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I have been Pakistan's best friend: Mullen

Mullen is correct, despite all the pressure he has still supported pak, however we must look at this from both sides now, We forced the Pakistani's into the war on terror otherwise pakistan would have been bombed to the stone age.
 
China's geopolitical strategic interests align with Pakistan's, so that's not an issue.................

............... for the time being. Who knows what tomorrow brings? Maybe China can be persuaded at the required time if needed.
 
............... for the time being. Who knows what tomorrow brings? Maybe China can be persuaded at the required time if needed.

Let's leave the future for the future, & look at the present, there are many pressing issues as of now.
 
Ok. so now we understand that Mullen or someone else, it's not what's important - what's important is US policy and how it impacts Pakistan.

R3 says with US policy perception is reality -- so what is the perception of Pakistan and how can Pakistan shape that perception, after all what is Pakistan's narrative, what is Pakistan's point of view, Why is it valid, why should Americans or any other buy in to it??

I encourage you to think along these lines - simply responding to every new accusation, every new charge, is counter productive - Pakistan must sell it's narrative first and foremost to it's own people but it must account for a worldwide audience and it must service this audience.

Why is Pakistan involved against extremism and militancy (read anti terrorism effort)?
What is Pakistan's strategy to counter extremism and militancy in Pakistan and around the world?
What legal framework has Pakistan created to execute this policy?
What are the challenges Pakistan faces in implementing their strategy?
Who are the good guys? WHY are these the good guys?
Who are the bad guys? WHY are these the bad guys?
Who are Pakistan's first tier, second tier and third tier partners in this effort? What criteria allows for their classification?
What is the framework for US Pakistan relationship? Is there or OUGHT there be a relationship with the US security establishment?? WHY?

Any winning narrative must explain the "WHY" otherwise people simply will not accept it.
 
Pakistan is as an-all-weather friend with China (& vice versa) as they can be, but of course, everyone looks after their strategic & national interests before friendship.

Not really, nothing is as black and white in politics, heck nothing is as black and white in our daily lives. Sometimes, the friendship IS the strategic interest for which you have to overlook material gain. Pak-China friendship and relations are of that sort where friendship is more important than what can be gained momentarily.

Think of it like the old story of shortsightedness we read back in grade school. A man gets his hand on a golden egg laying hen. Hen lays one golden egg everyday. At first its good but then he realizes why not kill the hen and take all the golden eggs out at once? So he does, rips the hen open, finds two or three golden eggs and thats it. The hen is dead and he's obtained his momentary strategic interest, but in future he won't ever be able to get the golden egg.
 
Mullen is correct, Pakistan has gotten it's wish to gain influence in Afghanistan at the cost of your own civilians by supporting militant groups, The Taliban will have to be apart of the future government of Afghanistan, however we must look at this from both sides now, We forced the Pakistani's into the war on terror otherwise pakistan would have been bombed to the stone age.
 
Interesting article:

Pakistan-US relationship post Mullen:

Speaking before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on Afghanistan and Iraq on September 22, US Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen appeared to have finally declared publicly his failure to cultivate a relationship for the past four years. He admitted this freely, but it must have been painful to have been betrayed. At times his was the lonely voice on the Capitol Hill asking for time and patience while his colleagues in the Pentagon, the CIA and even in the usually soft-on-Pakistan State Department were outraged. Mullen will be retiring in the end of the month. He was so hurt that he declined to make a farewell visit to Pakistan. His last meeting with the Pakistani military was in Savile, Spain, when he met army Chief Gen. Asfaq Parvez Kayani, and informed him to take definitive action against the Haqqani clique fighters/terrorists. Kayani, of course declined saying Pakistan’s action depended on their assessment.

Mullen described the Haqqani Network as “a strategic arm of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)”, responsible for the September 13 attack on the US Embassy in Kabul, and the June 28 truck bomb attack on the Inter-Continental Hotel in Kabul that killed five Afghans and injured another 96 people 77 of whom were American soldiers. Mullen also was clear in his statement that the Pakistani government supported the Mullah Omar’s (Taliban) Quetta Sura and the Haqqani Network both “actively and passively” hampering possibilities, and frustrating US-Pakistan relations. It is the sentiment of Mullen and the phrases that he used, that hang heavy. Mullen did not mention the assassination of Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani in Kabul’s high security zone in September 20 perhaps, because, clear evidence yet to emerge. The assassination of Rabbani was a huge blow to the Afghan peace process. Rabbani, a Tajik, and President of the Afghan Taliban government from 1992-96, was appointed by President Hamid Karzai at the head of the High Peace Council (HPC) for the Peace and Reconciliation process. His was one right choice, and one of the few prudent decisions made by President Karzai. Rabbani had connection with both the Pushtuns on the one hand and the Northern Alliance Tajik and Uzbek descendents on the other, although the alliance group leader Dr. Abdullah Abdullah and many in Karzai’s remain opposed to sharing power with the Taliban. Rabbani was also opposed to foreign troops and American bases in Afghanistan, but may have agreed to their retention for some time beyond 2014 to train Afghan National Army (ANA) troops. Rabbani and his HCP members were already in touch with the Quetta Shura emissaries. The Afghan government appears to shocked and directionless at the present. If the aim of Rabbani’s assassination was to derail the peace process, it has been successful to a great extent.

Pakistan’s response to Mullen’s charges, to say the least is, historic! Pakistani Prime Minister Yusaf Raza Gilani responded (Sept. 23) “They (the US) can’t live with us. They cannot live without us .... so, I would say to them if they cannot live without us, they should increase contacts with us to remove misunderstandings”. Gilani also advised the US to refrain from making statements unacceptable to the Pakistan people, and Pakistan should not compromise its sovereignty (referring to the Osama bin Laden episode of May 02) .

These words are certainly not that of the civilian government of Pakistan which is solely dependent on American aid and aid received from other international groups over which the US has a decisive say. The strategic calculation to trap the US in a Catch-22 situation is that of the Pakistan army.

Kayani had recently saved the civilian government from an army coup when a large number of corps commanders had proposed removal of the present government due to number of failures, and particularly the Karachi violence which was threatening the national integrity. Unlike Gen. Parvez Musharraf, Kayani is not garrulous, but quiet and calculative and keeps his thoughts to himself. For Kayani, the civilian government is an excellent foil internationally.

The US have little other option but to strategize differently or, as Admn. Mullen said “not to disengage with Pakistan ..... frame a new relationship”. Without using the words Prime Minister Gilani told them you cannot bomb us to the “stone age”, you cannot dictate us unilaterally, and a Vietnam may be awaiting you in Afghanistan.

Of course, Pakistan army finds itself in an advantageous position now. At least, that is its perception. But with the country’s very limited resources how far can it go and for how long? Saudi Arabia is a staunch supporter of Pakistan in more ways than one, but it is also dependent on the USA to protect it from Iran, stabilize the Gulf region, and keep its oil and trade shipping lines open. Saudi assistance will come nevertheless. That leaves China. As early as 1996, Chinese President Jiang Zemin, in his address to the Pakistani parliament, had warned America to keep away from the region, especially from Pakistan. China remains Pakistan’s main weapons supplier, including nuclear weapons technology. It wants to use Pakistan’s army to keep the US away from Pakistan and Afghanistan as this ranks high in Beijing’s security concerns. Yet Beijing does not want to be seen as a supporter of Pakistan and terrorism against Washington. China’s stakes with the US is far higher than its limited stakes with Pakistan. Chinese senior leaders are already rushing to Pakistan to deliberate on the Pak-US crisis. It is also not in Beijing’s interest if the Pak-US stand-off went out of hand. But a Pakistan preventing US influence incursion in the ****** region is a huge strategic bonus to China.

There is a perception from some of Pakistan’s leading press that people are against the machinations of the authorities with terrorists, Islamic extremists and the “strategic depth” policy in Afghanistan. These voices are a small minority among Pakistan’s policy elite. But a study done by the Jinnah Institute of Pakistan sponsored by the US Institute of Peace (USIP), reflecting the views of “Pakistan’s Policy Elite “ as the study claims, demolishes all such liberal thinking.

The policy elite projects the following three positions in Afghanistan (i) Kabul government that is not hostile to Pakistan (ii) an inclusive government in Afghanistan with adequate Pushtun representation, and the main Afghan Taliban factions-particularly Mullah Omar’s group and the Haqqani Network, and (iii) Limited Indian presence for development activities only which cannot manipulate the Afghan government.

Each of these points are flawed. To have a friendly government in Kabul, Islamabad must pursue a positive policy. Basically, there is a lack of trust, some deep and some not so deep, about Pakistan among the Afghans.

Pakistan army’s “strategic depth” policy actually aims to make Afghanistan a vassal state of Pakistan. Even if Taliban returns to rule the country or gets a major say in the Kabul government, they would resist on issues. They did so when they were in power between 1992-2001. The erstwhile Northern Alliance fought the Pakistan army supporting the Taliban during this period. One of their leaders, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah has made his opposition to and distrust of both the Taliban and Pakistan abundantly clear.

In formulating the “inclusive government” system in Kabul, Pakistan’s policy elite failed to get out of the old rut. There is absolutely no new thinking. About 40 percent of the Afghan population does not find a representation, leading to a suspicion if they are making a disguised proposal to divide Afghanistan. The aim is for a Pakistan selected Afghan government which would not be acceptable either in Afghanistan or internationally.

Limiting Indian presence in Afghanistan may not be the best of options. The people of India and Afghanistan have enjoyed historical, cultural and trade relations. India enjoys the highest acceptance among foreigners in Afghanistan, maintains strong political links. India has concentrated on development work like infrastructure, hospitals and education. It wisely kept away from the war and also maintains warm relations with Central Asian countries bordering Afghanistan, also maintains good relations with Iran where also New Delhi is involved infrastructural work. Pakistan cannot dictate the foreign policy of a neighbour. The concept of the Pakistani policy elite is just not workable because it lacks vision and fails to offer a solution worthy even consideration among the stake holders in Afghanistan.

Washington has to put together a new Pakistan policy that has a singular purpose to eradicating terrorism as a whole in the region. It is no secret that the US has multiple interest in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but it must realise that if it cannot resolve the issue of terrorism positively, its other pursuits will remain beyond reach.

Washington’s Pakistan policy tradition is remarkable in its ability to arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons and missiles and rear terrorism. Even in this period, as US Embassy cables brought out by Wikileaks reveal, the US was very much aware of China’s clandestine nuclear weapons components and technology transfer to Pakistan. This concealment and non-action has further helped sophistication of Pakistani nuclear arsenal. The dangerous region was made more dangerous yet. This, eventually, as happened always, will counter American interests. And the Chinese, who anyway treat international treaties and agreements with disdain, are sitting happily. Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal must be taken into account in considering the overall security of the region as the stand-off between Pakistan has never been so sharp, acrimonious and on the knife-edge.

President Barack Obama’s ****** policy lacked determination. His time table to withdraw troops from Afghanistan was against the advice of his military commanders. The shaky approach did more harm than good for the morale of the troops. Wars cannot be fought and won in a time table, and certainly not with an eye to elections. America’s hurry to get out of Afghanistan spread like influenza virus to the other NATO partners.

Pakistan’s astute army Chief Gen. Kayani seized the moment. He first tested the ground by disrupting NATO military supplies through Pakistan to Afghanistan. The alternate route tried by the NATO through Russia is not efficient enough and Pentagon certainly does not want to become totally dependent on Russia for other political reasons. Sensing this opportunity the Pakistan backed Taliban stepped up its attacks inside Afghanistan, supplemented by the Haqqani Network. Targeted killing of senior Afghan leaders perceived to be uncomfortable to Pakistan’s goal began to be assassinated. At least six of them have been killed this year.

It is clear now that the ISI is not a rogue organization, nor are there rogue elements in the ISI involved in terrorism. It is a solid organization of the state responsible to the army chief only. The ISI has acted more as terrorist sponsoring organization, and an organization involved in assassination within the country. The various administrations in Washington are fully aware of this, but opted to appease its far narrow interests. The Americans cannot declare the ISI a terrorist entity because they have to deal with it. Basically, Pakistan ISI terrorism has been legitimised.

Pakistan and the USA are trying to stare down each other. Pakistan has created a national consensus against the US. Ground attack inside Pakistan’s territory is no longer a viable option for the US army. Things will have to start from scratch and, to Pakistan’s perception, the US will start with a handicap. If there are military scuffles, Pakistan is likely open a front against India to complicate the entire situation.

The only option left for Obama is to pull out all stops, forget about elections, and show to his people he completed with honour what America had started in the interest of the world. Winston Churchill is remembered more for bringing Britain victorious in World War-II than losing the post-war election. Tempers are being cooled by both sides. But this is only temporary.

USA’s Pak Strategy Blown - A New Round of Challenges for the Region
 
We have lighted earlier the problem of civil/military relations in the US - for more than ten years the DoD has been running the affairs that the State Department is usually responsible for - the net result has been that the US is a less free country and it's standing in the world has fallen - only a strong US President can reset this imbalance, however, so destabilized is the internal political situation in the US, that it is unlikely a strong Presidency focused on the revival of the US can emerge in such a destabilized political environment


White House refuses to endorse Mullen’s claims
By Anwar Iqbal



WASHINGTON: The White House refused on Wednesday to endorse Admiral Mike Mullen’s description of Pakistan’s links with the Haqqani network, saying that it would “not use the language” that the US military chief had used.

Admiral Mullen told a Senate hearing last week that the Haqqani network of terrorists was “a veritable arm” of the ISI and that the Pakistani intelligence agency had directed its attacks on US targets inside Afghanistan.

“Is the Haqqani network a veritable arm of the ISI? Yes or no?” White House spokesman Jay Carney was asked at a regular briefing.

“It’s not language I would use. I think that the fact that there are links that exist between the Pakistani government and the Haqqani network — the nature of those can be assessed and is complicated. But there is no question that they have safe havens in Pakistan,” the White House official responded.

“So it’s not the position of the Obama administration that the Haqqani network is a veritable arm of the ISI?” he was asked again.

“It is the position of the administration that there are links and that Pakistan needs to take action to address that and to deal with the fact that there are safe havens for this criminal network that is dangerous for Pakistan as well as for the United States and Afghanistan,” Mr Carney said.

“But not a veritable arm of the ISI?” he was asked.

“I think it’s a matter of semantics… you’re trying — on the language here. I think I’m being quite clear about what our position is, which — and it’s a serious one. It’s one that we raise with our Pakistani counterparts regularly because it is of such great concern to us.”

“The White House official said the US had said unequivocally that the Haqqani network was responsible for the recent attack on the US embassy in Kabul and on Isaf headquarters in Kabul. But unlike Admiral Mullen, Mr Carney did not say that the ISI had directed those attacks.

Earlier, the US State Department rejected the suggestion that declaring the Haqqani network a terrorist organisation would also require the United States to declare Pakistan a sponsor of terrorism.

“If you designate the Haqqani network, those would be restrictions that would be placed on their financial activity in the United States, their travel in the United States, members of the Haqqani network. So it’s apples and oranges,” said the department’s spokesperson Victoria Nuland when asked about a possible link between the two designations.

But reports in the US on Wednesday insisted that one designation would automatically trigger the other because of Pakistan’s alleged link with the group. That’s why the US was reluctant to go for the Haqqani network although it has already put its senior leaders on its terrorist watch list.

While it’s not easy to assess the accuracy of these un-attributed links to the media, the Obama administration does seem divided between doves and hawks on Pakistan.

The hawks are apparently led by Vice President Joe Biden and a surprise addition to the group is that of Admiral Mike Mullen
who, until last week, was considered one of Islamabad’s key allies in Washington
.

The doves are apparently led by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who, although is concerned as others in the administration about the Haqqani network’s activities in Afghanistan, advocates a soft approach. And this is reflected in the statements that have come out of the State Department during the crisis that followed Admiral Mullen’s statement.

At the latest briefing, the department’s spokesperson was asked if the State Department actually believed that the ISI directed the Haqqani network.

“I’m not going to go any further than we’ve already gone, which is to say that we have serious concerns about the Haqqani network, we have to work on it together with the Pakistani government, and we are seeking collaboration, cooperation from all branches of the Pakistani government as we do that,” the spokesperson responded.

“The aid to Pakistan decisions are made with regard to our conversation with the government of Pakistan,” said the State Department official when asked pointedly if the US would stop aid to Pakistan if it designated the Haqqani network a terrorist organisation.

“We are continuing to review whether to designate” the Haqqani organisation. The US has told Pakistan that clamping down on the group “is job one, that we want to do it together, and that’s the conversation that we’re having now,” Ms Nuland added.
 
:ROFL Muse its just a translation problem.

Mullen: Is the ISI providing assistance and refuge to Haqquani? Yes.

Politician: Is the ISI providing assistance and refuge to Haqquani? Perhaps maybe well not in those terms not that we would put it that way for fear of offending Pakistan but the admistrations belief on the prepoderance of the evidenece is ....yes.
 
:ROFL Muse its just a translation problem.

Mullen: Is the ISI providing assistance and refuge to Haqquani? Yes.

Politician: Is the ISI providing assistance and refuge to Haqquani? Perhaps maybe well not in those terms not that we would put it that way for fear of offending Pakistan but the admistrations belief on the prepoderance of the evidenece is ....yes.


Ok, fair enough -- below is an editorial from the Hindu -

Published: September 29, 2011 00:28 IST | Updated: September 29, 2011 00:29 IST
Crisis in U.S.-Pakistan ties

The accusation by the United States that the Haqqani network is “a veritable arm” of the Inter-Services Intelligence seems to have hardly embarrassed Pakistan. Instead, following the pattern of defiance that it has shown since Osama bin Laden's killing, the Pakistan Army has made clear it will not subordinate its strategic interests to those of the U.S. But this new crisis in a rocky marriage may yet pass. The U.S. blames the Haqqani network, a faction of militants allied to the Afghan Taliban and based in the North Waziristan frontier region of Pakistan, for the recent attacks in Kabul. This includes the killing of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani and the attack on the U.S. Embassy some days before that. The July 2008 attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul was also traced to the Haqqani network. Islamabad is correct in saying it was the CIA that nurtured Jalaluddin Haqqani — the leader from whom the group takes its name — during the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan. But that is half the story. The Pakistan military's embrace of the CIA-Saudi-funded jihadists for its own goals in Afghanistan and against India is of no less relevance to the unending tragedy in the region. As the Pakistan security establishment prepares for the so-called end game in Afghanistan, it sees the Haqqani group as its best insurance policy against being sidelined — and importantly, against the rise of Indian influence over its western neighbour. The generals in Rawalpindi are confident that the superpower has no choice but to remain dependent on Pakistan to ensure a semblance of peace in Afghanistan and, by extension, in the whole region.

Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar's articulation of the message that the U.S. risks losing an ally with its allegations shows that even if the civilian dispensation is at variance with the security establishment, its political space is limited. Rightfully, the All Parties' Conference called by Prime Minister Syed Yousuf Raza Gilani should question the army's continuing links with militants and the internal risk this poses. But the track record of such initiatives, undertaken each time the Pakistan Army finds itself in hot water, shows that they end up endorsing the security establishment and its misguided strategies. Pakistan's ability to stand up to a superpower patron would have been admirable were its agenda clean. All this might be a source of anxiety to India, which depends to an extent on Pakistan's influential allies to force it to rein in groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba. Even so, New Delhi must work to discourage any precipitate action by Washington against Pakistan that may put the entire region at risk.
 
The generals in Rawalpindi are confident that the superpower has no choice but to remain dependent on Pakistan to ensure a semblance of peace in Afghanistan and, by extension, in the whole region

The one flaw in the armies thinking, yes peace and stability require to some extent going cap in hand to Kayani.

Bloody chaos how ever only requires the election of a tea party republican that says screw Pakistan, the troops are coming home. Seeing Pasha and Kayani keep telling the US only they can fix Afghanistan they are welcome to it.
 

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