The support given to Lashkar-e-Taiba by the Pakistani intelligence agency -- the Inter-Services Intelligence, or ISI -- serves as a case study for Haqqani. After the Mumbai massacre, Haqqani writes, Pakistan "initially denied any connection to the attack. Instead of trying to identify and punish terrorists, Pakistan focused on refuting reports of Pakistani complicity."
He says that the attack, which came in the final months of George W. Bush's presidency, lost Pakistan whatever official sympathy it previously had in Washington. No matter: Washington soon forgets, and Pakistan's military leaders can safely assume that they will pay no long-term price for supporting terrorism, Haqqani writes.
Soon after the bin Laden raid, the U.S. made an effort to test Pakistan's willingness to combat terrorism. Haqqani writes that two senior American officials visited Islamabad to propose a series of steps Pakistan could take to build confidence. They provided Pakistan with information about a bomb-making factory run by the Haqqani Network. (The Haqqanis of the Haqqani Network, a terrorist group, are not related to Husain Haqqani.)
Pakistan's military leaders "promised that the Pakistan army would send in troops to shut down the illicit factory that was manufacturing the IEDs," Haqqani writes. "A few days later the CIA sent time-stamped photographs showing the facility being dismantled hours before the army's arrival. The dismantling began after a man on a motorcycle went into the factory, thus leading to speculation that he had come to tip off the terrorists about the impending army operation."