K,
"my friend S-2 has mentioned somewhere else that the US has no choice but to become a "occupying force" and side-step the karzai govt..."
I don't know where I said such but, if so, it won't happen. We're trapped by our rhetoric of "building democratic institutions". That rhetoric is embedded not only with Afghans but our other allies as well.
"...in the long-term, the COIN will need to provide security, infrastructure, justice to ALL the people of afghanistan and not just the urban areas."
This is correct though it has less to do with being an "occupying force" which side-steps the Karzai regime than sheer numbers. I don't know the true quality of the Iraqi army but it's reasonable to suggest that it's likely better than the Afghan Army. Secondly, the demographics of Iraq permitted us to marry a U.S. rifle platoon with that of an Iraqi platoon in a COP somewhere within Iraq's urban sprawl and achieve far greater "bang per buck" than would be possible in Afghanistan.
Regardless of accuracy to population figures, there's little denying the uniformly rural character of Afghanistan. All one needs for such is to add together the total population of Afghanistan's fifty largest cities to see how many people are left out.
A lot.
If so, that suggests we may not cover enough of the nation to matter. I've suggested that the inter-connecting LOCs may be rendered vulnerable by such. It IS only a suggestion and remains incumbent upon my hypothesis about pop. demographics. That, though, must be contrasted by McChrystal's actual plan. Of that, I've no knowledge and may be reaching in my assessment...
...or not. Just don't know. I LIKE the idea but am dissatisfied with our ability to meaningfully implement such until I know much more-to include whether 40,000 more troops are deployed, in what configuration, and to where exactly.