Facts About “Spy Master” Hameed Gul You Need To Know!

[B@KH]

No, you have no clue what you have been talking about. Here's why:

• According to you Iran wasn't involved, when I showed you their involvement, you refused to admit that you were at fault.
• According to you, their mission was completed. What a completion, we saw their mission doomed with the fall of Kabul and ultimately in 1996.
• Going by your logic, USA won the war in Vietnam, instead of comparing it to Vietnam, you are making absurd comparisons with "shaitan bozurg" in Afghanistan.
  
  Clearly, you have no idea about warfare. Let alone warfare, your brain cannot even comprehend how we fought India and how we fought USSR. Had USSR invaded Pakistan, Pakistan would have fallen. I am in no mood of useless debate as you have no idea about the warfare in Afghanistan at that time. You are only making yourself look like a fool here with pathetic statements like above.

you can keep your Talibanic views that due to them the usa and ussr ran away.
or can say more that hameed gul made usa and ussr ran away.

why don't you see things in broader picture and behind the curtains.

Ofcourse if capitalist wahabis would have failed in Pak then for sure the answer was socialism as Islam was not acceptable to the satans. Those days all nations had to live under capitalism or communism or socialism or wahabisism. there were only few choices given to the world nations.

Capitalist wahabis vs socialists/communists - fair fight - whosoever wins had the right.

The taboo was broken by the Powerful بت شِكن Islamic Revolution in IRAN that changed the world.

 

[Solomon2]

A general’s legacy
By Ayesha Siddiqa
Published: August 20, 2015

PHOTO: AFP

It was an eerie feeling hearing of Lt General Hamid Gul’s death, almost the way it felt 27 years ago when General Ziaul Haq died on August 17, 1988. No one could quite believe that General Zia would ever go away, leave alone exit the way he did. Had nature waited another two days, people could have remembered a whole generation of generals together — Zia, Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Gul.

Notwithstanding disagreements with his strategic thinking, Gul was easy to talk to. While many of his contemporaries and successors feigned innocence when it came to the question of feeding militants, Gul unabashedly owned up to core policies of the security establishment. He owned up to the expensive security policies of his institution without admitting to the high cost that the state and society had to bear as a result of following them. He didn’t mind being a punching bag. I remember a personal conversation with him in 2001 regarding a de-weaponisation campaign that disallowed public display of weapons. He claimed playing a role in building consensus within mujahideen groups to comply with the campaign and not get into any friction with the military. He was thrilled by every political crisis, as he believed it meant the state and society was inching towards its real destiny of establishing Islamic rule and perhaps, the recreation of a Muslim empire in the form of a formidable Islamic state. Although he was no longer in the ISI in 1990, he was part of an intellectual exercise, along with Mirza Aslam Beg, to develop contours of a policy of strategic defiance and expansion. A restricted paper titled “Gulf Crisis 1990” expanded upon the idea of Pakistan installing itself as a regional power, but also as a potent force representing the Muslim bloc. Part of the plan was to use the Afghan mujahideen as additional infantry in case of a war with India. Not surprisingly, in 2008, another spymaster, Gul’s junior, who was known to represent cultural liberalism and moderation, called people such as Baitullah Mehsud patriots and recognised the right of the Taliban and jihadis to speak their minds.

In his personal life, Gul was not a fundamentalist, but neither was Zia. Unlike ordinary people, the families of these generals were given greater freedom to pursue matters of faith. Of course, Zia, Rahman and Gul believed in religious ethos, but they fine-tuned the use of religion for strategic purposes to a different level. Some will argue that Pakistan’s entire leadership, be it military or political, used religion for concrete political gains. But the junta in charge of the country during the 1980s took it to greater heights. If the 1980s is viewed as a watershed decade, then these generals were certainly part of that watershed and denote a critical milestone in the strategic thinking of their institution. The norms they set did not end with them. Many years later in 2009, as I interviewed another army chief ‘for a few hours’, he spoke about how Swat could be handled by allowing sharia rule in the area. He believed that the rest of the country could continue as normal. This was a continuation of the Gul school of thought that religious militancy could be used, but kept out of cantonments and other strategic areas. He probably knew a lot about ‘asset management’ to assume that these elements would not really get out of control, especially if good communication was maintained with them. To Gul, Pervez Musharraf’s over-obsession with the US was the primary cause for deteriorating relations with strategic assets. He must have died a proud man realising that succeeding generations of officers have kept up the traditions he established.

Gul and many of his colleagues fought the American war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. While many officers of the time were too glad to present the invasion as a precursor to Moscow invading Pakistan, Gul argued otherwise. When I interviewed him for the first time in 1994, he claimed that the configuration of Soviet forces in Afghanistan did not indicate further expansion. He held a similar opinion about India’s military exercise ‘Brasstacks’, which was labelled by many in Pakistan’s security community as a build-up to war. Gul claimed that because Generals Rahman and K M Arif had no experience of commanding a corps, they misread the movement across the border. He was one of those who argued for testing Indian intent by moving a strike corps close to the border, resulting in de-escalation.

Obviously, Gul challenged decisions within the confines of organisational norms; otherwise he would have been sent packing, as has historically happened to some good officers who suffered the ire of their bosses for disagreeing with them. He was extremely dedicated to the military’s internal and external power maximisation and survived as one of the beneficiaries of the myth-building around the fear of Soviet invasion. As money and weapons poured in, so did the capacity of the security establishment to fight a low-intensity conflict. The intelligence apparatus was fairly independent in raising its own funds.

This generation of generals provided the real watershed in military-strategic thinking in Pakistan — the war front could be made thrilling despite the disparity in conventional weapons strength. If Pakistan could cause the break-up of the Soviet Union (as is popularly believed) then gains could be made at other fronts, too, using the same operational formula. Gul was one of those who fathered the idea that Afghanistan could be manipulated for power maximisation in the larger South and Central Asian regions. This was not about defending territory against an offensive, which was the main logic behind Pakistan training the first generation of Afghan warlords during the 1970s, so they could keep President Daud’s government in check. The 1980s was a decade when the term offensive-defence took on a whole new meaning. This was also the beginning of a strategic thinking that insisted upon carving a larger military-strategic role in the region. So, when later spymasters flaunt how the world seriously engages with Pakistan and its military, it’s the thinking of Gul’s generation at work. Indeed, despite evidence of some friction, the military never disowned him or Zia.

Published in The Express Tribune, August 20th, 2015.

 

[The Headache]

Fact 5

His name is enough to make Indians Piss in there pants..

I heard his name for the first time when I read about his death on TOI. So, nuff said

 

[Indus Falcon]

Fact 6 He was a fool of highest grade

@waz @Jango @Horus @Emmie @Manticore

Request a ban for this monkey!

Thank You

 

[Not So Good]

@waz @Jango @Horus @Emmie @Manticore

Request a ban for this monkey!

Thank You

Cool down bro I'm going to delete that post
Btw he is not a saint he did more harm to pakistan than anyone else
Good to see he is your hero

 

[Kakaspai]

The guy who took apart soviet Union

 

[Indus Falcon]

Cool down bro I'm going to delete that post
Btw he is not a saint he did more harm to pakistan than anyone else
Good to see he is your hero

I don't need a two bit Indian telling me, what he was, and wasn't!!!

I heard his name for the first time when I read about his death on TOI. So, nuff said

Not our fault if you are illiterate! enough said!!

 

[Not So Good]

The guy who took apart soviet Union

Ironic that now you are begging the same Soviets/Russia for money
Is that a victory for you

 

[Kakaspai]

Ironic that now you are begging the same Soviets/Russia for money
Is that a victory for you

yes it is a victory for us and yes we are short on cash but we aren't out of cash

 

[Not So Good]

yes it is a victory for us and yes we are short on cash but we aren't out of cash

Seriously brother imagine if someone sane had then incharge of the whole Afghan matter, don't you think you would have been in better terms with Russia

 

[Signalian]

Gen Hameed Gul along with Zia didnt give Pakistan great gifts to remember in 1980's.

1. Extremism through religion especially promoting wahabism to fuel jihad and mujahideen
2. Ak-47 culture
3. Madrassa trainings
4. Herione and drug culture
5. Infinite influx of afghan illegals in our streets
6. Creation of IJI and promotion of MQM in Sindh to counter PPP.

There was no exit strategy for Taliban. we have lost thousands of soldiers and civilians. He along with Zia never completely understood CIA.

His two major achievements were defeat of USSR for which the above price was paid and still being paid by Pakistan. Second was the Jihad in kashmir in 1990's backed by Pakistan.

 

[Kakaspai]

Seriously brother imagine if someone sane had then incharge of the whole Afghan matter, don't you think you would have been in better terms with Russia

the problem is USA wants you to be either with them or against them

 

[ZooZoo]

Who is Spy-Master??

One who clean the terrorism..

The one who make terrorist is not good spy-master.. Spreading evil is easy, containing evil is tough.
Terrorist Lakhwi, terrorsist Saeed and many other terrorists are his brain child..

 

[Indus Falcon]

yA. Maybe your hijra chief wasn't good enough to be known. nuff said !

You just showed what sort of family background you come from!

@waz @Jango @Slav Defence @Horus @Emmie This idiot needs to be put in his place, plus this thread needs to shut down / cleaned up.

Thank You!

 

[Indus Falcon]

A general’s legacy
By Ayesha Siddiqa
Published: August 20, 2015

PHOTO: AFP

It was an eerie feeling hearing of Lt General Hamid Gul’s death, almost the way it felt 27 years ago when General Ziaul Haq died on August 17, 1988. No one could quite believe that General Zia would ever go away, leave alone exit the way he did. Had nature waited another two days, people could have remembered a whole generation of generals together — Zia, Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Gul.

Notwithstanding disagreements with his strategic thinking, Gul was easy to talk to. While many of his contemporaries and successors feigned innocence when it came to the question of feeding militants, Gul unabashedly owned up to core policies of the security establishment. He owned up to the expensive security policies of his institution without admitting to the high cost that the state and society had to bear as a result of following them. He didn’t mind being a punching bag. I remember a personal conversation with him in 2001 regarding a de-weaponisation campaign that disallowed public display of weapons. He claimed playing a role in building consensus within mujahideen groups to comply with the campaign and not get into any friction with the military. He was thrilled by every political crisis, as he believed it meant the state and society was inching towards its real destiny of establishing Islamic rule and perhaps, the recreation of a Muslim empire in the form of a formidable Islamic state. Although he was no longer in the ISI in 1990, he was part of an intellectual exercise, along with Mirza Aslam Beg, to develop contours of a policy of strategic defiance and expansion. A restricted paper titled “Gulf Crisis 1990” expanded upon the idea of Pakistan installing itself as a regional power, but also as a potent force representing the Muslim bloc. Part of the plan was to use the Afghan mujahideen as additional infantry in case of a war with India. Not surprisingly, in 2008, another spymaster, Gul’s junior, who was known to represent cultural liberalism and moderation, called people such as Baitullah Mehsud patriots and recognised the right of the Taliban and jihadis to speak their minds.

In his personal life, Gul was not a fundamentalist, but neither was Zia. Unlike ordinary people, the families of these generals were given greater freedom to pursue matters of faith. Of course, Zia, Rahman and Gul believed in religious ethos, but they fine-tuned the use of religion for strategic purposes to a different level. Some will argue that Pakistan’s entire leadership, be it military or political, used religion for concrete political gains. But the junta in charge of the country during the 1980s took it to greater heights. If the 1980s is viewed as a watershed decade, then these generals were certainly part of that watershed and denote a critical milestone in the strategic thinking of their institution. The norms they set did not end with them. Many years later in 2009, as I interviewed another army chief ‘for a few hours’, he spoke about how Swat could be handled by allowing sharia rule in the area. He believed that the rest of the country could continue as normal. This was a continuation of the Gul school of thought that religious militancy could be used, but kept out of cantonments and other strategic areas. He probably knew a lot about ‘asset management’ to assume that these elements would not really get out of control, especially if good communication was maintained with them. To Gul, Pervez Musharraf’s over-obsession with the US was the primary cause for deteriorating relations with strategic assets. He must have died a proud man realising that succeeding generations of officers have kept up the traditions he established.

Gul and many of his colleagues fought the American war in Afghanistan during the 1980s. While many officers of the time were too glad to present the invasion as a precursor to Moscow invading Pakistan, Gul argued otherwise. When I interviewed him for the first time in 1994, he claimed that the configuration of Soviet forces in Afghanistan did not indicate further expansion. He held a similar opinion about India’s military exercise ‘Brasstacks’, which was labelled by many in Pakistan’s security community as a build-up to war. Gul claimed that because Generals Rahman and K M Arif had no experience of commanding a corps, they misread the movement across the border. He was one of those who argued for testing Indian intent by moving a strike corps close to the border, resulting in de-escalation.

Obviously, Gul challenged decisions within the confines of organisational norms; otherwise he would have been sent packing, as has historically happened to some good officers who suffered the ire of their bosses for disagreeing with them. He was extremely dedicated to the military’s internal and external power maximisation and survived as one of the beneficiaries of the myth-building around the fear of Soviet invasion. As money and weapons poured in, so did the capacity of the security establishment to fight a low-intensity conflict. The intelligence apparatus was fairly independent in raising its own funds.

This generation of generals provided the real watershed in military-strategic thinking in Pakistan — the war front could be made thrilling despite the disparity in conventional weapons strength. If Pakistan could cause the break-up of the Soviet Union (as is popularly believed) then gains could be made at other fronts, too, using the same operational formula. Gul was one of those who fathered the idea that Afghanistan could be manipulated for power maximisation in the larger South and Central Asian regions. This was not about defending territory against an offensive, which was the main logic behind Pakistan training the first generation of Afghan warlords during the 1970s, so they could keep President Daud’s government in check. The 1980s was a decade when the term offensive-defence took on a whole new meaning. This was also the beginning of a strategic thinking that insisted upon carving a larger military-strategic role in the region. So, when later spymasters flaunt how the world seriously engages with Pakistan and its military, it’s the thinking of Gul’s generation at work. Indeed, despite evidence of some friction, the military never disowned him or Zia.

Published in The Express Tribune, August 20th, 2015.

@waz @Jango @Slav Defence @Horus @Emmie BS nonsense. Would appreciate it being deleted form this thread!

Ya Ya. You are saying like you were born in some General's household. And BTW, you don't really know me. Just come to India and in particular to my state and I'll show you who I am [In general, tera BAAP]

@waz @Jango @Slav Defence @Horus @Emmie