Btw you have the imposingly scaring excess zero in tonnage making it only Alien mothership can match
Don't really think that China should ever go to the same path in terms of CV development and ownership, aside from the different needs [so have several CVs are great, but not excessively], what folks never look into seriously here is the COST FACTOR.
Not only the construction costs but also the operating incl. the maintenance costs of those 11 CVBG are killing [and what its impact on the real economy development], and well, China does not own such WRC "Printer", neither China has such "Petrodollar" regime to defend!
Unlike a decade or more ago, the CV nowadays are much more prone to its neutralizers [A2AD anyone], may be much less effective in adjacent waters in any real conflict among the major powers. Though they still look good in scaring and smacking the smaller nations with weak defense [cases of Iraq, Libya, etc] and of course, their sizes still naturally keep the charming appearances for most viewers
Following is an excerpt from the Type 055 DDG thread:
"
CHINA’S TYPE 055 DESTROYER: FROM BLUEPRINT TO REALITY" originally appeared at
southfront.org in February, 2017 as just posted by
@cirr today
"... The United States Navy has embarked upon a very different path, and is already paying a heavy price for deciding to not only field a number of totally new vessel designs, but at the same time abandoning proven technologies for unproven ones. The Freedom and Independence LCS programs, the first in class Gerald FordCVN, and the DDG-1000 Zumwalt destroyer project are all glaring examples. [LCS: Littoral Combat Ship]
Both class of LCS have experienced major engineering casualties since they were commissioned. Initial investigations have pointed to a combination of faulty engineering systems and inadequate engineering management processes. A major goal of the LCS program was to reduce vessel crews by automating as many processes as possible, and to gain flexibility through a modular design that allowed the platforms to be made mission specific by swapping warfare modules. For example, an LCS could be fitted with an ASW module to focus on anti-submarine duties one year, and then have the module removed and replaced with an AAW module the next, so that it could be shifted to air-defense duties as requirements changed. The benefits of this modularity have largely not been realized to date. For example, the LCS has failed to meet its intended ASW capabilities, even though the first vessels were commissioned in 2008 (Freedom LCS-1) and 2010 (Independence LCS-2).
The DDG-1000 Zumwalt was originally planned as the first of 32 vessels; however, the U.S. Navy later settled for only 3 vessels, as cost overruns and the failure of the design to meet mission requirements became evident. What resulted from the ambitious program are a $4 billion USD cost per vessel, advanced deck guns that are too expensive to use as intended (with an estimated cost per round of $800,000 USD), and an Advanced Induction Motor (AIM) propulsion system that left the Zumwalt dead in the water on its maiden trip through the Panama Canal on November 22, 2016. The DDG-1000 class are not Aegis vessels, have limited AAW capabilities due to their smaller missile payload, and lack any Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) capability. They cannot integrate and coordinate AAW or BMD defense like all other Aegis class vessels. This is a major weakness, compared to all other Arleigh Burke and Ticonderoga class surface combatants, that can work together seamlessly using shared Aegis-based systems.
The most expensive naval vessel ever constructed, the Gerald R. Ford CVN-78, has already cost U.S. tax payers a cool $13 billion USD, yet the Navy Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) has no idea when it will be able to officially take delivery of the vessel. Major defects in the main turbine generators (MITs), and an Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG) that has yet to be deemed operational, have only added costs to a program that has already experienced cost overruns approaching $3 billion USD. The adoption of multiple unproven technologies in the key areas of propulsion, and aircraft launch and recovery systems, was a foreseeable mistake..."
