Your excuse doesn't fly - merely painting his comments as 'showmanship' does not invalidate them.
That was neither an excuse, nor was my attempt to deny anything. Had it been so, I wouldn’t have cared to present my opinion based on his quotes. However I will grant you your excitement.
Read Manekshaw's comments more carefully - the meeting was in mid-end April, and he refers to IG's plans to incite a revolt in East Pakistan as having succeeded, which places Indian covert intervention in East Pakistan far earlier than April (which was also substantiated in the links I provided in the last thread).
And what exactly was India intending to do to get 'Pakistan at the table'? It was none of your business to be at the table, and it is the height of dis-ingenuity to suggest that supporting terrorists and separatists in a region where Pakistan was having internal political issues, to exacerbate them, was somehow 'helpful' to the resolution of the issue.
If India did indeed want the political issues to be resolved in EP and have YK 'come to the table', then increasing the instability in EP to achieve stability is a nonsensical argument.
I am not sure what constitutes ‘mid-end April’, but 29th surely constitutes end of April. It was on 29th April, that Ms Gandhi had invited Gen. Makenshaw at the cabinet meeting. Anyway, it wouldn’t have been possible to ‘incite revolt’ in East Pakistan, by means indicated by Makenshaw, before mid April, even if she tried. It was on 17th April, 1971 a Bangladesh government in exile was established in India with imprisoned Sk Mujib as president, Sayed Nazrul Islam as vice-president, Tajuddin Ahmed as prime minister and A.G.Osmani as the commander of Mukti Bahini. A.G.Osmani was a retired colonel of Pakistani army. 17th April, 1971, is more or less assumed to be the date when Mukti Bahini (then it was called Mukti Fauj) came into existence, although, please note, at that time, anybody who fought against the Pak army was considered to be Mukti Bahini. Indeed resistance was carried on by defectors of EBR and EPR, most of who were armed. Of 17,000 defectors, roughly about 4,000 were disarmed. These defectors took refuge in India sometime in early April and it was they who formed the core of Mukti Bahini. (From Niazi’s,
Betrayal of East Pakistan) However, it was under Col. Osmani, that the training of refugees commenced. And by all indication, the first batch of guerillas was not pushed into East Pakistan before end of April. This is supported by US govt. documents and plenty of independent historians and memoirs of the key players. Even Gen. Manekshaw’s comment don’t contradict this time line, given that his conversation was at the end of April – to be precise on 29th April, 1971.
And yes, it was our business to get that nincompoop to the table, because it was his bright ideas that kept pushing the refugees into our border. He had already imprisoned Sk Mujib on 27th March on charges of ‘treason’ and wouldn’t set him free, while the key to the solution was setting him free and negotiating with him. After the first couple of weeks since 25th March, he had full control of Dhaka and the cantonments, although the rural Bengal still eluded him. US documents prove that, although it was not exactly a cake walk for the Pak army, they weren’t seriously challenged. In spite of that, he embarked upon systematic cleansing of the intelligentsia and particularly the Hindus. The famous Blood telegram, was dated 6th April, where Pak military’s crackdown was termed as ‘genocide’. An article in Times, noted on, as late as 2nd August that:
The Hindus, who account for three-fourths of the refugees and a majority of the dead, have borne the brunt of the Moslem military's hatred. Even now, Moslem soldiers in East Pakistan will snatch away a man's lungi (sarong) to see if he is circumcised, obligatory for Moslem.s; if he is not, it usually means death. Others are simply rounded up and shot. Commented one high U.S. official last week: "It is the most incredible, calculated thing since the days of the Nazis in Poland."
[Why is the plural of 'Moslem' censored here?]This part of the crack down had nothing to do with suppressing the armed rebels. It was simply ethnic cleansing based on religion. The only way he could be brought to the table, it was believed, was only if he could be convinced that military brutality would be resisted by the Bengalis at all cost, creating a prolonged quagmire, resulting in drain of resources. There was also a growing concern that Sk Mujib would be either hanged or shot dead, if Yahya was not quickly brought to the table. Hence the strategy of training the refugees to knock some sense into Yahya’s thick skull. You will find it hard to believe, but during the early days of the crackdown, till May at least, India operated on the misconception that the ‘British had negotiated with Gandhi, Yahya too will eventually negotiate with Mujib’ (From
Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh, by Sisson & Rose). The whole strategy revolved around getting Yahya to negotiate with Mujib.
It was not a war plan, but Manekshaw clearly indicates that the decision to go to war was conveyed to him them, and that his opposition (or Gen. Jacob's), is what prevented IG from launching war then - the preparations for war, once the decision had been made in accordance with Manekshaw's timetable, obviously took longer. But the decision was taken too early to give any credence to your argument that 'India tried to engage with Pakistan'.
Her own Army Chief confirmed it - his comments about the state of the IA and its available resources at that moment indicate that the Indian government may not have had much idea about the readiness of the IA in launching a war at that moment.
Gen. Manekshaw’s claim was on 29th April. I had said earlier said that Ms Gandhi had started thinking in terms of military solution from early May. I had based my assessment on a communique between the Mr Kaul, Foreign Secretary of India, and Mr Stone, on 7th May, where, Mr Kaul had indicated that if Yahya didn’t immediately take steps to stop this flow of refugees, which by that time had swelled to close to 2 million, and create an atmosphere to take back the ones that were already there, then India might attempt to seize some land and resettle the refugees. This was what Dr Kissinger had referred to as ‘Isreali type’ offensive in his memoirs and I guess, I have quoted the same, somewhere. This in my mind was the first indication that perhaps Ms Gandhi was thinking in terms of military.
However, I couldn’t help but note, that she was already aware of the fact that IA was in no way prepared for any offensive at that time – given that Gen. Manekshaw had already briefed her on IA’s preparedness only a few days earlier on 29th April. In other words, IA’s disposition was irrelevant to her, in her decision making. She was merely pressurizing US with threats of military intervention, so that US in turn would pressurize Yahya to yield.
The idea that Manekshaw’s spiel had prevented war in April is absolute bull. Ms Gandhi may not be a military general, but she understood international politics better than Gen. Manekshaw, Jacob and her entire cabinet combined. I have already explained that military intervention in April would have been a diplomatic suicide and until Indo-Soviet treaty in August, it was impossible for Ms Gandhi to actually start a war.
In your attempt to prove that since the decision to go to war was taken ‘too early’, India couldn’t have ‘engaged with Pakistan’, your are forgetting that decision to go to war is not same as going to war. Whether or not the decision to go to war was taken in April, the war itself was not started until the last week of Nov. Even drawing of war plans do not mean war itself. Yahya had 7 months from then to do two simple things – release Sk Mujibar Rehman and stop the 'genocide'. That would have put Ms Gandhi in a very sore position. And all the war plans would have had come to naught. There were numerous back channel meetings between Pakistan on one side and India & Bangladesh govt in exile on another with US as middleman. All of these failed primarily because of Yahya’s refusal to release Sk Mujibar Rehman and his inability to provide anything concrete to assuage India that the refugees would be taken back.
That is again a disingenuous argument.
1. It has been shown conclusively that India was covertly involved in stoking rebellion in EP before 1971, and from Manekshaw's comments, involved before April. The refugee crises was not at the high levels we saw later at that stage -so what does India do if it truly was concerned about the refugees and cost of helping them? It trains, equips and launches thousands of them into EP to further destabilize the situation and cause more refugees and incur a greater cost, while also simultaneously preparing for a war that would incur an even larger cost. Sell this nonsensical argument to someone else.
If India was interested in stabilizing EP and helping achieve a political solution, supporting and sending in terrorists was not the way to go.
In case you have not noticed, we have been successfully selling this ‘nonsensical argument’ to everyone else. The cost of war was estimated to be far less than the cost of assimilating 10 million refugees, which was what the numbers were when India eventually crossed the border. I have already explained above what the strategy was for training the rebels.
The outcome of the War was not a given in April of 1971 when Manekshaw had that conversation with her. Nor do Gen. Jacob's comments in his interview posted in the last thread indicate that Manekshaw was convinced that the war would end before a ceasefire would take effect. No one could have anticipated Gen. Niazi surrendering 30,000 troops to Gen. Jacob's bluff, with only 3000 troops opposing him. And Gen. Jacob's plan to bypass the various towns on the way to Dhaka, instead of securing them and controlling them, was apparently not part of the operational plans either.
IG was a civilian leader, not a military general in charge of the military operation - all this talk of 'until she was dead sure' is nothing bu hot air - not even the IA General's were dead sure, and it took an inspirational bit of initiative by Gen. Jacob's, a lot of luck, and Niazi's cowardice to take EP. Otherwise the fighting might have still been ongoing when a UN sponsored ceasefire might have taken effect.
You are using the assessment made in April to determine the ground situation in late November, when the war was actually started. If this is your idea of jest, then I am not amused. It was because of unpreparedness of the army, lack of diplomatic support, uncertainty about how the general population in East Pakistan would react to the presence of Indian army on their soil, and an expectation that political solution would be finally reached, that Ms Gandhi didn’t take any decision to wage war, as early as April. By November the situation had spun right on its head to India’s advantage. Treaty with Russia, in August, ensured China wouldn’t be too much interested, and in case Pakistan moved to UN, the required veto was ensured. The world opinion, even in US, although not of Nixon and Kissinger, was in India’s favour. By November, Pakistan’s diplomatic isolation was complete. Militarily, India was in far more stronger position than it was in April. In April, there was no armor around the East Pakistan border. By Nov, Navy was in position, air force was in position, and Mukti Bahini, had successfully blown out important bridges, which ensured that PA won’t be reinforcing in a hurry. There was one more factor which you haven’t considered. Pakistan military operated on the bizarre philosophy of ‘defense of East lies in West’. This meant, the proper defensive strategy in the East was not well formulated, which actually made IA’s planning and operation far easier. November meant that the rainy season was over and IA wouldn’t be bogged down by waterlogged fields or swelling rivers. Also, November ensured that there would be enough snow in the north to hold the Chinese back, in case they still felt adventurous. As reported by Hamoodur Rahman Commission:
This was a war in which everything went wrong for the Pakistan Armed Forces. They were not only out-manned but also out-gunned and out-Generaled. Our planning was unrealistic, strategy unsuited, decisions untimely and execution faulty
The result, in the east, was a given in November, not in April. In the west, however, India was a bit apprehensive and that’s why immediately after the surrender of the east, IA hurriedly started moving to the west.
Had India played no role in the destabilizing EP, your analogy might fit. India herself helped the situation in EP cross the threshold by sending in terrorists and rebels and through her covert intervention, so 'crossing the threshold' was a self-fulfilling prophecy.
What prevented Yahya from stopping his ‘genocide’ and negotiating with Mujib.
Oh I agree that the PA would have controlled the insurgency, I just disagree that the all of the rebels sent in were villagers handed a gun and told to trot off into EP to go fight the PA. I am sure some were just that, but the IA is a professional institution, it knew the virtues of having proper training camps and training, at least for some of the cadres - and all of that takes time and money.
You can disagree. That is not my problem.
By the end of June some thirty thousand Mukti Bahini recruits had been trained, although in a rather slipshod manner. […] According to both Pakistani and Indian sources, the weapons made available to the Mukti Bahini by India were limited and largely obsolete. Modern weapons became available when the Mukti Bahini could purchase them on the international and West Bengali arms markets.
Pakistan, India, and the creation of Bangladesh, by Sisson & Rose
Another source of modern weapons was those seized from Pak army. There is no doubt, some were properly trained. So far as I know, some were taken to Cochin, in Southern India to be trained as frogmen. Some were also taken to Derha Dun, at IMA, to be trained as officers. But they were few and far between. Enough spoon feeding.
How could it be political when you yourself acknowledge that the PA was on its way to controlling the insurgency? That would imply that it was Indian military intervention that tipped the scales, hence a military defeat. Had India not intervened covertly and overtly, Pakistan may have resolved the political situation over time, as have other nations.
The Bengali nationalism during 1971 had two aspects – first political and later military. The military solution was the suppression of armed rebellion, while the political solution, the real solution, was addressing the Bengali grievances. Yahya succeeded in quelling the armed rebellion to a large extent, but failed to provide any political solution. That was because, he believed, just as you seem to believe, that Bengali nationalism was more of a military situation rather than political one and hence military victory will automatically resolve the political situation. That these were two entirely separate issues, and if anything the military situation arose from the failure of addressing the Bengali grievances through a political dialogue, was completely misconstrued. As early as 1969, the British ambassador in East Pakistan predicted the break up of East Pakistan, primarily because of this thought process that started to be reflected in Yhaya’s running of affairs. (From
Pakistan – Eye of the storm by O.B.Jones)
Alienation of the Bengalis through various fateful policies, and finally the rejection of plebiscite, followed by brutal crackdown and the heavy handedness in dealing with the situation, ensured that 70 million Bengalis turned completely against Pakistan. Bengali employees, including high ranking officials in Pak govt, as also the Bengalis in Pak army, were defecting en mass. Economy came to a complete standstill. The deep fissure between the West and the East, and the mistrust that resulted in the process, no matter how much Pakistan succeeded in suppression of armed rebellion could have never got back to the normalcy.
Military intervention by India only hurried the creation of Bangladesh, and nothing more. The inevitability of Bangladesh, that Yahya ensured through his brutality is what I meant by political defeat.
You are once again trying to justify the thief's actions by arguing that the man who was robbed was careless. Political solutions to complex long term issues do not have some sort of fixed time-table for resolution. By that yardstick India should have given up control of Punjab, and should now give up control of the Maoist infected states, Sri Lanka shoudl have given up control of the Tamil areas, Spain of the basque region etc.
The assessment was not mine. It was by Dr Kissinger and I have merely narrated it. I have never said that the political process had to be completed within that time frame of 9 months. I clearly mentioned that Yahya failed to ‘show a willingness’ towards providing a political solution. For example, releasing Sk Mujib and engaging in dialogue with him, or pausing his ‘ethnic cleasing’ and try to install a civil administration.
Btw, Punjab crisis was actually solved through dialogue and a democratic process. Regarding the Maoist infected states, there is a constant dialogue between the states and the Maoists. More importantly none of those had complete support of its constituents. Tamil problem in Sri Lanka also involved a minority section of the population, whereas, in East Pakistan during 1971, the entire population, except some pockets, were entirely against Pakistan. There are very few instances, when an entire community, almost in unison rose in revolt against its country. And almost none of those involved such deluge of refugees fleeing from their country of residence to the neighboring country.
These are not my strawmen, but those raised by Indians almost everywhere, as Halaku once more illustrated in his last post where he tries to provide a 'moral ' justification.
You should take it up with those Indians. If you are responding to my quotes, I would expect you to stick to what I am saying. Since I have never claimed ‘altruism’ or any sort of ‘moral’ justification, these are strawmen to me.
PS: My fingers hurt.
