Documentary on Indian Navy's Killer Squadron that lit up Karachi in '71

[Shinigami]

Anything concrete to prove it?? Must say a revelation of its kind if true...

Has it occurred to you.. that the source you quote is fairly biased and fictional in its premise.
And that they COULD NOT know more than me... having a grandfather in the top echelon of the PN during 71?

i'm sure your granpa is a good man, but what he heard was probably just a rumor. do u really think any naval chief is incompetent and crazy enough to say "what a bonfire" in the middle of an attack? that behavior is beyond fiction. how would such a crackpot reach all the way to the top?

This behaviour on the other hand is realistic and normal.
See how desperate he was after being attacked? that is NORMAL human behavior.

Immediately after the attack, when it was calculated that the retreating missile boats would take around 6 hours to reach their nearest sanctuary, the PAF commanding officer was approached to order an attack them. However, no air strike could be made available and the PAF in Karachi did not react to the Navy's request. Therefore, the C-in-C of the Pakistani navy rang up the C-in-C PAF at 0400 hours and woke him up. After all sorts of begging and pleading, the answer he obtained was "Well old boy, this happens in war. I am sorry your ships have been sunk. We shall try to do something in the future!”.

In your case, i think u would (due to a bias i observed in almost all pakistanis) rather demonize the PN chief than the PAF chief and organization, who and which in fact is as much to blame for the 71 fiasco, as well as the PA. if u want i could point the mistakes carried out by each of the three organizations during the time.

 

[SQ8]

i'm sure your granpa is a good man, but what he heard was probably just a rumor. do u really think any naval chief is incompetent and crazy enough to say "what a bonfire" in the middle of an attack? that behavior is beyond fiction. how would such a crackpot reach all the way to the top?

This behaviour on the other hand is realistic and normal.
See how desperate he was after being attacked? that is NORMAL human behavior.



In your case, i think u would (due to a bias i observed in almost all pakistanis) rather demonize the PN chief than the PAF chief and organization, who and which in fact is as much to blame for the 71 fiasco, as well as the PA. if u want i could point the mistakes carried out by each of the three organizations during the time.

You dont have rumors when your coursemates are admirals then.
Realistic is what writers make it out to be.

 

[SQ8]

To confirm my account again.. I spoke to two different officers who were part of the senior leadership.
The PN chief at the time Adm Muzaffar hasan was not the one to make the statement on bonfires..
it was a rear adm whose charge shall not be named.
Adm Muzaffar Hasan was involved in another scandal after he had gone to rest after being up for a while.
To his bad luck there were people asking for him at that very time and after finding him sleeping raised hue and cry about the Chief taking a nap while Karachi was burning.
Interestingly.. there were the usual racial slurs heard as well..

The PAF chief did not use the purported "old boy" phrase given.. and had rather said in a curt way on what the PAF's limitations were and how it cannot prevent the navy from taking losses.
This has been confirmed by two senior PAF officers and those previously mentioned from the PN as well.

 

[Capt.Popeye]

To confirm my account again.. I spoke to two different officers who were part of the senior leadership.
The PN chief at the time Adm Muzaffar hasan was not the one to make the statement on bonfires..
it was a rear adm whose charge shall not be named.
Adm Muzaffar Hasan was involved in another scandal after he had gone to rest after being up for a while.
To his bad luck there were people asking for him at that very time and after finding him sleeping raised hue and cry about the Chief taking a nap while Karachi was burning.
Interestingly.. there were the usual racial slurs heard as well..

The PAF chief did not use the purported "old boy" phrase given.. and had rather said in a curt way on what the PAF's limitations were and how it cannot prevent the navy from taking losses.
This has been confirmed by two senior PAF officers and those previously mentioned from the PN as well.

I really can't vouch for who said what to whom on that fateful evening. But some facts need to be set straight. In the scheme of things then prevailing; the PA and PAF hogged all the importance at that time. The PA because it was probably ordained so on the "Day of Creation"! And the PAF (somewhat grudgingly) because it had some role in pulling the PA's chestnuts out of the fire in the past. So where did the PN count for anything at all? Nobody, but nobody could be bothered with the PN and its fate. If the PN Commander supposedly said what he did about the "bonfire" etc. I would'nt hold that against him too much, he did'nt have too much of a fleet to start with, just some super-annuated rust buckets to pass of as a fleet. Which operated out of a single port that had a single narrow entrance. And was there even a plan that either he or the Higher Command had set out for that fleet to execute? Santro, may be you can throw some light on that aspect too.He must have been extremely frustrated.

On the other side, things were not radically different until that operation was mounted. The IN was also severely constrained by a total lack of higher strategic (read political, in the Indian system) direction. In the 1965 operations, the IN was prohibited from even operating beyond a certain geographical limit! After that conflict the Indian Defence establishment suddenly woke up to the fact that they posessed a Navy! And that they needed that Navy to protect and preserve SLOC, which was crucial to prosecute any meaningful war effort. So some attention was given to the Navy operational tasks. But they were solely directed to keeping the SLOC open and resupply maintained, while denying the same to the adversary. That was as far as it went.

The then CNS Adm. S.M.Nanda is quoted as saying that in any high-level discussion with the Cabinet (at that time), the COAS and CAS were invariably asked for there appreciations, then (probably as an after-thought) he used to be asked if he had anything to add. And he always said that he had nothing to add.
Till the time that hostilities became imminent. That is when he asked the PM if he could embark on an offensive task in the Western Theater. She thought a while and replied that he could in case of a war. So the plan was worked on by him with his DNO and DNI which in short became OP Trident and OP Python. But there were not too many takers for it, outside or within the Navy; to start with. But that is another story.

So there was quite a "bit behind the scenes" of that audacious attack that left part of Karachi burning. Our esteemed member Niaz was (as I understand) another eye-witness to that night and its aftermath.