DRDO: More failures than successes.

[Maarkhoor]

In an earlier Broadsword article ("Bringing the private sector into defence," April 11, 2006), I had pointed at the woeful record of the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) and the defence public sector undertakings (defence PSUs), to argue for a larger role for the private sector in defence production. In response, Ashok Parthasarathi ("Public-Private Partnership requires equals," April 29) declares that the private sector is incapable of managing the high-tech projects of developing and producing weapons systems for our defence services. He cites several "success stories" of the DRDO to conclude that the DRDO and the defence PSUs have in fact performed excellently.

Most of the supposed successes that Parthasarathi cites are perfect examples of the smoke-and-mirrors obfuscations that these agencies have used for years to create the illusion of success. Look more closely at his most prominent "success story": the Arjun tank. Parthasarathi is correct only in enumerating what the project visualised: designing, developing, testing, mass-producing and handing over to the Army a world-class tank. What he does not mention is that the DRDO's Arjun tank has, despite a time overrun of more than two decades and the expenditure of over Rs 2,000 crore, failed in developing critical systems like an engine, night vision equipment and radio sets. Instead, it imported them off-the-shelf and fitted them in the Arjun, creating a dependency on foreign vendors that undermines the logic for developing an Indian tank: creating self-sufficiency. The ministry of defence (MoD) wants to close this sorry saga by getting the Army to accept a token order of 124 Arjuns. But even that seems far off. Last December, the DRDO was to field five Arjun tanks for comparative trials by the Army. Instead, those tanks went into the Heavy Vehicles Factory near Chennai, having basic defects rectified. The trials have not yet been held.

Parthasarathi's article has several more inaccuracies. He credits the DRDO with upgrading the 130-mm artillery gun to 155-mm; an Israeli company, SOLTAM, did that work. He claims the DRDO developed night vision equipment and fire control systems for T-72 tanks; in fact not one tank fields the DRDO's sights. The Thermal Imaging Stand-alone Sights (TISSA), now fitted in hundreds of Indian tanks, were bought from Israel. The Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) that Parthasarathi cites is nowhere near completion. Having failed to produce a workable engine, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) has fitted the LCA with a US engine!

Private corporations, eager to enter the defence field, ask: wouldn't open competitive bidding for major defence contracts insure that projects don't run on forever and that they meet the standards expected by the services? But the old system of MoD patronage to its own establishments continues; the DRDO gets to evaluate prospective defence purchases and decide if it wishes to develop that system in India, or allow its purchase from the international market. If the DRDO vetoes the purchase, development could go on for decades. The DRDO enjoys monopoly status since private corporations""as Indian as the DRDO""are completely excluded from this indigenisation process.

The captive customers""the services""meanwhile suffer in silence, often paying for delays with lives. Former Army chief, General VP Malik, in his just-released book on the Kargil War, recounts how the DRDO scuttled the purchase of a gun-locating radar from the US in 1997, declaring that they could develop it in-house within two years. The absence of this radar in Kargil denied Indian forces the capability to zero in on the Pakistani guns that eventually caused hundreds of Indian deaths. In 2005, after it became clear the DRDO was getting nowhere, India finally signed the contract with the US.

At no stage was any company from India's private sector given the offer to develop the radar. Compare this with the way the US does things. Any planned weapons system is developed concurrently by at least two private corporations; Uncle Sam pays them appropriate development costs. The products developed by these companies compete against each other and a production contract is signed with the successful company. In India, there is no such system. The DRDO decides what it wants to develop. The government funds it without regard to time or money. The private sector considers itself lucky if it gets sub-contracts for ancillary systems.

This is not to suggest that the DRDO and the defence PSUs have enjoyed no success at all. The Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) can boast of projects like the Prithvi and Agni missiles. Shipbuilding is another success story. But a lengthy list of failures cannot be wiped away by a handful of successes or by the rhetoric of self-reliance. India's vast defence R&D and production establishment""thousands of scientists, bureaucrats and workers""are understandably shy of competition from the private sector. But genuine self-reliance in defence production will be greatly enhanced by spicing it with competition from India's increasingly excellent private sector. And Parthasarathi's contention that the private sector cannot handle the kind of projects that the defence PSUs do will be tested only when private corporations are finally allowed a central role in defence production.
Ajai Shukla
Ajai Shukla: DRDO: More failures than successes | Business Standard Column

 

[Maarkhoor]

@haviZsultan @Hyperion @Indus Falcon @engineer saad @fakhre mirpur

@Bratva @nForce

How DRDO failed India's military
The difference between India's failure against Pakistan's success in their respective missile programmes is based on the purist mindset of the Defence Research and Development Organisation to develop indigenously all complex weapon platforms and Islamabad's intelligent alliance with China and the approach to achieve its goals 'by any means, fair or foul'! While Pakistan was pragmatic in its approach, India was merely pompous.

Therefore, it should not come as a surprise that India's Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme has been finally shelved. This marks an unceremonious end of an ambitious technological misadventure by the DRDO -- country's premier defence R&D agency. For nearly two-and-a-half decades, it doled out mere promises to the country's armed forces -- delaying their much- needed modernisation plans.

The armed forces were forced to resort to off-the-shelf 'panic buying' whenever they realised that the strategic balance was tilting in favour of their adversaries. Besides missiles, there are other equipments such as the Main Battle Tank Arjun, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Nishant, Light Combat Aircraft Tejas, INSAS rifles which have been thrust on the end users despite unsatisfactory performances during trials.

In the bargain, the military lost 25 precious years and the taxpayers' nearly Rs 2,000 crore by keeping the IGMDP programme under wraps to hide its inefficiency from the nation.

Even when the IGMDP was embarked upon, many pointed out that to successfully complete such a high-end technological programme, foreign collaboration would be needed. But the DRDO's obduracy prevailed and the programme dragged for so many years.

It is wasteful to try and 'reinvent the wheel', but that is precisely what the DRDO backed by New Delhi did for all these years -- trying to develop every system and sub-system indigenously and ending up developing practically nothing of substance.

The IGMPD started in 1983 after India failed to reverse engineer a Russian missile in the seventies, with A P J Abdul Kalam as the head. However, 25 years later the DRDO missiles remain off target. The army cannot rely on Prithvi, a battlefield support missile, unless technological issues affecting its launch readiness are resolved. Trishul, the quick reaction anti-aircraft missile, turned out to be a dud and is now being resurrected with the induction of foreign technology as a stopgap arrangement for the air force, till the Spyder missile systems from Israel finally arrives. Meanwhile this delay for the navy meant importing Israel's Barak missile. While Akash, the medium range surface to air missile with 27-km range, had its first user trial in end 2007, Nag, the anti-tank missile with 4-7 km range, is yet to begin user trials.

Meanwhile, the air force with depleting fleet of obsolete Russian SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK missile systems, is in a quandary as to how to plug holes in its air defence system in the western sector as the DRDO has failed to deliver.

AGNI �I and AGNI-II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km respectively, have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile. The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force with 8 and 24 missiles in their arsenals but lack confidence in the quality of the product even as AGNI-IV is readied for trial in mid-2008 with a range of 6,000 km.

The tacit admission of the DRDO's inability must not be limited to the missile programme alone; a review of all projects under its aegis is needed for a reality check and course correction. The DRDO fault-line primarily is a result of lack of accountability, focus, and failure to develop scientific disposition.

The director general of DRDO wears three hats. He is also, secretary defence R&D and scientific advisor to the defence minister. These three inter-linked hats on one individual destroy the basic principal of accountability. Therefore, he is not answerable to anyone.

DRDO scuttled a contract that was on the verge of being signed by India in 1997 for the import of a Weapon Locating Radar as the latter promised to produce it indigenously within two years. Due to this negligence, the Indian Army could not neutralise Pakistan's artillery fire effectively in the Kargil conflict and suffered heavy causalities. Of course, the DRDO to date is not in a position to produce WLR and ultimately India bought it from the previously selected producer in 2003. In my view, DRDO should be held directly responsible for these unwarranted war causalities.

The DRDO actually produces in its Tezpur laboratory orchids and mushrooms, identifies the sharpest chili in the world with pride, while its lab in Pithoragarh develops hybrid varieties of cucumber, tomato and capsicum. It spends merrily from the defence budget on developing new strains of Angora rabbits and 'Namkeen Herbal Tea'! DRDO by indulging in such irrelevant activities lost its focus and sight of its primary responsibility.

Instead of building a scientific temper, DRDO from its inception indulged in empire building, spending a major part of its budget on world-class auditoriums, convention centres, conference halls, and hostels, while neglecting research work.

To remove DRDO's fault-line, New Delhi should rapidly transform India into a low cost, high end R&D centre of the world without neglecting its manufacturing sector. Fairly ideal demographic conditions exist along with favourable geo-political factors whereby international actors are willing to invest, as well as, set up shop in India. To maintain their technological lead, the West finds India as a logical destination for their defence industries, both as a potential market and also a base to develop low cost high-end research projects.

On the other hand, we need to leapfrog as well as piggyback technologically, as reinventing the wheel is not necessarily an answer to the yawning technological gap that exists between the western countries and India. Therefore, there are synergies that should be exploited. Enormous mutual benefits can occur to both, if New Delhi can develop itself as a world-class R&D centre and a global hub for manufacturing sensitive military equipment.

Due to the rapid march of technologies and huge costs involved in R&D, no single player is in a position to deliver next generation weapon systems. Whether it is Boeing, Lockheed Martin, DCN, Airbus, or HDW -- all of them sub-contract different assemblies and sub-systems globally to the most competitive and competent companies. The other interesting trend is the formation of trans-national consortiums of nations and companies to manufacture superior platforms like the Euro fighter or the Euro copter. The game, thus, is global as it is not feasible for a single player to manufacture or develop each item.

In the development Sukhoi SU-30 MKI, the major player was the Russian corporation IRKUT but without the help of France [Images] and Israel, the fighter aircraft could not have developed the decisive technological edge that it displays. Therefore, India needs to shed its inhibitions, diversify, and form international industrial alliances to leapfrog technological gaps, boost export revenues from its military industrial complex, and leverage this strength as a strategic asset in Asia.

In any case, defence technologies become obsolete by the time a country can reinvent the wheel. Therefore, radical shifting of strategic gears to a more advantageous position by opening up the field to private sector will stimulate self-sufficiency. Companies like Tatas or L&T can enter into joint ventures and where necessary import CEO's and employ foreign scientists to kick start complex projects.

In fact, to improve performance of the Public Sector Units there should be competitors making fighter aircraft, missiles, and warships in the corporate world. Such farsighted policy shifts will improve India's self�sufficiency in the shortest possible time frame. This in turn, will increase the stakes of multi-nationals in India's well being and marginalise sanction regimes.

The Indian Foreign Office took 58 years to grudgingly acknowledge the criticality of military diplomacy in international affairs. If DRDO can appreciate that a technologically advanced and vibrant defence industry is equally critical for India's security and its global aspirations, we will not replicate this mistake. In other words, it should be made to realise that it solely exists to support the armed forces and not vice versa. Therefore, New Delhi should force ruthless accountability, create focus and development of scientific temperament within DRDO and ensure fruitful collaboration with the Indian and international private sector, instead of permitting them to fritter away the defence budget on irrelevant and peripheral activities.
Bharat Verma
How DRDO failed India's military

 

[nForce]

It is good, that they are criticizing the efficiency of DRDO. Constructive criticism is welcome, especially from knowledgeable people like Bharat Verma.

They do not have any issues with funds, or qualified people to work there. DRDO used to recruit from my college campus and they used to take only the very best(yeah, I was not one among them).

Probably, what they lack is proper focus, motivation and willingness to get the job done in time. Quality has improved nonetheless, if we compare it to what it was back in the 80s or 90s. But a lot more has to be done.The curve is positive, that's a good thing.

 

[Maarkhoor]

Arjun Tank
How the Indian Army lost its Catapult

India’s ambition to become a great power has never been matched by its willingness to spend hard cash on its military. The previous government in particular ran defence preparedness into the ground by keeping the military starved of operational funds, with A.K. Antony probably deserving the title of Pakistan’s best defence minister ever.

The critical howitzer shortage facing the Indian Army is a glaring example of the Indian leadership’s cavalier approach towards defence. While New Delhi splurges on shameful extravaganzas such as the Commonwealth Games, the Indian Army has not purchased a single artillery gun since the Bofors scandal broke in the late 1980s.
Artillery is a key element of warfare. For the decisive Battle for Berlin in 1945, the Russians threw a total of 41,600 guns and mortars at the Germans. Alex Popov of the 5th Shock Army wrote: “The amount of equipment deployed for the Berlin operation was so huge I simply cannot describe it and I was there.” Marshal Georgy Zhukov wrote in his memoirs that it was the rain of three million shells that broke German resolve to hold on to Berlin at all costs. “As prisoners later told us, the great artillery barrage at night was what they had least expected,” he wrote.

Similarly, in the 1999 Kargil War it was the Bofors 155mm gun that sent the Pakistanis scurrying from their positions in the high mountains. Because of its long range, accuracy, high rate of fire and mobility, the Indian Army was able to take out Pakistani positions quickly based on real time intelligence inputs.

Despite the critical impact of artillery systems in war, India hasn’t replaced the over 200 (of the original 410) Bofors guns that have been lost due to attrition and cannibalisation.
Quick fix

But even as the bureaucrats and politicians fiddled, the army brass resorted to Indian jugaad (innovative fix) in order to keep the artillery forces battle ready. Going by the adage that the army fights with the weapons it has rather – than the weapons it wants – the Indian Army asked the Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO) to use available assets to develop a self-propelled gun (SPG).

In order to fulfil the interim and immediate requirements of the army, the DRDO’s Combat Vehicle Research & Development Establishment (CVRDE) developed an SPG by mating the Russian built M-46 130mm howitzer with the Arjun MK-I tank chassis. This new artillery system, which was on show at Defexpo 2014 is known as the Arjun Catapult MK-II.

The Catapult has side and front armoured walls protecting the gun compartment, providing the crew with armour protection of STANAG level II. Its main weapon, the M-46, was originally a manually loaded, towed 130mm howitzer. Manufactured in Russia in the 1950s, it was one of the longest range artillery systems around, with a range of more than 27 km.
ut curiously, after 100 of the Arjun Catapults were produced, the army did not ask for further enhancements to the system and today India continues to seek high calibre artillery systems from foreign vendors.

Because of the army’s about turn, the DRDO team working on the gun has lost development continuity. Weapons get better with each successive iteration, and in fact the Arjun Catapult MK-II is an improvement on the Catapult MK-I fashioned in the early 1980s by mounting the M46 gun onto the Indian-built Vijayanta tank.

There were other spinoffs from the project. Private defence contractors like Tata, L&T and Bharat Forge were involved in locally upgrading the M46 guns to 155mm, which increased the range from 26 km to 39 km.

These private players were also developing their own 155mm howitzers in collaboration with overseas defence companies, while also collaborating with the DRDO’s Armament Research & Development Establishment in Pune to design a 155mm Advanced Towed Artillery Gun System with a 50-km strike range.

All plans were nixed by the cancellation of the Catapult and the new government’s decision in November 2014 to purchase 155 mm guns with a range of 40 km under the “Buy & Make Indian” programme. The plan is to acquire 814 guns for the Indian Army – 100 would be acquired off the shelf while the remainder of the 714 guns would be made in India.

So instead of developing a gun with a 50 km range, the army is shooting for an artillery system with a much lower range. It happens only in India.
The real big guns

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure that the only people to gain from the DRDO’s failure are foreign manufacturers.
Indeed, it is intriguing that DRDO projects such as the Agni series intermediate range ballistic missiles (which are banned from the international export market) have been extremely successful, while others such as tanks, aircraft, helicopters and short range missiles (all of which are readily available) are rejected by the defence forces for not being up to scratch.

But then how can any weapons platform attain world class standards if it is not accepted by the military, if the designers do not get feedback, if the engineers and scientists are demoralised. The first generation of any weapon will have faults because weapons are tested in extreme environments. To repeatedly fail them at the first sign of trouble points to sabotage.

For, let’s be clear about one thing. The Indian Army’s primary enemy is the Pakistan Army, not the US Army. We do not need world class weapons to fight a corrupt, slothful and incompetent army that has lost four wars against India. We need affordable and rugged weapons that can be produced in large numbers and easily replaced during wartime.

And think about it. If India can send a successful interplanetary probe to Mars, discover water on the Moon, build nuclear powered submarines and develop supersonic missiles such as the BrahMos, then the rejection of the home made Catapult is clearly suspicious.

Perhaps the dodgiest case is that of the Arjun tank, which has been under development for nearly 40 years. In 2008 the DRDO had to install a black box in the indigenous battle tank following an alleged attempt to "sabotage" its engine. The instrument was installed after the Indian Army termed the winter trial of the Arjun tank a "failure".

According to a DRDO official, "The German company Renk AG supplying the engines for the Arjun tank stumbled upon the tinkering with its engines after a complaint from the Indian Army that the tank's gear box failed during its winter trials. Following this we have installed an instrument similar to the data recorder or black box in aircraft that would record all the information related to the engines.”
The then minister of state for defence (production) Rao Inderjit Singh also hinted at a conspiracy. “The possibility of sabotage needs to be examined,” he said. “The engines fitted in the tanks were German and were performing well for the past 15 years. I wonder what has happened to them overnight.”

Nearly every weapon produced by DRDO has been rejected by the defence forces, forcing the government to release funds for imports. Take the Augusta Westland scandal. Initially, former air chief marshal S.P. Tyagi was under investigation for allegedly tweaking the technical requirements of VVIP helicopters. Later it transpired that the specifications were changed prior to Tyagi’s tenure on the orders of Brajesh Mishra, the National Security Adviser, who was reporting directly to former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.

The scandal shows that it is in the interests of a clique comprising the military brass, politicians and middlemen to scuttle indigenous defence projects. R.S.N. Singh, a former military intelligence officer who later served in the Research & Analysis Wing, writes in Canary Trap about the “Chandigarh Gang” that surfaced as the “mainstay of the international arms lobby” during the decade long UPA rule. “This gang is not necessarily in Chandigarh alone, but nevertheless is centered around it,” Singh writes. “It comprises some retired officers, politicians, journalists and prominent newspapers.”

How the Indian Army lost its Catapult | Russia & India Report

Is India's Main Battle Tank Finally Doomed?
The Indian Army may be finally giving up on the indigenously developed Arjun main battle tank.

Last week, the Indian Army released a global request for information (RFI) inviting responses by 31 July to develop a multi-purpose Future Ready Combat Vehicle (FRCV) in order to replace older license-built Soviet-era main-battle tanks (MBTs).

“The Indian Army is planning to design and develop a new generation, state-of-the-art combat vehicle platform for populating its armored fighting vehicle fleet in the coming decade. This vehicle, which will be called the future ready combat vehicle (FRCV), will form the base platform for the main battle tank which is planned to replace the existing T-72 tanks in the Armored Corps,” the RFI reads.

The Indian military envisions the FRCV system as a platform for as many as 11 different tracked vehicles, including light tracked, wheeled, bridge layer and trawl tanks, self-propelled howitzers (SPH), air defense guns, artillery observation post and engineering reconnaissance vehicles, and armored ambulances.

Additionally, the RFI notes that the FRCV “should be in the ‘Medium Tank’ category” and should “match contemporary MBTs in engagement ranges, all weather day/night fighting capability, depth of penetration and variety of ammunition.” The Indian Army wants the new FRCV ready for induction by 2025-27 – a deadline that almost certainly will have to be extended given India’s defense procurement track record.

Consequently, in the meantime, India will do well to continue upgrade its 1900 strong T-72 MBT force. As I noted in a previous article (“Breakdown: What’s Happening With India’s Tank Force?”), New Delhi has so far failed to successfully mass-produce an indigenously developed modern main battle tank.

The recent RFI could also very well ring the final death-knell for India’s indigenously developed third generation Arjun MK-I main battle tank – a poorly designed vehicle (e.g., too much heavy armor versus too little horsepower) that encountered repeated delays due to a flawed procurement and testing process. Almost eighty percent of the 124-strong Arjun MK-I tank force is currently grounded due to more than 90 technical issues.

India has been working on an improved version of the Arjun, the MK-II, which has done very well in comparative trials with license-built Russian tanks such as the T-90M. It displays more than 93 improvements over the older version and contains 60 percent locally manufactured components. However, a decision to indigenously develop a new anti-tank missile to be fitted onto the MK-II will, in all likelihood, delay the induction of the upgraded platform.

As I noted in my previous article:

Due to the repeated delays, India decided to acquire T-90s main battle tanks from Russia in the early 2000s. While the first 310 were directly imported from Russia, India is currently locally producing a customized and improved version of the T-90, the T-90 M Bhishma. A total of 500 T-90 and T-90 M tanks are currently in service in the Indian Army. India plans to field 21 tank regiments of T-90s by 2020 through license-production, with 62 tanks per unit and more than 1,300 armored fighting vehicles total, although that number could go up.

Is India’s Main Battle Tank Finally Doomed? | The Diplomat

Arjun And Pinaka another failure
'DRDO took up Arjun before it learnt to make tanks'

George Iype

Some 20 years ago, the defence ministry entrusted the DRDO with two projects: the development of a battle tank and a multi-barrel rocket launcher system.

The DRDO called the former, assigned to it in 1974, Arjun, and the latter Pinaka.

Two-plus decades later, the Arjun is considered a major failure. And so is the Pinaka. The Indian army found the latter passed only seven of its 29 requirements.

Defence experts allege that DRDO continues to work on Arjun and Pinaka just to keep its laboratories open.

"The Arjun main battle tank is not world class and has failed to meet the required levels of accuracy. But DRDO is keeping it alive because it does not want its factories to close down," says Major General (retd) Ashok Mehta.

Experts like Major General Mehta feel the Arjun could have been a tank with potential if DRDO had got its act together. But the premier defence research organisation continues to exert pressure on the army to accept a limited series of production for the Arjun.

Army officers say it is politics and not the tank's potential that is at work in the defence ministry, which last year placed orders with the Avadi Ordinance Factory to manufacture 124 Arjun tanks.

"I am happy to inform you that not only is the army satisfied with the Arjun tank's performance, but it has placed an order for 124 more such tanks," Defence Minister George Fernandes had told Parliament. "With this India has achieved the capability for indigenous manufacture of battle tanks."

Army officials, however, say no other defence agency in the world must have spent 25 years and Rs 3.5 billion on developing a tank that has failed to perform.

"We have wasted money and time in producing a tank that is just not a world class product these days," an army officer in Hyderabad says.

Insiders say the army was not "satisfied with the Arjun's performance" as Fernandes claimed, but was coerced to accept it by the DRDO.

N K Mohan Pillai, a retired army officer who witnessed the Arjun trials, says the tank lacked three vital strengths. First, its engine is weak. Second, its suspension needs permanent maintenance. Third, its gun control is not accurate enough to obtain first round kill probability.

"In fact, the main problem was that DRDO took up the Arjun project before learning how to make tanks," Pillai remarks.

In 1994 when DRDO announced that the Arjun tank was ready for production, then army chief General B C Joshi witnessed the trials. He sent a note to the DRDO and the defence minister saying the tank fails to meet standards and therefore was unacceptable. General Joshi then laid down a dozen imperatives that DRDO should take to improve upon the tank.

General Joshi's main concerns were that the tank that weighs 57 tonnes lacked armour protection and vital suspension for crew comfort and gunfire accuracy.

But DRDO, which has showcased the Arjun as its finest indigenous product, claims that the problem is not with the tank, but with the army.

"The army is used to handling only T-72 tanks. For the soldiers who have fired T-72 tanks, operating the Arjun is a gigantic task. So we have told the army to train their crew before accusing us of inferior production," a DRDO engineer says.

Despite DRDO's claims, many in the army believe that the 124 Arjun tanks will drain the exchequer just like the multi-barrel rocket launching system Pinaka did.

In 1999 the Comptroller and Auditor General severely indicted DRDO for its failure to develop critical components for Pinaka after spending Rs 424.5 million on the project.

The defence ministry had entrusted DRDO with the Pinaka project in 1980. The deadline given was 1994. Twenty years later DRDO is nowhere near finishing. The war heads and all the three vehicles necessary for launching the rockets are yet to be developed by DRDO. Against the requirement of eight types of warheads, only three have been developed. Of this, one is not acceptable to the army and the other is only a dummy.

"The delay in the development of the EWPinaka has compelled the army to depend on our existing 20 kilometre-range system even during Kargil conflict. The DRDO is entirely responsible for this," charges an army officer.

According to experts, the Pinaka system has met just seven of the 29 requirements of the army during trials. The indigenous rocket launcher lacks the promised range, fire power, loading time of the salvo and deployment time.

These, however, are "minor problems" according to DRDO.
rediff.com: The DRDO, an investigation

 

[gslv mk3]

However, 25 years later the DRDO missiles remain off target. The army cannot rely on Prithvi, a battlefield support missile, unless technological issues affecting its launch readiness are resolved. Trishul, the quick reaction anti-aircraft missile, turned out to be a dud and is now being resurrected with the induction of foreign technology as a stopgap arrangement for the air force, till the Spyder missile systems from Israel finally arrives. Meanwhile this delay for the navy meant importing Israel's Barak missile. While Akash, the medium range surface to air missile with 27-km range, had its first user trial in end 2007, Nag, the anti-tank missile with 4-7 km range, is yet to begin user trials.

Meanwhile, the air force with depleting fleet of obsolete Russian SA-3 Pechora and OSA-AK missile systems, is in a quandary as to how to plug holes in its air defence system in the western sector as the DRDO has failed to deliver.

AGNI �I and AGNI-II with a range of 700 km and 2,500 km respectively, have been tested five times, which is inadequate to generate confidence in a nuclear capable missile. The end users of these ballistic missiles are army and the air force with 8 and 24 missiles in their arsenals but lack confidence in the quality of the product even as AGNI-IV is readied for trial in mid-2008 with a range of 6,000 km.

BS article

 

[Indian Patriot]

Every Indian knows that.

 

[Maarkhoor]

Breakdown: What's Happening With India’s Tank Force?
New Delhi has so far failed to successfully mass-produce an indigenously developed modern main battle tank

The majority of India’s indigenously developed third generationArjun main battle tanks have been grounded due to technical issues and missing spare parts, Defense News reported last week.

Originally supposed to enter service in the Indian Army in the 1980s, the Arjun MK-I program has witnessed repeated delays due to an inadequate design concept (e.g., too much heavy armor versus too little horsepower) that is partially based on the German Leopard II main battle tank, and a flawed procurement and testing process.

Defense News quotes an Indian official who stated that “nearly 75 percent of the 124 [Arjun] tanks with the Army are grounded.” All in all there are more than 90 technical issues. “The problems in the Arjun tank are mainly confined to its transmission system, targeting and thermal sights,” the defense official noted.

Originally, more than 50 percent of components of the tank were imported, but this percentage has gradually diminished as various parts have been replaced by indigenous designed systems. Yet the tracked vehicle still requires foreign hardware to function and those supplied have dried up, according to the official.

“This prompted the Ministry of Defense (MoD) in late April to form a committee, headed by a retired three-star armored corps officer, to resolve the component shortages and reactivate the MBTs within two months,” IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly reported.

Rahul Bhonsle, a retired Indian Army brigadier general and defense analyst confirmed this assessment: “There are a number of issues related to functionality due to imported components, which seem to be bugging the Arjun Mark-1 fleet for some time now [sic]. The technical snags have reportedly led to much of the fleet remaining non operational, creating a void in the tank strength of the Indian Army.”

The Arjun MK-I tank was developed by the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and produced by the Indian Ordnance Factory’s production facility in Avadi in southern India. The official noted that the Indian Army was obliged to acquire 124 tanks by the DRDO so that the factory could remain in operation.

Due to the repeated delays, India decided to acquire T-90s main battle tanks from Russia in the early 2000s. While the first 310 were directly imported from Russia, India is currently locally producing a customized and improved version of the T-90, the T-90 M Bhishma. As of now, a grand total of 500 T-90 and T-90 M tanks are operated by the Indian Army.

India plans to field 21 tank regiments of T-90s by 2020 through license-production, with 62 tanks per unit and more than 1,300 armored fighting vehicles total, although that number could go up (see: “The Main Battle Tanks of Asia: Junk or Still Useful?”).

However, DRDO is also working on an improved version of the Arjun, the MK-II, which has done very well in comparative trials with the T-90M, according to Defense News. It sports more than 93 improvements over the older version and with around 60 percent locally manufactured components is less depended on foreign imports, a DRDO official said.

“If the experience gained from Mark-1 is utilized fully there should be lesser technical problems with Mark-2 at present though reports of trials do not suggest the same,” Rahul Bhonsle emphasized. In September 2014, the Indian Army has placed an order for 118 MK-II tanks. However, a decision to indigenously develop a new anti-tank missile to be fitted onto the MK-II will, in all likelihood, delay the induction of the upgraded platform.
Breakdown: What’s Happening With India’s Tank Force? | The Diplomat

BS article

Kindly explain how you feel it biased. Any arguments ?

Tejas the divine aircraft

Failure to take off
Air chief has pointed to worrying absences in air defence.
All those interested in the country’s security and defence have a duty to pay heed to what the chief of air staff, Arup Raha, had to say about the state of the Indian Air Force. It is worrying, to say the least. The air chief tried not to create panic by pointing out that things were likely to improve soon because the new government “meant business” and was “seized of the matter”. However, even if long-delayed decisions are taken day after tomorrow, desperately needed new acquisitions will take time, perhaps a couple of years, to materialise. This should underscore that the stark situation will persist for quite a while. Immediately after the debacle in the brief but brutal border war with China in 1962, defence-planners had decided, and declared emphatically, that for its air defence, this country must have a minimum of 45 combat squadrons. Half a century later, this number ought to have gone up considerably, if only because of the massive increase in the military might of China, which is determined to give all help to its “all-weather” friend, Pakistan. But the dismal reality is that the number of combat squadrons of the IAF has dwindled to 34. To make matters worse, some of the fighter aircraft still in service are so aged that they will soon become unusable. At the present rate, it would be no surprise if the number of combat squadrons falls to 32 next year and plummets to 30 in 2016. By 2017, some new acquisitions would start coming in. Until then, the IAF will have to make do with whatever it has. For this purpose, it is trying to upgrade the Jaguars, which are deep penetration strike aircraft, not fighters. According to Raha, a three-fold failure to adhere to firmly fixed deadlines is the source of the current woes. The first relates to the indigenous light combat aircraft (LCA), Tejas, which was to obtain “operational clearance” by December this year but will miss this deadline. Serial production of this aircraft is already delayed. Strangely, IAF pilots are yet to start training to fly the Tejas. Why? Because “flight manuals” have not yet been written! There is a lot more to the LCA story. Its production was delayed badly because — in keeping with its tradition of wanting to reinvent the wheel — the DRDO wasted time trying unsuccessfully to develop an engine for the aircraft. Ultimately, at the height of the Cold War, Indira Gandhi persuaded US President Ronald Reagan to supply us the American G-404 engine. By now, the Tejas has become “under-powered”. So the air force needs only a few LCA-I squadrons for training. With the US engine G-414, the LCA-Mark II will be produced for operational purposes. Production will start perhaps by 2017. Second, and more importantly, the air chief complains that the decision on the purchase of 126 French Rafale fighters as India’s medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) has been delayed for too long. But he believes that the government is now in the “final stages” of negotiations with Dassault, the manufacturer. Even if the negotiations are clinched speedily, to raise the first squadron would take three to four years. In any case, only a limited number of MMRCAs will be available in flying condition. The rest will have to be produced under licence in India. Obviously, the air chief is better informed than others about the government’s thinking on the subject. However, not only competing foreign suppliers, including the US and Russia, many Indians, too, are trying to persuade this country to change its choice of the Rafale. Their argument is that it is too costly and that an equally effective aircraft would be available at a lower price. Their suggestion is to go for the Swedish Viggen, which would be cheaper. The Swedes are also willing to give the entire factory to India for the Viggen’s production. Third, though a fifth generation fighter aircraft, a stealth fighter, is being designed and developed jointly with Russia, negotiations have “hit turbulence on technical issues”. There has been a delay in signing the design contract. Nobody knows when this will be done, though everybody realises that the induction of the aircraft would take at least eight years after the design contract is signed. It is said that the Russians already have a design and they are insisting on its adoption. The need of the hour is to decide on the appropriate structure of the management of national defence, which successive governments have brushed aside casually. In view of this, it is remarkable that Raha also appealed to the government to appoint a full-time chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee because all three service chiefs are agreed on it. This was strongly recommended by the Naresh Chandra task force on security. After sitting on it for two years, the UPA government rejected the idea a few days before losing the elections. Against this backdrop, the Narendra Modi government has its task cut out. Throughout the election campaign, Modi promised quick and muscular decisions to enhance national security. This should be done as soon as possible. To begin with, Prime Minister Modi should appoint a full-time defence minister. To put this “additional burden” on the already overworked finance minister is not fair. The writer is a Delhi-based political commentator express@expressindia.com
Failure to take off | The Indian Express

 

[Grevion]

While DRDO have it's own sets of failure it has brought great success to the country's indigenous defense programs as well and we choose to look at it in a more positive way.
Yes there are failures in many critical programs but we also look at many successful efforts it has made boosting our self preparedness in defense.

 

[Maarkhoor]

Government Auditor Faults Tejas Light Combat Aircraft Project, Says it Fails to Meet Air Force's Needs
NEW DELHI: India's Tejas Light Combat Aircraft project, in the works for over three decades, came under severe criticism from the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) on Friday, which said the Mark-I version has several shortcomings and does not meet IAF specifications.

Not only that, Indian Air Force (IAF) would be "constrained" to induct the fighter LCA without availability of a trainer model, thereby "adversely impacting pilot training", the audit body said in a report tabled in Parliament.


The CAG noted that it was due to the delay in the manufacture and supply of LCA that IAF had to go for alternative temporary measures such as upgrading its MIG BIS, MiG-29, Jaguar, and Mirage aircraft at a cost of Rs. 20,037 crore and revise the phasing out of MiG-21s.

Listing the shortcomings, the CAG said that the LCA Mark-I fails to meet the electronic warfare capabilities sought by IAF as the Self-Protection Jammer could not be fitted on the aircraft due to space constraints.

Also, it said that the Radar Warning Receiver/Counter Measure Dispensing System fitted on the aircraft had raised performance concerns which are yet to be overcome (January 2015).

The LCA Mark-I, which got Initial Operational Clearance in December, 2013, significantly falls short (20 permanent waivers/33 temporary concessions) in meeting the Air Staff Requirement (ASR), the CAG said, adding that that has led to reduced operational capabilities and survivability and, consequently, its operational employability.

It added that the shortcomings in the Mark-I (increased weight, reduced internal fuel capacity, non-compliance of fuel system protection, pilot protection from front, reduced speed) are expected to be overcome in the Mark-II model.

"LCA Mark-I does not meet the ASR. The deficiencies are now expected to be met in LCA Mark-II by December 2018," the CAG said.

While DRDO has always showcased LCA, christened Tejas, as an indigenously-developed aircraft and the indigenous content of the LCA was estimated by ADA to be 70 per cent, the CAG said it "actually worked out to about 35 per cent" as of January this year.

Systems such as Kaveri engine, Multi-Mode Radar, Radome, Multi-Functional Display System and Flight Control System Actuators taken up for indigenous development could not be developed successfully, resulting in LCA's continued dependence on the import of these systems, CAG said.

IAF had proposed in the early 1980s that a new aircraft be developed to replace the MiG-21 fleet, manufactured during 1966 and 1987, after its phasing out in the 1990s.

The project for indigenous design and development of LCA was sanctioned in 1983 at a cost of Rs. 560 crore, which was enhanced from time to time up to Rs. 10,397.11 crore.

The government in June, 1984, constituted an Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) as a dedicated institution for the management of the LCA project.

IAF had issued Air Staff Requirement (ASR) in October, 1985, envisaging a light-weight multi-mission fighter with contemporary air combat and offensive air support capabilities and excellent manoeuvrability for close air combat at low and medium altitudes.

The projected requirement was for 220 Light Combat Aircraft (200 Fighters, 20 trainers) to be inducted by 1994.

However, LCA could only achieve Initial Operational Clearance in December, 2013, as against the earlier scheduled date of December, 2005.

The Full Operational Clearance (FOC), which was scheduled to be completed by December, 2008, is now slated to be achieved by December this year although experts said even that could be delayed.

The CAG added that ADA's decision regarding the advance building of two prototypes from Full-Scale Engineering Development (FSED) Phase-II to FSED Phase-I so as to utilise its savings on the grounds of accelerating the development process of LCA had failed to yield the desired results.

This, the report said, was because preponed prototypes were deficient in terms of critical onboard systems (Multi- Mode Radar, Self-Protection Jammer, Radar Warning Receiver) and led to ADA using the Limited Series Production (LSP) aircraft (meant for IAF use) towards flight testing/evaluation of these critical on board systems.

"This was in contravention of the Cabinet approval (November, 2001) for phased development of the prototypes in FSED Phase-II after Technical Demonstrators had been built and flight tested for 210 hours," CAG said.

Talking about lack of trainer aircraft, the audit body said that IAF was in the interim using an upgraded Full Mission Simulator (FMS) at ADA for pilot training, pending supply of an FMS by HAL at the LCA operating base.

It said that the long gestation period led to a change of weapon systems on LCA, necessitating the acquisition of new ones.

"That led to design changes on the aircraft, coupled with delay in integrating R-73E missile with Multi-Mode Radar/ Helmet Mounted Display and Sight. Delayed identification (December, 2009) of Beyond Visual Range Missiles also contributed to the delays in achieving IOC/FOC by LCA," the report said.
Government Auditor Faults Tejas Light Combat Aircraft Project, Says it Fails to Meet Air Force's Needs

While DRDO have it's own sets of failure it has brought great success to the country's indigenous defense programs as well and we choose to look at it in a more positive way.
Yes there are failures in many critical programs but we also look at many successful efforts it has made boosting our self preparedness in defense.

Kindly post some major success of DRDO

'LCA Tejas likely to be ready for operational service by 2015' | Business Standard


The much-delayed indigenous Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) Tejas aircraft is expected to be ready for induction into operational service by 2015, IAF chief Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne said today.

Talking to reporters, the IAF chief said the indigenous aircraft will have to be modified further for operating in high-altitude areas as recently during trials in Leh, its engine "did not work".

"By my estimate it (the Initial Operational Clearance II) should be by the end of this year and the Final Operational Clearance (FOC) should take another year-and-half more," he said on the sidelines of a seminar.
The FOC is the final nod required before an aircraft is considered to be ready for operational deployment in an air force. While the IOC I of the LCA Tejas was completed two years ago, but the FOC date has been postponed due to certain issues.
Browne said delays do take place in a development project such as the LCA. "Recently we went for high-altitude trials. The engine (of LCA) did not work at that altitude because it is a different cup of tea. Even the Su-30, when it was taken to Leh, it had to be modified. So, the LCA will have to be modified. It has to do the retrials," he said.

The IAF chief said the aircraft will take part in the exercise 'Ironfist', which will be held at Pokharan in Rajasthan on February 22.

"There it will be firing the R-73 missile along with laser guided bombs etc. But a lot more work is still required," he said.

Earlier at an international seminar here, DRDO chief V K Saraswat said the LCA had completed 2,000 test flights.

At the same seminar, Browne said the IAF is planning to induct around 350-400 aircraft in the 12th Defence Plan period.

The air force is planning to procure more than 200 fighter aircraft including the 126 Rafale medium-multirole combat aircraft, over 40 Su-30MKIs, several types of transport aircraft and various choppers, he said.

Listing the major modernisation milestones achieved by the air force, he said the IAF signed 325 contract worth Rs 1.52 lakh crore for modernising the force.

"Of these, 217 contracts worth around Rs 84,000 crore have been signed with Indian companies," the IAF chief said.

In 2013-14, the IAF is planning to sign several deals including one for 126 Rafale aircraft, additional six C-130J Super Hercules and several chopper contracts for attack and heavy-lift category, he said.

On the future requirements of the force, he said advanced active electronically scanned array (AESA) radars, electronic warfare suites and unmanned combat aerial vehicles were the need of the force in the future.

The IAF chief said testing facilities of DRDO and defence PSUs should be opened up for private sector as they are national assets.

Source: LCA Tejas Engines failed during high-altitude trials in Leh

Tejas grounded after snag in landing gear

For almost 3,000 hours of flying, the made-in-India combat aircraft “Tejas” was a pilot’s delight, but within months of joining the Indian Air Force (IAF)’s fleet, these jets have been grounded because of nagging problems with their landing gear.

This major snag — the first since the military jet’s maiden flight in January 2001 — has showed up at a time when the country’s air strike wing is contemplating induction of 120 of them to make up for the depleting strength of its squadrons. With the Union government taking a decision to acquire only 36 Rafale fighters instead of 126 as originally planned under the multi-billion dollar, medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA) contract, IAF chief Air Chief Marshal Arup Raha has spoken of the need to add at least six squadrons (108 fighter aircraft) to shore up the total strength to 42 squadrons, and indicated his preference for an advanced version of “Tejas”.

Sources in the ministry of defence (MoD) told this newspaper that IAF pilots encountered problems with the landing gear of “Tejas” twice — first in Bengaluru and the second time in Jaisalmer after a round of weapon trials at the Pokhran range. The fighter was flown from Jaisalmer to Bengaluru with its landing gear deployed after the second incident. The upshot: the entire fleet consisting of fighters, the naval variant, trainers and prototypes have been grounded. “Occasionally, test pilots have attempted solo sorties, but the problem with the landing gear persists,” sources added.

Sources in Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL), Bengaluru, confirmed that the snag has resulted in discontinuation of flights of these military jets but disclosed that the glitch would be fixed soon as the cause for malfunctioning of the landing gear has been identified.

The first “Tejas” combat jet was handed over to the IAF in Bengaluru on January 17, 2015, by defence minister Manohar Parrikar with the first squadron set to be based at an air force station in Sulur, Tamil Nadu.
Tejas grounded after snag in landing gear | The Asian Age


Rs 1,500 cr more for combat aircraft Tejas as HAL fails to meet targets
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) has allocated an additional Rs 1,500 crore to the Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme, boosting its projected Rs 14,047 crore budget. The additional amount will be spent on a production line for Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) to build 20 fighters that Indian Air Force (IAF) has ordered for its first Tejas squadron. The IAF has also promised another order for 20 more Tejas for its second squadron. Once the improved Mark II Tejas is developed, the IAF will field 6-7 Tejas squadrons (120-140 fighters).

This need for additional money arises from the inability of HAL, a public sector aerospace monopoly, to establish a production line that can build at least eight Tejas fighters a year. The production line that HAL set up two years ago on the priceless real estate that it holds in the heart of Bangalore has not yet produced a single Tejas fighter.

Briefing Business Standard the Director of the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA), P Subramanyam, who runs the LCA programme, explains that nobody realised that setting up a production line was a technology by itself. So far, ADA and HAL have built only prototypes and limited-series Tejas aircraft, producing individual parts one-by-one like a tailor making a suit. When HAL graduated to a standardised production line, it encountered serious difficulties.

“ADA and HAL have realised that creating a production line needs major effort… That realisation has come,” says Subramanyam.

So serious are the difficulties that ADA and HAL approached foreign aircraft manufacturers last year — including Eurofighter GmbH, which builds the Typhoon. The proposal to appoint a foreign consultant for the Tejas production line remains alive in the MoD.

Senior IAF officers express frustration that HAL has failed to set up a Tejas assembly line, though its primary activity for the preceding decades has been to build foreign aircraft on an assembly line under licence.

Air Marshal Pranab K Barbora, who retired as the IAF vice-chief two years ago, summarises the Air Force’s viewpoint: “HAL’s assembly line expertise is outdated by at least three decades. They have done nothing to upgrade their technology. Setting up a modern assembly line for the Tejas is far beyond HAL’s capabilities.”

Barbora says this is why the IAF lobbied hard to post a serving air marshal as HAL chief. Instead, the MoD appointed RK Tyagi, who has no experience in aeronautical development or manufacture.

Contacted repeatedly for comments, Tyagi did not respond to the calls.

ADA is defending HAL, with Subramanyam insisting that HAL would build the first 20 Tejas within two-and-a-half to three years. By then the fighter would have obtained final operational clearance (FOC) in its flight-testing programme and production can begin of the next 20 Tejas (which must be built to FOC standards).

This, says Subramanyam, will take another two-and-a-half years, i.e., be completed in 2018. By then, the Tejas Mark II will be tested and ready, and can enter series production.

What the ADA chief does not explain is: How will HAL, which cannot yet build even two Tejas fighters per year, build 20 fighters over the next three years?

The annual general meeting on Friday of ADA (which is a registered society under the MoD) was also clouded by delays in flight-testing, which Business Standard has reported, will delay the initial operational clearance (IOC) of the Tejas until mid-2013 at the earliest.

For the IAF, which contemplates dangerously depleted squadron numbers, the big question is: When will the first two Tejas squadrons become operational?

Going by the lack of energy in HAL — which is struggling to build the last two limited series fighters and the first two series production Tejas — the IAF might have a longer wait than it is comfortable with.
Rs 1,500 cr more for combat aircraft Tejas as HAL fails to meet targets | Business Standard News

 

[Dragon4]

Research is failure and paintjob accounts to success, oh well.

 

[Maarkhoor]

'Pinaka' fails in mission parameters
After nearly 20 years into development, indigenously developed Pinaka rocket system failed to meet mission parameters during a trial from Chandipur base on Wednesday, putting the reliability on the weaponry system at a stake.

Sources said two rounds of an advanced version of Pinaka rocket were test-fired from a multi-barrel rocket launcher (MBRL) positioned in the testing range of Proof and Experimental Establishment (PXE) between 11 am and 12 noon.

Both the rockets failed to provide the desired result as expected by the mission team. “The experimental trials were carried out by the DRDO. The rockets could not cover the designed distance and some of their sub-systems too did not function properly. Further analysis was on,” the sources said.

Wednesday’s tests were conducted by personnel of Pune-based Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE) at the PXE firing point-2. Pinaka rocket system, which has already undergone several tough tests since 1995 and inducted in the armed forces, has been drawing criticism for over a decade for its poor show during the Kargil war.

The tests were, however, conducted nearly two weeks after similar trials of the Pinaka Mark-II Multi Barrel Rocket Launcher System from Chandhan area in Pokhran field firing ranges of Rajasthan, which were stated as ‘successful’ by the DRDO. The trials were conducted by the DRDO and Indian Army.

Contacted, a DRDO official neither confirmed the ‘failure’ nor did he deny it. He, however, said data on the trials could not be collected due to bad weather. “The trials were conducted for a longer range than its previous trails. The inclement weather came as a hindrance for retrieving data,” he said.

Describing the tests as routine, he said earlier this year, 10 rounds of Pinaka rockets were tested from the same base on January 30 and 31, and February 28. “The developmental trials of the advanced system will continue and the rocket is expected to be pressed into service very soon,” he added.

While the older version of the rocket system has a strike range of 40 km, its advanced version can strike a target beyond 55 km and is capable of acting as a force-multiplier. It has been developed to supplement artillery guns. The system can be operated in four modes __ autonomous, stand-alone mode, remote and manual.
'Pinaka' fails in mission parameters -The New Indian Express




The Missile that Cannot Fire
Long delays, cost escalation damage DRDO's reputation
The Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) was set up in 1958 with a vision to "provide our defence services a decisive edge by equipping them with internationally competitive systems and solutions". The DRDO has clearly failed in its mission.

There is no bigger indictment of India's premier organisation for research and development in military hardware than the fact that 54 years after its establishment, India still imports 70 per cent of its defence equipment requirements. In 1997, India's best-known defence bureaucrat and the then scientific adviser to defence minister, APJ Abdul Kalam, had said that India should bring the share of imports in defence equipment purchases down to 30 per cent by 2005. No progress has been made. The percentage is still 70-30 in favour of imports.

DRDO's list of successes is short-primarily the Agni and Prithvi missiles. Its list of failures is much longer. The Light Combat Aircraft (ICA) project, which was commissioned in 2001, is running late by four years. The costs have gone up from an original estimate of around Rs 3,300 crore to over Rs 5,780 crore. The Kaveri Engine for ICA is running late by 16 years and the cost has escalated by around 800 per cent (see box).
n 2011, the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) put a serious question mark on drdo's capabilities. "The organisation, which has a history of its projects suffering endemic time and cost overruns, needs to sanction projects and decide on a probable date of completion on the basis of a conservative assessment of technology available and a realistic costing system," its report stated.

The CAG report also revealed that not all technologies developed by DRDO were suitable for use by the armed forces. The three services have rejected 70 per cent of the products developed at the Armament Research and Development Establishment (ARDE), Pune, in the last 15 years costing Rs 320 crore because the products did not meet their standard and requirement. The CAG report stated that in order to form a fair and balanced view of the success of the projects undertaken by drdo, 46 completed and nine ongoing projects worth Rs 387.35 crore were scrutinised in February 2011. Of the 46 completed and closed projects, only 13 closed projects, wrapped up at a cost of Rs 68 crore, underwent production. "Without close synergy between the users and the technology development agency, much of the development efforts would go in vain, as the success rate of projects in ARDE amply demonstrates," the report said.

The army is not impressed by DRDO's performance either. Says Major-General S.V. Thapliyal, a former deputy director-general for perspective planning at army headquarters in Delhi, "DRDO promises to manufacture. It nixes our plans to acquire from abroad. It does not meet the deadline. Worse, it does not maintain quality either. The soldier, the end user, is the worst sufferer.''
General V.P. Malik, who was chief of army staff during the Kargil War, has an interesting incident to narrate in his book Kargil From Surprise to Victory. In 1997, the army finalised plans to acquire the AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder radars from the US. Prices were negotiated and just before purchase, drdo offered to manufacture them at half the price and within two years. The government shot down the army's plans to buy these radars. In 1999, during the Kargil War, the radars were desperately needed. Neither had DRDO manufactured them nor could they be procured from the US (post-1998 Pokhran tests there was an arms embargo). Several lives were lost in Pakistani shelling. When Indo-US relations improved, India did buy these radars in 2003, but at almost twice the initial price. "The problem with drdo is that it is big on promise and small on delivery. There is no accountability in the system," says Malik.

DRDO continues to mislead. On April 4, it claimed it had achieved a major milestone on an "indigenous" programme to develop a sophisticated radar to monitor the Indian airspace. The aircraft on which the radar is mounted-a modified Embraer EMB 1451-is imported from Brazil. drdo had to resort to the Embraer aircraft because its own efforts at producing an indigenous carrier had ended in disaster. Project Guardian Airawat was stalled in 1999 when its HS-748 turboprop aircraft crashed, killing eight crew members-engineers, scientists and Indian Air Force (IAF) officers-on board.

Under a Rs 1,050 crore agreement, Brazil's Embraer will now act as the overall systems integrator for the "indigenous" project, supplying the three jets, mounting the radar and electronics onto the plane's fuselage and ensuring that the altered jets retain acceptable flight performance.

According to its original 2004 timeline, this project was to be completed by 2011. Now the delivery of the remaining two modified Embraer aircraft is only expected by mid-2013. The project will not be complete until 2014. Even then there are serious flaws in the project. IAF has pointed out that the Embraer EMB 1451 cannot fly above 40,000 ft and therefore is only of limited use in surveillance. "DRDO has a history of claiming foreign designs as its own, like the Arjun tank which is a derivative of the German Leopard," says a source in the agency.

The technology development agency is also largely responsible for the fact highlighted by General V.K. Singh that 97 per cent of the army's air defence is obsolete. The CAG report lists seven requirements of the army for air defence guns and the project status report. CAG notes the end result: "Even though three R&D projects and one staff project were undertaken, the air defence gun system could not be developed by DRDO to satisfy the frequently revised requirement of the user.''

Army air defence sources say DRDO is tinkering with World War II equipment instead of working on cutting-edge technology. "The chief downplayed the state of affairs. It is in dire straits,'' says a top-ranking air defence officer.
"The air defence is in a very sorry condition," says Air Marshal A.K. Singh, former air officer commanding-in-chief, Western Air Command. "DRDO is not able to service the equipment. Even if systems are acquired from abroad and DRDO or Hindustan Aeronautics Limited is meant to service it, it fails. This leaves critical gaps in national defence,'' he says.

The Government had constituted a committee for the first-ever external review of the agency in February 2007. The committee chaired by P. Rama Rao, ex'secretary, Department of Science and Technology and former director, Defence Metallurgical Research Laboratory, Hyderabad, suggested that DRDO be restructured to make it a leaner organisation. It also recommended the setting up of a commercial arm of the organisation to make it a profitable entity, besides cutting back on delays in completing projects. "Delivery delayed is delivery denied," said Defence Minister A.K. Antony on delays in DRDO projects. But little progress has been made in the last five years on implementing the committee's suggestions.

DRDO chief V.K. Saraswat is eager to put his house in order. He has called for the setting up of a Defence Technology Commission as well as a bigger role for DRDO in picking production partners for products developed by the agency. Instead of the current practice of the Ministry of Defence arbitrarily nominating a defence public sector undertaking or an ordnance factory to build the product, usually when development is almost complete, DRDO would be able to select a capable partner company from the outset, from the private sector if necessary.
The defence organisation, which has an annual budget of over Rs 10,000 crore, now has no choice but to reinvent itself. The agency's research has drifted away from its core competence in recent times. It has been accused of "wasting time and precious resources'' being engaged in research and development of technique for detection of pesticides in fruits, technology for dengue control, dental implants, foldable stretchers and berry juice.


The moribund agency is also suffering from employee attrition. Over the past five years, while the report of the Rama Rao Committee has languished, around 1,700 of its 7,900 engineers and scientists have left for better opportunities in private companies. The depletion of talent will be the last stage in what cynical insiders say is the process of converting DRDO into a dodo.
Long delays, cost escalation damage DRDO's reputation : Special Report - India Today

 

[Shinigami]

just imagine the kind of work he had to do to get these articles.
i have always said that pakistanis were an insecure bunch.

 

[Maarkhoor]

The "Failure" That is DRDO
It’s official. The DRDO is a DODO. The Arjun tank is a no-show. The Tejas Light Combat Aircraft still is nowhere near completion in spite of being in development since 1983. The Prithvi missile is already obsolete. The Agni-III fell into the sea during its very first test. The air-force wouldn’t touch the Akash with a ten foot pole. India would certainly be better off without the DRDO, which has done nothing except consume ridiculous amounts of money with no positive output. At least this is what the Indian English-language media would have you believe. I am, of course, referring to the Indian Express’ eight-part exposé on the DRDO, which is one of the most stunning examples of journalistic crap I’ve seen coming from the Indian media in a long time. As if obfuscation and baseless comparisons weren’t enough, the Express has resorted to printing outright lies under the garb of investigative journalism. Because of lack of time and space, I’ve trashed only three of these articles in this post.

1) 6,000 cr wasted, 10-yr delay & they want 150,000 cr more

Quite unsurprisingly, the first article of the series is the standard anti-DRDO rant. It seems to me that the Indian Express has a bone to pick with the DRDO. They have apparently missed the plethora of projects that the DRDO has successfully delivered. The Agni Missiles, the Akash SAM's 3D Central Acquisition Radar, the Rajendra Radar (shown right), the Battlefield Surveillance Radar, the MiG-27 and Jaguar upgrades and the Samyukta and Sangraha Electronic Warfare systems are just a few examples of the DRDO's successful endeavours. This article only focuses on the negative aspects of the LCA and the Arjun.


Moeover, the way Amitav Ranjan and Shiv Aroor have compared the DRDO to its Chinese counterparts just goes to show how little they know about defence research in India. It is not the DRDO’s fault that the government doesn’t pour millions of dollars into defence research, as the Chinese do. It is not the DRDO’s fault that the Air Force and Army want world-class products that are also inexpensive and able to keep up with their whimsical requirements.


2) Armed Forces wait as showpiece missiles are unguided, way off mark
Ranjan and Aroor claim that “former deputy director of the Prithvi project and now DRDO’s chief controller of missiles and strategic systems Dr. V. K. Saraswat’s report RCI/PGT/PGM/1 admits: “Accuracy of missiles like Prithvi is acceptable in surface-to-surface theatre role, but precision strike without collateral damage is not possible with this system.”” I simply cannot bring myself to believe that someone of Dr. Saraswat’s stature could make such a childish statement. Ballistic missiles aren’t designed for precision strike. Their precision is measured in terms of the Circular Error Probable (CEP), which is defined as the radius of a circle into which a missile will land at least half the time. And the CEP of the Prithvi-I (10-75 metres) and Prithvi-II are comparable to similar missiles. The job of precision strike is better left to the precision guided munitions fielded by the Air Force and cruise missiles.

Also notice the way they imply that the Agni-III is a failure, because it “plunged into the sea after just five minutes of flight in July”. What they don’t mention is that such high-tech missiles do fail on their first test flights, as the American MX-774, or Russia’s latestBulava SLBM did. That is certainly not a reason to just give up on their development, because, last I knew, no country was ready to violate the Missile Technology Control Regime to provide India with a long-range ballistic missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

Another ridiculous claim by the two journalists is about how “an exasperated IAF, which calls Phase-I user trials (of the Akash SAM) unsatisfactory, has decided to buy Israeli Spyder missile systems instead”. This, when it is known that the short-ranged Spyder is supposed to make up for the lack of the Trishul.

But this one takes the cake: “Saraswat’s report calls for integrating Nag’s seeker with Prithvi to make the latter a precision-guided munition (PGM) but that hasn’t worked either”. Anyone with basic knowledge of missile guidance would know that simply bolting an IIR seeker of an anti-tank missile onto a hulking big ballistic missile which flies many times faster and wishing it would turn it into a fantabulously cool PGM is nothing short of stupid.




3) Arjun, Main Battle Tanked
This article is a perfect example of how, through selective reporting and obfuscation, one can trash a perfectly fine product, and make it look inferior to what can be bought in the Chor Bazaar for half the price. The two “journalists”, while glibly proclaiming how “the T-90, a far superior tank, can kill the Arjun”don’t elaborate on exactly how they arrived at this conclusion.I suppose they have access to the results of Arjun v/s T-90 tests in different scenarios, because, as a professional journalist, I would have balked at making such apparently baseless statements without solid proof. But then again, this is the Indian media we are talking about. They claim that the Arjun weighs much more than the T-90 without attempting to explain where all the extra weight comes from. My logic tells me that the Arjun has heavier and superior armour. So do manyreputed publications. Maybe the American M1A1, the German Leopard-II, and the British Challenger-II are horrible tanks too. In fact, they are even heavier than the Arjun! But the Pakistani Al-Khalid, being the lighter tank, is obviously superior! Going by that logic, the answer to our troubles lies in (hold your breath) the venerable Maruti-800! It has everything the DDM claims the Arjun lacks. It is cheap, mobile, light, air-conditioned, and nimbler than the vaunted T-90. Plus, with our present railway infrastructure we can easily carry it to border areas. Sure, the Arjun trounces the Maruti-800 (and the T-90) when it comes to sheer firepower, armour, crew protection, crew comfort, and electronics. But since when have these things been important?
The Express also makes a big fuss about how the temperature inside the Arjun reaches an “abnormal” 55 degrees. But it fails to mention the reason why this happens. After all, the DRDO had offered an air-conditioned Arjun to the Army, but the latter rejected the idea. So, is the temperature problem the fault of the Army or the DRDO? And the T-90 has faced problems with high interior temperatures too - its thermal imagers packed up in the blistering heat of the Thar. It was unable to fire theReflecks missile until quite recently. The engine had its own problems. So why was it accepted with such alacrity? Why was it not subject to rigorous testing the way the Arjun was? Why was the Arjun supposed to be a tank that was heavily armoured, comfortable, fast, small, light, and cheap at the same time? Why was it subjected to continuously changing goalposts? Why does everyone seem to suffer from memory loss when one mentions how the initial requirements, which called for a relatively simple 40-ton tank to replace the Vijayanta, were changed when Pakistan decided to acquire the formidable M1A1 Abrams? Maybe Ranjan and Aroor, in their infinite wisdom, would like to tell us how the DRDO (or anyone else for that matter) can design such a tank in a short span of time.


Generally speaking, the writers seem to have spent all their time coming up with creative titles for each part of the series, rather than doing what they are paid to do – report the facts as they are. Adding insult to injury is the fact the Indian Express has spoken of DRDO's apparently non-existent accountablity, while they themselves are accountable to no one. The DRDO will not sue them for libel. The goverment will make a few noises about how things have to be improved. The educated public, which knows squat about defence, will feel proud of our “free” and “empowered” media, which in reality, thrives on lies, half-truths, and sensationalism. All of which reminds me of the Michael Jackson number, “Tabloid Junkie”


It’s slander
You say it's not a sword
But with your pen you torture men
You'd crucify the Lord


MiG Alley: The "Failure" That is DRDO

 

[FULL_METAL]

DRDO needs one or two djinns it its R&D Labs to make things right

 

[Maarkhoor]

Interceptor missile tested 7 times, DRDO’s Rajinikanth moment still far
The system would be able to tackle incoming ballistic missiles of range up to 2,000 km.

The proposed Ballistic Missile Defence system is supposed to blow enemy n-missiles out of the sky as they fly towards Delhi. But last month’s test failed, and many questions remain unanswered. DRDO’s promises and seven tests notwithstanding, the plan to put a nuclear missile defence shield over Delhi remains a work in progress. The unsuccessful test of an interceptor missile last month swung the spotlight back on the proposed Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. Think of Rajinikanth firing a bullet to destroy the bullet fired by the villain in mid-air. That’s what a BMD system does: it provides a city with a protective shield where an incoming enemy ballistic missile is shot down by interceptor missiles.
Besides the interceptors, a BMD consists of radars — satellite-, ground-, and sea-based — to detect and track a missile and its warhead, data communication links to pass on the information, and a command and control system. DRDO first spoke of a BMD system in December 2007. All building blocks for Phase 1 of a two-layered, fully integrated system were to be in place by 2010. In March 2010, Dr V K Saraswat of DRDO promised initial systems deployment by 2013.
On May 7, 2012, DRDO declared it had developed a Missile Defence Shield that could be put in place at short notice at two selected locations in the country, presumably Delhi and Mumbai. The system would be able to tackle incoming ballistic missiles of range up to 2,000 km. DRDO also said that long-range tracking radars, real-time data-link and mission control systems needed for the perationalisation of the BMD had been “realised”. The fact is the BMD system is at the moment not even close to being put into operation. Last month’s unsuccessful test at the Chandipur range was the seventh time the BMD interceptor missile has been tested. It was its second failed test, although the first failure was not of an interceptor, but due to a faulty target missile. Washington-based emerging and space technologies expert Dr Bharath Gopalaswamy said, “Interceptor technologies are test-intensive and never foolproof. We have to wait until DRDO releases the data for these tests — which I suspect they never will — but for the moment, I would contextualise this as part of a routine test phase.” A senior DRDO official told The Indian Express that they hoped to conduct another test within a couple of months. “It is part of the development process. This was the first time we launched the interceptor missile from a canister. The target was also a more difficult one than the simulated Prithvi missiles used earlier,” the DRDO official said. According to Gopalaswamy, this is something to be expected with hit-to-kill technologies. “Dr Saraswat (former DRDO chief) declared missile defence capabilities as operational but the failure in such tests exposes the vulnerabilities in the system,” he said. MILES TO GO According to Air Marshal (retd) M Matheswaran, “a development trial by DRDO will not result in an operational system so soon. We can only expect to get a technology demonstrator at the end of the ongoing tests. Even the US took three decades to produce a BMD system. A fully mature BMD system is at least a decade away. The political leadership must be made aware of this reality”. The BMD system was proposed to India’s political leadership by Dr APJ Abdul Kalam in the mid-1990s, a former cabinet secretary told The Indian Express. It was triggered by Pakistan’s acquisition of M-11 missiles from China. The proposal was to provide cover for Delhi, Mumbai and two other strategically important sites. DRDO is believed to have started work on the programme in 1999. The armed forces were brought into the loop only a decade later, a senior Indian Air Force officer told The Indian Express. A BMD system cannot be operated in isolation; it has to be networked with existing IAF sensors for better situational awareness to avoid friendly fire, or shooting down of own aircraft or missiles. IAF already has a fully integrated air defence system, and the complexities of deployment will have to be resolved as and when the BMD is put into operation. “There is no direct involvement of the armed forces in its development even now. The IAF, which is the end user, must be closely involved,” Matheswaran said. DO WE NEED IT? Many experts argue that the BMD can take on only a limited number of incoming missiles, and will invite saturation salvos from the enemy. Western non-proliferation activists have said India’s BMD will encourage Pakistan to expand its nuclear arsenal to fire multiple missiles. Bharat Karnad of the Centre for Policy Research said BMD was a “hit-and-miss” system whose reliability has been questioned by various US studies. Last year, the US General Accountability Office questioned the reliability and efficacy of the Pentagon’s Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) programme, a system similar to India’s BMD. The Pentagon accepted that the GMD system provides “a limited capability against a simple threat”. Senator Tom Coburn’s report last year estimated the GMD system’s success rate at 30 per cent. DRDO has, on the other hand, promised 99.8 per cent reliability for its BMD system. Unlike the GMD, BMD does not have early warning radars or satellite tracking of an enemy missile. The delayed detection capability reduces the time available for interception of, say, a Pakistani missile to around five minutes. Also, the BMD system can only intercept missiles launched from 900-1,000 km away; the Chinese Dong Feng-21 ballistic missile with a range of 1,700-2,000 km cannot be intercepted. The BMD is expensive. Ballpark estimates for defending one Indian city vary from Rs 1 lakh crore to Rs 2.5 lakh crore. At the higher range, it is more than India’s annual defence budget. The US continental system is estimated to have cost more than $ 100 billion so far, the GMD system $ 41 billion. “A system that doesn’t work, costs a lot, and can’t handle multiple attacks will breed a false sense of security and compound our problems. All this talk of deployability of a BMD is premature. What we need at best is a technology demonstrator,” Karnad said. “We have no expert committee like the US JASON to validate projects like the BMD. India has scarce resources. To use them judiciously, a high-level technical committee should validate all strategic projects proposed by DRDO or the armed forces,” he said. Whatever the case, India’s ‘Rajinikanth’ gun can’t fire yet. As the Americans like to say, “The real problem with ballistic missile defence is that it is rocket science.”
Interceptor missile tested 7 times, DRDO’s Rajinikanth moment still far | The Indian Express