gypt’s Muslim Brotherhood First Casualty Of US Verdict: Saudi Arabia Not Qatar, To Lead Arab World – OpEd
By Zayd Alisa
July 26, 2013
The Egyptian army issued a stern ultimatum, on July 1, 2013, which was ostensibly a stark warning to both, Morsi, the elected president of Egypt – who represents the Muslim Brotherhood MB – and on the other side the Tamarod Movement and the National Salvation Front – which is a loose coalition of secular parties. However, in reality, it was nothing short of a thinly veiled threat to, Morsi, stressing that unless he conceded a significant portion of his powers within 48 hours, the army would oust him. It was abundantly clear that the army has already taken the monumental decision to depose Morsi.
Given that the U.S. provides the Egyptian army with $ 1.5 billion annually in military aid, so it is highly inconceivable for the army to embark on such a highly risky strategy without the full blessing of its paymaster. Therefore, Morsi, tried to make it starkly embarrassing to the U.S. by explicitly emphasising in his speeches on, Jul. 2, – and, Jul. 3, – that he was the first democratically elected civilian president of Egypt.
While, it is incontestable that Qatar – headed by its previous Emir, Hamed bin Khalifa Al Thani and his Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Hamed Bin Jassim – was at the forefront of unequivocally backing the popular uprisings that swept Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Syria, however, when these uprisings were on the verge of successfully toppling dictatorship, the Qataris always scrambled to restrict their support to propping up the MB.
The Saudi regime, by contrast was deeply rattled by the popular uprisings that swept through the region. The Saudi regime offered Ben Ali, Tunisia’s dictator, refuge and the Saudi king gave his emphatic support to Mubarek, Egypt’s tyrant, threatening the U.S. that he would bankroll him. The Saudis also implemented their own initiative, replacing, Saleh, Yemen’s dictator, with another staunch ally. For the Saudis, the Bahraini uprising was indisputably the nightmare scenario. Since, Bahrain – a dictatorship, which is only a stone-throw away – is governed by, Al Khalifa family, from the Sunni minority. While, just like, Saudi Arabia’s oil-rich Eastern province the vast majority of its population are Shia. Therefore, fearing the pervasion of the uprising to Saudi Arabia, the king offered billions of dollars in benefits, strictly prohibited protests, rewarded the Salafi Wahhabi religious establishment and, most ominously, gave the green light to the Saudi army to invade and occupy Bahrain. What is irrefutable is the pivotal role played by the radical and regressive Salafi Wahhabi religious establishment in giving religious legitimacy to the Saudi regime, which in turn provides it with the vital funding to propagate and export its violent ideology. According to the Wahhabi ideology it is strictly forbidden to oppose the ruler. Thus, in the Saudi regime’s eyes the MB’s explicit endorsement of political Islam – which underlines explicitly that legitimacy to rule stems only from democratic elections – is undoubtedly an existential threat, casting serious doubts on the very legitimacy of the Saudi King’s absolute power. To make matters even worse, Qatar has enthusiastically embraced and even offered citizenship to the influential and highly controversial spiritual leader of the MB, Yusuf Al Qaradawi.
As the protest in Syria, became increasingly militarised, the Qataris ramped up their full-blown support to the MB. For the Saudis, the Syrian regime has consistently been, since the days of the late, Hafiz Al Assad, Bashar’s father, a major thorn in its side and an irreplaceable strategic ally to Iran. Consequently, its overthrow would irreparably damage Iranian influence. The Saudi regime moved swiftly to shore up the armed insurgents, fast crumbling front, by utilising its intelligence service’s – whose instrumental role in establishing and funding Jabhat Al Nusra JN was highlighted in an online intelligence review released in Paris in, Jan. 2013 – huge influence and leverage – on, not only Sunni tribal leaders in Western Iraq, but also Saudi members of Al Qaida in Iraq AQI, who according to an NBC report in, Jun. 2005, formed a majority (55 %) of the suicide bombers and foreign fighters converging on Iraq – to convince AQI that its principal battlefield must be Syria and its ultimate goal should be deposing Bashar Al Assad Alawite regime, since its overthrow would break the back-bone of the Iraqi Shia-led government and inevitably loosen Iran’s grip on Iraq. Creating a new branch of Al Qaida in Syria under the new label of JN, which was not yet designated a terrorist organisation, was, not only an unmissable lifeline to AQI – which was on the back foot, in 2011 – enabling it to circumvent the strict sanctions, but also it provided Saudi Arabia and Qatar with a window of opportunity to bolster AQI and JN – under the perfect pretext of supporting democracy in Syria – to destabilise both countries without being accused of shoring up terrorism. So AQI scrambled to send Abu Mohammed Al Jolani, in, Jul. 2011, to form JN, while, Aymen Al Zawahri, the overall leader of Al Qaida instructed all of his fighters in, Feb, 2012, to converge on Syria. The New York Times reported, on, Oct. 14. 2012, that most of the weapons shipped by Saudi Arabia and Qatar are going to hard-line jihadist in Syria. Thus, explaining how JN swiftly turned into the best armed group in Syria. It also reported on, Feb. 29, 2013, that Saudi Arabia has dramatically stepped up support for the rebels by financing a large purchase of weapons from Croatia. However, its article on, Apr. 27, 2013, was – even though indirectly – far more scathing about, Saudi and Qatari, arming and funding of extremist jihadist by asserting ominously, that nowhere in rebel-controlled Syria is there a secular fighting force. The Guardian, meanwhile, reported on, Jun. 22, 2012, that Saudi Arabia is in the process of paying salaries to Syrian rebels to entice them to defect from the Syrian army. But, in a rare admission, by a well informed source – in an article, on, Apr. 13, 2013, in Al Arabia news channel, a mouthpiece of the Saudi regime – confirming the purchase and shipment of Croatian weapons to Syrian rebels and acknowledging that appointing, Bander Bin Sultan, in, Jul. 2012, as intelligence chief, was to ratchet up Saudi Arabia’s faltering efforts in Syria. Even more revealing, however, was the assertion that, Bander, was firmly behind the steering wheel, so the Qataris must have been told to take a back seat. In essence, all this funding, arming, and paying salaries to militants by Saudi Arabia and Qatar have, not only turned JN – which according to Abu Baker Al Baghdadi’s, head of AQI, declaration in early, Apr. 2013, is merely an extension of AQI – Salafi Wahhabi group into the most ruthless and potent force among the opposition groups, but also dramatically reinvigorated AQI.
Without a doubt, the recapture of the strategic city of Qusair, in early Jun. 2013, by the Syrian army, backed up by its Lebanese allies Hezbollah, marked a major turning point in the Syrian conflict, sending shockwaves across Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the U.S. Thus, prompting Obama’s startling decision on, Jun. 13, 2013, to arm the rebels. Followed menacingly by, Saudi Arabia’s king, sudden return from his holiday. Last time he returned suddenly was to invade and occupy Bahrain. This time, he went back to assume his new role as the undisputed leader of the Arab World after the U.S.’s verdict: Saudi Arabia not Qatar, must lead the Arab World. Thus, Qatar’s Emir, was pushed, by the U.S. on, Jun. 25, 2013, to abdicate power to his son, Tamim Bin Hamed. And, in stark contrast to what many experts predicted, all the indicators manifest that, instead of the heavily active and interventionist approach, Qatari foreign policy would either toe the Saudi line or keep a low profile. These indicators include the following: First, Qatar’s new Emir, made it abundantly clear in his first speech, that Qatar would respect all political directions and rejects sectarianism in Arab societies. Second, the highly conspicuous absence of any mention of the Syrian crisis. Third, and incontestably far more significant, replacing, Hamed Bin Jassim, who was Prime Minster and Foreign Minster by, Abdallah Bin Nasser Bin Khalifa, who has been appointed PM and Interior Minster, reflecting an inward looking policy. Fourth, the appointment of, Khalid Al Atiyah, who despite his experience, would have far less clout, since he is not a member of the royal family. Fifth, the new Emir swiftly congratulated the interim president, Adly Mansour, who was appointed by the Egyptian army on, Jul. 4. This was in stark contrast to the Fatwa issued on, Jul. 6, 2013, by, Yusuf Al Qaradawi, who openly called on the Egyptian people to defy the army and back up, Morsi.
Even though, Egypt’s MB was the first casualty of the major change in Qatari foreign policy, nonetheless, hot on its heels came the dramatic takeover of the leadership of the SNC – which the Qataris, until very recently, had been fighting viciously to retain their firm control over, by ensuring that the MB maintains its tight grip and pressing hard for the selection on, Mar. 19, 2013, of its candidate, Gassan Hetto, as interim Prime Minster – on, Jul. 6, 2013, by, Ahmed Jerba, who is Saudi Arabia’s candidate and afterwards, the closure of the Taliban’s political office in Doha.
The principal reasons behind the U.S decisive verdict were the following: First, the high degree of confusion amongst its allies in the Middle East, which gave the Syrian regime and its allies Iran and Russia the edge. Second, the U.S. was not ready to tolerate the sheer arrogance and recklessness of the Qatari leadership. Third, the U.S. hoped that the Saudis would learn from the lesson taught to the Qataris. Fourth, The U.S. believed that having the Qataris in the back seat, threatening to take over, would give the U.S. added leverage over the Saudis. Fifth, pushing the Qatari Emir to abdicate to his son sends a clear message to the Saudi king to hand over power to the next generation. Sixth, the U.S. is increasingly worried about Saudi Arabia’s weakening internal front, especially after its patently deceitful myth of being the guardian of Sunni Islam has unravelled, largely due to the Saudi regime’s full-blown support to tyrannical regimes against the Sunnis in these countries. Seventh, giving the U.S. the golden opportunity to point the finger of blame at the previous Qatari leadership if a new 9/11 – similar to a terrorist attack on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi – took place, rather than blame Saudi Arabia or indeed itself for allowing the Saudis – as reported by Der Spiegel and Reuters – to send anti-aircraft missiles to Syrian rebels, which could so easily fall into the hands of Al Qaida.
Knowing, that a change in the Qatari leadership was imminent, Morsi, scrambled to placate Saudi Arabia’s intense hostility to the MB, by shifting towards the Salafi Wahhabi extremist stances and announcing at a rally held on, Jun. 16, 2013, that he was cutting ties with Syria.
Despite, the Saudi regime’s ringing endorsement to the military coup and the Saudi king’s donation on, Jul, 10, of $ 5 bn to the interim leadership; yet, both sides of the Egyptian political divide blame the U.S. for the crisis. Similarly, if the Saudis successfully ignite a regional sectarian war – to demonstrate to its people that it is heavily engaged in combating an existential threat from the Shia, namely Iran, thus, staving of any internal uprising – both sides of the sectarian divide would undoubtedly blame the U.S. It is, therefore, high time for the U.S. to promptly start off by acknowledging that its unwavering support to Saudi Arabia – where the vast majority (15 out of 19) of the 9/11 suicide bombers, never mind, the mastermind, Osama Bin Laden, came from and where almost all the Fatwas giving religious legitimacy to Al Qaida’s atrocities emanate from – has played a major role in turning the war on terror into an irrefutably the most successful enterprise for the promotion of terror and undeniably vaulting Al Qaida into prominence through countless new countries and across different continents. Then it is imperative for the U.S. – if it genuinely strives to halt the menacingly fast-spreading avalanche of extremist Salafi Wahhabi ideology and avoid an all out confrontation with an increasingly radicalised Muslim world – to forestall Saudi Arabia’s relentless export of its hard-line Salafi Wahhabi ideology and extremist jihadist fighters, by putting immense pressure on the Saudis, who desperately need U.S. protection, to push them to expand its protection for oil deal into protection for oil and concrete political reform along with democratic change deal.
Zayd Alisa is a political analyst and a writer on Middle East affairs with numerous appearances on various TV channels, including BBC and France 24. Zayd Alisa has published several articles and press releases relating to the Middle East, and has been a human rights activist for twenty five years and have actively promoted democracy and freedom of expression in the Arab world.
