Last part was mispost.
I disagree on one point - that is soviet russia was in any position to attack in july 1941.You are refering to suvorov's 'icebreaker' thesis.But this has been now largely refuted.Main points of refutal are -
1.He bases his concept on selective quotings from some soviet officer memoirs,however can't back it up with any archival material.Even after end of uss when files were declassified no such decisive archival material has been found.Stalin's other controversial top secret orders like partisan order were backed up by archival material.So its a theory based on interpretation of readings rather than actual physical evidence.
I wouldn't be too quick to dismiss Suvorov's work just because its mostly based on memoirs and interviews of high ranking Soviet officials, considering that there are other historical events of the same time period that are accepted as universal truth despite being based on similar sources, ie memoirs and eyewitness accounts (albeit from unreliable individuals), and not actual archival documents of that time. Also, you have to take into account that Icebreaker was written by Suvorov when the Soviet Union was still intact and a lot was classified (even to this day). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Suvorov wrote several books about this topic and further reinforced his information in his new book
The Chief Culprit. wherein he reinforces his previous thesis with newly available information.
Another Russian historian that supports Suvorov's view is Mikhail Meltyukhov and unlike Suvorov, he does have access to declassified Soviet Archives to support this view.
Stalin's Missed Chance - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia (From Meltyukhov)
"Meltyukhov suggests that the assault on Germany was initially planned to take place on June 12, 1941, but was postponed because the Soviet leadership feared an Anglo-German reconciliation against the Soviet Union after the flight of Rudolf Hess on May 12, 1941.[16]
The basis for this assumption is revealed by Molotov's recollection 40 years later in a conversation with Russian journalist Ivan Stadnyuk: "I don't remember all the motives for cancelling this decision, but it seems to me that Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess' flight to England played the main role there. The NKVD reconnaissance reported to us, that Hess on behalf of Hitler had proposed the United Kingdom to conclude peace and to participate in the military march against the USSR... If we at this time would have unleashed ourselves a war against Germany, would have moved forces to Europe, then England could have entered the alliance with Germany without any delay... And not only England. We could have been face to face with the entire capitalist world".[17]
So if we are to go by the above statement of Molotov (Stalin's foreign minister), the Red Army was prepared to attack well before June-22. This statement only further reinforces Suvorov's argument that the Soviet planned offensive was to take place in the summer of 1941 despite the above postponement. That makes sense because any later than that (Summer, 1941) and the weather would no longer be suitable for larges cale offensive operations.
2.More importantly an army of the size and scale of the red army poised to attack would need to stockpile large amounts of fuel and ammo reserves for a coming offensive in forward depots,when germans invaded ussr in 22 june there were no such enormous stockpiles.Infact many soviet tanks ran out of fuel or broke down and were abandoned- more than those knocked out in action.
3.The red army was also not deployed in an offensive posture,but rather as large garrisons.An attacking army would concentrate major assault formations around its railway heads -not disperse them.The red army was also busy fortifying the stalin and molotov lines which makes no sense if you are going to attack.It was also reorganizing its tank formations,which would not be done if a invasion was imminent because of the chaos caused and need for training with the reorganized force.
Stalin himself said to churchill as he(churchill) states in his memoirs that he knew war was coming but thought he would get another year at least.
1. According to a German wartime productions report from
September-October, 1941, the German Arms industry only produced 75,000 75mm shells, while in that same period the Wehrmacht expended 561,000 of the same type. Another report details that in
December of the same year (1941) 18,000 75mm shells were delivered to the front while in the exact month 494,000 shells were expended. How is this possible when we both know that the German industries were still operating on peacetime basis (and Hitler was in no hurry to change gears)? These were all captured during the initial months of Barbarossa from Soviet munitions stockpiles and rail cars packed with munitions. Also, the Germans did capture a lot of fuel during the initial phases of Barbarossa, but this fuel was not of much use to the Wehrmacht because it was diesel and German tanks ran on gasoline. Suvorov actually delves into this extensively in his recent book
The Chief Culprit.
Source
2. On the eve of June 22, 1941, the Red Army had between 3-4 million men concentrated on their Western military districts, with more being transported. The Germans themselves had a similar number of manpower on the exact date. The Red Army also had 5 times as many tanks as the Wehrmacht, and 5 times as many air craft.
Now for a defensive strategy you don't need this many men and material. On top of that they were all
concentrated, not dispersed. Concentrating forces in tight locations is suitable for
punching through defensive lines in a offensive operation, but not ideal for defense as this same concentrated force is vulnerable to being surrounded and cut off, not to mention an easy target for saturation bombing. A dispersed force is suitable for defense as it absorbs an enemy's spearhead (example of this is Soviet defensive lines at Kursk). Soviet forces were concentrated on June 22nd, 1941 and were way too close to the German border.
Of course, the Red Army wasn't going to launch its own offensive on the exact date the Germans launched theirs which is why the Soviets were caught in the midst of the final stages of preparation. Also, the Stalin line had been dismantled by the date of Barbarossa.