"...the principle is equally applicable in case of the Baluch insurgency."
Not with an open coastline of hundreds of miles it isn't. Further, there's more than principle at play when tribal forces like Bahadur and Nazir contribute their weight to the insurgency. Nevermind Haqqani and Hekmatyar's networks.
Baluch tribes in Afghanistan, however, remain unsuggested as sources of such support in any amounts whatsoever, much less to the degree we see routinely otherwise coming into Afghanistan from Pakistan.
Your thoughts constitute speculation for a domestic audience in hopes of dissemblance. Were your case so compelling you'd have your answer in the court of global opinion if satisfaction couldn't be derived from America.
The coastline would only have an impact in terms of hostile entities or other Baluch population centers supporting the insurgency, and barring India there is no other with the capability or motive to utilize the coastline for those purposes. That section of the Arabian Sea is also amongst the most heavily patrolled regions in the world, which makes sea based support for the insurgency unlikely.
Afghanistan shares a border and possesses the motive and the resources, has provided sanctuary and support in the past to Baluch insurgencies. The involvement of the Indians significantly increases the impact on the insurgency than Afghanistan alone.
And back to Afghanistan, the reports indicating large flows of drugs and weapons across the Iranian and Central Asian States represent the same argument that your 'coastline in Balcuhistan' does - namely that material support for the Afghan Taliban, and subsequently the Pakistani Taliban, flows across quite a few borders, not just the Pakistani one.
"'Reportedly' says it all. No evidence to validate that 'reported' assertion."
Actually it doesn't. "UNCLASSIFIED" says it all. Much is left unsaid in open sources.
In other words, since 'Much is left unsaid', perhaps he'll blame invaders from the Planet X!
Speculative tripe, and you know it. There is no evidence, classified or otherwise. Petraeus's comments said much the same thing - 'only one unambiguous case' of an alleged tip off from someone in the ISI prior to a raid.
"Can also be re-written as, 'Pakistan's insurgency is cleary supported from Afghanistan' - per the analysis from Pakistan."
It COULD but that's not how McChrystal's assessment is written. That, however, is EXACTLY what shall transpire once Pakistan has seen the taliban back into power in Afghanistan.
You're next sure as the sun rises in the east.
I forelornly await reading this mythical "analysis" from your army.
I was not referring to McChrystal re-writing that - merely pointing out that the evidence on the Pakistani side supports that particular 'role reversal'.
And Pakistan is not trying to 'see the Taliban back into power in Afghanistan'. That is pure dissemblance ala Haas - Pakistan's position has been clear - include the reconcilable factions of the Taliban in the government. Richard Haas would do well to first listen to and understand the PA's official position on Afghanistan before clinging to conspiracy theories based on an obsolete concept.
And that analysis, of the Pakistani Taliban being supported from Afghanistan, is not 'mythical' - that position has been argued for a few years now by Musharraf, the GoP and military leadership. Do pay attention.
"The incidents in Bajaur and elsewhere where hundreds of Afghan based Taliban crossed the border to assault Pakistani positions and join the Pakistani Taliban in resisting GoP operations testify to that."
Any insurgent army would do so if its sources of sustenence and sanctuary were endangered. For once, that was the case. You'll see FAAAR more of the same when/if you finally enter the Islamic Emirate of Waziristan.
Fortuately, it wasn't sustainable. That will change though if we leave.
One 'source of sustenance and sanctuary' - as the report I posted indicates, the level of violence and the insurgency in Afghanistan did not notice any significant drop despite Bajaur no longer serving as the sort of Taliban stronghold SW and NW are currently.
"If it is not a destabilizing presence, then the need for 'strategic depth' does not arise."
I don't find McChrystal's assessment to be the bollocked product of an "armchair" warrior but your attempt to dissemble misses fully half of the equation that governs "strategic depth". Somehow lost in your critique is the GoP's clear ambition to project pashtu nationalist ambitions away from the Punjab and onto Afghanistan.
That remains an overarching objective of your army's national security strategy.
Oh! BTW, the editorial is written by Richard N. HAASS.
Becoming dyslexic? I was referring to Haas's commentary on 'strategic depth', not McChrystal's, being the reason for Pakistan opposing US troop increases in Afghanistan, despite some of the rationale behind PA reservations being voiced publicly.
Where is this 'clear ambition', where are the signs of pursuing 'strategic depth'? They remain mythical products of minds seeking to concoct excuses for US failures and find scapegoats.
Your 'project Pashtun nationalist ambitions into Afghanistan' is an inherently flawed concept (and is in fact related to my discussion with Post Colonial a few days ago - his argument was that the US was interested in bolstering Pashtun Nationalism in Afghanistan to consolidate Afghanistan).
The concept is flawed since an Afghanistan that has as its identity Pashtun nationalism will in fact be a threat to Pakistan in terms of 're-uniting the Pashtun'. Pakistan's interests are in fact best served with an Afghanistan recognizes its multi-ethnic roots and diversity with the different ethnicities sharing power.
