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HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAM System Battery Radars

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HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAM System Battery Radars

Technical Report APA-TR-2009-1201


Dr Carlo Kopp, SMAIAA, MIEEE, PEng
John C. Wise, MBE, J.C. Wise and Associates
December 2009
Updated January 2010
Text © 2009, 2010 Carlo Kopp
Introduction
China's recent 60th Anniversary National Military Parade produced a number of interesting disclosures, including the first public viewing of the complete components of the HQ-9/FD-2000 and HQ-12/KS-1A SAM system batteries. While the HT-233 and H-200 phased array engagement radars have been well exposed previously, the parade did yield plentiful high resolution imagery providing a more accurate perspective on these important systems.

Much more interesting, however, was the first public exposure of three new self-propelled battery acquisition radars associated with these systems, the Type 120, Type 305A and the Type 305B. While two are derivatives or variants of existing acquisition radars, one is entirely new and hitherto unknown to Western analysts.

Another important observation is that all of the components of the HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAM systems are designed from the outset for hide, shoot and scoot operations, to maximise opportunities to evade SEAD/DEAD tasked aircraft. This is an important advance for the PLA IADS, which even a decade ago relied primarily on the static HQ-2 Guideline system, typically operated from fixed semi-hardened SAM sites. With the PLA IADS now replacing HQ-2 batteries with a mix of HQ-9, S-300PMU/PMU1/PMU2 and HQ-12, the SAM force has wholly transitioned to systems with excellent, if not exceptional mobility, by contemporary standards.

While the HQ-12 TEL has been displayed frequently in public, the HQ-9 TEL has until recently been known only from poor quality Chinese media imagery. High quality imagery shows a design closely modelled on the Russian S-300PM/PMU 5P85SU/SE TEL design, hosted on the Taian TAS-5380 8 x 8 chassis, itself a derivative of the MAZ-543 Uragan/Kashalot. An important difference is the absence of an automatically deployed and stowed telescoping radio datalink mast, requiring a two man crew to deploy or stow the TEL datalink mast. For rapid hide, shoot and scoot operations this will impact the repeatability of stow and deploy times.

Sources in Asia claim that HQ-9 battery components can be networked using fixed optical fibre cables, microwave directional line of sight links, or other RF datalinking channels1. However, until HQ-9 TELs and HT-233 engagement radars are equipped with organic telescoping or folding RF datalink antenna/mast systems, the full mobility of the basic self-propelled configurations employed will not be exploited. Retrofit of such technology, given the availability of extant Russian terminal hardware on 30N6E Tombstone and 5P85TE TELs, is not a challenging task in reverse engineering.
CONTINUES.....
HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAM System Battery Radars
 
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FD-2000 / HQ-9 SAM - China's Strategic ‘Game Changer’

Air Power Australia - Australia's Independent Defence Think Tank


Air Power Australia NOTAM
6th December, 2009



Modern Surface to Air Missile (SAM) systems are formidable area-denial weapons. They are the agile Kings on the checkerboard landscape. While one SAM battery searches and tracks, another shoots and guides. Others move to new locations, denying an enemy an effective attack. These systems are networked, and may use diverse frequencies to penetrate ‘stealth’ designs. They feature redundant elements, so if the enemy is lucky and destroys one element, others seamlessly take its place. The missiles are fast, high flying and deadly, with advanced guidance systems and high resistance to electronic jamming. To further confuse and deny an enemy a shot, realistic dummies and electronic decoys draw fire away from the real equipment.

China has joined the select club of countries that indigenously manufacture effective SAMs. Initially drawing on decades of Russian research, they have re-engineered the highly effective Russian S-300PMU or SA-20 system into the HQ-9. With many obsolete SAMs to replace, China has built a high-capacity production line, and is progressively replacing obsolete SAMs with new SAM systems.

The Chinese SAM replacement strategy will generate a ‘China Price’ for the HQ-9. Once the production facility cost is ‘written down’ to zero, and with the research and development costs greatly reduced by drawing from Russian intellectual property, new generation HQ-9 batteries will be sold relatively cheaply – perhaps half the cost of a Russian S-300PMU / SA-20 series SAM battery and a small fraction of the cost of a US built Patriot Battery.

China has an obvious vested interest in selling the HQ-9 abroad. In many places, it will build influence and dependence, and China may choose to provide area defence as part of a foreign aid package. In other places, China’s emerging search for raw material may require protection from air attack; area denial weapons are part of the required military capabilities. Sudan is a case-in-point1. Then there is the simple reality that good money can be made from selling advanced HQ-9s into a globalised market.

Thus, the Western democracies can expect a rapid proliferation of the HQ-9 to places where they would rather not have to counter such modern SAM systems.

The ongoing “Rise of China” shows every sign of being a zero-sum-game, as Western military capabilities progressively erode, China's progressively expand, with the trend in superior air defence capability moving to China.

The latest APA technical report by Dr Carlo Kopp and John Wise, which explores recently revealed Chinese military radars, shows that there is more that we do not know about China’s indigenous air defence weapons development program than we do know, but what we do know shows a rapid advance towards mastery of state-of-the-art SAM system technology. This study follows Dr Kopp’s recent technical report on the HQ-9 design2.

The Chinese 60th Anniversary military parade, held on the 1st October, 2009, is now producing fallout as Western analysts dissect the multitude of new systems publicly displayed for the first time. Surprise revelations included the launcher vehicles for the YJ-62 and CJ-10/DH-10 Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM), new ballistic missile hardware, and importantly, three new acquisition / search radars for China's indigenously manufactured HQ-9 and HQ-12 SAM systems.

The HQ-9, exported as the FD-2000, and the HQ-12, exported as the KS-1A, are both wholly manufactured in China, and largely designed by Chinese engineers, who as noted heavily exploited access to Russian technology during the 1990s.

The HQ-9 would qualify, in Pentagon-speak, as a ‘long range double digit SAM’, in fact much of the basic technology in this system was licensed from the Russians. The missile, the launchers, the vehicles, and the phased-array fire-control radar are all derived from Russian S-300PMU/PMU1, i.e. late model SA-10 and early model SA-20 technology. The effective range of this system is around 80 percent of the range of the first SA-20 variant, and is better than earlier US MIM-104 Patriot variants.

The radar makes use of all of the anti-jam design features the Russians cleverly built into the SA-10 and SA-20. One Asian source is claiming a basic Low Probability of Intercept capability for the radar, which would make it extremely difficult to detect and track by its microwave emissions. And the 8 x 8 and 10 x 10 vehicles used make it just as mobile as the latest Russian SAM designs, for highly survivable ‘hide, shoot and scoot’ operations.

The HQ-12 is a much shorter ranging system, intended to provide an inner layer defence, inside the footprint of the HQ-9. It is also mobile, and the radar looks to be based on much the same technology as the HQ-9, making it hard to detect, hard to track and hard to jam.

For all intents and purposes, the HQ-9 and HQ-12 are modern technology SAM systems, designed for contemporary high intensity conflicts.




The three new HQ-9 acquisition radars are the Type 120, Type 305A, and Type 305B, all self-propelled high mobility designs carried on licence built Mercedes-Benz NG 80 ‘North Benz’ heavy trucks – a wise decision that provides reliable transport with a low implementation and operating cost. Like the latest generation Russian designs, these radars are built to automatically stabilise on hydraulically deployed legs, and automatically unfold and elevate their antennas using hydraulic rams. The Chinese have yet to comment on deployment and stow times, but five minutes would be a reasonable estimate. In short, these are true ‘hide, shoot and scoot’ designs built for modern war-fighting.

The Type 305B is a variant of the established and relatively new YLC-2V battery acquisition radar, and appears to be the standard for the HQ-9 and HQ-12. This is a modern mechanically steered planar array with electronic beam-steering for height-finding. It is similar to a good number of US and EU radars in this category, but is built for greater mobility in the field, making it harder to engage and destroy.

The Type 120 appears to be entirely new, but substantially based on the recent JY-11B series. Like the Belarus Vostok D/E series, it uses a hydraulically elevated mast to increase low altitude coverage. Interestingly, this design appears to operate in the L-band, unlike the earlier JY-11B, which it otherwise resembles. This change is clearly intended to improve detection range against stealth aircraft and cruise missiles, most of which are difficult to detect at operationally useful ranges in the S-band.

The most interesting of the trio is the Type 305A, which Kopp and Wise assess to be most likely an S-band AESA based the same technology used in the KJ-2000 AWACS and KJ-200 AEW&C AESA radars. This technology makes the radar equivalent in antenna technology to the new Thales-Raytheon Ground Master 400 series - reliable, difficult to jam, and difficult to locate, with agile beam-steering of the kind seen in US systems like the Aegis SPY-1. As we have seen with latest generation Chinese smart bombs, their most advanced products are very close to the US and EU built benchmark-designs.

Export variants of the HQ-9, HQ-12 and nearly all PLA surveillance and acquisition radars have been actively marketed across the world. Latin America has been buying Chinese surveillance radars in significant numbers. In Asia, PRC clients like Pakistan and Myanmar have been sold these technologies, and Pakistan is claimed to be procuring the HQ-9 system.
What the future will bring is clear - increasing global proliferation of modern high technology Chinese built air defence weapons. These will be comparable to the latest Russian designs, but cheaper in raw dollar terms, and without political strings attached. Russia's treatment of Iran over the S-300PMU1 / SA-20A Gargoyle order is likely to drive Iran directly into buying HQ-9 systems, arguably just as effective, and motivate other developing nations in turn to do the same3.

Western bureaucrats continue to show absolute disdain for Chinese built air defence weapons. While in the short term, ignorance might be bliss, the pain will be felt acutely if several dozen US combat aircraft are shot down by modern HQ-9s in some remote corner of the world, by a country the US considers to be incapable of such a defence.
FD-2000 / HQ-9 SAM - China's Strategic ?Game Changer?
 
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