Here's What Iran Wants From Sanctions Relief

[Sineva]

A very interesting article,it clearly lays out the emerging consensus,based on the latest report by the majils research center,of irans basic political [and economic] requirements,ie verification of western compliance,for any return to the JCPOA.It describes both the flaws in the original rouhani era deal that ensured that it could never deliver on what was promised,and also the fixes that will be required in order for iran to consider that the JCPOA is still viable.

Here is a link to a pdf of the original report[in farsi]
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/s/BBF_Majlis_Sanctions_Verification_Report

Here's What Iran Wants From Sanctions Relief
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2021/10/1/heres-what-iran-wants-from-sanctions-relief

Back in February, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, set out an early condition for new negotiations over the fate of the JCPOA. In a major speech outlining Iran’s “final” stance on U.S. reentry into the nuclear deal, Khamenei declared that sanctions relief must be implemented “in practice” and not just “on paper.” Iran would also “verify” that sanctions relief commitments had been met before fulfilling its own commitments under the restored agreement.

Khamenei’s demands were shaped by the bitter experience of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and unilateral reimposition of sanctions. The issues surrounding sanctions relief and Khamenei’s demands hung over six rounds of negotiations in Vienna. They are again being cited as a possible reason for the Raisi administration’s slow return to the nuclear talks. But what exactly Iranian leaders envision for verifiable sanctions relief has been unclear.

A new report, published by the Office of the Deputy for Economic Research of the Majlis Research Center, the influential research body of the Iranian parliament, offers the first detailed assessment of what verified sanctions relief might look like. The report, entitled “Verifying Sanctions Relief,” does not represent the official position of the Raisi administration, but given the timing of its publication and the affiliation with parliament, it likely represents an emerging consensus about how best to meet Khamenei’s demands while also assuaging the concerns of Iranian parliamentarians who feel the JCPOA is inherently unfair. Many of the details in this new report are drawn from an April 2021 report published by the same research centre that also looked at issues around the verification of sanctions relief. But the new report is more detailed in its diagnosis of the problem sanctions verification seeks to address and the mechanisms that should be used.

In particular, the report aims to address the perceived imbalance between paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA. Iran interprets paragraph 26 to allow it to lessen its commitments under the deal if sanctions relief is not fully implemented—an interpretation that is disputed by the P5+1. Paragraph 36, meanwhile, allows any party to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism and begin the process of “snapback” of sanctions—a provision that Iran considers a tool for the West to renege on the deal. Additionally, the report outlines an asymmetry in the ways in which Iran’s nuclear commitments under the JCPOA and the sanctions commitments of the P5+1 are overseen and implemented. Unlike nuclear commitments, sanctions relief commitments lack a verification and monitoring mechanism, can be obstructed, are slow to implemented, and can be undone unilaterally through snapback. The report summarises this asymmetry in the following table (translated here):


Asymmetry in JCPOA Implementation

	Iranian commitments	P5+1 commitments
Body responsible for verification and monitoring	IAEA	None
Verification mechanism	Technical	Non-technical
Means to disrupt	None	Increasing the perceived risk of engaging Iran
Timeframe for implementation	Immediate	Not immediate (Delay between sanctions relief and economic benefits)
Means to punish	“Snapback” mechanism	None

To address this asymmetry, the report calls for measures to be taken in three broad areas. What is striking about these measures is their practicality. The report basically calls for a more institutional and technical approach to sanctions relief in which a checklist provides Iranian policymakers an ability to assess the implementation of sanctions relief on an ongoing basis. As part of this approach, the report also sets out targets for oil exports and bilateral trade with Europe.

New Verification Body

The report calls for the designation of an Iranian body or institution to oversee verification of sanctions relief. This could be the Supreme National Security Council or it could be a new body established with its own staff and active secretariat. The body would have three tasks:

1. Observe and assess the actual impact of sanctions removal.
2. Establish a mechanism so that any Iranian person or entity can submit a complaint about issues related to sanctions relief.
3. Prepare an action plan for decreasing nuclear commitments in the event that other parties to the JCPOA renege on their commitments. Actions might include ceasing the voluntary application of the Additional Protocol, producing uranium metal, increasing enrichment above 20 percent, or expanding the number of operational IR6 centrifuges.

Verification Checklist

The new verification body would perform its mission in accordance with a defined “checklist.” The checklist would have two sections. The first section relates to specific actions and targets related to American and European sanctions relief commitments. The stipulations include:

1. Iran should be able to export oil and gas condensate according to its rightful market share of 2.5 million barrels per day (bdp) with an initial target of 2 million bdp.
   This target is feasible—during the sanctions relief afforded Iran under the JCPOA in 2016-2018, Iran exports hovered between 2 and 2.5 million bpd.
2. Iran should be able to increase bilateral trade with key European partners and conduct normal banking transactions to facilitate that trade. The report stipulates an initial monthly target of $3 billion in transactions with EIH Bank in Germany, rising to $4.2 billion. Monthly transactions with the French branch of Tejarat Bank are targeted at $1 billion, rising to $1.5 billion.
   Here, the report has highlighted Iranian-controlled financial institutions in Europe as the key conduits, perhaps reflecting how in recent years Europe-Iran trade has been increasingly run through smaller European banks without Iranian ownership or management. While the report stipulates “transactions,” the targets here are high when likely trade totals are considered. Even if we interpret that key Germany and France-based banks may process most EU-Iran trade, the total initial transaction volume envisioned of $48 billion is significantly higher than the total value of EU-Iran trade in 2016 following the lifting of sanctions. That year, bilateral trade reached just over EUR 20 billion. While the transaction targets could include foreign investment in Iran, it is unlikely that either EIH or Tejarat Bank can scale-up to handle the envisioned volumes.
3. Iran will also seek to verify a range of sanctions lifting measures taken by the Biden administration. This includes the removal of executive orders issued by “two American presidents,” a likely reference to Trump and Biden that suggests a desire for non-nuclear sanctions designations, such as the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to be lifted. In addition, the report calls for the update of the website of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the sanctions enforcement body of the U.S. Department of Treasury. OFAC is to cease publishing notices, advisories, and fact sheets that dissuade trade with Iran and should increase the issuance of licenses and exemptions to ease trade
   This stipulation that means the report authors understand U.S. primary sanctions will continue to pose a challenge for Iran’s engagement with the global economy.

The second section of the checklist focuses on ongoing efforts to decrease the risks of doing business with Iran once sanctions have been lifted. These stipulations reflect the perception in Iran that following the lifting of sanctions “on paper” in January 2016, the Obama administration took a lackadaisical approach to supporting the normalisation of global trade and investment in Iran. The continued characterisation of Iran as a high-risk jurisdiction is seen to have hampered economic engagement. Therefore, the checklist would require:

1. The removal of all measures that have presented Iran as a jurisdiction with high risk of money laundering and adoption of measures to normalise economic relations with Iran.
2. Changing the basis of guidance to banks issued by the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) from risk-based to rule-based.
3. Maximal removal of sanctioned individuals and entities from the SDN list and a substantive review of SDN and non-SDN sanctions lists.
4. Removal of statements by OFAC and other institutions that dissuade humanitarian trade and maritime trade with Iran. In addition, there should be new licenses issued to all banks that hold Iranian oil revenues in order to ensure the timely release of frozen assets.
5. A written commitment from neighbouring countries not to take action against foreign entities willing to engage Iran economically.
6. Official statements proclaiming that medium and long-term economic engagement with Iran is permissible and refraining from any action that would damage engagement with Iran.

Notably, the report does not indicate that Iran would make progress on key measures such as implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plan that would substantially change the perceived risk associated with engaging with the Iranian financial system. While the demand that FinCEN changes its guidance from risk-based to rule-based is unrealistic, it does point to a desire for a more prescriptive approach from the U.S. government that may create a basis for reciprocal regulatory reforms in Iran. Here, the report is pointing to the issue of over-compliance by international banks, which deem the risks and costs of transacting with Iran, even in support of clearly permissible trade, to be too high. FinCEN’s risk-based guidance essentially places the burden on financial institutions to determine the appropriate level of due diligence, putting bank managers in an uncomfortable position where minimising risk means maximising administrative burdens. A more prescriptive approach, like the rule-based approaches taken by some European regulators, may reduce the incidence of over-compliance by eliminating the uncertainty around just how much due diligence is required to mitigate anti-money laundering or counter-terrorist financing risks.

Ongoing Monitoring

Finally, the report envisions that the verification of JCPOA-related sanctions relief will be take place on an ongoing basis. The verification body would produce a quarterly report that would certify that Iran is benefiting from sanctions relief in accordance with the checklist. This monitoring function would track developments in five key sectors: baking and finance, transportation and logistics, oil, gas, and petrochemicals, aviation, and industry and mining. The body would also consult across government and with the private sector. As part of its report, the body would offer its recommendation as to whether Iran should remain in the JCPOA, decrease its commitments, or cease participation. The quarterly reports would be used by Iran to inform its engagement with the JCPOA Joint Commission. Interestingly, the report envisions an Iranian body tasked with verification and does not outline the creation of an international third-party body that would be the true analogue for the IAEA. This may reflect a lack of trust that the third-party body would be impartial.

Outlook for Negotiations

As the Raisi administration has delayed its return to the Vienna negotiations, fears have grown that Iran will not continue the talks where they left off in the sixth round, instead returning to the table with new and unreasonable demands. But there is little to indicate that Khamenei’s “final” stance on the talks have changed since February, meaning that the key unknown is how reasonable Iranian negotiators will be in seeking to secure his core demand for verified sanctions relief. To this end, the new report from the Majlis Research Center should be reassuring. While some of the demands are unreasonable, for example the high targets for Europe-Iran trade and the insistence on changes to how FinCEN provides guidance, they are undeniably technical. Should this report reflect an emerging consensus about how to “improve” the JCPOA not by changing its terms, but by improving its implementation, then the outlook for negotiations may be less dire that many predict. A focus on technical shortcomings rather than political or strategic flaws indicates that Iran sees the value of a restored JCPOA but wishes the benefits to be assured and durable. Should the Biden administration be prepared to acknowledge the shortcomings in the sanctions relief provided to Iran between 2016-2018, there are ways in which verification can be addressed within the context of the deal.

 

[Apollon]

A very interesting article,it clearly lays out the emerging consensus,based on the latest report by the majils research center,of irans basic political [and economic] requirements,ie verification of western compliance,for any return to the JCPOA.It describes both the flaws in the original rouhani era deal that ensured that it could never deliver on what was promised,and also the fixes that will be required in order for iran to consider that the JCPOA is still viable.

Here is a link to a pdf of the original report[in farsi]
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/s/BBF_Majlis_Sanctions_Verification_Report

Here's What Iran Wants From Sanctions Relief
https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2021/10/1/heres-what-iran-wants-from-sanctions-relief

Back in February, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, set out an early condition for new negotiations over the fate of the JCPOA. In a major speech outlining Iran’s “final” stance on U.S. reentry into the nuclear deal, Khamenei declared that sanctions relief must be implemented “in practice” and not just “on paper.” Iran would also “verify” that sanctions relief commitments had been met before fulfilling its own commitments under the restored agreement.

Khamenei’s demands were shaped by the bitter experience of the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and unilateral reimposition of sanctions. The issues surrounding sanctions relief and Khamenei’s demands hung over six rounds of negotiations in Vienna. They are again being cited as a possible reason for the Raisi administration’s slow return to the nuclear talks. But what exactly Iranian leaders envision for verifiable sanctions relief has been unclear.

A new report, published by the Office of the Deputy for Economic Research of the Majlis Research Center, the influential research body of the Iranian parliament, offers the first detailed assessment of what verified sanctions relief might look like. The report, entitled “Verifying Sanctions Relief,” does not represent the official position of the Raisi administration, but given the timing of its publication and the affiliation with parliament, it likely represents an emerging consensus about how best to meet Khamenei’s demands while also assuaging the concerns of Iranian parliamentarians who feel the JCPOA is inherently unfair. Many of the details in this new report are drawn from an April 2021 report published by the same research centre that also looked at issues around the verification of sanctions relief. But the new report is more detailed in its diagnosis of the problem sanctions verification seeks to address and the mechanisms that should be used.

In particular, the report aims to address the perceived imbalance between paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA. Iran interprets paragraph 26 to allow it to lessen its commitments under the deal if sanctions relief is not fully implemented—an interpretation that is disputed by the P5+1. Paragraph 36, meanwhile, allows any party to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism and begin the process of “snapback” of sanctions—a provision that Iran considers a tool for the West to renege on the deal. Additionally, the report outlines an asymmetry in the ways in which Iran’s nuclear commitments under the JCPOA and the sanctions commitments of the P5+1 are overseen and implemented. Unlike nuclear commitments, sanctions relief commitments lack a verification and monitoring mechanism, can be obstructed, are slow to implemented, and can be undone unilaterally through snapback. The report summarises this asymmetry in the following table (translated here):


Asymmetry in JCPOA Implementation

	Iranian commitments	P5+1 commitments
Body responsible for verification and monitoring	IAEA	None
Verification mechanism	Technical	Non-technical
Means to disrupt	None	Increasing the perceived risk of engaging Iran
Timeframe for implementation	Immediate	Not immediate (Delay between sanctions relief and economic benefits)
Means to punish	“Snapback” mechanism	None

To address this asymmetry, the report calls for measures to be taken in three broad areas. What is striking about these measures is their practicality. The report basically calls for a more institutional and technical approach to sanctions relief in which a checklist provides Iranian policymakers an ability to assess the implementation of sanctions relief on an ongoing basis. As part of this approach, the report also sets out targets for oil exports and bilateral trade with Europe.

New Verification Body

The report calls for the designation of an Iranian body or institution to oversee verification of sanctions relief. This could be the Supreme National Security Council or it could be a new body established with its own staff and active secretariat. The body would have three tasks:

1. Observe and assess the actual impact of sanctions removal.
2. Establish a mechanism so that any Iranian person or entity can submit a complaint about issues related to sanctions relief.
3. Prepare an action plan for decreasing nuclear commitments in the event that other parties to the JCPOA renege on their commitments. Actions might include ceasing the voluntary application of the Additional Protocol, producing uranium metal, increasing enrichment above 20 percent, or expanding the number of operational IR6 centrifuges.

Verification Checklist

The new verification body would perform its mission in accordance with a defined “checklist.” The checklist would have two sections. The first section relates to specific actions and targets related to American and European sanctions relief commitments. The stipulations include:

1. Iran should be able to export oil and gas condensate according to its rightful market share of 2.5 million barrels per day (bdp) with an initial target of 2 million bdp.
   This target is feasible—during the sanctions relief afforded Iran under the JCPOA in 2016-2018, Iran exports hovered between 2 and 2.5 million bpd.
2. Iran should be able to increase bilateral trade with key European partners and conduct normal banking transactions to facilitate that trade. The report stipulates an initial monthly target of $3 billion in transactions with EIH Bank in Germany, rising to $4.2 billion. Monthly transactions with the French branch of Tejarat Bank are targeted at $1 billion, rising to $1.5 billion.
   Here, the report has highlighted Iranian-controlled financial institutions in Europe as the key conduits, perhaps reflecting how in recent years Europe-Iran trade has been increasingly run through smaller European banks without Iranian ownership or management. While the report stipulates “transactions,” the targets here are high when likely trade totals are considered. Even if we interpret that key Germany and France-based banks may process most EU-Iran trade, the total initial transaction volume envisioned of $48 billion is significantly higher than the total value of EU-Iran trade in 2016 following the lifting of sanctions. That year, bilateral trade reached just over EUR 20 billion. While the transaction targets could include foreign investment in Iran, it is unlikely that either EIH or Tejarat Bank can scale-up to handle the envisioned volumes.
3. Iran will also seek to verify a range of sanctions lifting measures taken by the Biden administration. This includes the removal of executive orders issued by “two American presidents,” a likely reference to Trump and Biden that suggests a desire for non-nuclear sanctions designations, such as the Foreign Terrorist Organization designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, to be lifted. In addition, the report calls for the update of the website of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the sanctions enforcement body of the U.S. Department of Treasury. OFAC is to cease publishing notices, advisories, and fact sheets that dissuade trade with Iran and should increase the issuance of licenses and exemptions to ease trade
   This stipulation that means the report authors understand U.S. primary sanctions will continue to pose a challenge for Iran’s engagement with the global economy.

The second section of the checklist focuses on ongoing efforts to decrease the risks of doing business with Iran once sanctions have been lifted. These stipulations reflect the perception in Iran that following the lifting of sanctions “on paper” in January 2016, the Obama administration took a lackadaisical approach to supporting the normalisation of global trade and investment in Iran. The continued characterisation of Iran as a high-risk jurisdiction is seen to have hampered economic engagement. Therefore, the checklist would require:

1. The removal of all measures that have presented Iran as a jurisdiction with high risk of money laundering and adoption of measures to normalise economic relations with Iran.
2. Changing the basis of guidance to banks issued by the Treasury Department’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) from risk-based to rule-based.
3. Maximal removal of sanctioned individuals and entities from the SDN list and a substantive review of SDN and non-SDN sanctions lists.
4. Removal of statements by OFAC and other institutions that dissuade humanitarian trade and maritime trade with Iran. In addition, there should be new licenses issued to all banks that hold Iranian oil revenues in order to ensure the timely release of frozen assets.
5. A written commitment from neighbouring countries not to take action against foreign entities willing to engage Iran economically.
6. Official statements proclaiming that medium and long-term economic engagement with Iran is permissible and refraining from any action that would damage engagement with Iran.

Notably, the report does not indicate that Iran would make progress on key measures such as implementation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) action plan that would substantially change the perceived risk associated with engaging with the Iranian financial system. While the demand that FinCEN changes its guidance from risk-based to rule-based is unrealistic, it does point to a desire for a more prescriptive approach from the U.S. government that may create a basis for reciprocal regulatory reforms in Iran. Here, the report is pointing to the issue of over-compliance by international banks, which deem the risks and costs of transacting with Iran, even in support of clearly permissible trade, to be too high. FinCEN’s risk-based guidance essentially places the burden on financial institutions to determine the appropriate level of due diligence, putting bank managers in an uncomfortable position where minimising risk means maximising administrative burdens. A more prescriptive approach, like the rule-based approaches taken by some European regulators, may reduce the incidence of over-compliance by eliminating the uncertainty around just how much due diligence is required to mitigate anti-money laundering or counter-terrorist financing risks.

Ongoing Monitoring

Finally, the report envisions that the verification of JCPOA-related sanctions relief will be take place on an ongoing basis. The verification body would produce a quarterly report that would certify that Iran is benefiting from sanctions relief in accordance with the checklist. This monitoring function would track developments in five key sectors: baking and finance, transportation and logistics, oil, gas, and petrochemicals, aviation, and industry and mining. The body would also consult across government and with the private sector. As part of its report, the body would offer its recommendation as to whether Iran should remain in the JCPOA, decrease its commitments, or cease participation. The quarterly reports would be used by Iran to inform its engagement with the JCPOA Joint Commission. Interestingly, the report envisions an Iranian body tasked with verification and does not outline the creation of an international third-party body that would be the true analogue for the IAEA. This may reflect a lack of trust that the third-party body would be impartial.

Outlook for Negotiations

As the Raisi administration has delayed its return to the Vienna negotiations, fears have grown that Iran will not continue the talks where they left off in the sixth round, instead returning to the table with new and unreasonable demands. But there is little to indicate that Khamenei’s “final” stance on the talks have changed since February, meaning that the key unknown is how reasonable Iranian negotiators will be in seeking to secure his core demand for verified sanctions relief. To this end, the new report from the Majlis Research Center should be reassuring. While some of the demands are unreasonable, for example the high targets for Europe-Iran trade and the insistence on changes to how FinCEN provides guidance, they are undeniably technical. Should this report reflect an emerging consensus about how to “improve” the JCPOA not by changing its terms, but by improving its implementation, then the outlook for negotiations may be less dire that many predict. A focus on technical shortcomings rather than political or strategic flaws indicates that Iran sees the value of a restored JCPOA but wishes the benefits to be assured and durable. Should the Biden administration be prepared to acknowledge the shortcomings in the sanctions relief provided to Iran between 2016-2018, there are ways in which verification can be addressed within the context of the deal.

From our point of view any new contract between Iran and Europe must also contain several points.

1. Iran and Israel must come to peaceful relations, this would put alot of pressure out of the near east.

2. Iran has to allow full acess to its nuclear sites

 

[QWECXZ]

From our point of view any new contract between Iran and Europe must also contain several points.

1. Iran and Israel must come to peaceful relations, this would put alot of pressure out of the near east.

2. Iran has to allow full acess to its nuclear sites

Do you seriously think anybody in any part of the world cares about Greece's point of view? You're not even a middle power.

 

[Apollon]

Do you seriously think anybody in any part of the world cares about Greece's point of view? You're not even a middle power.

And thats exactly our power. We see things neutral.

We know what USA wants, We know what Brussels wants, we know what Israel wants and we know what Iran wants.

There wont be any functional agreement if the points that i mentioned are not fullfilled. Israel will never accept any agreement when Iran and Israel have not made some stable or neutral relations. Thats a simple fact and also the main reason why the first agreement was destroyed. Israel did evrything in its power to bring it down. Same thing will happen again.

Beside that i might remember you that Greece is a member of the EU. The EU decides with one vote. If Greece says no, nothing is decided. Which means we have as much power as Germany or France in this process. The main reason why Turkey never became member of the EU, even so Germany wanted it.

We are neutral with Iran and have quite positive relations. So just consider it as advice from a friendly nation.

 

[QWECXZ]

And thats exactly our power. We see things neutral.

We know what USA wants, We know what Brussels wants, we know what Israel wants and we know what Iran wants.

There wont be any functional agreement if the points that i mentioned are fullfilled. Israel will never accept any agreement when Iran and Israel have not made some stable or neutral relations. Thats a simple fact and also the main reason why the first agreement was destroyed. Israel did evrything in its power to bring it down. Same thing will happen again.

Beside that i might remember you that Greece is a member of the EU. The EU decides with one vote. If Greece says no, nothing is decided. Which means we have as much power as Germany or France in this process. The main reason why Turkey never became member of the EU, even so Germany wanted it.

We are neutral with Iran and have quite positive relations. So just consider it as advice from a friendly nation.

Nah, not really. Try again. Why do you assume that you are neutral by the way? Did Greece refuse to take part in Trump's maximum pressure campaign? I don't remember that.

The first agreement collapsed because our negotiators did an awful job. The reformist government of Iran at the time negotiated an agreement that was based on mutual trust, something that the conservatives in Iran had been warning against it at every opportunity. Also, the whole election campaign of the reformist party was based on an agreement over our nuclear program and they felt that they had to do it as quickly as possible to secure a second term. Luckily or not, those negotiators are out. Some of them may not ever get a new official role for the rest of their lives.

As for the European Union, I hate to say it but the EU does not hold much power in the international relations these days. First of all, only the UK and France are important for us because they are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Even Germany is in the negotiations as a wild card (it used to be our biggest trade partner in Europe) and we might ditch them if they don't work in our favor. So, your argument about the EU, even if true, does not really mean much to us. Plus, the UK is no longer part of the EU.

But even France and the UK have been proven to be inept at defying the US. France itself is throwing temper tantrums because the US literally stole over 50 billions of dollars from its pocket. Can you take a country that can't protect itself from the US seriously?

It is very likely that the Europeans will be left entirely from future negotiations between Iran and the United States. Negotiating with the Americans used to be a taboo for the Iranian regime. That's why the Europeans got involved. Now that the taboo has been broken, Iran and the US may eventually settle their differences together. And in that case, nobody cares what the Europeans think, let alone one European country.

 

[Apollon]

Nah, not really. Try again. Why do you assume that you are neutral by the way? Did Greece refuse to take part in Trump's maximum pressure campaign? I don't remember that.

The first agreement collapsed because our negotiators did an awful job. The reformist government of Iran at the time negotiated an agreement that was based on mutual trust, something that the conservatives in Iran had been warning against it at every opportunity. Also, the whole election campaign of the reformist party was based on an agreement over our nuclear program and they felt that they had to do it as quickly as possible to secure a second term. Luckily or not, those negotiators are out. Some of them may not ever get a new official role for the rest of their lives.

As for the European Union, I hate to say it but the EU does not hold much power in the international relations these days. First of all, only the UK and France are important for us because they are permanent members of the UN Security Council. Even Germany is in the negotiations as a wild card (it used to be our biggest trade partner in Europe) and we might ditch them if they don't work in our favor. So, your argument about the EU, even if true, does not really mean much to us. Plus, the UK is no longer part of the EU.

But even France and the UK have been proven to be inept at defying the US. France itself is throwing temper tantrums because the US literally stole over 50 billions of dollars from its pocket. Can you take a country that can't protect itself from the US seriously?

It is very likely that the Europeans will be left entirely from future negotiations between Iran and the United States. Negotiating with the Americans used to be a taboo for the Iranian regime. That's why the Europeans got involved. Now that the taboo has been broken, Iran and the US may eventually settle their differences together. And in that case, nobody cares what the Europeans think, let alone one European country.

And thats the reason why you always lose. You never get the grand scheme right.

Europe, one of the largest economies in the world, has extreme power and has proven to simply crush sanctions when they wanted too. A good example is Cuba, where EU simply made US sanctions illegal.

THE EU ditched the agreement with Iran as much as US did. It was good cop, bad cop game. The EU could have easily used the same mechanism they used to declare sanctions against Cuba illegal.

Iran is meaningless in the grand scheme of things. This is USA vs China. And Biden needs Europe desperately in his attempt to counter China. Something Europe is not willing to do now. Biden wont ditch Europe for minor negotiations with Iran.

 

[Muhammed45]

From our point of view any new contract between Iran and Europe must also contain several points.

1. Iran and Israel must come to peaceful relations, this would put alot of pressure out of the near east.

2. Iran has to allow full acess to its nuclear sites

And who the hell are you to say that Mr Genius?

 

[QWECXZ]

And thats the reason why you always lose. You never get the grand scheme right.

Europe, one of the largest economies in the world, has extreme power and has proven to simply crush sanctions when they wanted too. A good example is Cuba, where EU simply made US sanctions illegal.

THE EU ditched the agreement with Iran as much as US did. It was good cop, bad cop game. The EU could have easily used the same mechanism they used to declare sanctions against Cuba illegal.

Iran is meaningless in the grand scheme of things. This is USA vs China. And Biden needs Europe desperately in his attempt to counter China. Something Europe is not willing to do now. Biden wont ditch Europe for minor negotiations with Iran.

Yeah. We always lose like when we were occupying most of your "kingdoms" and your "people" had to fight in our army under our command. Losses like how the United States (the Achaemenid empire) lost in Afghanistan (Greece). I wonder why Iran is 13 times larger than Greece though.

I hate to break it to you, but Europe has no power and can crush nothing. A very cold winter is coming for you with oil prices above $100 a barrel. There used to be a time, mostly during 1990s, when we had extensive economic ties with Europe and most of our main trade partners were European countries. Things have changed fast since then. Europe used to buy 20% of our oil. Now China is gladly buying it. And they're more than happy to buy even more secretly. Our trade with Europe is minimal and we intend to keep it this way until the Europeans have become even more irrelevant to international relations than they are now.

Believe it or not, Iran is way more relevant to the grand scheme of things than Greece has ever been or will ever be. And believe it or not, nobody has a problem ditching Europe when the chance of Europe surviving in its current form in the next 5 decades is quite low.

 

[Muhammed45]

And thats the reason why you always lose. You never get the grand scheme right.

Europe, one of the largest economies in the world, has extreme power and has proven to simply crush sanctions when they wanted too. A good example is Cuba, where EU simply made US sanctions illegal.

THE EU ditched the agreement with Iran as much as US did. It was good cop, bad cop game. The EU could have easily used the same mechanism they used to declare sanctions against Cuba illegal.

Iran is meaningless in the grand scheme of things. This is USA vs China. And Biden needs Europe desperately in his attempt to counter China. Something Europe is not willing to do now. Biden wont ditch Europe for minor negotiations with Iran.

Sorry for bursting your bubble, EU is an American lappy with no actual power. USA has planted its nuclear warheads all over European countries making them its frontline against Russia an other part of Europe ironically. Why can't Brussels take its golds back from New York eh?

Europe is nothing more than a regional dog under American boots.

 

[Apollon]

And who the hell are you to say that Mr Genius?

I am an individual person. In our culture we can say our opinion.

 

[QWECXZ]

I am an individual person. In our culture we can say our opinion.

Yeah, as long as it does not deviate from the official story of the World War II and the Holocaust.

 

[Apollon]

Yeah. We always lose like when we were occupying most of your "kingdoms" and your "people" had to fight in our army under our command. Losses like how the United States (the Achaemenid empire) lost in Afghanistan (Greece). I wonder why Iran is 13 times larger than Greece though.

I hate to break it to you, but Europe has no power and can crush nothing. A very cold winter is coming for you with oil prices above $100 a barrel. There used to be a time, mostly during 1990s, when we had extensive economic ties with Europe and most of our main trade partners were European countries. Things have changed fast since then. Europe used to buy 20% of our oil. Now China is gladly buying it. And they're more than happy to buy even more secretly. Our trade with Europe is minimal and we intend to keep it this way until the Europeans have become even more irrelevant to international relations than they are now.

Believe it or not, Iran is way more relevant to the grand scheme of things than Greece has ever been or will ever be. And believe it or not, nobody has a problem ditching Europe when the chance of Europe surviving in its current form in the next 5 decades is quite low.

Iran never set a foot into where i come from. Remember it was us, who crushed your empire. Sparta is just 100 km away from my town.

That said, most of Iran is infertile deserts and mountains. I assume our fertile land is equal to ours.

P.s. i wonder where your agression comes from? Just because i assumed Iran will have to make peace with Israel? Thats a simple fact.

Greece has excellent relations with Israel, we even build pipelines with them. Iran used to have good relations with them too and im sure will have again.

Sorry for bursting your bubble, EU is an American lappy with no actual power. USA has planted its nuclear warheads all over European countries making them its frontline against Russia an other part of Europe ironically. Why can't Brussels take its golds back from New York eh?

Europe is nothing more than a regional dog under American boots.

Germany took its gold back from New York in 2017. Brussels has no gold in New York.

 

[Battlion25]

Yeah. We always lose like when we were occupying most of your "kingdoms" and your "people" had to fight in our army under our command. Losses like how the United States (the Achaemenid empire) lost in Afghanistan (Greece). I wonder why Iran is 13 times larger than Greece though.

I hate to break it to you, but Europe has no power and can crush nothing. A very cold winter is coming for you with oil prices above $100 a barrel. There used to be a time, mostly during 1990s, when we had extensive economic ties with Europe and most of our main trade partners were European countries. Things have changed fast since then. Europe used to buy 20% of our oil. Now China is gladly buying it. And they're more than happy to buy even more secretly. Our trade with Europe is minimal and we intend to keep it this way until the Europeans have become even more irrelevant to international relations than they are now.

Believe it or not, Iran is way more relevant to the grand scheme of things than Greece has ever been or will ever be. And believe it or not, nobody has a problem ditching Europe when the chance of Europe surviving in its current form in the next 5 decades is quite low.

Sorry for bursting your bubble, EU is an American lappy with no actual power. USA has planted its nuclear warheads all over European countries making them its frontline against Russia an other part of Europe ironically. Why can't Brussels take its golds back from New York eh?

Europe is nothing more than a regional dog under American boots.

I was skeptical of you previously but you proved me wrong. Now that is the kind of brotherly nation I envision.. Iran has to re-united with it's body. In such scenario forget sanctions or building one we will give you dozens

By the way.. Iran has more recoginition, relevance and name than EU combined of mini irrelevant states..

By the way don't vaste time on the remnants left behind by the turks across Europe like the greeks, bulgars, and many others who make part of the so-called mini states of the EU

 

[Apollon]

Now, after hearing your fantasies, here is what happened:

In 480 BCE, after the victory of Xerxes I at the Battle of Thermopylae, all of Boeotia fell to the Achaemenid Army. The two cities that had resisted Xerxes, Thespiae and Plataea, were captured and razed. Attica was also left open to invasion, and the remaining population of Athens was thus evacuated, with the aid of the Allied fleet, to Salamis.[1] The Peloponnesian Allies began to prepare a defensive line across the Isthmus of Corinth, building a wall, and demolishing the road from Megara, thereby abandoning Athens to the Persians.[2]

Athens fell a first time in September 480 BCE.[3] The small number of Athenians who had barricaded themselves on the Acropolis were eventually defeated, and Xerxes then ordered Athens to be torched.[4] The Acropolis was razed, and the Old Temple of Athena and the Older Parthenon destroyed:[5]

Why do you stop there my friend and dont continue how things developed from there? Move on, i´m interested how it developed from there one.

Tell us how it went at Salamis and Plataea. Not a single persian made it out alive.

You stop right when it gets interesting.

I was skeptical of you previously but you proved me wrong. Now that is the kind of brotherly nation I envision.. Iran has to re-united with it's body. In such scenario forget sanctions or building one we will give you dozens

By the way.. Iran has more recoginition, relevance and name than EU combined of mini irrelevant states..

By the way don't vaste time on the remnants left behind by the turks across Europe like the greeks, bulgars, and many others who make part of the so-called mini states of the EU

Iran has a smaller economy than Romania...which is the poorest EU member state...

 

[tower9]

From our point of view any new contract between Iran and Europe must also contain several points.

1. Iran and Israel must come to peaceful relations, this would put alot of pressure out of the near east.

2. Iran has to allow full acess to its nuclear sites

You're acting like Israel can be trusted to act in good faith and would settle for anything other than an overthrow of Iran's government. Sorry, Israel's voice doesn't count. They are the most destabilizing influence in the whole region.