Featured How American Intelligence Spy on Pakistan Army

[Bratva]

SNOWDEN ARCHIVE
——THE SIDTODAY
FILES
SIDtoday is the internal newsletter for the NSA’s most important division, the Signals Intelligence Directorate. The Intercept released four years’ worth of newsletters in batches, starting with 2003, after editorial review. From the documents and the accompanying articles available in this archive, you can learn a surprising amount about what the agency's spies were doing, how they were doing it, and why.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/?orderBy=publishedTime&orderDirection=desc#archive

SNOWDEN ARCHIVE
——THE SIDTODAY

The NAC's Advanced Network Development & Analysis (ANDA) Division

SUMMARY
Profile of the Network Analysis Center's ANDA division, which helped capture suspected al Qaeda operative Husam al-Yemeni, improved understanding of the Pakistani Army Defense Network, and spied on a network associated with the leader of Venezuela

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Mar. 29 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Dec. 7 2016



Where do SIGINT collectors and analysts go for information needed to access and exploit targets of interest? -- The Network Analysis Center (NAC). Today we'd like to profile one of the NAC's three divisions, namely the Advanced Network Development and Analysis (ANDA) Division. (TS//SI) The ANDA Division brings together people with a range of skills -- Collection Managers, Computer Scientists, Engineers, Intelligence Analysts, Network Engineers and Mathematicians -- all performing Network Analysis in order to isolate and access targets within the worldwide digital network. In doing so, we use a variety of data sources, including open source data and SIGINT information such as routing protocol data.

As worldwide network use has exploded, becoming the communications of choice for many targets, ANDA is called upon from various elements within both the Analysis and Production and Data Acquisition Directorates to assist with both tactical and strategic Network Analysis needs. (TS//SI) Our work has shown concrete results. For example, ANDA played an instrumental part during the January 2004 apprehension of a key Al Qaida operative within Iraq - namely Husam al-Yemeni, aka Firas.

We've assisted the Office of Regional Targets with developing a more complete understanding of the Pakistani Army Defense Network (ADN) infrastructure. We've also assisted this same office with the development of an important digital network associated with Venezuelan's leader, Victor Chavez. Regularly we assist the Office of Counterterrorism with the daily tracking of several key targets as they move throughout the worldwide digital network.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3233071-the-nac-s-advanced-network-development-amp/

A Success Story, In Which the MSOC Takes On a Pakistani Satellite and GSM Network

SUMMARY
In March 2006, analysts working at the Misawa Security Operations Center discovered two Pakistani GSM cell phone infrastructure links and began sustained collection. In the following months they discovered and began spying on a total of 14 links. These GSM links "enable development and reporting on al-Qaeda senior leadership, which primarily uses GSM and C2C (computer-to-computer) modes of communication."
DOCUMENT’S DATE
Dec. 11 2006
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
May. 29 2019

NMDC Tech Lead, Misawa Security Operations Center (F79) Run Date: 12/11/2006 SERIES:

Misawa's NMDC has four branches: a Signals Keeping Secrets Development Center (SDC); a Network Analysis Center (NAC); a 4. A Success Story, In Target Analysis Center (TAC) and a System Development Branch. Which the MSOC Takes On a Pakistani GSM Network (U//FOUO) Misawa Security Operations Center

(TS//SI//REL) In March 2006, SDC analysts identified two GSM 1 infrastructure links carried over the Chinastar-1 satellite. Processing these signals briefly through a recently acquired developmental JUGGERNAUT system revealed the links were in use by a Pakistani operator. A longer look produced Priority 2 and 3 telephone calls, which prompted the NMDC to keep the links on developmental collection and perform more analytical work to determine the relative value.

(TS//SI//REL) The NMDC System Development Branch continued surveying Chinastar-1, identified ten additional signals carrying Pakistani GSM links and placed six of these on developmental collection. (S//SI//REL) The TAC further analyzed the links and engaged S2I (Counterterrorism) to assess their value. S2I determined the links served the Karachi area. (TS//SI//REL) Because the NMDC identified the signals of interest and informed the appropriate target offices, the MSOC received sustained tasking for these signals in April from S2I11 (al-Qa'ida Senior Leadership Branch). FORNSAT Planning (S33121) had proactively installed two JUGGERNAUT systems in LADYLOVE, Misawa's sustained mission area, but they lacked the modems necessary to take over collection from the NMDC. Both the NMDC and LADYLOVE engaged FORNSAT Planning and Collection Management (S33123) branches to rectify the capability gap.

In June, FORNSAT Planning provided additional modems to enable the collection of the GSM carriers. After the installation of the new equipment in July, the collection of the Pakistani links moved from the NMDC to LADYLOVE. (TS//SI//REL) Since then, the NMDC has identified and added to sustained collection six more Pakistani GSM infrastructure links--a total of fourteen. These provide sole-source collection of the infrastructure links for various GSM providers and enable development and reporting on al-Qaeda senior leadership, which primarily uses GSM and C2C 2 modes of communication. (U//FOUO) So it was that Misawa's NMDC discovered an important new target and drove the creation of a new mission capability.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/5987479-a-success-story-in-which-the-msoc-takes-on-a/

The Geographic Resource Center Has Info You Need: Maps, Data and Research
SUMMARY
The Geographic Resource Center is NSA's map library, which provides hard-copy and digital maps and geographic data to analysts at NSA headquarters and around the world.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Oct. 29 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

(S) Many analysts visit the GRC in person so they can talk with staff about the kind of map they want and what they want it for. GRC analysts know what questions to ask and where to draw from the vast resources, whether for a planning map for the wall, a tourist map of Kabul, data for an ArcView project, or the pinpointing of a target. Most often, a single quick visit solves a simple problem. Sometimes the problems are harder.

(S//SI) Earlier this year, Pakistan military analysts following Pakistani troop movements were frustrated by the Pakistanis' use of a coordinate system that didn't match up with any current maps. GRC researchers found old copies of Pakistan topographic maps produced by the British in the 1940s -- which turned out to have nearly the same grid system used by the Pakistanis. After scanning and printing the maps, the NGA (National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, formerly NIMA) liaison then transferred the images to a CD for use by the analysts at their desktops.

(S//SI) "The maps dug out by the GRC researchers were used to locate many small villages not in the gazetteer, which in turn helped us track the reported locations of various terrorist high value targets," said , an analyst involved in the project. "We also were able to update and formulate the Pakistani military's order of battle and force disposition for the area."


https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676099-the-geographic-resource-center-has-info-you-need/


SECONDDATE is a tool designed to intercept web requests and redirect browsers on target computers to an NSA web server. That server, in turn, is designed to infect them with malware.

(TS//SI//RELTOUSA, FVEY) SIGINT Development Challenge:Establish a proven foundation of targets in Pakistan's National Telecommunications Corporation's (NTC)VIP Division. Mission Example and Result:Successfully enabled positive identification of users in NTC's VIPdivision who focus on maintaining the Green Exchange.

The Green Exchange branch houses ZXJ-10 switches , which are the backbone of Pakistan's GreenLine communications network.This network is used by senior Pakistani civilian and military leadership.Four machines in the VIP division who have Green Exchange related documents on their machines were successfully implanted.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3031638-Select-Slides-FINAL-PMR-4-24-13-Redacted.html

 

[HRK]

SNOWDEN ARCHIVE
——THE SIDTODAY
FILES
SIDtoday is the internal newsletter for the NSA’s most important division, the Signals Intelligence Directorate. The Intercept released four years’ worth of newsletters in batches, starting with 2003, after editorial review. From the documents and the accompanying articles available in this archive, you can learn a surprising amount about what the agency's spies were doing, how they were doing it, and why.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/?orderBy=publishedTime&orderDirection=desc#archive

SNOWDEN ARCHIVE
——THE SIDTODAY

The NAC's Advanced Network Development & Analysis (ANDA) Division

SUMMARY
Profile of the Network Analysis Center's ANDA division, which helped capture suspected al Qaeda operative Husam al-Yemeni, improved understanding of the Pakistani Army Defense Network, and spied on a network associated with the leader of Venezuela

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Mar. 29 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Dec. 7 2016



Where do SIGINT collectors and analysts go for information needed to access and exploit targets of interest? -- The Network Analysis Center (NAC). Today we'd like to profile one of the NAC's three divisions, namely the Advanced Network Development and Analysis (ANDA) Division. (TS//SI) The ANDA Division brings together people with a range of skills -- Collection Managers, Computer Scientists, Engineers, Intelligence Analysts, Network Engineers and Mathematicians -- all performing Network Analysis in order to isolate and access targets within the worldwide digital network. In doing so, we use a variety of data sources, including open source data and SIGINT information such as routing protocol data.

As worldwide network use has exploded, becoming the communications of choice for many targets, ANDA is called upon from various elements within both the Analysis and Production and Data Acquisition Directorates to assist with both tactical and strategic Network Analysis needs. (TS//SI) Our work has shown concrete results. For example, ANDA played an instrumental part during the January 2004 apprehension of a key Al Qaida operative within Iraq - namely Husam al-Yemeni, aka Firas.

We've assisted the Office of Regional Targets with developing a more complete understanding of the Pakistani Army Defense Network (ADN) infrastructure. We've also assisted this same office with the development of an important digital network associated with Venezuelan's leader, Victor Chavez. Regularly we assist the Office of Counterterrorism with the daily tracking of several key targets as they move throughout the worldwide digital network.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3233071-the-nac-s-advanced-network-development-amp/

A Success Story, In Which the MSOC Takes On a Pakistani Satellite and GSM Network

SUMMARY
In March 2006, analysts working at the Misawa Security Operations Center discovered two Pakistani GSM cell phone infrastructure links and began sustained collection. In the following months they discovered and began spying on a total of 14 links. These GSM links "enable development and reporting on al-Qaeda senior leadership, which primarily uses GSM and C2C (computer-to-computer) modes of communication."
DOCUMENT’S DATE
Dec. 11 2006
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
May. 29 2019

NMDC Tech Lead, Misawa Security Operations Center (F79) Run Date: 12/11/2006 SERIES:

Misawa's NMDC has four branches: a Signals Keeping Secrets Development Center (SDC); a Network Analysis Center (NAC); a 4. A Success Story, In Target Analysis Center (TAC) and a System Development Branch. Which the MSOC Takes On a Pakistani GSM Network (U//FOUO) Misawa Security Operations Center

(TS//SI//REL) In March 2006, SDC analysts identified two GSM 1 infrastructure links carried over the Chinastar-1 satellite. Processing these signals briefly through a recently acquired developmental JUGGERNAUT system revealed the links were in use by a Pakistani operator. A longer look produced Priority 2 and 3 telephone calls, which prompted the NMDC to keep the links on developmental collection and perform more analytical work to determine the relative value.

(TS//SI//REL) The NMDC System Development Branch continued surveying Chinastar-1, identified ten additional signals carrying Pakistani GSM links and placed six of these on developmental collection. (S//SI//REL) The TAC further analyzed the links and engaged S2I (Counterterrorism) to assess their value. S2I determined the links served the Karachi area. (TS//SI//REL) Because the NMDC identified the signals of interest and informed the appropriate target offices, the MSOC received sustained tasking for these signals in April from S2I11 (al-Qa'ida Senior Leadership Branch). FORNSAT Planning (S33121) had proactively installed two JUGGERNAUT systems in LADYLOVE, Misawa's sustained mission area, but they lacked the modems necessary to take over collection from the NMDC. Both the NMDC and LADYLOVE engaged FORNSAT Planning and Collection Management (S33123) branches to rectify the capability gap.

In June, FORNSAT Planning provided additional modems to enable the collection of the GSM carriers. After the installation of the new equipment in July, the collection of the Pakistani links moved from the NMDC to LADYLOVE. (TS//SI//REL) Since then, the NMDC has identified and added to sustained collection six more Pakistani GSM infrastructure links--a total of fourteen. These provide sole-source collection of the infrastructure links for various GSM providers and enable development and reporting on al-Qaeda senior leadership, which primarily uses GSM and C2C 2 modes of communication. (U//FOUO) So it was that Misawa's NMDC discovered an important new target and drove the creation of a new mission capability.

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/5987479-a-success-story-in-which-the-msoc-takes-on-a/

The Geographic Resource Center Has Info You Need: Maps, Data and Research
SUMMARY
The Geographic Resource Center is NSA's map library, which provides hard-copy and digital maps and geographic data to analysts at NSA headquarters and around the world.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Oct. 29 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

(S) Many analysts visit the GRC in person so they can talk with staff about the kind of map they want and what they want it for. GRC analysts know what questions to ask and where to draw from the vast resources, whether for a planning map for the wall, a tourist map of Kabul, data for an ArcView project, or the pinpointing of a target. Most often, a single quick visit solves a simple problem. Sometimes the problems are harder.

(S//SI) Earlier this year, Pakistan military analysts following Pakistani troop movements were frustrated by the Pakistanis' use of a coordinate system that didn't match up with any current maps. GRC researchers found old copies of Pakistan topographic maps produced by the British in the 1940s -- which turned out to have nearly the same grid system used by the Pakistanis. After scanning and printing the maps, the NGA (National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, formerly NIMA) liaison then transferred the images to a CD for use by the analysts at their desktops.

(S//SI) "The maps dug out by the GRC researchers were used to locate many small villages not in the gazetteer, which in turn helped us track the reported locations of various terrorist high value targets," said , an analyst involved in the project. "We also were able to update and formulate the Pakistani military's order of battle and force disposition for the area."


https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676099-the-geographic-resource-center-has-info-you-need/


SECONDDATE is a tool designed to intercept web requests and redirect browsers on target computers to an NSA web server. That server, in turn, is designed to infect them with malware.

(TS//SI//RELTOUSA, FVEY) SIGINT Development Challenge:Establish a proven foundation of targets in Pakistan's National Telecommunications Corporation's (NTC)VIP Division. Mission Example and Result:Successfully enabled positive identification of users in NTC's VIPdivision who focus on maintaining the Green Exchange.

The Green Exchange branch houses ZXJ-10 switches , which are the backbone of Pakistan's GreenLine communications network.This network is used by senior Pakistani civilian and military leadership.Four machines in the VIP division who have Green Exchange related documents on their machines were successfully implanted.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3031638-Select-Slides-FINAL-PMR-4-24-13-Redacted.html

@Arsalan ....

 

[Bratva]

Doing SIGINT in Pakistan

SUMMARY

A SID intern from the Pakistan Branch was deployed to work at Special Collection Service sites in Islamabad and Lahore. He played a part in tracking a terrorist target captured in August 2004 and worked on leads related to threats on the U.S. Embassy.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Nov. 10 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

SERIES: IA intern describes what it is like to work at SCS sites in (U//FOUO) Intern TDYs Pakistan, doing both SIGINT reporting and collection (TS//SI) (TS//SI) For approximately two and one-half months this summer, I had the unique experience of being able to forward deploy to Pakistan to work at SCS* sites in Islamabad and Lahore.

Although I had been working as a reporter and analyst in SID's Pakistan Branch for approximately 8 months prior to my TDY, I was excited to learn about the technical aspects of SIGINT collection and to provide support to the variety of SIGINT customers forward deployed throughout the region. (U) The author pictured with al-Qa'ida graffiti in Murre, Pakistan. The building is a long-abandoned brewery built under British rule. (S//SI) Because this was my first time living and working in a different country, I was not really sure what to expect once I finally landed in Islamabad.

However, as I met the rest of the team that I would be working with for the next 74 days, I could see that they were very knowledgeable and dedicated to their jobs and they quickly made me feel right at home. (TS//SI) Because I was already familiar with the target, I was able to jump into SIGINT product reporting via Local Support Reports (LSRs) but was also encouraged to branch out into other SIGINT areas besides reporting. I spent time with the collectors learning about the various signal types that were collected at the site, about the signals processing gear, and about various collection systems - I was even able to physically tune in a signal or two using the spectrum analyzer and dish controller in the site's collection center.

(S//SI) As my technical knowledge increased, I became involved in evaluating the content of new signals that were being targeted and collected, examining the various types of traffic being carried on the signal and then determining where the traffic came from. In addition to becoming involved in various DNR* collection projects, I was also able to branch out into the DNI* world, learning about DNI collection and processing and basic DNI traffic analysis. (S//SI) Because of the diversity of the target, working in Pakistan provided me with the opportunity to become involved in a wide range of projects: because I was forward deployed, I was able to help provide near-real time support to counterterrorism operations and was able to help in the exploitation of DNR and DNI lead information gathered through SIGINT and HUMINT.


(TS//SI) These efforts paid their greatest dividends when one of the site's terrorist targets who was being tracked via SIGINT was 1. Doing SIGINT in Pakistan 2. The Only Game in Town (part 1) 3. The Only Game in Town (part 2) 4. Eye-Opening Experience in Haiti (part 1) 5. Eye-Opening Experience in Haiti (part 2) 6. Assisting in the Hunt for al-Qa'ida Leadership apprehended in mid-August. It was quite exciting to know that I helped play a role in the target's capture and it was also very enlightening to be a first-hand witness to "SIGINT in action" and to see how the close collaboration between SCS, NSA, and CIA personnel can produce real results.

(TS//SI) In addition to tracking specific terrorist targets, I was also involved in helping to exploit and analyze lead information related to several threats on the U.S. Embassy itself. Although Pakistan is not as openly dangerous an area as other places, a real threat does exist there as evidenced by the recent 28 October bombing at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad

(S//SI) While security was a constant concern, I was pleasantly surprised at the level of freedom that Embassy personnel had and was equally surprised at the fine shopping and restaurants to be found throughout Islamabad -- cheap prices, high quality handicrafts, and numerous large marketplaces made for a suitcase that was much, much fuller on my return trip than it was when I departed the States. (S//SI) Overall, my TDY experience was one of most enriching experiences of my entire life from both a personal and professional perspective. I was able to gain broad professional knowledge and experience that made me a better and more well-rounded analyst and living and working in Pakistan for an extended period of time provided me with a unique personal experience that gave me insight into an entirely different culture that I would otherwise never have been exposed to. *(U) Notes: SCS = Special Collection Service.


For further info, see the SCS mission overview page. DNR = Dial Number Recognition DNI = Digital Network Intelligence "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108 deployed 100 additional SGAs to Iraq. All in all, we have about 2.5 times as many deployed as in '07. This is a great testimony to our Agency's workforce. What's more, those deployed have incredible access to senior military commanders and decision makers, which of course should only enhance NSA's reputation. 5. (U//FOUO) What is RT-RG's impact in the theatre? (S//SI//REL) As RT-RG has become more widely used in the last few years, it has exponentially enhanced our analytic capacity in the theatre.

Not only important for SIGINT analysts, it helps provide situational awareness, and fosters -- and even forces -- a much higher level of collaboration: Analysts in Jalalabad, Salerno and Kabul [Afghanistan] can all communicate via chat, and can share target information. For instance, if I'm an analyst in CST23 at Combat Outpost SHANK, and one of the targets from my neighbor analyst in CST17 at Jalalabad is in my battle space, I can let him know more quickly. So it greatly enhances overall battle space visibility. Coupling RT-RG with our ONEROOF servers prevents us from being hamstrung by selfimposed boundaries ... it helps us to work a target set much more collaboratively.

A Pashto or Arabic linguist working at NSA Georgia, for example, can work on a voice cut collected in theater. This greatly mitigates linguistic challenges, and allows you to tap into a much bigger cadre of available linguists& Ultimately it greatly enhances the warfighter's ability to "find, fix, and finish" the adversary. It helps with both contextual and geolocation info, and we are finding broader applications for RT-RG all the time -- even applications beyond doing SIGINT. For example, RT-RG can ingest Blue Force Tracker data [which shows the location of Coalition troops] to allow SIGINT analysts to alert friendly forces to nearby insurgent communications and activities. Its usefulness is limited only by our ability to wrap our head around its potential.

6. (U//FOUO) What is the status of the Afghan Remote Operations Cryptologic Center (A-ROCC)? (S//REL) Planning for the A-ROCC began in the fall of 2008 (see related article ); the facility is one-third complete, and will be 100% complete soon. It is designed as an "in-theater" SIGINT language processing center that will enable us to transcribe or export voice cuts from ground, air and national collection sources, and turn these into "first-instance reports." During the processing of standing up the A-ROCC, the NCR has been awestruck daily by the commitment and expertise of those involved -- from I&L standpoint, setting up work flows, etc. It is a huge success story.

(U//FOUO) The A-ROCC 7. (U) Any final comments? (U//FOUO) In closing, on behalf of NCR CENTCOM, Mr. John Mulligan, I would like to thank our NSA colleagues who have volunteered to be away from friends and family, and put themselves in harm's way in support of US Central Command. We continue to be humbled by the number and quality of our deployers, and we welcome potential deployers to go ahead and make the commitment; you will be both personally challenged and professionally rewarded beyond your wildest dreams.


"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676115-doing-sigint-in-pakistan/

 

[gangsta_rap]

And then these pricks have the nerve to even wonder why we don't see them as a friend in the geopolitical arena

 

[Bratva]

A Firsthand View of Pakistan and Its SIGINTers

SUMMARY
An intelligence analysis intern goes to Pakistan, where the partner agency is “at least 10 years -- if not many more -- behind ours,” and deep cultural differences characterize the relationship.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
May. 31 2006

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Aug. 15 2018

(S//REL) A Firsthand View of Pakistan and Its SIGINTers FROM: Intelligence Analysis Intern Run Date: 05/31/2006

(S//SI) NSA's relationship with Pakistani intelligence is of high importance. An IA intern had the opportunity to see the relationship close-up...

(S//REL) I recently had the opportunity to travel to Pakistan with a group of coworkers from various Product Lines and organizations throughout NSA for the Annual Planning Conference (APC) with our Pakistani Partner, the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate, Technical (DGT). I cannot think of a better way to end my 3-year internship in the Intelligence Analysis Development Program (IADP), and the experiences that I've had in the Foreign Affairs Directorate (FAD), topped off by my trip to Pakistan, will stay with me throughout my career.

(U) Author poses with rifle (S//SI) I landed in FAD (NSA's Foreign Affairs Directorate) for my sixth and final IA Intern tour as the Assistant Country Desk Officer for Pakistan, hoping to learn a little bit about how NSA works with its Third Party Partners on the Counterterrorism mission. Experiencing Pakistan firsthand at the APC was a fascinating experience for me because I was able to witness negotiations with our Partner up-close and personal. Having spent most of my time in SID working with our technologically savvy Second Party Partners, this was quite an eye-opening experience for me.

(S//SI) Actually being in-country allowed me to get a sense of the cultural and economic factors that influence Pakistan to make the decisions it makes as a state. In large part, Pakistan lacks the competitive and entrepreneurial edge that drives innovation in capitalist states, and this is apparent in its SIGINT apparatus. As one observer on the trip noted, Pakistan is in a natural state of rest.

(S//SI) DGT's technology is at least 10 years -- if not many more -- behind ours. And not surprisingly, even their technical academic knowledge is on a different level -- not because they are any less intelligent, but more as a result of the level and quality of training available in Pakistan. Of course this lag is caused by many factors, not the least of which is economic. Pakistan is, after all, a developing nation. That being said, NSA has a vested interest in making Pakistan into a first-class SIGINT organization because of its geopolitical standing in the world -it is home to a large number of Al-Qa'ida Senior Leadership (most likely to include UBL and Zawahiri), not to mention other terrorist organizations, and provides a pipeline for narcotics trafficking. (U//FOUO) On a lighter note, the Partner escorted us on some very interesting cultural excursions, including a shopping trip to Rawalpindi... ...a visit to the King Faisel Mosque (built by the King of Saudi Arabia as a gift to the newly independent Pakistan), and a trip up a dangerously narrow and steep road to the beautiful Margalla Hills Park, which overlooks Islamabad: ...We were escorted at all times by a cadre of four security guards armed with AK-47s, so we felt pretty safe for the most part. I enjoyed the food immensely and have to agree with the Pakistanis that they have the best rice in the world!

(S//REL) The negotiations at the APC were difficult at times and trust has always been an issue on both sides of the partnership. Pakistan struggles with the anti-American sentiment that runs ripe throughout the country, but the government claims to be committed to standing by the US as its friend and partner. My sojourn to Pakistan opened my eyes to the relationships that NSA has beyond our English-speaking allies and I gained an understanding of Pakistan's contribution to many NSA missions. (U) So, what did I learn? Here are a few nuggets: (S) What NSA wants isn't necessarily what the partner wants. (S) What the partner wants isn't always something NSA is willing to give. (U) We both may be speaking English, but that doesn't mean we understand each other. (U) If you're a woman, don't be overly offended if a Pakistani man refuses to shake your hand.

"(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/4755718-a-firsthand-view-of-pakistan-and-its-siginters/

The Only Game in Town (part 1)

SUMMARY
An intelligence analysis intern describes her tour as NSA counterterrorism representative at the CIA station in Islamabad, where she witnessed the arrests of several dozen terrorists.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Dec. 15 2004
PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

(U) The Only Game in Town (part 1) FROM: Intelligence Analysis (IA) Intern Run Date: 12/15/2004 IA intern describes her experience at the first SIGINT Fusion Cell in Islamabad, March-August 2004...

(S//SI) (S//SI) As I was sitting in the Heathrow terminal on an eight-hour layover, awaiting my flight to Islamabad, I thought about all the advice I had been given the week before my departure. Several experienced travelers had suggested I buy baggy clothes and a headscarf to cover myself, while others claimed that Islamabad was a fairly progressive city compared to the rest of Pakistan. I was anxious to find out for myself and excited about the opportunity to be part of the first NSA SIGINT Fusion Cell at Station* Islamabad. Over the next four and a half months, I would learn the importance of this team and why Station once described SIGINT as "the only game in town" during a critical time in the Pakistani Spring Offensive when there were no other intelligence sources available. (S) Just a few weeks before, I had been making preparations to deploy to Baghdad as part of a NIST team , which was a logical follow-on to the Iraq reporting I had been doing in the Counterterrorism (CT) Sunni Extremism Branch. When the NIST office asked if I would be interested in a brand-new position in Pakistan instead, I eagerly jumped at the chance to experience a country I had studied in graduate school, as well as spent a year targeting in the Pakistan Branch. I quickly went through the deployment processing checklist, put my belongings into storage, and boarded the plane less than three weeks later.

(U//FOUO) When I touched down in Pakistan, it was obvious that I would need to get accustomed to the constant stream of stares and curious looks I would receive, since women with blonde hair are a rarity. As I sat alone in the terminal waiting for my driver, with literally hundreds of Pakistanis in traditional dress watching me inquisitively, it truly hit me that I was embarking on one of the most exciting times in my personal and professional career. I was taken where I would be living out of my two suitcases for the next four and a half months. I instantly thought of how different my living arrangements would have been in Baghdad, as I was now in a mini-bar stocked room and able to enjoy all the amenities that a Western hotel has to offer. (U) A colorful jinga bus filled with passengers in Taxila.

(TS//SI) The Embassy compound itself is one of the largest in the world and sports a new gym, pool, restaurant/club, track, and softball field. My desk would be in a very small room on the third floor, which could have as many as 10 people working shoulder-toshoulder at any given time. Even though I had originally deployed SERIES:

as part of a NIST, it was quickly determined that interests would be best served if I worked in another capacity. I became the NSA CT representative to the Settled Areas Office (SAO) Liaison Branch, which focuses exclusively on non-tribal areas such as Islamabad, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. My role would be to provide NSA CT analytic support and keep SAO informed of any relevant NSA reporting or SIGINT leads. SAO, in conjunction with the Pakistani partner, has been responsible for over 600 arrests since September 11. I would be able to witness first-hand the arrest of several dozen terrorists during my tenure at Station.

(TS//SI) My typical workday began around 0830 when I started preparations for my daily SIGINT briefing to the Tribal Areas Office and also COS (Chief of Station) Islamabad, which involved prioritizing various SIGINT reporting, gists, or tips that we had received. Following the briefings, I dedicated the rest of the day to supporting the SAO targeters and acting as the middleman between Station and NSAW to facilitate a variety of issues. I coordinated with the appropriate offices at NSA to ensure that Station had the most up-to-date intelligence possible, as well as keep NSA apprised of activity in the field. In addition to the steady stream of support I received from HQs, I was able to utilize the various NSA databases and analytic tools to provide services ranging from a quick number look-up to comprehensive targeting packages.

(TS//SI) As mentioned above, SAO works closely with its liaison counterpart to track and arrest high-value targets throughout Pakistan, which means that Station must supply daily releasable tearlines with the relevant intelligence. I was able to author several of these tearlines, as well as coordinate approvals with the necessary offices at NSAW. There were several occasions when I was literally on the phone with NSOC while a SAO targeter waited in the doorway for approval to pass the time-sensitive message to liaison.

(TS//SI) Perhaps the best aspect about the position was that it afforded me the opportunity to witness the start of one of the most collaborative ventures NSA has undertaken. With the stand-up of the Fusion Cell, NSA became truly integrated with Station personnel for the first time and was able to contribute in ways that were once impossible. As the SAO representative, I was able to coordinate with NSAW, Bagram, GRSOC, and the Tribal Areas Office at Station to ensure that actionable SIGINT was in the operators' hands as close to real-time as possible.

(TS//SI) One success story was when a high-value target was captured due to timely intelligence and a good working relationship between NSA and CIA. Analysts at NSAW worked extra hours to ensure that Station had the latest DNI and telephony intelligence, which were often the first tippers or reporting that we received in the field. A combination of NSAW tippers, CIA cable traffic, and front-end analysis in the SAO all contributed to a successful capture operation.

(S//SI) The original NSA SIGINT Fusion Cell at Station Islamabad. The author is third from the right. *Notes: (S) The term "Station" refers to a CIA operations center located within a US Embassy abroad. (U) Watch for the conclusion of this article, coming soon... "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108


https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676159-the-only-game-in-town-part-1/

The Only Game in Town (part 2)

SUMMARY
An intelligence analysis intern describes the lighter side of deployment to Islamabad, including shopping, dining, and camel rides.

DOCUMENT’S DATE
Dec. 16 2004

PUBLICLY AVAILABLE
Apr. 24 2017

(U) The Only Game in Town (part 2) FROM: Intelligence Analysis (IA) Intern Run Date: 12/16/2004 Here's part 2 (and final) of Islamabad. (S) story of her tdy to

(U//FOUO) Despite the long hours we all put in at the Embassy, there was time for some shopping, dining out, and a little bit of sightseeing. While Pakistan remains a high-threat environment, as evidenced by the recent explosion at the Marriott Hotel, I still maintained a semi-normal lifestyle that wasn't confined to the Embassy grounds. I frequented many shops in Islamabad where you could buy everything from Persian carpets, glass bracelets, spice boxes, and hand-carved woodwork to the very latest American DVDs, which were all at considerably lower prices. The shop owners, and the MANY street vendors, were always anxious to sell to Americans, so there was no shortage of goods being offered at every corner.

(U) Women selling glass bracelets at an outdoor market in Islamabad. (U) Carpet shopping in Islamabad with fellow TDYer (U//FOUO)

If work at the Embassy was finished early enough, there were many dinner options in the city. The Marriott Hotel alone had five restaurants that included Chinese, Japanese, and Thai cuisine. There was even a Pizza Hut and ice cream parlor that served food comparable to that found in the US. It's definitely one of the few places I've been to where you can get a steak dinner with two side dishes for about $4.00, although its inevitable that you will eventually get sick no matter where you choose to eat.

(U//FOUO) Additionally, I wanted to share a few of the more memorable experiences I had during my TDY: Visiting the neighboring town of Taxila and getting a flat tire that we had to change in a crowded parking lot. Touring Murree and riding on a probably-not-so-safe chairlift down the side of a mountain. Riding on a camel in a very decrepit, run-down zoo, which charged an admission price of around $.10.

Going running almost every day at 13:00, in 100-120 degree heat, with everyone I pass yelling that I'm absolutely crazy to be doing anything outside. Eating dinner at the "Chicken Shack," which requires considerable faith in both the drive up the winding road and the cooking.

Haggling over the price of something already cheap, someone who can't speak English, just because it's expected and fun. Driving on the left hand side of the road, with the steering wheel on the right hand side of the car, in a place where there are practically "no rules," and trying to avoid the countless number of people and even donkeys loitering in the street.

(S//SI) Station Islamabad is one of the most exciting, challenging, and fast-paced locations to work in the world, with everyone putting in lots of overtime and weekend hours to accommodate for the dynamic environment. It is one of the few places where you can truly experience your surroundings while seeing the fruits of your counterterrorism efforts on a daily basis. I would recommend that anyone looking for an exhilarating tour where they can see SIGINT, HUMINT, and IMINT in action give serious consideration to an assignment here.

(U) The Faisal Mosque in Islamabad is the second-largest mosque in the world. "(U//FOUO) SIDtoday articles may

not be republished or reposted outside NSANet without the consent of S0121 (DL sid_comms)." DYNAMIC PAGE -- HIGHEST POSSIBLE CLASSIFICATION IS TOP SECRET // SI / TK // REL TO USA AUS CAN GBR NZL DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 1-52, DATED 08 JAN 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

https://theintercept.com/snowden-sidtoday/3676160-the-only-game-in-town-part-2/

 

[RedHulk]

Isn't the green exchange communication separate from rest of the telecommunications? If its not then no wonder it can be compromised despite all firewalls.
Analyst said Pakistani analyst were ten years behind. What if they were not provided the company of cream to give them as minimum info about our capabilities. If ISI letting in NSA analyst obviously they would have not provided the whole structure by keeping them at bay

 

[crankthatskunk]

Well. I am amazed.
This is quite old information. The technology is moved on.

I don't know many of you have heard of Echelon!!
Originally a secret USA program, working on SIGINT or signal intelligence collection and analysis network.
Originally created to spy on USSR and then Russia, originally military and diplomatic spying network, now include mass communication intercepts around the world.

Five countries take part in this program, USA, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand. Seen something common!!

In the UK Menwith Hill facility in Yorkshire, is one of the facilities, which through satellite links is part of the listening and monitoring network.

There is one in Geraldton in Western Australia.

There are hundreds of alerts designed, each based on the severity of the threat, picking certain words in telephone conversations, emails, social media etc.

You get picked my friends, your profiles are kept.

That's why when a terrorist incident happen in the west. Most of the time it is said that the person involved was on the intelligence radar, but slipped out and security breach occurred.
It is because 1000s of people are monitored and in most severe cases physical surveillance take place.

When Gary can penetrate Pentagon network stations with blank administrator's password, then everything is possible.

 

[MastanKhan]

Well. I am amazed.
This is quite old information. The technology is moved on.

I don't know many of you have heard of Echelon!!
Originally a secret USA program, working on SIGINT or signal intelligence collection and analysis network.
Originally created to spy on USSR and then Russia, originally military and diplomatic spying network, now include mass communication intercepts around the world.

Five countries take part in this program, USA, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand. Seen something common!!

In the UK Menwith Hill facility in Yorkshire, is one of the facilities, which through satellite links is part of the listening and monitoring network.

There is one in Geraldton in Western Australia.

There are hundreds of alerts designed, each based on the severity of the threat, picking certain words in telephone conversations, emails, social media etc.

You get picked my friends, your profiles are kept.

That's why when a terrorist incident happen in the west. Most of the time it is said that the person involved was on the intelligence radar, but slipped out and security breach occurred.
It is because 1000s of people are monitored and in most severe cases physical surveillance take place.

When Gary can penetrate Pentagon network stations with blank administrator's password, then everything is possible.

Hi,

Thank you for your post---. I believe that there are two programs or possibly three programs that are ahead of ech--- by now---.

 

[SQ8]

The title is misleading since the spying was done in lieu of helping shore up Pakistan’s sigint capacity. If it isn’t for these exchanges, our warfighting concepts would still be stuck in the 60’s.

 

[TNT]

Well Pakistanis are no fools either, as is evident from the outcome and will be further evident.

 

[truthfollower]

good keeping an eye on everything

 

[Pan-Islamic-Pakistan]

Great thread, thanks for sharing.

 

[Enigma SIG]

The title is misleading since the spying was done in lieu of helping shore up Pakistan’s sigint capacity. If it isn’t for these exchanges, our warfighting concepts would still be stuck in the 60’s.

Document date states 2004, so i'm pretty sure we're far ahead now.

 

[LeGenD]

They spy on [every] country of interest. This is not much of a news.

Given Pakistan's nuclear capability and geopolitical significance, the country will continue to draw much attention. US is not the only country spying on Pakistan, the list is not small actually and I wouldn't be surprised one bit if the list contain names of those countries which are given the benefit of doubt usually. I am sure that the gravity of the situation is not clear to average individual, or some want to keep their heads buried in the sand.

One cannot trust any entity in the age of cyber espionage.

Isn't the green exchange communication separate from rest of the telecommunications? If its not then no wonder it can be compromised despite all firewalls.
Analyst said Pakistani analyst were ten years behind. What if they were not provided the company of cream to give them as minimum info about our capabilities. If ISI letting in NSA analyst obviously they would have not provided the whole structure by keeping them at bay

ISI does have history of working with CIA - this is open-secret. These files suggest workings in pursuit of Al-Qaeda Network in the region.

NSA have the resources and minds to infiltrate/breach virtually any network nevertheless. This is not your traditional spy agency. Its present-day reach and capabilities is the outcome of a work spanning over 3 decades of research and exploitation of ICTs, and beyond comprehension of average minds.

FYI: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/lights-shadows-capabilities-nsa/

Competing with NSA is a fools errand given its global reach, space-faring technologies, and resources. They can take control of your system and you wouldn't know about it even if you had necessary security arrangements in place.

Cyber-security measures evolve, but NSA is not sitting idle.

This isn't to say that WE should take our cyber-security lightly. Do whatever WE must...

Edward Snowden is the face of mockery of global cyber security arrangements. NSA is laughing behind-the-scenes. It is an open challenge to all. He is allowed to live and release information from time-to-time.

Its funny that Edward disclose something, and others scramble to work... Sad as well.

 

[Alpha BeeTee]

They spy on [every] country of interest. This is not much of a news.

Given Pakistan's nuclear capability and geopolitical significance, the country will continue to draw much attention. US is not the only country spying on Pakistan, the list is not small actually and I wouldn't be surprised one bit if the list contain names of those countries which are given the benefit of doubt usually. I am sure that the gravity of the situation is not clear to average individual, or some want to keep their heads buried in the sand.

One cannot trust any entity in the age of cyber espionage.


ISI does have history of working with CIA - this is open-secret. These files suggest workings in pursuit of Al-Qaeda Network in the region.

NSA have the resources and minds to infiltrate/breach virtually any network nevertheless. This is not your traditional spy agency. Its present-day reach and capabilities is the outcome of a work spanning over 3 decades of research and exploitation of ICTs, and beyond comprehension of average minds.

FYI: https://resources.infosecinstitute.com/lights-shadows-capabilities-nsa/

Competing with NSA is a fools errand given its global reach, space-faring technologies, and resources. They can take control of your system and you wouldn't know about it even if you had necessary security arrangements in place.

Cyber-security measures evolve, but NSA is not sitting idle.

This isn't to say that WE should take our cyber-security lightly. Do whatever WE must...

Edward Snowden is the face of mockery of global cyber security arrangements. NSA is laughing behind-the-scenes. It is an open challenge to all. He is allowed to live and release information from time-to-time.

Its funny that Edward disclose something, and others scramble to work... Sad as well.

This makes one wonder that how Pakistan's nuclear capability has still survived. They way NSA is ahead in tech and spying, we stand naked. Nothing is protected. How does Pakistan Army do anything without them knowing about it. This is not easy to understand. How did Pakistan play chess with US in Afg theater for so long...