look to India. Will India step up to the table? This would entail getting our hands dirty. So far, India has shied away from a robust security role in Afghanistan.

A WIN-WIN FOR PAKISTAN? NOT SO SOON

It ain’t gonna be easy for the Pakistanis either. On the face of it, Pakistan faces the welcome prospect of putting its creation, the Taliban, back in power in Kabul, but the very fact that their leadership lives ensconced inside Pakistan means the Taliban have a stake in Pakistan as well. That has implications.
If the Taliban does assume a position of power in Kabul, it could be a windfall for some of the armed and dangerous groups Pakistan is fighting. And the connections are wellknown now. Holbrooke said that when he saw a video of the Jordanian double agent suicide bomber issue his final message with Hakimullah Mehsud of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) sitting by his side, he thought it was “shocking.’’ It showed, if evidence was needed, that there are few lines between the different Taliban groups and al Qaida.
Peter Bergen, an authority on Qaida, explained this to the US Congress recently: “Taliban is much closer to the al Qaida today than it was eight years ago. Yes, there are local groups of the Taliban operating for purely local reasons, but the upper levels of the Taliban on both sides of the Afghan/ Pakistan border have morphed together ideologically and tactically with al Qaida.’’
Dreaded Taliban war veteran Jallaluddin Haqqani and other fighters of the Haqqani clan along the Afghan-Pak frontier operate with impunity on both sides of the Khyber. They have close ties with al Qaida, and with Pakistan’s ISI. Then, of course, there are stand-alone warlords like Gulbuddin Hekmatyar of Hizb-e-Islami who has changed sides so many times that Afghan watchers have lost count. He now maintains close ties with bin Laden and Co and US officials say he may be one of the first to be flipped!
So let’s assume Pakistan’s dream comes true and the ‘good’ Taliban join the Kabul government. Ahmed Rashid, a Taliban specialist and author of the acclaimed Descent Into Chaos, admits the Afghan Taliban have developed a degree of mistrust of the ISI, and grown closer to the TTP. The chances that the Pakistan Taliban could use southern and eastern Afghanistan as their strategic depth against the Pakistan army would be unconscionably high, posing a potential security threat to Pakistan itself.

CAN TALIBAN TURN A NEW LEAF?

After some 1,200 attacks a month through all of 2009 (according to the UN), the Taliban are scenting victory in Afghanistan. A statement by Mullah Omar, rejecting the Karzai peace offer, was telling: “They have tried in the past and are trying now to entangle our Muslim and brave people and their leadership, the Islamic Emirate. Some time, they announce that they will provide money, employment and opportunity to have a comfortable life abroad, for those mujahideen who agree to part ways with jihad. They think that mujahideen have taken up arms to gain money or grab power or were compelled to turn to arms. This is baseless and futile.” It’s a no-brainer that the Taliban leadership will not be bought. Why then, should anyone expect their rank and file to defect, when they haven’t for so long?
Besides, the Taliban leadership is unlikely to allow this kind of ‘defection’ without adequate retribution — in the past few years, Taliban have summarily killed people who have gone over to the government. They have systematically removed tribal chieftains opposed to the Taliban and al Qaida. Why should they stop now?
The West appears to have adopted a stance that it’s okay for the Taliban to flog women and stone heretics as long as they aren’t firing missiles at the West. The Taliban clearly cannot accept the Afghan constitution, because their faith remains the Islamic emirate, and Mullah Omar has said as much. That should be of concern for everyone, even the Taliban-eager British. Out of 7 million children currently attending school in Afghanistan, 40 per cent are girls. Over the past few years, there has been a fair degree of women’s empowerment in that country. Progress will almost certainly be a casualty under Taliban rule.
But isn’t there even a hint of a silver living? Ahmed Rashid points to Mullah Omar’s Eid message, repeated last week, that the Taliban would “pose no threat to neighbouring countries” as a sign of flexibility in the Taliban position.

WHAT DOES INDIA DO NOW?

While Pakistan is smoking victory in Afghanistan, it is also pushing for a greater focus on India-Pakistan relations. This argument has been persuasive in Washington since the beginning of the Obama administration, but is gathering currency now. Mike Mullen, chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, said on Wednesday, “South Asian security tensions and political dynamics significantly impact our objectives in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The longstanding animosity and mistrust between Pakistan and India complicates regional efforts.... While we acknowledge the sovereign right of India and Pakistan to pursue their own foreign policies, we must demonstrate our desire for continued and long-term partnership with each, and offer our help to improve confidence and understanding between them in a manner that builds longterm stability across the wider region of South Asia.’’
The argument within the UPA government is that if India doesn’t take unilateral steps with Pakistan, it will inevitably get drawn into a trilateral effort with the US. Therefore, the government, even at the risk of being pilloried for ‘succumbing’ to the US, is working to engage Pakistan across a spectrum of issues, starting off with home minister P Chidambaram’s visit to Islamabad end-February. Senior officials are certain this is unlikely to affect Pakistan’s support to terrorists or its position on India in Afghanistan. But not talking with Pakistan is raking in diminishing returns.

Not only has Pakistan won this round against India, it has won it big. It’s even managed to impress upon the world India’s nonrelevance in Afghanistan. Will India take this on the chin and continue or, in the eventuality that the Taliban-Pakistan combine returns to power in Kabul, will it cut its losses and run?
At present there are two schools of thought in the Indian establishment. The first says Afghanistan is a graveyard, and India’s had a good run there for the past decade. “The Hindu Kush was so named for a specific reason,” said an official. But if the US security cover goes with the prospect of a Talibanised power structure in Kabul, India should reduce its presence, get its people out, and keep a modicum of influence to prevent the country from becoming a pre-9/11 anti-India space. Significantly, India hasn’t taken on new infrastructure projects in Afghanistan lately.
But another school says India should not only maintain its presence but add different dimensions to it. This will define how India uses its power for peace in the neighbourhood, which will not happen by cut-and-run policies. Pakistan is in Afghanistan not because it wants to have a strong and stable country next door. It is there because of its flawed doctrine of ‘strategic depth’ against India. It stands to reason that India’s stakes in Afghanistan are vital precisely for that reason. India’s goal therefore should be to prevent a Taliban return.
But the bottomline is that India is on its own in Afghanistan. But Afghanistan will define Indian power more comprehensively than all its ships sailing in the Indian Ocean. So what should India do? In off-the-record conversations with TOI-Crest, senior government officials said India should get a strong foothold in the Afghan administration. It needs to force situations where the Afghans will be able to take their own decisions and not be railroaded by the Pakistanis or the British. “If the Afghans take their own decisions, that’s good for us.”
Second, India needs to support Karzai through a period when he will surely be making existential deals to ensure a life after the US. For India, Karzai is a better bet than the Taliban, so among the first things India should do is to be able to train their officer corps, many of whom already come here for ‘soft’ training. There are supporters in Karzai’s circle like Asadullah Khalid (erstwhile governor of Kandahar) and Gul Agha Sherzai (Nangarhar) whom India can help. Most of all, India can help Karzai govern better.
Primarily, India will have to step up its engagement with the Pashtuns. Since 2001, India has been doing precisely this, and it’s no coincidence that India’s enormously successful small projects are scattered through the Pashtun provinces. As one official remarked, “There is no door in Afghanistan that is closed to India any longer.” But as one security official admitted, the Pashtuns will always have naturally Pakistani leanings, which have to be factored in as well.
India ’s traditional engagement with Afghanistan has been through the Pashtun tribes. India has picked up a lot of IOUs over the past years, now’s the time to cash in. India’s Pashtun outreach should straddle the Durand Line though there it will be much tougher going. Meanwhile, the Tajiks and Hazaras can be empowered once again though there is no formal Northern Alliance any longer. India can join hands with the Russians and could expect some cooperation from Iran, but Iran is always iffy.
Former Pakistan envoy, G Parthasarathy says, “India’s role cannot be marginalised. We should train the Afghan army and open Indian markets for Afghan produce.’’
On the military side, there is a case for more proactive Indian security tasks in Afghanistan, without sending troops. Thus far, India has held back, which is counter-productive. The airbase in Ayni, Tajikistan, can be given more teeth. And if China can think of overseas military bases, so should India.
The prize is not Afghanistan, it’s peace

 

[Fighter488]

Taliban will negotiate, but path fraught with risk​

Thu, Jan 28 2010 LONDON (Reuters) - Unthinkable a year ago and still officially beyond the pale, the idea of a political role for Taliban leaders in Afghanistan is creeping onto the agenda as war-weary governments seek to bring an end to an unpopular war.

Some say this could open the door for negotiations if the Taliban think they can secure a better settlement through talks than by waiting for U.S.-led troops to leave and then fighting their way to power through a renewed civil war.

"The Taliban know they can't take over the country. They would be presiding over a country with persistent and perennial poverty and civil war. So they would like to negotiate," said one diplomat involved in discussions about Afghanistan.

The United States and its allies have so far spoken only of reconciliation with those Taliban who renounce violence, sever ties with al Qaeda and accept the Afghan constitution.

Washington is also sending an extra 30,000 troops to Afghanistan in a display of strength meant to secure better terms in any eventual peace deal, and trying to peel off Taliban foot soldiers through a program of "reintegration."

It is seen as unlikely to want to negotiate as long as it believes it can still make gains on the battlefield.

"In my view the Taliban have to be convinced they cannot win before meaningful negotiations can take place," Republican Senator John McCain told reporters this weekend.

But ultimately neither side can win by military means alone, prompting many to look ahead to the day when Washington has to engage with leaders of the insurgency.

"I would trust, frankly, the instincts and the impulses of our administration to at least look at a time when that might be fortuitous," said McCain.

Many analysts say talks would need to involve Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar -- condemned in the West for his refusal to hand over al Qaeda leaders after the September 11, 2001 attacks.

"As long as the leaders are not included in the talks, you cannot expect much from a meaningful peace," said Wadeer Safi, a political science professor at Kabul university.

And the price for a settlement could be high as far as the west is concerned -- for example the rehabilitation of Mullah Omar as supreme leader of Afghanistan -- even if not directly running the government.

The Taliban for their part are expected to come under pressure from Pakistan to negotiate to try to end a war which has increasingly spilled over from Afghanistan.

"The regional political situation seems to be changing and I believe now the Pakistan authorities have reached the conclusion to make the Taliban join in the talks," said Afghan analyst Khalil Roman.

POLITICALLY DIFFICULT ON BOTH SIDES

Washington says many Taliban leaders including Mullah Omar are based in Pakistan. And while Pakistan has far less leverage over the Taliban than it had when it nurtured them in the 1990s, it could still make life hard for them if they refused to talk.

Rather like the secret talks between then U.S. National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger and the North Vietnamese which tried, and ultimately failed, to secure an honorable exit from Vietnam, any negotiations would be long and easily derailed.

They would also be fraught with risk for both the United States and the Taliban. Any hint of compromise could unleash a public backlash in the United States, as well as alienate the Taliban's own fighters and supporters.

"It is politically very difficult for both Mullah Omar and the American government," said Kamran Bokhari, at STRATFOR global intelligence group.

Whatever happens, public statements on both sides are expected to stick to existing positions. The Taliban say all foreign troops must leave before they negotiate; Washington says they must sever ties with al Qaeda and renounce violence.

But the U.S. announcement it will start drawing down troops in 2011 has already gone some way to meeting a key Taliban demand for a timetable for the withdrawal of foreign forces.

For its part, the Taliban has repeated in a statement that it would not allow Afghan territory to be used to harm any other country, a reference to the demand it sever ties with al Qaeda.

Some argue the Taliban could look initially for a schedule for the withdrawal of foreign forces, along with measures like the release of prisoners and the removal of names of Taliban members from a U.N. terrorism blacklist as a starting point.

"The Taliban understand they are not going to roll into Kabul when the Americans leave," said Bokhari. "Eventually he (Mullah Omar) needs negotiations."

But even if both sides were willing to negotiate, a major problem would be in finding the right interlocutors.

Washington and its allies want any process of reconciliation to be Afghan-led, and President Hamid Karzai promised a peace council, or jirga, to try to forge an Afghan consensus on the issue. But Taliban leaders are unwilling to deal with Karzai, whose government they see as weak and corrupt.

In a statement on their website the Taliban rejected Karzai's attempt to reach out to them but said they were open to talks to achieve their goal of an Islamic state.

They distrust Pakistan after it turned against them after September 11, while its determination to check Indian influence in Afghanistan means it cannot act as a neutral mediator.

An attempt to get Saudi Arabia to mediate may be foundering. Analysts say Riyadh resents being asked to help without its own interests being taken into account. Like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia is concerned about Indian and Iranian influence in Afghanistan.

A former Taliban official said the Taliban wanted to talk directly to the Americans, whom they see as their main adversary rather than the Karzai government.

U.S. special envoy Richard Holbrooke said Sunday there had been no direct, secret contacts with the Taliban, but said Washington recognized the importance of reconciliation.

"But it must go hand in hand with security success. It is not an alternative to the military campaign. It requires military success to make progress," he told reporters in Munich.

(Additional reporting by Sayed Salahuddin in Kabul; Alistair Lyon in Beirut; and Mark Trevelyan in Munich; editing by Ralph Boulton)


Taliban will negotiate, but path fraught with risk | Reuters

 

[Fighter488]

Another extremely educated and plausible opinion.
A brilliant analysis I wold say!

Kashif

The winner takes all in Afghanistan ​

By M K Bhadrakumar

The Nobel Peace Prize has a tradition. In the entire period from 1901 to 2009, it has never been awarded twice to any of its 97 individual recipients.

United States President Barack Obama is thus unlikely to win a second Nobel. Yet, in an historical perspective, Afghanistan promises to become the first country in which Islamists will have been ushered into power on the wave of America's newfound smart power.

That too may only be the beginning. "Of course Afghanistan is not an island. There is no solution just within its borders," North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) secretary general Anders

Fogh Rasmussen said at a security conference in Munich last weekend.

NATO eyes Central Asia

The international community has been led to believe that the India-Pakistan faultline is the pivotal concern in the US's diplomatic strategy in Afghanistan. However, it is a mere subplot. The US's principal protagonist is China, while India and Pakistan - and increasingly Russia - are more like jesters in forming the confusion and the humor in an Elizabethan drama.

The main plot is about the expansion of NATO into Central Asia. At Munich, Rasmussen spoke of the "need to turn NATO into a forum of consultation on worldwide security issues ... NATO is a framework which has already proven to be uniquely able to combine security consultation, military planning and actual operations ... Afghanistan is a vivid example that in the 21st century, security can't be a relay race, with one individual handing the baton to the next runner ... That is why ... the Alliance should become the hub of a network of security partnerships ... Already today, the Alliance has a vast network of security partnerships, as far afield as northern Africa, the Gulf, Central Asia and the Pacific."

The Central Asian region is increasingly projected in the Western media as a "ticking bomb waiting to go off". The argument runs like this: social and ethnic tensions are smoldering and the economic crisis is deepening, whereas the autocratic and repressive regimes are incapable of addressing the tensions; Islamists are, therefore, stepping into the political vacuum and Central Asia is becoming increasingly susceptible to al-Qaeda.

The argument is gaining ground. Pakistani analyst Ahmed Rashid said recently, "[Militants] are preparing the ground for a long, sustained military campaign in Central Asia. There is now a real threat because the Islamist surge is combined with an economic and political crisis ... The reason is that they have, first of all, done enough fighting for other people. They now want to fight for their own country. The real threat now is the fact that they are trying to infiltrate back into Central Asia .. They are trying to infiltrate weapons, ammunition and men back into Central Asia."

Islamists as agents of geopolitics

There is an ominous overtone to Western reports. Al-Qaeda was used after all as justification for the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003.

This is where the US's idea of reconciliation with the Taliban merits scrutiny. The idea is indeed eminently sensible at a time when Muslim anger is rising, there is growing disillusionment about Obama, and when the US is dangerously close to confronting Iran and a need arises to "split" Muslim opinion.

At the same time, the Taliban's reconciliation also makes realpolitik. The Afghan war costs a lot of money, it costs Western lives and it cannot be won. The Taliban's reconciliation is arguably the only option available to keep open-ended NATO's military presence in Central Asia without having to fight a futile war.

The ascendancy of malleable Islamist forces also has its uses for the US's containment strategy towards China (and Russia). Islamists lend themselves as a foreign policy instrument. The rise of Islamism in Afghanistan cannot but radicalize hot spots such as the North Caucasus, Kashmir and the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region in China.

China has the maximum to lose if a Taliban regime re-emerges. That explains the length to which Beijing went at the London conference on Afghanistan on January 28 and at the Istanbul regional conference immediately preceding it to assert that Afghanistan is far too critical an issue for regional security and stability to be left to Washington.

China repudiates US's strategy

Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi spelt out in great deal during his speeches at London and Istanbul that Beijing intends to play an active role to safeguard its interests.

Yang outlined the kind of Afghanistan that China wishes to see emerge out of the abyss. First and foremost, it has to be a peaceful and stable Afghanistan that "eradicates the threat of terrorism". Two, it should be an Afghanistan that accepts the "existence of diverse ethnic groups, religions and political affiliations and rises above their differences to achieve comprehensive and enduring national reconciliation".

The accent on pluralism is a virtual rejection of the fundamentalist ideology of Wahhabism practiced by the Pashtun-dominated Taliban. Three, Afghanistan should "enjoy inviolable sovereign independence, territorial integrity and national dignity. Its future and destiny should be determined and its state affairs run by its own people."

In essence, China expects a total and unconditional vacation of foreign occupation. Four, Yang highlighted repeatedly the centrality of regional powers in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Afghanistan "should be a part of the regional cooperation mechanisms ... Countries of the region have special associations with Afghanistan."

He added, "There are now quite a number of mechanisms and initiatives regarding Afghanistan. Countries in the region should increase communication to ensure that the relevant mechanisms are viable, practical and efficient and can play a positive role ... We should avoid overlapping of various mechanisms ... we should be open and inclusive and promote sound interaction with other partners ... It is imperative to respect the leading role of the United Nations in coordinating international efforts and demonstrate openness and transparency."

Yang then added a punchline: [/SIZE]"Countries from outside the region should vigorously support the efforts of countries in the region and fully appreciate their difficulties in order to foster sound interactions between the two." In effect, he challenged the US's monopoly of conflict-resolution.

Yang demanded that the Obama administration should get off the back of Afghan President Hamid Karzai. He asked Washington to "respect the leading role of Afghanistan in economic reconstruction and let the Afghan government and people sit in the driver's seat. China supports channeling more assistance through the Afghan government and making more investment ... on the basis of equal consultations with the Afghan government."

Equally, "[The] international community should fully respect the unique history, culture and religion as well as the current development stage of Afghanistan, take into consideration the realities and difficulties of the Afghan government and respect the wishes of the Afghan people. In short, we should let Afghanistan choose on its own a governance model most suited to its own national circumstances."

Obama deserves another Nobel

Chinese commentaries have since robustly questioned the efficacy of the Obama administration's plan to "reintegrate" the Taliban, saying it is a deeply flawed idea and raises concerns that Karzai may be ultimately forced into making "certain political concessions" to the insurgents in terms of a power-sharing arrangement and constitutional reform.

They lamented that the entire exercise aimed at "a graceful exit strategy" for the US and its allies and "appears to have been carefully stage-managed to allow the US and NATO troops to start scripting a withdrawal. But perceived in a certain light, it could be counter-productive."

The Chinese commentaries underlined that the plan to split the Taliban by buying off its cadres and reintegrating those who had no links with al-Qaeda wouldn't work. "The United States has always tried to spend its way into a solution, a tactic that could backfire with the more extreme element of the Taliban ... the prospect conjures images of a bottomless money pit."

China is far from alone among the regional powers to harbor deep misgivings about the US's plan to reconcile the Taliban. Almost word-by-word, Moscow or Delhi will be pleased by what Yang said.

Yet, if Yang's Russian and Indian counterparts chose to keep their counsel at the London conference, Obama could claim credit for it as a superb practitioner of smart power and grand bargains - worthy of a Nobel - even if his plan to pacify Taliban leader Mullah Omar gets nowhere.

Ambassador M K Bhadrakumar was a career diplomat in the Indian Foreign Service. His assignments included the Soviet Union, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Germany, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, Kuwait and Turkey.

(Copyright 2010 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)

Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan

 

[Fighter488]

Another view of the situation. This time Pakistan centric!

Fighter

:. Indian Prospective Retreat from Afghanistan ​

Kashmir Watch, Feb 14

By Sajjad Shaukat

Since the US-led NATO forces occupied Afghanistan after 9/11, stiff resistance of the Taliban militants against the occupying forces created unending lawlessness in the country which has become a most conducive place for India so as to prepare conspiracy in order to fulfill its secret strategic designs against Iran, China and especially Pakistan.

Under the pretext of Talibinisation of Afghanistan and Pakistan, India has been running secret operations against Pakistan from its consulates in Mazar-i-Sharif, Jalalabad, Kandhar and other sensitive parts of the Pak-Afghan border. It has spent millions of dollars in Afghanistan to strengthen its hold on the country. New Delhi has not only increased its military troops in Afghanistan, but has also decided to set up cantonments. In this respect, puppet regeme of Hamid Karzai encouraged India in using the Border Roads Organisation in constructing the ring roads by employing Indo-Tibeten police force for security.

According to an estimate, world�€™s 90% heroin is cultivated in Afghanistan. However, money earned through drug-smuggling and even hostage-takings is utilized in buying weapons, being sent to the foreign agents in Pakistan.

In the past, emboldened by the tactical support of the US and Israel, Indian RAW, based in Afghanistan has been sending well-trained agents in Pakistan, who have joined the ranks and files of the Taliban. Posing themselves as the Pakistan Taliban, they not only attack the check posts of Pakistan�€™s security forces, but also target schools and mosques. They are continuously conduct suicide attacks in our country. In this context, India has also arranged some Madrassas in Afghanistan ( This really is a NEWS to me. Fighter ) where highly motivated and RAW-paid militants are being trained with the help of Indian so-called Muslims scholars. Now, Indian support to insurgency in the Frontier Province and the Baloch separatism has become a common matter.

Besides backing terrorism in Pakistan, India is also in collusion with the Balochi separatist leaders who have taken shelters in Afghanistan. For example, Akber Bugti�€™s grandson, Brahmdagh Bugti has been operating against Pakistan from Kabul. On July 23, 2008, in an interview with the BBC, Brahmdagh Bugti revealed that they �€œhave the right to accept foreign arms and ammunition from anywhere including India.�€�

Pakistan�€™s civil and military high officials have been repeatedly revealing that Indian RAW, Israeli Mossad and other foreign agencies, collaborating in Afghanistan are involved in creating unrest in Pakistan

On April 23, 2009, in the in-camera sitting of the Senate, Rehman Malik displayed documentary evidence of Indian use of Afghanistan to create unrest in FATA and Balochistan.

During various press briefings, ISPR spokesman, Maj-Gen. Athar Abbas has also indicated infiltration from Afghanistan by saying that foreign spies along with huge cache of arms, made of Indian origin were captured during the military operations.

While Pakistan�€™s Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani and Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Quereshi have also repeatedly indicated that Islamabad has strong evidence of Indian intervention in Pakistan, and the same would be shown to the foreign countries.

Regarding Indian undue incursion, even Pakistan�€™s Chief of Army Staff General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani assertively said in the NATO meeting at Brussels that the NATO countries, which have greater stakes in Afghanistan, should pay heed to the concerns raised by Islamabad particularly regarding Indian interference in Pakistan through Afghanistan. On his return from Brussels on February 1, Kayani denied that Pakistan wanted a �€œTalibanised�€� Afghanistan, and said his country has no interest in controlling Afghanistan. He further pointed out that peace and stability in Afghanistan were crucial to Islamabad�€™s long-term interests.

In the past, some American officials had also suggested to engage India in ****** strategy. But while realsing the ground realties, a shift started in the US strategy in the end of 2009. In this regard, on September 20, 2009, NATO commander, Gen. McChrystal had clearly revealed: "Indian political and economic influence is increasing in Afghanistan including significant development efforts�€¦is likely to exacerbate regional tensions."

During his recent visit to India, US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, while discussing Afghanistan with Indian leadership, has urged India to be transparent with Pakistan about their activities in Afghanistan.

In this connection, some rapidly changing developments show that India will have to withdraw its networks from Afghanistan in future. To what extent, India has been creating lawlessness in Afghanistan by using Afghan soil for terrorist activities against Pakistan as well as Iran could be judged from the fact that on January 16, three foreign ministers of Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan committed to non-interference in the internal affairs of each country, ensuring that their territories were not used for activities detrimental to each other�€™s interests.

On January 29 this year, in their final communique, world leaders of the London Conference agreed on a timetable for the handover of security duties to the Afghan forces in late 2010, while backing Afghan President Hamid Karzai�€™s plan to reintegrate the willing Taliban to pursue political goals peacefully. In this context, sources suggest that dialogue with the Afghan Taliban has already started through some backdoor channels.

While India was interested in the training of Afghan security forces, and was covertly making strenuous efforts in that respect, but no country in the London Conference considered New Delhi�€™s case. On the other side, Pakistan�€™s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi has remarked that Islamabad was ready to train Afghan forces on is own soil. In fact, Afghanistan and Pakistan share common geographical, historical, religious and cultural bonds. So Islamabad�€™s case of training the Afghan forces is stronger than that of New Delhi which is only manipulating the phenomenon of regional terrorism against Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Moreover, Pakistan�€™s successful Swat-Malakand and Waziristan military operations have surprised the US-led western countries as our armed forces dismantled the command and control system of the Taliban militants within some months. They did in eight months what the US-led NATO forces could not do in Afghanistan in more than eight years. In this regard, while praising Pakistan�€™s security forces, western high officials insisted upon New Delhi to observe restraint in connection with its war-mongering style. It is due to these developments that the US and European countries have donated million of dollars for the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

It is owing to these new developments in relation of Pakistan and Afghanistan that while applauding Islamabad�€™s role against terrorism, President Obama and other high officials of America have openly been saying that they badly need Pakistan for war on terror.

It is mentionable that in the State of the Union address, the US President Obama has repeatedly said that American combat troops will begin a phased withdrawal from Afghanistan from July 2011. Nonetheless, after bearing major losses like cost of war, amounting to more than 6 trillion dollars, financial crisis and domestic pressure, US strongly supports process of reintegration�€”peace and reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban with the sole aim of leaving that country in accordance with the announced schedule.

Meanwhile, although the US-led coalition has started the operation, Moshtarak(Together), the largest offensive military operation since the in 2001 in the Helmand province of Afghanistan, yet it is also part of American fast exit strategy from Afghanistan.

If US-led NATO forces pull out of Afghanistan, Indian influence will be eliminated by the Taliban insurgency. As a result New Delhi will have to retreat from Afghanistan, rolling back its anti-Pakistan agenda.

Sajjad Shaukat writes on international affairs and is author of the book: US vs Islamic Militants, Invisible Balance of Power: Dangerous Shift in International Relations. Email: sajjad_logic@yahoo.com

Kashmir Watch :: In-depth coverage on Kashmir conflict

 

[Fighter488]

AFGHANISTAN- WHAT INDIA SHOULD EXPECT AND WHAT IT SHOULD DO | Hard News

AFGHANISTAN- WHAT INDIA SHOULD EXPECT AND WHAT IT SHOULD DO​

Vikram Sood, the former RAW chief explains the situation in Afghanistan and also puts forth the options available to India


Afghanistan has been at the cross roads of great empires and thus a scene for frequent/brutal conflict but never under the control of any outside power for long.

In the last 30 years Afghanistan has seen the effects of a Communist takeover promising liberation from feudalism and assuring equality, a religious bigoted group establishing itself spearheaded by US led Islamic zeal, followed by the US attempts to give the hapless country liberty and equality. Today we once again see the return of the Taliban and the US eager to negotiate with the same ideology and the same people they wanted to overthrow in 2001. There are many who say that this is actually a display of ethnic nationalism under the guise of a religious movement.

Situation in Afghanistan is a very complex one with a number of actors - internal and external, conflicting interests and capabilities. It is not likely to change in the next few years.

■This includes the various ethnic nationalities of Afghanistan.
■The warlords and their vested interests in the production and smuggling of narcotics, and arms.
■Corruption alone is a US $ 2 billion industry. A weak government in Kabul without any viable succession option visible.
■Its inability to exercise any control outside Kabul is well known. It has weak army and law enforcement machineries; their growth is hindered by factors of corruption and local ethnic interests. Attempts to establish an ANA and ANP have been slow and arduous.
■Most importantly, there is more than one group operating inside Afghanistan and many from Pakistani soil.
There are a number of external players and their own interests. The US and its allies want to make US free of any terrorism emanating from Afghanistan which is a threat to them and their allies. To do this they rely on Pakistan whose interests are different from the American interests and whose co-operation is less than forthcoming. Having made Pakistan totally indispensible to their cause, US has allowed Pakistan to play the spoiler. Pakistan, obsessed with India, has assumed that the control of Kabul slipping into the hands of the Taliban and that the Taliban being under their control would leave them in an advantageous position vis-a-vis India. The Pak establishment has endeavoured, successfully so far, to keep India out of any international arrangement aimed at solving the Afghan tangle.

That being so, a solution to the problem is equally difficult.

There are several kinds of insurgencies afloat in Afghanistan since 2002.

The Quetta Shura in South and Eastern Afghanistan . Sirajuddin Haqqani in Pakhtia, Pakhtika, Jalalabad . Salafis of Hayatullah in Kunnar and Nooristan. Hizb- e-Islami of Hikmetyar but have now mostly been fighting under the banner of Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban, their own sub groups according to region and clan, and their various associates from the LeT , JeM, SSP, LJ. And then, there is the Al Qaeda.

For the present Pakistan may exult. It presumes that the inevitable and hopefully substantial departure of the US/NATO would leave it with the much sought after strategic depth.

It is difficult to predict if and when the US will change its decades old policy of pardoning Pakistan all its transgressions. What we need to take into account is that one of these days the US will carry out its much vaunted but ridiculously inadequate much delayed surge, declare mission accomplished and thin out. Its long-term policies are dictated by election year compulsions. Once the coalition forces begin to pull out a few things will inevitably happen as other interests try to fill the empty spaces. It is a retreat by another name. It is different from the Vietnam quagmire because the Vietnamese did not come after the Americans for vengeance. The Afghans will. Istanbul and London are the markers for the retreat. Although US may put whatever spin it may want to.

Pakistan will naturally assume that its moment has come again and it could now acquire its much dreamt strategic depth, throw the Indians out and be the overlord in Afghanistan.

■The Iranians are unlikely to remain idle spectators as a Sunni Wahabi neighbour is going to be an unsettling factor for them.
■Saudi Arabia on the other hand would want a Wahabi regime in Afghanistan that would check the Iranians and hopefully also keep the anti-Saudi extremists in Afghanistan.
■The Chinese have already begun to move in with their commercial and resource interests into Afghanistan as they would see an opportunity to move closer to the Persian Gulf, given their steady relations with the Iranians. The Chinese would see themselves moving into empty spaces up to the Persian Gulf vacated by a retreating American empire without having fired a bullet and lost a man. They also need to keep the Islamist extremists away from sensitive areas like Xinjiang so their presence in Afghanistan and image might be an insurance against the marauding extremists.
■The Central Asian Republics and Russia have their concerns about the dangers of Talibanised ideology spreading into their countries. Russia is realigning; so is Japan..
■Finally, the absence of a strong centralised authority will only create more confusion in a country that has been run on drug money and foreign doles.
■Pakistan's exultation may be temporary. Unable to control its own territory it is unlikely to be able to run Afghanistan in the way it may want to. It does not have the resources to do so and the US, hopefully, may not sub lease Afghanistan to Pakistan this time. The other very real danger is that the Pushtuns on both sides of the Durand Line, joined together in a common fight for decades, may well ask if they fought all these years only to end up being minorities in both countries. The departure of the Coalition Forces will only add to the instability of the region and India needs to prepare itself for this eventuality.

It is an accepted fact of history that the Taliban were the creation of Pakistan. But what is not known today is the degree of control Pakistan exercises on the Taliban.

Either way it is feared that there will be a destabilising effect on PK. One would doubt if the Pashtun/Taliban will rest after assuming power in Afghanistan. A victorious Taliban in Kabul is less likely to accept the Durand Line.

Rahimullah Yusufzai in a recent article in the News (February 2, 2010) made this very astute observation when he said that the "Return of the Afghan Taliban to power whether by force or some peace process, would definitely raise the spirits of the Pakistani Taliban and likeminded jihadis and thus lead to fallout on the situation in Pakistan." He added that "There is bound to be fallout on Pakistan when the world's most powerful armies are involved in the longest war in the US and NATO history in neighbouring Afghanistan. And the fallout is to be expected because the US and NATO consider Afghanistan and Pakistan's tribal areas as theatres of the same war and have thus deliberately named their strategy to deal with the challenge as ******."

If the Taliban succeed in Afghanistan then one can expect a repeat of what happened in India after the retreat of the Soviets from Afghanistan. There will be far too many of unemployed jihadis in Pakistan who would want to continue their jihad.

The status of the Afghan army and the police

The dilemma is that losing is not an option for the US; stalemate is strategic defeat for a superpower; troop augmentation to the extent required is unacceptable, and even a surge of 40000 is difficult. The much talked of Afghan army is still a ghost army. Ann Jones in her report in the Nation (Sep 21, 2009) had described the Afghan Army as a figment of Washington's imagination. It does not exist in the numbers claimed, it is untrained, many of the recruits/trainees are repeats who come back with new names for the money, the food and the equipment they can take away and sell. It is a frightening thought to have a man trained with rubber guns for three weeks, then given the real gun and sent off to fight battles for his country.

This became apparent when the Helmand campaign began last July and the ANA could muster only 600 men, far short of the 90000 that are supposed to be enlisted. The hope that Afghanistan will suddenly have an efficient 134000 strong army in two years is very much a false hope. What should worry Washington is that there have been reports of demoralisation and self-doubts among some sections of the US forces. The state of the Afghan police is even worse with 60% suspected to be on drugs. Ill equipped and ill trained, they are easy pickings for the Taliban. No wonder Pakistan will continue to hedge its bets with the Taliban, targeting only those that they see threatening them. They are aware also that NATO countries may not be able last out in Afghanistan much beyond 2010.

There are many Afghans who do not see the Taliban as necessarily bigoted or evil; they see the possibility of a more rational Taliban regime once the US has left.

Striking deals with the Taliban
It is presumed that some kind of a deal will be attempted in the months ahead. Mullah Omar will accept to negotiate only after the US /NATO leave. If the US objective is to get rid of foreign militants then the Taliban may be more willing to talk. But the trust deficit is huge.

The Afghan/Pashtun/Taliban fear is that the surge and augmentation of ANA/ANP would eventually mean more targets, more damage more explosions - more deaths and destruction. This would be a part of the surge.

All indications are that the US/NATO will commence withdrawal/disengagement around mid-2011. It is necessary for us to think of the post-US situation. The West had made it their business 8 years ago to get rid of Al Qaeda and Taliban from Afghanistan to make America and its friends safe. Today, they rationalise and prepare for a dignified exit by saying that Al Qaeda is not really in Afghanistan while the Taliban are a reality, so the world must deal with this reality.

There are talks of good/moderate Taliban and the hardcore/bad Taliban. These are essentially rationalisations to set the new discourse. Moderate Taliban or those who will be weaned away from the main Taliban and may not have the authority to deliver what they promise. It is doubtful, if Taliban would strike a deal with the US under pressure from the Pakistanis on terms that are more favourable to the Taliban than to Mullah Omar. Attempts to divide the Taliban have essentially failed. In India we should stop post-event rationalisations on behalf of the Americans.

Options to Pakistan
One sees a new mood in Islamabad post Istanbul and London. A new mood of assertiveness, self confidence and aggression is visible in Kayani's statements and Qureshi's choreographed obduracy prior to the talks and collective theatrics afterwards. Pakistan will up its demands with Washington in the months ahead. For India it will do likewise. The cue this time will be water. Pakistan will buy additional insurance for itself in Afghanistan while keeping its options in India open and up the ante in Kashmir. This will be to provoke an Indian reaction and get out of having to take sterner action against the Taliban in Balochistan and Afghanistan.

■One can expect the following in the next few months from Pakistan:
■Intefada type protests in Kashmir
■Provocations to keep Indian Army engaged yet seek their withdrawal
■Terrorism in the rest of India.
■One can expect continued terrorist attacks in Afghanistan against Indians and Indian assets to frighten away India from Afghanistan since persuasion through the US has not succeeded.
■Water will be the issue that will be used to unite the people against India as the temperature in Kashmir is raised.
■Consolidate in Afghanistan by making itself a party to any negotiations that the Americans may have with the Taliban, so that Pakistan remains in control
■Insulate and preserve India-specific terrorist organisations for use from time to time.
■Talk to India which would be showcased as a favour to the US

What should India do

■Indian primary interest is to prevent Pakistan from using Afghanistan as a base for terrorist activity in India.
■The other interest is to seek access to Central Asia through Afghanistan and Iran, since Pakistan will not oblige.
■It would be self defeating to withdraw from Afghanistan at this juncture after the attack in Kabul because this is what the Pakistanis want India to do. India must therefore continue with its present policy of providing infrastructure and financial assistance to the Karzai government something which has earned India tremendous goodwill in that country.
■It is hoped that by staying on and continuing this assistance under greater safety guarantees from the Afghan government could help strengthen Karzai's hands.
■India needs to develop contacts/strengthen them as the case maybe with all sections in Afghanistan, with different power centres and ethnic groups, including the Pashtun and the Taliban too.
■Russia, China, the Central Asian Republics and Iran are all extremely wary of the spread of Wahabi Islam and its destabilising consequences. These are the other interested regional powers with whom India must seek common ground to address common problems

 

[Super Falcon]

hahahahhahaahhhahahaha indians willl be kicked by afghans in future for sure

 

[ajpirzada]

i see some intense debate going on in india on their fate in afghanistan. this is not less interestin than a game of chess.

all i wish is taliban somehow come to the negotiating table and accept the democratic process which is the only way to insure peoples say.

the issue also is that we cannot simply ignore taliban as they are a major force (good or evil it doesnt really matter as of now). however if talibans come back, this does not grantee any soft depth to pakistan. taliban dont see us as a dependable ally any more. also with them indifferent to militants from china, they might provide them refuge and hence affect pak china relationship in the long run. Furthermore if any other incident like 9/11 happens in western world then that will be the last card on the deck for pakistan doesnt matter who is involved in it. only possible gain of pakistan will be limited indian influence but that comes with a lot of risk.

not many can see but here we have got a win win situation for everyone including india and that is the political integration of taliban even if americans have to leave. talibans should be made to agree either by ISI or anyone else that they have to cut their ties with al qaeda. a gud sign in this regard is that mullah omar has mentioned that he will not be of any threat to any country. system of democracy in line with that of iranian can be worked out where mullah omar can be made supreme leader with ceremonial powers while making sure that democracy doesnt die.

any ideas and viewpoints are more than welcome

 

[lemurian]

not many can see but here we have got a win win situation for everyone including india and that is the political integration of taliban even if americans have to leave.

Power sharing is definitely a probable outcome. Can u elaborate on how the integration of Taliban is a win-win situation (for India)? As far as i know India's position is ruthlessly Anti-Taliban. I don't think either country will sacrifice its interests.